

LOGIC AND EPISTEMOLOGY IN THERAVĀDA

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Ven. Hegoda Khemananda

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LOGIC AND EPISTEMOLOGY IN THERAVĀDA

(Theravāda Nyāya)

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DEDICATED

UPAHĀRO

To

**THE MOST VENERABLE SANGHARAJA
SOMDEJ PHRA NYAṆASAMVARA
(SUVADḌHANA MAHATHERO)**

*Thāisaṅgharājadhuradhāri Suvaddhano yo
Somtej phra ñāṇavuti theravaro hi tassa
Sammā mayā racita vaṇṇita Theravāda -
ññāyavha ganthamiha sādhu samappayāmi*

and to

**HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THAILAND
BHUMIBOL ADULYADEJ (RAMA IX)**

*Sotthyatthu te bhuvi suvissuta Bhūmipālā -
tulyādi tejavara saññita Thāirāja
Laikeya therā katasānisita Theravāda -
ññāyo mayā tava padīyati' dāni sammā*

To

**Students who are interested
in Theravāda Buddhism**

GUIDE TO THE PRONUNCIATION OF PĀLI LETTERS

VOWELS (8)

a, ā, i, ī, u, ū, e, o.

CONSONANTS (33)

K, Kh, g, gh, ṇ,

t, ṭh, ḍ, ḍh, ṇ,

P, ph, b, bh, m,

Sanskrit: gñ. (jn), ṣ, ś,

c, ch, j, jh, ñ,

t, th, d, dh, n,

y, r, l, v, s, h, ḷ, ṁ,

PRONUNCIATION

a as in shut

ā as in father

i as in pin

ī as in machine

u as in put

ū as in rule

e as in met

e as in great

o as in pot

o as in hope

c as in chair

g as in go

h as in hot

ṁ as in sing

ñ as in signor

y as in young

t as in Thing

ṭ as in cut

d as in that

ḍ as in did

The Aspirates of k g c j ṭ t ḍ d p b are written along with h;
n and ṇ and l and ḷ have no difference in pronunciation but may cause
a difference in meaning.

ABBREVIATION

A - Anguttara Nikāya

AA - Anguttara Nikāya Aṭṭhakathā

D - Dīghanikāya

DA - Dīgha Nikāya Aṭṭhakathā

J - Jātaka

Kh - Khuddaka Pāṭha

M - Majjhima Nikāya

MA - Majjhima Nikāya Aṭṭhakathā

Mm - Majjhima Nikāya majjhima

Paṇṇāsaka

Mu - Mijjhima Nikāya Mūla

Paṇṇāsaka

S - Saṅyutta nikāya

SA - Saṅyutta nikāya Aṭṭhakathā

Sn - Suttanipāta

U - Udāna

Vsm- Visuddhimagga

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SYNOPSIS (*Saṅkāsanā*)

Theravada Buddhism; Buddhist nyāya; northern Buddhist nyaya ; Theravāda nyāya treatises; doctrine of pramāṇa; pramāṇa in the Theravāda; the present work; chapter on arya knowledge; chapter on conventional knowledge; section on nyāya; language in nyāya; new Interest; misunderstandings.

AXIOMS

Chapter on noble knowledge (aryagnana); chapter on conventional knowledge; Inferential knowledge (anvaya gnāna); chapter on what is not perception (apratyaksha); Section on Method (nyāya); analysis of method

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matter; space Element matter; bodily expression matter; vocal expression element; lightness, plasticity and pliability; growth, contitution, decay and impermanence; thoughts and constituents of thought; a non-commentarial method concerning means; conclusion; comparison with other systems; non-conceptual and conceptual; Theravada method.

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FOREWORD

It is generally agreed by all students of Buddhism, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist, that Pāli Tripiṭaka contains the earliest strata of Buddhist literature. The internal evidence pertaining to history, philology and sociology of early India testify to this fact. The Mahāyāna represents a development in Buddhism subsequent to the early Pali tradition.

In my studies into the intellectual history of Buddhism, I found that the later Mahāyāna tradition had a highly advanced body of literature belonging to logic, methodology and epistemology which the Theravāda did not seem to have. As a result I gathered material pertaining to these areas in Theravāda Buddhism and published my findings in 1962 as *Theravāda Nyāya*. In the introductory essay of this publication I explained the reasons behind the project. The book was well received by the scholars in the country. It also received favorable reviews from news papers.

It was the impression of many who read the book that it deserved to be made accessible to a wider audience and hence should be translated into English. However, the idea was not materialized owing to so many reasons foremost among which was the difficulty to find a translator who is both competent in the subject matter and willing to undertake the job. Finally it is at the suggestion of Prof. Dr. Tilak Kariyavasam, head of the Department of Pali and Buddhist Studies, Kelaniya University, Sri Lanka that I invited Dr. Asanga Tilakaratne, Head of the Department of Buddhist thought, Postgraduate Institute of Pāli and Buddhist Studies, (Kelaniya University), to undertake this work. The present work is a result of this intellectual cooperation. I sincerely thank both Dr. Kariyavasam for his keen interest on this project and the translator for the work well done. I would express my gratitude to Professor Dr. Y. Karunadasa, Director of Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, (University of Kelaniya) for introducing the book in brief.

I would also like to acknowledge my gratitude to Professor Aggamahapandita Balangoda Anandamithreya Maha Nayaka Thero, Pandita Sastrapati (M.A.) Akuretiye Amaravansa Nāyaka Thero, the

Principal of Vidyodaya Pirivena, His Excellency Dr. Ānanda Guruge
Sri Lankan Ambassador to the USA, Professor Ediriveera Sarachchandra
and HON. W.J.M. Lokubandara, Minister of Education and Higher
Education in Sri Lanka who were among those who introduced the
original Sinhala work to the academic world. Finally a word of appre-
ciation for Karunaratne and Sons Ltd for their excellent printing work.

May all realize good “(*sabbe bhadraṇi passantu*)!”

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05.12.1993

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

'*Epistemology and Logic in Theravāda*' is the English translation of Ven. Hegoda Khemananda Nāyaka Thera's work *Theravāda Nyāya* which was originally written in Sinhala and published about 30 years ago. The work contains some very valuable original research into certain logical, epistemological and philosophical aspects of the Theravāda canon.

The author's use of the term *nyāya* goes well with the traditional use of the term in Indian epistemological studies in which the term did not mean exclusively logic in the modern sense but many other related areas of study, such as, philosophy, epistemology and methodology. In our translation we used 'method' for 'naya' which is the Pali equivalent of Sanskrit 'nyāya'. The latter term which has been used in Sanskrit philosophical literature in a much broader sense may more appropriately be translated as 'methodology' in the present context. Nevertheless, for the title of the work we have used 'epistemology and logic' in order to capture the richness of the material that has been dealt with.

The value of the venerable Thera's work lies not in giving the final word on the matters he discusses but in putting forth many exciting and challenging ideas which need to be examined carefully by serious students.

In translating Pali and Sanskrit technical terms into English we tried, as much as possible, to adopt the established terminology. We also tried to maintain the consistency in rendering terms throughout the work. Nevertheless, it seems that a term like '*pratyaksa*' - perception has been used in at least two senses in the original, namely, perception in ordinary philosophical and psychological sense and the specific Buddhist sense of the realization of truth.

I would like to record my indebtedness to Prof. Y. Karunadasa, Prof. Tilak Kariyavasam and Mr. Senarat Wijayasundara for illuminating discussions, Prof. W.S. Karunatilaka for his valuable help to find better renderings for some intricate semantical terms, and Mr. Sanat Nanayakkara for reading the original draft and making comments on both style and the content. My very sincere gratitude goes

to Mrs. Suvimali Karunaratne who in addition to kindly correcting proofs, made valuable suggestions on both style and the content which greatly enhanced the accuracy and the sharpness of the presentation.

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Sri Lanka.

COMMENTS BY SOME EMINENT SCHOLARS ON (THE SINHALA ORIGINAL OF) THIS WORK

I. Venerable Professor Aggamahā Pandita Balangoḍa Ānandamaithreya Nāyaka Thero of the Vidyodaya University of Jayawardhanapura:

We read with pleasure *Theravāda Nyāya* by venerable Pandit Hegoda Khemānanda thera (M.A.). Among many books published in Sri Lanka, I must confess that so far there has never been one of this calibre. It is our impression that this is a remarkable work which results from a thorough study of the Tripitaka by an author who is well acquainted with various logical systems. It is not surprising that this kind of new work may have some shortcomings. Such things, if any, may well be corrected in a second edition. It is my belief that if this work was done during the times of the ancient Sinhala Buddhist kings, it would be honoured by offering the entire country as a recognition of its value.

II. The Venerable Professor Moratuve Sasanaratana Thero of the Vidyalankara University of Kelaniya:

The venerable Pandit Hegoda Khemānanda thero's *Theravāda Nyāya* which presents the fundamentals of the Theravāda philosophy in the form of axioms is a work of a very high standard. The need for a systematic exposition of Nyaya of the Theravada either in Pali or in Sinhala has been long felt. The present work satisfies this need admirably. It should be reason enough to welcome this work with due sense of respect.

Of the many interesting subjects treated in the work, the inquiry into the 'indeterminate means' testifies to the critical acumen of the author. So does his account of the '*apaṇṇaka*' practice. The introduction of the work in itself is a good example of a thorough research in the course of which the author proves the invalidity of certain views held by some authors regarding his subject matter. One example is his treatment of the view that right view is a kind of means.

Theravāda Nyāya may not give us the last word on the subject and it may even cause some controversies; nevertheless, I must say that a work of this calibre has not been written in this country for several centuries. The effort of the author has not been in vain. The work is a text-book for both the Theravāda methodology and deep doctrinal matters. I am sure that the fruits of venerable Khemananda's efforts will be enjoyed by all those who value scholarship.

III. Professor Ediriweera Sarachchandra of the University of Peradeniya:

The present work by venerable Hegoda Khemananda which subjects the doctrines of Buddhism to a logical analysis appears to me an unprecedented research in philosophy and methodology. The Buddhist Nyāya of Dinnāga, Dharmakīrti etc. which we have inherited from the past is actually not based on the Pali Tripitaka, but based on the Mahāyāna texts. Their works are, no doubt, valuable logical and philosophical treatises. Nonetheless, the value of those works as a means of understanding the word of the Buddha is questionable. Therefore I regard the present work by venerable Hegods Khemānanda as the first step towards the systematic analysis of the logical basis of the word of the Buddha.

A valuable aspect of this work is that the logical principles of Buddhism have been compared with those of both the other Indian philosophical systems and western logical systems. I must say that this comparison throws much light on the Buddhist Nyāya. Furthermore, this work clarifies the authentic meaning of certain terms used in the discourses of the Buddha. There is little doubt that the present work will inaugurate a new way of thinking in Buddhism and that it will enable a deeper understanding of the core of the teaching of the Buddha. I wish that the students of Buddhism take this work seriously.

IV. Dr. Ananda W.P. Guruge (Ph. D., D, Litt., Ambassador of Sri Lanka in U.S.A.)

This is the first ever treatise on the *Nyāya* in Theravāda Buddhism.

CHAPTER I

SYNOPSIS (*saṅkāsanā*)¹

The teaching of the Buddha which is also called the '*āhacca vacana*' (authoritative word) comprises the oral discourse of the Enlightened One. It occurs in Pali (Māgadhi) language. It is believed that Buddhism propagated abroad during the reign of Asoka was in Pali. Buddhism, in some of its new homes, did not take root while in some others it did and acquired various shapes and forms. In India itself Buddhism underwent transformations in the course of which it was subject to the influence, both positive and negative, of Sanskrit and many other local dialects and various ideologies, and finally was destroyed. However only in Sri Lanka was Buddhism preserved in its original form, having been brought there from India and sustained by means of the compilation of commentaries. It is only subsequently that Buddhism spread to countries such as Myanmar, Thailand and Campuchia.

Theravāda Buddhism

The historical researches of modern scholars have proved that the Pali canon contains the oldest form of Buddhism. The Buddhist literature available in such languages as Sanskrit, Prākṛit, Tibetan and Chinese is believed to have evolved subsequently. What we mean by 'Theravāda' is that oldest form of Buddhism.

The Buddha himself has used the term 'theravāda', but not in this particular sense. Once the Buddha told his disciples that, prior to his Enlightenment, while he was a trainee under Ālāra Kālāma and Uddaka Ramaputra, he would claim knowledge and '*ñāṇavāda* and *theravāda*' by mere touch with lips and by a single reading of their teaching.²

1. To outline in brief is 'saṅkāsanā' ("*sankhittena kāsanā dīpāna sankāsanā*" *Netti Aṭṭhakathā*). There are six ways of elaboration, namely, sankāsanā, pakāsanā, vivaraṇā, vibhajanā, uttanīkamma and paññatti.
2. *So kho aham bhikkhave tāvatakeneva oṭṭhapahata mattena lapitalāpana mattena ñāṇavādaṃ ca vadāmi theravādaṃca, jānāmi passāmi itī ca paṭijānāmi, ahañceva aññe ca.* (Ariya pariyesana sutta, Majjhimanikāya)
Ñāṇavādanti jānāmi itī vādam; theravādanti thirabhāvavādam; thero ahametthāti etam vacanam. (Majjhimanikaya Aṭṭhakathā)

‘Theravada’ in this context is an aspect of the Brahmanic system of education. ‘Ñāṇavāda’ is the claim that one understands what is taught, and ‘theravāda’ is the claim that one has absorbed in mind what is taught. ‘Thera’ here means the stability (*sthira*) of knowledge. This is confirmed by the exegetical explanation: “*theravādanti thirabhāva vādam*”. Knowledge and its stability are two things; it is possible that one might lack one or both whereas another might have both. The Buddha’s remark indicates that he had both.

Thus the Buddha has used the term ‘theravāda’ in the sense that one stands firm on a particular (aspect of) knowledge. That the Pāli tripiṭaka is called ‘theravāda’ is either because it was orally transmitted or because, on the view of the writers of the sub-commentaries, it was the tradition of the great Theras like Mahākāśyapa.³ Whatever the reason may be, it is clear that Pāli tripiṭaka is known as theravāda since antiquity.

Buddhist Nyāya

There is a field of knowledge known as ‘nyāya’ or ‘tarka’. Its counterpart in Buddhism is called ‘bauddha-nyāya’ (buddhist Nyāya). However, since Buddhism is split into various schools such as Hinayāna, Mahāyāna, Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda there cannot be a unitary discipline called ‘Buddhist Nyāya’. Due to the differences of their opinions, the Nyāya of one school is not applicable to the rest. In particular, the Nyāya analyses of such Mahāyānaic teachers as Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti are not relevant to the Theravāda.

The practice of certain scholars to mix all such divergent Buddhist Nyāya systems is baffling to the average Buddhist who seeks clear understanding of the matter. Although some such fundamental principles as the Four Noble Truths are common to all schools, there is a marked difference in the analysis of the sources of knowledge between Mahāyāna and Theravāda. Therefore it is not appropriate to take what may be called Buddhist Nyāya as one homogeneous system. What we would like to stress is that a Nyāya for the Theravāda has to be built solely on the basis of the Pāli Tripiṭaka.

Northern Buddhist Nyāya

There is a sizeable number of Nyāya treatises compiled by both Mahāyāna teachers like Nāgārjuna and Hinayāna teachers belonging to

3. *Mahasangītiyā ārūḥhā pāliyevettha theravādoti veditabham. Sa hi mahākassapappa-bhutinam mahātherānam vādattā theravādoti vuccati. (Sāratthadīpani)*

such schools as Sarvāstivāda. Some call all such schools, with the exception of Theravāda, 'Northern Buddhism' for the reason that they subsequently existed in Northern India. Equally, the Pāli Buddhism which found a home in Śrī Lankā and Southern India is called 'Southern Buddhism'. Therefore it seems reasonable to call all forms of Buddhist Nyāya compiled in Sanskrit, whether they be Hināyana or Mahāyāna, 'Northern Buddhist Nyāya' and the Nyāya in Pāli which belongs to Southern Buddhism 'Theravāda Nyāya' or 'Southern Buddhist Nyāya'.

The Northern Buddhist Nyāya is rich in content. It is believed that Dinnāga alone compiled more than one hundred nyāya treatises. (It is not our intention to go into details concerning this matter. See *Nyāya Parveśa* of Kotahene Paññākitti for more information.) Today the Buddhist students in Sri Lanka get their first introduction to Buddhist Nyāya from Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu* or Dinnāga's (or Sankarasvāmi's) *Nyāyapraveśa*. Even these books will help one to know the differences between Mahāyāna and Theravāda insofar as their Nyāya and epistemological sources (*pramāṇavāda*) are concerned.

Thervāda Nyāya Treatises

The Tripiṭaka which consists of Sutta, Vinaya and Abhidhamma is the content of Theravāda. It has existed in Śrī Lankā for twenty-two centuries and in Myanmar, Thailand and Campuchia for fifteen centuries. The learned Mahātheras of these countries have enriched the Buddhist literature by compiling commentaries, sub-commentaries and various other exegetical works. Nevertheless, in this literature as it is at present, we do not find any work on Logic or Nyāya. Although some tend to describe *Nettipakaraṇa* as a Theravāda Nyāya work, in actuality what it contains is only some methods for explaining the doctrine. In other words, this work tells us how a given statement from the teaching (of the Buddha) may be explained meaningfully. *Peṭakopadesa* closely follows the former. In addition, there are *Saddasāratthajālīni*, *Saddatthabhedacintā*, *Diṭṭhantaratānāvali* and *Nitipadāvali* which have been subsequently added to the same line of thought, but none countable as a Theravāda Nyāya work.

There are reasons to believe that the Theravāda tradition had some Nyāya works in the past. The commentator Mahānāma thera who wrote during the reign of king Kumāradāsa, 516 A.C., supports his explanation to "suñño loko" in *Paṭisambhidāmagga* by referring to a Nyāya work that presumably existed in his time.⁴ A similar reference to a Nyāya work is

4. *Tathā nāyaganthe ca saddaganthe ca ayameva attho.* (*Paṭisambhidā Atṭhakathā*, Hevavitarana Edition. p. 358.)

available in *Dāṭhāvamsa* of the 13th century.⁵ In addition, it must also be mentioned that there are some nyāya methods scattered in many parts of the tripiṭaka.

The Reasons Behind the Non-Development of Theravāda Nyāya

History reveals that Buddhism which existed between the 4th and 12th centuries A.D. in Northern India was rich in logical treatises. Since there was a lot of interaction between India and Śrī Lankā during this period it is hard to believe that Śrī Lankan Buddhists did not know about the developments in this area made by their Indian counterparts. Their exegetical accounts suggest that the commentators such as Dhammapāla and Mahānāma were acquainted with Indian logic. It is hard to believe that the Śrī Lankan Buddhist scholars who compiled books on such fields as medicine, astronomy, grammar and literary criticism drawing inspiration from the Indian sources, did not write any book on logic, drawing inspiration in the like manner. Although our discussion shows that there did exist some works, judging from the vast development of the subject in India, it is worth asking why this field of study did not develop in the countries of Theravāda Buddhism.

There is more than one way to explain this phenomenon. In India, the Buddhist teachers had to interact with other philosophical traditions. In these encounters, it was sufficiently clear that they could not depend on the word of the Buddha alone for their defence. Instead they had to compile logical treatises in order to face opposition successfully. These encounters were both inter-religious and intra-religious.⁶ This explains the reason behind the development of Buddhist logic in India. Buddhists in Śrī Lankā did not encounter this problem. Śrī Lankā was a small country without a long history of an established ideology (when Buddhism was first introduced) whereas India was a bigger country with a history of long established religious and philosophical traditions. The relative smallness of the countries where Theravāda Buddhism spread and the fact that they were so easily converted largely due to the absence of any established religious traditions explain why the Buddhists in these countries did not have a need for logical treatises. Perhaps people in these countries were less dogmatic and more pliable compared to the brāhmins in India, and this too may have contributed to the situation that the

5. *Santappayan dhamma sudhā rasena yo mānuse tuṇḍila sūkaropi lsīva katvā atha nāyagantham nijam pavattesi cirāya dhammam.* (*Dāṭhāvamsā*:41.)

6. *Sarvam mādhyamike śūnyam yogācae vahirgatam sautrāntikenumanam syāt sarvam vaibhāṣike sphuṭam.* (*Sarvadarsanasamgraha*)

Buddhist teachers did not require logical treatises to convince the local groups.

An ancient tradition of early Buddhism (represented in Aṭṭhaka and Pārāyaṇa vaggās of *Sutta nipāta*) underscore the view that debate is a result of dogmatism, and that the Noble Ones are beyond the mentality of debate, and that such exercises would not conduce for emancipation. This explains why the Theravādins were less enthusiastic about developing an art of debate.

Theravādins were very particular about the pristine purity of their doctrine, and they made sure that it was not corrupted by any heretic views. Whenever there was an attempt to introduce any doctrine which was against Theravāda, such an attempt was thwarted at the very outset. This may have done away with the necessity in the Theravada tradition of forming any logical treatises.

Finally, the Theravadins did not require separate treatises of logic for the entire tripitaka was arranged in such a way that it facilitated the logical understanding of truth. In particular, the Abhidhamma piṭaka reveals the Theravāda philosophy, and the study of the *Visuddhimagga* and the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* will give the student the quintessence of Buddhist logic.

Doctrine of Pramāṇa

The (various) means of knowing reality are called ‘pramāṇa’ in (Indian) logic. Due to the fact that they have been enumerated differently by numerous teachers, there exists ‘pramāṇa-logy’. There is no evidence to prove that this branch of study was developed during the Vedas or Pre-Buddhist Upanishads.⁷ However, in post-Buddhist Upanishads⁸, in such treatises as Nyāya-sūtra⁹ and in such Mahāyāna teachers as Dinnaga, Dharmakīrti and Śāṅkaraswāmi, there is a highly developed pramāṇa-logy. In these traditions the means of knowledge are enumerated in such concepts as perception, inference, authority and simile. We do not intend to discuss these means in detail here, but we will treat in brief those means accepted by Theravādins.

Pramāṇa in the Theravāda

The tripitaka reveals that the Buddha himself refers to pramāṇa. Nevertheless, he did not use the term to refer to means of knowledge,

7. Chāndogya Upaniṣad which is pre-Buddhistic refers to ‘pratyakṣa’ (5.2.2.).

8. *Maithri Up.* 6.4; *Muktikopaniṣad: Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* 1.2; *Manusmṛti* 2.13; *Caraka A* II.17; *Rāmāyana* 5.87 & 23.

9. Akṣapāda’s this work belongs to the 2nd century A.D.

but he used it in the sense of something or someone being the ‘measure’. The well-known textual reference in this regard is “*rupappamāṇa ghosappamāṇa lūkhappamāṇa dhammappamāṇa*”¹⁰ which indicates, for example, the fact that some conclude that a certain person is good on the basis of his physical appearance. The Buddha did not approve of this practice. He said that one must not take a person as *pramana* for the reason that there are not any absolutely good or bad persons among the worldings.¹¹ However, this is not applicable to arahants for the Buddha himself has called such persons *pramāṇa*.¹² Furthermore, the Buddha has said that one who has attained the transcendental state does not take anything as *pramāṇa*.¹³ *Pramāṇa* itself is a form of *māṇa* which is a defilement and the arahant is devoid of it. Since the arahants cannot be measured they are called ‘*appameyya*’¹⁴ (immesurable). The Buddha is described as *appamāṇo buddho* since he has an immesurable amount of virtues. Once the Buddha said that those who are versed in *pramāṇa* are engaged in measuring the good or the bad of the statements made by others and that this practice brings suffering to those who are engaged in it.¹⁵

All these points suggest that the practice of *pramāṇa* is not the ‘right knowledge’ (*samyagñāna*) and that it leads to wrong conclusions. It seems that the Buddha used ‘*pamāṇikā*’ to refer to logicians. It may, however, be concluded that the Buddha did not use the *pramāṇa*-logy in the sense of the act of measuring.

Such *pramāṇas* as ‘*rupa-pramāṇa*’ (referred to above) may be included in inference, but not in perception. This shows that perception is not a *pramāṇa* for there is nothing to be measured in perception.

The Present Work

The construction of a comprehensive system of Theravāda-nyāya is a work of such magnitude as befitting a great scholar of nyāya and the Buddhist doctrine. The present effort is only a humble beginning in that

10. *Puggalapaññatti* (catukka).

11. *Mā puggalesu pamaṇika ahuvattha, mā puggalesu pamaṇam gaṇhittha.* (*Anguttaranikaya: dasaka nipāta*).

12. *Esā bhikkhave tulā etam pamāṇam mama sāvakānam upasakānam yadidam sariputta moggallānā.* (*Samyuttanikāya*.)

13. *Atthamgatassa na pamāṇamatthi* (*Sutta Nipata:Upasiva*).

14. *Appameyyam pamiṇanto kodha vidvā vikappaye appameyyam pamāyīnam nivutam tam maññe puthujjanam. Appamanamti pamāṇakaradhammarahitam lokuttaram.* (*Samyuttanikaya: Brāhmaṇa samyutta*).

15. *Tatrānanda pamāṇikā pamiṇanti...tam hi tesam hoti ahitāya dukkhāya.* (*Anguttaranika : dasaka*).

direction. Nevertheless, some explanation of our methodology seems opportune.

We have divided this work into two, namely, the book of knowledge comprising the method of perceiving reality and the book of nyāya comprising the analysis of causality. The book of knowledge comprises two sections: Āryan knowledge and conventional knowledge. The conventional knowledge is divided into two: perceptual and non-perceptual. The ‘anvayagñāna’ containing the characteristics of non-perceptual knowledge has been placed next to perception. It was not included in non-perceptual knowledge for it contains a (kind of) certainty not available in non-perceptual knowledge, and it does not produce the twofold result typical of other forms of non-perceptual knowledge.

Chapter on the Āryan Knowledge

According to Theravāda, the knowledge of those (Āryan individuals) from the stream-entrant to the arahant is transcendental. How a practitioner gains this knowledge has been made quite plain in such popular treatises as the *Visuddhimagga* and the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*. Nevertheless, we have elucidated the stages pertaining to the realization of the following: truth, phenomena to be known and to be abandoned, matters pertaining to the safeguard of truth (*satyānurakṣaṇa*), and emptiness.

The kind of knowledge which may be called non-worldly is known as ‘yogi gñāna’ in the other systems. Although it has not been dealt with by such nyaya teachers as Dharmakīrti, Buddhaghōṣa, however, has described it in detail as ‘*nāṇadassana visuddhi*’. The Buddha’s term for perception is ‘*sacchikiriya*’ which denotes the realization of nirvāṇa. Herein we have used the same term.

Furthermore, it must be noted that the classification of knowledge into ‘*anvaye nāṇa*’, ‘*pariyāye nāṇa*’ and ‘*sammutiyā nāṇa*’ referred to in the *Dīghanikāya* and the *Vibhaṅga* etc. is very important in philosophy. One must also consider the fact that conventional knowledge (‘*sammuti*’ or ‘*voḥāra*’) is used by the Āryans and hence it has been described as the fourfold ‘*ariya voḥāra*’ (Āryan convention) which comprises such factors as ‘what is seen’ (‘*diṭṭha*’).

Chapter on Conventional Knowledge

The perceptual aspect of conventional knowledge, according to Buddhism, is fourfold: what is seen, what is heard, what is felt and what is known. This is how the Buddha classified worldly perception. Its origin and its obstacles have been described by us following the method of the Elders. The ‘anvaya gñāna’ we come across in the Theravada is

an important technical term which is somewhat, but not altogether equivalent to 'anumāna gñāna' in other systems. This particular knowledge helps gain a definite knowledge of what is not perceived. If 'anumāna' means 'measuring accordingly', 'anvaya' should mean 'going or knowing in accordance with'. This etymological definition of 'anvaya gñāna' lays bare the significance of this particular knowledge. We have treated it here separately.

In analyzing a category of a-perceptual knowledge, we have included therein some five means of knowledge available in the Theravāda, namely, faith, inclination, tradition, reflection on reasons and conviction based on reflection on theories. The knowledge derived by these means has been described by the Buddha as having a two-fold consequence for such knowledge is not invariably true, but may be either true or false. Since these means are valid in the conventional sphere and helpful for the realization of Aryan knowledge we cannot easily do away with them. Therefore we have included them as indeterminate means. It is upto those who are versed in nyāya to determine the appropriateness of this step.

Section on Nyāya

Nyāya is the manner of the existence of a phenomenon. It is none other than an exposition of the causal relations involved (in a phenomenon). It is a well known fact that all component phenomena arise due to conditions. The dependent co-origination is a fundamental characteristic in this process. We have classified the analysis of causal relations into eight groups such as 'whatever...that' method and 'if' method. We have further included some concepts such as 'great indicators' (*mahā-padesa*), guide(*netti*), *apaṇṇaka* and non-repetition as specific methods.

Language in Nyāya

Like any other science, Nyāya too has a technical vocabulary. A prior knowledge of these terms is mandatory to understand Nyāya. The Nyāya sāstras of the Mahāyānists and Hīndus have developed an extensive vocabulary of such terms.¹⁶ In compiling Pāli grammar, ancient teachers borrowed from other traditions ('*parasamaññā payoga*') and we cannot altogether escape this. However, this practice may be justifiable only in the absence of suitable Pāli terms. It is customary for many Buddhist teachers to use terms belonging to other systems to discuss

16. *Pramāṇa, pratyakṣa, anumāna, āpta, śāhda, upamāna, anupalabdhi, prameya, tarka, svārthanumāna, parārthanumāna, sādhyā, sādhana, ābhāsa, dūṣaṇa, anvaya, vyatireka, indriya, hetu, kārya, kāraṇa, pakṣa, sapakṣa, vipakṣa, nyāya, drṣṭānta, henvābhāsa* etc.

Buddhist Nyāya. It is also customary for them to interpret the Theravāda Nyāya through those terms. However, the technical terms used in the *Nettipakaraṇa* are meant more for research in the Tripiṭaka doctrine than for the study of its Nyāya.

Although there isn't any particular Theravāda Nyāya system available, it is not necessary that one must go to Mahāyanic or Hindu texts in order to find terminology for Nyāya. Nor does one have to invent them for they may well be obtained from the Tripiṭaka itself. One must not hasten to grab a term denotive of a particular Nyāya sense at the first sight; instead one must inquire whether the term has been used in the particular sense which one wishes to attribute to it. If it is the case, one may adopt it. This seems to be the best method for borrowing terms from others, and the invention of new terms may cause confusion in both the philosophy of the Theravāda and the study of Nyāya.

Following above guidelines, we have discovered from the Tripiṭaka a good number of technical terms. We did not take commentaries as authorities in this regard. However we have made use of them in order to support our definitions. we have not included a single term which cannot be supported either through the Text or through the commentaries.

New Interest

There has never been a time, to our knowledge, when Buddhism was more scrutinized than it is today. Nevertheless, many a scholar has expressed the view that, while all the other religions have failed, it is Buddhism alone which has been able to survive such scientific scrutiny. This fact has caused tremendous interest in Buddhism among serious students. In almost every university in the world there is a chair for Buddhist research. The publications coming out from such institutions testify to the scientific nature of Buddhism.

Meanwhile there have been many efforts by scholars to study the logical analysis of the Buddhist epistemology. Among those who have studied the Northern Buddhist traditions Satischandra Vidyābhūṣaṇa (1921), Scherbatasky (1932) and Rahula Sanskrtyāyana are noteworthy. Winternitz, Geiger, Rhys Davids and Mrs. Rhys Davids are among those who have rendered an invaluable service to Pāli literature and Theravāda Buddhism. However either they did not study the Theravāda nyāya or simply they did not have time. Mrs. Rhys Davids' statement that there are no logical methods in the Theravāda is perhaps due to the absence of any specific logical treatises written in Pāli; or she may have not examined Pāli tradition carefully enough.

The two most prominent Buddhist education centres in Sri Lanka, Vidyodaya and Vidyālankāra have contributed much to highlight the

Nyāya methods in the Theravāda. Ever since they were promoted to university status they have enhanced such research.

Misunderstandings

Nyāya systems are a result of the efforts made by some of the greatest minds to unravel the intricacies of knowledge. To comprehend such works itself is a difficult task. It is quite natural for one who is not infallible to err in the process. The obvious danger to be avoided is best presented by the analogy of a swimmer and a diver. Whereas the former may get across a stretch of water with ease the latter may remain submerged in an ocean of knowledge. However, it is a matter of intellectual honesty to accept when such errors are pointed out.

It is quite possible that there are shortcomings in our own effort. If the lovers of knowledge were to draw attention to such errors, we are more than willing to accept corrections.

We commend the effort by Nyāyāchārya Abhayasinghe of Vidyodaya University to reconstruct Nyāya methods in the Theravāda. However, it must be mentioned that some of the comparisons he makes between the Theravāda and other concepts are not wholly acceptable. It seems that he is trying to understand the Theravāda tradition through Hindu and Mahāyāna traditions. It is our contention that the Theravāda has to stand on its own. In what follows we will produce a few of Abhayasinghe's views for the critical evaluation of scholars.

We will agree with Abhayasinghe when he compares Mahāyānic 'samyagnāna' with the Theravāda 'sammādiṭṭhi'; but we do not think that the latter is a means of knowledge.¹⁷ If it is, the former must also be one. Perception, inference etc. are taken as means but not samyagnāna etc. Although it may be called a 'means' on logical and etymological grounds, there is no such technical term denoting means in Nyāya studies. Abhayasinghe himself rightly calls factors generative of the right understanding 'means'. In a causal analysis, means is the cause; knowledge is the effect.

Abhayasinghe's claim that sammādiṭṭhi itself is both the Nyāya and the means confuses the beginner.¹⁸ We suppose that the mistake lies in his effort to coin technical terms purely on the grounds of logicity or etymology. It is necessary to make sure that the particular term is used in that particular sense in the language. The corresponding term in Pāli language for nyāya is naya. What is meant by it is the causal analysis. We fail to understand why 'sammādiṭṭhi' has to be brought in when it is obvious that Abhayasinghe could use 'naya' to denote 'nyāya'.

17. *Bhāratīya Tarka Sāstraya* p. 124.

18. *Vidyodaya* (journal) 1945.

Abhayasinghe is of the opinion that '*parato ghosa*' is equivalent to '*parārthānumāna*' (syllogism).¹⁹ The latter refers to listening to what is said by others. It is the same as the 'knowledge deriving from hearing' (*sutamaya paññā*). According to the Buddha, it may cause either right or wrong views.²⁰ Whether for oneself (*svārthānumāna*) or for another (*parārthānumāna*) inference is a means of right knowledge. If inference produces a wrong knowledge then it must be a wrong inference or no inference at all. '*Parato ghosa*' (*parato ghosa*) cannot be included in inference for it has been described by the Buddha as a cause of wrong views. However it may be compared with '*āpta*' in other systems. According to Theravāda, it is of twofold consequence. This will be discussed in detail later.

Abhayasinghe further claims that '*paccavekkhaṇa*' and '*anumāna*' are synonymous.²¹ This does not agree with the usage of the Buddha. Paccavekkhaṇa, an oft recurring technical term in Buddhism reveals a fascinating aspect of Buddhist thought, and refers to retrospection. It²² has nothing to do with '*anumāna*' in other systems.

Abhayasinghe's emphatic claim that knowledge of impermanence is possible only through '*tīraṇa pariññā*' (conclusive knowledge) and this knowledge is nothing other than inference is outrageous.²³ Tīraṇa pariññā is one among the three pariññās, namely, *ñāta*, *tīraṇa* and *pahāna*. It is almost exclusively associated with the Āryan knowledge. The counterparts in the other systems are given as '*yogi pratyakṣa*', '*yogi gñāna*' or '*alaukika pratyakṣa*'. In the Theravāda it belongs in the realization (*sacchikiriya*). According to nyāyavādins, there is no such thing as yogi anumāna but only yogi pratyakṣa. The confusion between what is worldly and what is transcendental not only does harm to the Theravāda but baffles the student also.

It is also regrettable that Abhayasinghe misinterprets certain doctrinal statements. In a footnote in his book on Indian Logic (p.127) he partially quotes a stanza from Udāna and mistranslates it (p.169) in the

19. *Bhāratīya Tarka Sāstraya* p. 141.

20. *Paratoghoso diṭṭhiṭṭhānanti durakkhāta dhammasavaṇena diṭṭhiupattito.* (*Paṭisambhidāmagga Aṭṭhakathā* Hevavitarā Edition, p. 300).

Dve'me bhikkhave hetu dve pacayā micchādiṭṭhiyā uppādāya parato ca ghoso ayoniso ca manasikāro'ti vacanato parato ca ghoso diṭṭhīnam kāraṇam. (*Paṭisambhidāmagga Aṭṭhakathā* Hevavitarā Edition, p. 300).

21. *Bhāratīya tarka sastraya* p. 137.

22. *Paccavekkhaṇa ñānanti nivattitvā bhusam passanam jānanam ñānam.* (*Paṭisambhidāmagga Aṭṭhakathā* p. 20.)

Paccavekkhatiti paccavekkhaṇa javanehi nivattitvā passati. *Ibid.* p. 218.

23. *Bhāratīya Tarka Sastraya* p. 153.

following manner: “So long as the Enlightened Ones do not appear in the world, logicians will not get purified; nor will the disciples. Until such time, those who hold wrong views also will not be liberated from suffering”. For the right interpretation refer to the Buddha Jayanti edition of the Khuddakanikāya.²⁴

Nyāya Praveśaya saha Nyāya Hodiya by Venerable Kotahene Pannakitti of Vidyalankara University is a valuable addition to the Buddhist Nyāya literature. Nevertheless, it is difficult for us to agree with some of the comparisons he makes between Mahāyāna Nyāya teachings and Theravāda statements. For example, (p.125) the learned monk holds that what comes as ‘*diṭṭhe diṭṭhamatta, sute sutamatta, mute mutamatta, viññāte viññātamatta*’ is equivalent to the non-conceptual knowledge accepted by other systems. ‘Nirvikalpa’ is a technical term used by Mahāyānists and Hindus in order to describe the nature of worldly perception. We do not think that it has anything to do with what the Buddha meant by the above statement which refers to the state of comprehension characterized by the absence of craving, deceit and wrong views. This latter is an Āryan knowledge. Therefore it can never be compared to an aspect of worldly knowledge. An examination of what the Buddha said to Maluṅkyaputta²⁵ and Dārucīriya²⁶ would amply clarify this matter.

24. The statement and its correct translation is as follows:

*Evam obhāsitamattameva takkikānam
Yāva sammāsambuddhā loke nuppajjanti
Na takkikā sjjhanti na cāpi sāvaka
Duddiṭṭhi na dukkhā pamuccati (Udāna)*

So long as the Fully Enlightened Ones do not appear in the world, ‘logicians’ will be prominent; but once the Buddhas appear they will no longer be prominent, and they, with their wrong views, will not escape suffering. (The Buddha Jayanti Edition p. 277.)

25. *Samyuttanikāya* (Chalavagga).

26. *Udāna* (Bodhi Vagga and its commentary).

THERAVĀDA NYAYA (LOGIC AND EPISTEMOLOGY IN THERAVĀDA)

AXIOMS

SECTION ON KNOWLEDGE (*GÑĀNA*)

Chapter on Noble Knowledge (āryagñāna)

1. Realization of truth takes place through wisdom (*pragñā*).
2. Truth is twofold: absolute truth and conventional truth.
3. The person who realizes truth by wisdom is 'ārya'.
4. Wisdom is for super knowledge (*abhigñā*), comprehensive knowledge (*parigñā*) and eradication (*prahāṇa*).
5. There are two stages in realization: partial comprehension of truth (*satyānubodha*) and arrival at truth (*satyānupprāpti*).
6. The act of realization constitutes its knowledge.
7. It is a conceptual object perceived by the faculty of mind.
8. There are two stages in the understanding of the absolute truth: vision and cultivation. Stream-attainment (*soṭāpatti*) is the stage of vision; once-returning etc. (*Sakadāgami*, *anāgāmi*, *arahanta*) are the stages of cultivation.
9. Therein are three components: knowledge, eradication and conclusion. The object of knowledge is unique characteristic; the object of conclusion is general characteristic; what is eradicated are such distortions as (in) sensation.
10. What is measured (*prameya*) by realization is the cessation of suffering. One who sees suffering alone sees its cause, path leading to its cessation and its fruit, namely, the cessation. (It is) a knowledge for one's own sake (*svārtha*). That knowledge-vision (*gñāna-darśana*) is right-vision (*sammā dassana*), right-view (*sammā dīṭṭhi*) and wisdom born out of cultivation. It is fourfold, namely Stream-entrance etc.
11. Self-view (*satkāya drṣṭi*) is the phenomenon to be avoided.
12. 'Phenomena to be acquired' (*upādeya*) is not applicable in noble realization.
13. Of one endowed with vision, the path of vision comprises *nyāya*, namely, the doctrine of dependent origination. For this reason, the ārya is called 'one who walks in the right path' (*ñāyapaṭipanna*).

14. The ārya understands the noble truths by way of realization. Nevertheless, he obtains knowledge by such means as inference, analysis and convention. Hence it is fourfold: i. knowledge gained through the doctrine (*dhamme ñāṇa*), ii. knowledge by inference (*anvaye ñāṇa*), iii. knowledge by analysis (*pariye ñāṇa*) and iv. knowledge gained through convention (*sammutiya ñāṇa*).
15. There are five phenomena that serve as factors safeguarding the absolute truth. They are also indeterminate means of knowledge: namely, faith (*saddhā*), inclination (*ruci*), tradition (*anussava*), reflection on reasons (*ākāraparivitakka*) and conviction based on reflection on theory (*ditṭhinijjhānakkhanti*).
16. Wisdom by learning and wisdom by thought are supportive of the wisdom by cultivation. They are forms of conventional knowledge.
17. Herein emptiness is a phenomenon to be avoided. It is fourfold: 'nowhere I am' (*ñaham kvaṇa*), 'not in anything of any other' (*kassaci kiñcanatasmim*), 'nowhere anything that belongs to me' (*na ca mama kvaṇa*), and 'not anything in anywhere' (*katthaci kiñcanatatthi*).

Chapter on Conventional Knowledge

1. Conventional truth is what has been designated (*pragñapti*).
2. To know it, is knowledge or *vigñāna* (knowing).
3. Knowing is a single phenomenon, but, like (in the case of) fire, depending on the modes of arising, is sixfold.
4. It is fourfold: what is seen, heard, felt and known. These are the varieties of perception.
5. What is seen with the eye is 'seen' (*drṣṭa*). The knowledge of what is seen arises due to the combination of the following six: eye, (visual) form, light, coordination (*samannāhāra*), thought (*ābhoga*) and attention. These are the causes of visual perception.
6. A (visual) form enters the fields of both eye and mind.
7. Following are the obstacles to the knowledge of what is seen: minuteness of the object, shortness of duration, extremity of distance, extremity of closeness and being in the past or future. Although the objects may not enter the field due to these reasons, those objects are still the objects of (visual) form. Even in the case of divine eye, its objects are precisely those that do not enter the field, but are not conceptual objects.
8. The maximum duration of matter is 17 thought-moments. The minimum is one thought-moment. It is necessary to spend all the 17 moments in order to know matter fully which is the comprehensive perception of what is seen.
9. Knowledge that arises due to the combination of ear, sound, space, coordination, attention and thought (*ābhoga*) is the perception of what is heard. Contact is the common factor here.
10. Two objects, matter and sound, are non-present-perceivers (*asampattaggāhi*).

11. What is known through the organs of nose, tongue and body is called 'what is felt' (*muta*). They are present-perceivers. Due to their common characteristics they have been taken together.
12. Nose-consciousness arises due to nose, smell, air and attention; tongue-consciousness due to tongue, taste, water and attention; and the body-consciousness due to body, contact, reality (*bhūta*) and attention.
13. The perception called 'what is known' arises due to the combination of life-continuum, mind, concepts (objects), seat of heart and attention.
14. The objects (made) of concept comprise both what is material and what is not material. The 21 material (elements), except such 7 as matter, sound, smell, taste and contact, mind and its constituents and nibbāna and designation are concept-objects.
15. Non-being called emptiness itself is a phenomenon to be known. It is (the same as) non-availability (*anupalabdhi*). It is a concept-object.
16. Doubt and distortions in sensation, view and mind are hindrances to perception.
17. Perception undistorted by the above mentioned, viz., 'the content of (such) knowledge', is a definite means (of knowledge).

Inferential Knowledge (anvaya gñāna)

1. Inference is to know with the help of what is perceived what is not perceived.
2. In other systems, this is included in 'anumāna'. It is the inference for the sake of oneself (*svārthānumāna*).
3. The object of the inferential knowledge is perceived by the faculty of mind. Its objects are (visual) forms belonging to the past or future, and concepts.

Chapter on What is Not Perception

1. What is not an object of the five sense organs is what is not perceived. There are objects which are also perceived by the faculty of mind.
2. Its objects are past and future (material) objects and concepts. (They are the) objects of mind, and (hence) known by the same faculty.
3. A-perceptions are supportive of perception.
4. They are fourfold: Faith, inclination, hear-say, reflection on reasons and conviction based on reflection on theories. They are of twofold consequence: true or not true. Due to that very same reason, they are considered indeterminate.
5. Those selfsame five phenomena are again divided into two: reflection from origin (*yonisomanasikāra*) and others' voice (*paratoghosa*). Wisdom by reflection (*cintāmayā paññā*) and wisdom by hearing (*sutamayā paññā*) correspond to these two respectively.

6. The object of faith-means is either the doctrine or a trustworthy person, viz, the content of the oral communication of such a person. It is a conceptual object and hence it is known by mind.
7. Willingness to do something is inclination (*ruci*). The quality of inclination is a phenomenon and it is not perceived.
8. Hear-say is to repeat what has been heard. It too is known indirectly (*parokṣa*).
9. Knowledge of invariable concomitance is reflection on reasons. It is known non-perceptually. It belongs in the inference for one's own sake.
10. To draw a conclusion on the knowledge of invariable concomitance is conviction based on reflection on theories. It too is a phenomenon to be known.
11. Appearances are fourfold: Untrue and looking untrue, untrue but looking true, True and looking true and True but looking untrue.
12. Examination of purity or impurity of what is said is removal (*parihāra*).

SECTION ON METHOD (NYĀYA)

1. The manner of knowing is fourfold :

- I. Knowing effect on seeing the cause.
- II. Knowing cause on seeing the effect.
- III. Knowing something similar on seeing both cause and effect.
- IV. Knowing an object on seeing a mark of it.

Analysis of Method

2. What follows are the methods (applicable in the process of acquiring knowledge) :

1. Dependent co-origination method
2. Paṭṭhāna method
3. Cause and effect-discourse method
 - i. 'Whatever...that' method (*yat-tat naya*)
 - ii. 'If' method (*cet naya*)
 - iii. Temporal method (*kālārtha naya*)
 - iv. Analytical method (*vibhaṅga naya*)
 - v. Syllogistic method (*anvaya naya*)
 - vi. Simile method (*upamā naya*)
 - vii. Case (grammatical) method (*vibhatti naya*)
 - viii. Particle method (*nipāta naya*)
4. Method of *Netti* (*netti naya*)
5. Great indicator method (*mahāpadesa naya*)
6. *Apaṇṇaka* method (*apaṇṇaka naya*)
7. Non-repetitive method (*agahitaggahāṇa naya*)
8. Two-cornered method (*ubhato koṭika naya*)

CHAPTER II

ON NOBLE KNOWLEDGE (ĀRYAGÑĀNA)

1. Realization of truth takes place through wisdom (*pragñā*).

To understand truth is to know phenomena as they are (*sat*). That is to say, experience of reality; to witness causes and effects in the correct manner. This takes place through right knowledge. Wrong knowledge is either to not know causes and effects or to see wrong causes and effects. The absence of the afore-said is wisdom which is also the right-knowledge (*samyag ñāna*), right-vision (*samyag-darśana*) and right-view (*samyag drṣṭi*).

2. Truth is twofold: absolute truth and conventional truth.¹

Absolute truth is the cessation. By cessation are implied all the four noble truths. Conventional truth is the worldly convention. This will be described in chapter II.

3. The person who realizes truth by wisdom is 'ārya'.²

In Buddhism 'ārya' denotes eight noble persons.

4. Wisdom is for super knowledge (*abhigñā*), comprehensive knowledge (*parigñā*) and eradication (*pahāna*).³

Wisdom is the knowledge of both one who is (in the process of) attaining the āryahood and one who has attained the āryahood. It has three uses: super knowledge which comprises the comprehension of the own-nature of phenomena, comprehensive knowledge which comprises the comprehension of the general nature of phenomena and the eradication of such distortions as those in designation etc.

1. *Paramasaccam sacchikaroti (Cankisutta. M.m.). Cattaro'me āvuso vohārā bhagavatā sammadakkhātā (Chabbisodhanasutta M.u.). Dve saccāni akkhāsi. (MA.).*

2. *PsA (ñānakathā).*

3. *Kimatthiyā paññā? Abhiññattham pariññattham pahānattham. (Mahavedallasutta. M.mu.)*

5. There are two stages in realization: partial comprehension of truth (satyānubodha) and arrival at truth (satyānupprāpti).

Herein 'partial comprehension' and 'arrival' refer to the realization of path and fruit respectively. It does not seem right to equate 'anubodhagñāna' (partial comprehension) with 'anumānagñāna' (inference). The commentator to the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* too has said: *anubuddhoti anumānabuddhiyā, paṭibuddhoti paccakkhabuddhiyā* (Hevavitarana edition, p.377). Nevertheless, in the same work (p.71) he says thus: *anubujjhanattho anāgamimaggabojjhangānam, paṭibujjhanattho arahattamaggabojjhangānam, dassanamagga-bojjhanganam anubujjhanattho, bhāvanāmaggabojjhanganam paṭibujjhanattho, phalabojjhangānam sambujjhanattho*. In explaining the partial comprehension of truth to brāhmin Caṅki, the Buddha said: *Pahitatto samāno kāyena c'eva paramasaccam sacchikaroti, paññāya ca nam ativijjha passati; ettāvatā kho Bhāradvāja, saccānubodho hoti, ettāvatā saccamanubujjhati, ettāvatā saccānubodham paññāpema* (Cankisutta, M.m.). Both this statement and its commentary testify to the fact that 'anubodha' is not the same as the inferential knowledge of logicians, but an aspect of the noble realization itself.

The guide-lines given by the Buddha to Canki who wished to know how to safeguard truth and arrive at conclusion constitute a good example of Buddhist teaching of pramaṇa. Among them are five indeterminate, truth-safeguarding principles which could be either true or false and a method for partial comprehension of truth. The relevant Pali statement⁴ is worth analysis.

4. *Kittāvatā bho Gotama, saccānurakkhaṇā hoti? Saddhā pi ce Bhāradvāja, purisassa hoti evam me saddhāti iti vadam saccamanurakkhati, na'veva tāva ekamsena niṭṭham gacchati idam'eva saccam mogham'aññanti. Ruci- anussavo-ākāraparivītakko- paññāpema, na'veva tāva saccānubodho hoti.*

Kittāvatā bho Gotama, saccānubodho hoti?

Idha Bhāradvāja, bhikkhu aññataram gāmaṃ upanissāya viharati. tamenam gahapati upasaṅkamitvā tisu dhammesu saṃannesati lobhaniyesu dosaniyesu mohaniyesu... tam'enam samannesamāno evam jānāti natthi kho imassa... atha tasmim saddhā niveseti, saddhājāto upasaṅkamati, payirupāsati, sotam odahati, dhammam dhāreti, attham upaparikkhati, tena dhamma nijjhānma khamanti, chando jāyati, ussahati, tulayati, padahati, paramasaccam sacchikaroti. paññāya ca nam ativijjha passati. Ettāvatā saccam anubujjhati, na'veva tāva saccānupatti hoti.

Kittāvatā saccānupatti hoti? ... tesam yeva Bhāradvāja, dhammānam āsevanā bhāvanā bahulikammā saccānupatti hoti: ettāvatā ca mayam saccānupattim paññāpemaṃ. Saccānupattiyā bho Gotama katamo dhammo bahukāro? Saccānupattiyā kho Bhāradvāja, padhānam bahukarāṃ, no ce tam padaheyya nayidam saccam anupāpuneyya... evam tulanā, ussāho, chando, dhammanijjhānkhanti, atthūpaparikkhā, dhammadhāraṇam, dhammasavanam, sotāvadhānam, payirupāsanam, upasaṅkamanam saddhāti. Ime saccānupattiyā bahukāra dhammā honti. (Cankisutta, M.m.)

6. The act of realization constitutes its knowledge.

To perceive is to ‘make it in one’s eye’. It is to know through one’s own faculties.⁵ Methodically and logically derived knowledge is inference. The dhamma (noble truth) cannot be known by logic. Hence it is ‘beyond the scope of logic’ (*atakkāvacara*). The commentators have described those who draw conclusions based on logic as ‘view-addicts’.⁶

Is Perception a Means (of knowledge) (pramāṇa)?

The term used by the Buddha in order to connote ‘perception’ is *sacchikiriya* (to make it in one’s mind faculty). The *paccakkha* occurs only in two instances in Tripitaka, namely, in the *Dhammasaṅgani* and *Samyuttanikāya* as ‘*apaccakkhakamma*’. It does occur in commentaries. The Buddha has said that there is no ‘*pramāṇa*’ for one who has perceived (or ‘has made it in one’s eye’).⁷ When ‘*pramāṇa*’ is understood as a measure in obtaining the right knowledge perception is not a *pramāṇa* for what needs to be measured is what is not perceived. Thus the first *pramāṇa* has to be inference. In the present context, ‘making it in one’s eye’ or the āryan perception is nothing other than the ‘*yogigñāna*’ (meditative knowledge) described by such teachers as Dharmakīrti, the author of the *Nyāyabindu*. Although ‘making it in one’s eye’ is not a *pramāṇa* according to the teaching of the Buddha, perception may be taken as a *pramāṇa* according to the nyāya philosophy. When taken as a response to the question ‘how was (it) known?’ perception is a kind of knowledge and also a *pramāṇa*.

7. It is a conceptual object perceivable by the faculty of mind.

‘It’ refers to the absolute truth, namely, nirvāṇa.

8. There are two grounds in the understanding of the absolute truth: vision and cultivation. stream-attainment is the stage of vision; once returning etc. are the stages of cultivation.⁸

The stream-entrant is one who has seen the reality of nirvāṇa. By the cultivation (*bhāvanā*) of the same one comprehends it in its entirety.

5. *Paccattam veditabbo viññūhi*, Kh.

6. *Takkikā hi diṭṭhigatikā, Sabhāva paṭivedha paññāya abhāvā kevalam takkena vattanti. Yepi jhānalābhino abhiññālābhino vā diṭṭhim gaṇhanti tepi takketvā gaṇhanato takkika* (PsA- Diṭṭhikathā).

7. *Atthamgatassa na pamāṇam’atthi* (Upasivasutta, Sn.). Its commentary is: *rūpādi pamāṇam na atthi*.

8. According to the *Nettipakaraṇa* and the *Visuddhimagga* (Ñāṇadassana visuddhi), realization is twofold: worldly and transcendental. Absorptions are worldly whereas paths and fruits are transcendental.

9. Therein are three stages: knowledge, eradication and conclusion. The object of knowledge is the unique characteristic;⁹ what is concluded is general characteristic;¹⁰ what is eradicated are such distortions¹¹ as (in) sensation.

The partial comprehensive stage (viz. attainment of the path-thought) in the comprehensive knowledge or in seeing nirvana is known-stage. The stages of conclusion and eradication constitute the stage of realization, namely, the attainment of the fruit-thought. There is no gap between the attainment of path and fruit. The Theravāda view that one perceives, respectively through the stages of knowledge and conclusion, own character and the general character of an object may be contrasted with Dharmakīrti's view in *Nyāyabindu* which takes the general character as the object or the scope of inference.¹² However in the present context, both knowledge and conclusion lead to perception which includes understanding of the general character too.

When taken as a kind of knowledge, the eradication of such distortions as (in) sensation is comparable to '*anupalabdhi*' of Mimāmsikas.

10. What is measured (*prameya*) by realization is the cessation of suffering.¹³ Only one who sees suffering sees its cause, path leading to its cessation and its fruit, cessation.¹⁴ (It is) a knowledge of self-interest (*svārtha*).¹⁵ That knowledge-vision (*gñāna-darśana*) is right vision (*sammādaśana*), right view (*sammāditṭhi*), wisdom born out of cultivation. It is fourfold, namely, stream-entrance once-returning never returning, arahanthood.

This is comparable to the case of a clever physician whose knowledge of the disease is immediately followed by the prognosis and the resultant relief. In this context, suffering refers to the five aggregates.¹⁶

This person who is also described as 'endowed with vision' or 'endowed with view' would draw a definite conclusion only by perception but not by inference¹⁷. This phenomenon of knowledge-vision is four-fold,

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9. *Dhammānam paccatta lakkhaṇa sallakkhaṇa vasena pavattā paññā ñāta pariññā nāma.* (PsA- Nānakatha).
10. *Dhammānam sāmāñña lakkhaṇam āropetvā pavattā lakkhaṇā rammaṇikavipassanā paññā tiraṇapariññā nāma.* Ibid.
11. Three distortions are: sensation, mind and view (*Vibhaṅga*).
12. *Anyat sāmānya lakṣaṇam, so' numānasya viśayah:* (*Nyāyabindu*.)
13. *Dukkhapariññattham āvuso maggabrahmacariyam vuccati.* (S. Navapurāṇavagga).
14. *Visuddhimagga* (Saccaniddesa).
15. *Paccattam veditabbo viññūhi, Paccattam nibbuti veditā.*
16. *Saṅkhittena pañcupādānakkhandhā dukkhā.*
17. *Na ekamsena niṭṭham gacchati.* (Caṅkissutta, M.m.)

namely, stream-entrance, once-returning, non-returning and worthiness. The analysis of knowledge-vision is well-known in the Theravada.¹⁸

11. Self-view (*satkāya drṣṭi*) is the phenomenon to be avoided.

This vision does away with the twenty-fold self-view. (Self-view regarding the aggregate of form is as follows:)

1. Seeing the form as self.
2. Seeing self as made of form.
3. Seeing that form is in self.
4. Seeing that self is in form.

With the application of these four modes to the rest of the aggregates, namely, feeling, ideation, volition and consciousness, there obtains the twenty-fold self-view.

12. Phenomena to be acquired are not applicable to the noble realization.

‘*Upādeya*’ means something to be acquired. There is no ‘*upādeya*’ for the āryans for they are devoid of grasping (*upādāna*). *Upādāna* is a property of one who has self-vision. It is eradicated with this knowledge.

13. Of one endowed with vision, the path of vision comprises *nyāya*,¹⁹ namely, the doctrine of dependent origination. For this reason, the ārya is called ‘one who walks in the right path’ (*ñāyapaṭipanna*).

The āryan analyses by way of causes and effects. *Nyāya* is the causal method. In other philosophies, *nyāya* is something related to inferential knowledge. Knowledge which draws a conclusion with the help of *vyāpti* etc. is inference. In this system, *nyāya* refers to the phenomena of cause and effect. To see the causal origin and the cessation of the five aggregates which are taken as self is the ārya-*nyāya*. The ārya sees this by perception (or by *yogigñāna*).

14. The ārya understands the noble truth by way of realization. Nevertheless, he obtains knowledge by way of such means as inference, analysis (*pariccheda*), and convention. Hence it is fourfold: i. knowledge in the doctrine (*dhamme ñāṇa*),

18. See *Visuddhimagga*.

19. *Katamo c’assa ariyo ñāyo paññāya sudiṭṭho hoti suppaṭividdho, idha gahapati, ariyasāvako iti paṭisañcikkhati. Iti imasmim sati idam hoti, imassa uppādā idam uppajjati yadidam avijjā paccayā saṅkhārā.* (A.- Dasaka nipāta).

ii. knowledge in inference (*anvaye ñāṇa*), iii. knowledge in analysis (*pariye ñāṇa*) and iv. knowledge in convention (*sammutiyā ñāṇa*).²⁰

As stated earlier, the āryan knowledge has perception alone (as its source). It is for the realization of the āryan truth, and it is called '*dhamme ñāṇa*'. However, a truth pertaining either to past or to future cannot be known by perception; but may be known with the help of such a knowledge. This is called '*anvaye ñāṇa*'²¹ or inferential knowledge, namely, the inference-means. The āryan's ability to penetrate someone else's mind is called '*pariye ñāṇa*'. When the ārya realizes with the help of the worldly convention it is called '*sammutiyā ñāṇa*'.

'*Anvaye ñāṇa*' is the āryan inferential knowledge which the Buddha has also called '*dhammanvaya*'.²² The '*svārthānumāna*' of the other systems corresponds to this inferential knowledge.

Once the following dialogue occurred between Sāriputta and the Buddha:

Sāriputta: There has never been, there is no and there will never be a śramaṇa or a brāhmin superior to the Buddha in the enlightenment.

Buddha: Sāriputta, have you penetrated with your own the minds of all the past Buddhas so as to know that they were of such nature, of such wisdom, of such behaviour and of such liberation?

Sāriputta: No, Sir.

Buddha: Have you done so with regard to those future Buddhas?

Sāriputta: No, Sir.

Buddha: Have you done so with regard to the present Buddha?

Sāriputta: No, Sir.

Buddha: Sāriputta, how could you utter such a bold statement without that penetrative knowledge regarding the Buddhas of past, future or present?

Sāriputta: Sir, it is true that I do not have an ability to penetrate the minds of the Buddhas of past, present and future. Nevertheless, I have known by inference. Sir, suppose there is a rural city sur-

20. *Vibhaṅga* - *Ñāṇakathā*).

21. *Tattha katamam dhamme ñāṇam, catusu maggesu phalesu ñāṇam. anvaye ñāṇanti cattari saccani paccakkhato disvā yathā idāni evam atitepi anāgatepi imeva pañcakkhandhā dukkha saccam, ayameva tanhā samudaya saccam. ... evam tassa ñānassa anugatiyam ñāṇam.* (S.- *kalārahattiya vagga*) and (D.-*Sangitisutta*). See also their commentaries.

So iminā dhammena ñāṇena diṭṭhena pattena viditena pariyogālhena atitānāgatena yam neti yepi kho atitānāgatañāṇam samaṇā vā...dukkham abbhāññamsu...anāgate yā tattha paññā. (*vibhaṅga*.)

22. (S.- *Nālandā vagga*) and D. *Sampasādaniyasutta*).

rounded by a fortified wall with a single entrance; the door-keeper, being clever and intelligent, would not let strangers in and but only those known to him. And going round the wall, he does not see a hole wide enough even for a cat to enter. The following occurs to him: whatever a large being were to enter the city it has to go through this very same door, and there is no other door. In the like manner, Sir, I knew by inference. This is how I came to know that all those Buddhas had given up the five hindrances and having established themselves on the four bases of mindfulness, became enlightened by developing the factors of enlightenment.

The Buddha agreed.

Sāriputta knows such phenomena as five hindrances, four bases of mindfulness, seven factors of enlightenment etc. by perception. Following this knowledge he infers the nature of the Buddhas. This is the āryan inferential knowledge. This will be dealt in detail in the chapter on inference.

15. There are five phenomena that serve as factors safeguarding the absolute truth. They are indeterminate means of knowledge, namely, faith (*saddhā*), inclination (*ruci*), tradition (*anussava*), reflection on reasons (*ākāraparivitaṅka*) and conviction based on the reflection on theories (*diṭṭhinijjhānakhanti*).

The five phenomena, *saddhā*, *ruci*, *anussava*, *ākāraparivitaṅka* and *diṭṭhinijjhānakhanti* have been described (by the Buddha) as factors safeguarding the truth. But the realization of the āryan truth does not take place through them. They could be either true or false; hence they have been described as ‘having twofold effect’.

These five are indeterminate means and are applicable in the account of conventional truth. They will be dealt in the second chapter.

16. Wisdom born out of learning and wisdom born out of thought are supportive of the wisdom born out of cultivation. They are conventional knowledges.

Out of the forms of the Buddhist wisdom described as ‘*sutamaya*, *bhāvanāmayā* and *cintāmayā*’ what is applicable to the realization of the absolute truth is only the wisdom born out of cultivation. The other two only the supporting factors. Nonetheless, they are the means of conventional knowledge. and they will be elaborated on later.

17. Herein emptiness is a phenomenon to be avoided. It is fourfold: ‘*nowhere I am*’ (*nāham kvaṇa*), ‘*not in anything of any other*’ (*kassaci kiñcanatasmim*), ‘*nowhere anything that belongs to me*’ (*na ca mama kvaṇa*) and ‘*not anything in anywhere*’ (*katthaci kiñcanatātthi*).

The non-existence element of the Vaibhāṣikas may be compared with the Theravādins' *suññatā* and *pahāna pariññā*. The non-existence in this context has divided into two, namely, relationship (*sansarga*) and mutual (*anyonya*). The former has again divided into three: 1. earlier non-existence (*prāgabhāva*), non-existence in consequence of annihilation (*pradhvansābhāva*) and absolute non-existence (*atyantābhāva*). Sansarga is a relationship; relationship between the existence (origin) and the cessation of matter. If we take a pot as an example, the relationship may be threefold depending on how the non-existence of the object takes place, namely, 1. 'non-existent before and existent now' (*anādi sānta*), 2. existent before and non-existent now (*sādi anta*) and 3. non-existent before and now (*anādi ananta*).

Mutual Non-Existence

A pot is not a (piece of) cloth, or there is not a pot in a (piece of) cloth or *vice versa*. This is mutual non-existence. By the fact that there is no singularity the presence of plurality is implied. Therefore both being and non-being are involved here.

The above analysis of the Vaiśeṣikās leaves much to be desired. Both past non-existence and non-existence by destruction actually refer to the same element. Non-existence by destruction contains the past non-existence for what is destroyed has to exist earlier. However this too is refuted by the *satkāryavāda* of the Sāṅkhyās for their argument is that nothing which was not earlier is possible. This is why we said that this leaves much to be desired.

Furthermore, neither is it complete for there are forms of non-existence which are not covered by this analysis. For example the non-existence in 'the physician is not at home' is understood by the listener and it is a form of knowledge. And what kind of knowledge is this? It is not past non-existence for the physician has been at home before. Neither is it a non-existence by destruction for the physician is back home now. Nor is it an absolute non-existence for he is usually at home. Since there exists a relation between the physician and his home it is not a mutual non-existence either. This shows that this non-existence has not been covered by the above categories. Therefore their analysis (of non-existence) is not complete.

The author of the *Tarkasaṅgraha* takes the qualifier-qualified relation (adjunct-substantive relation?) as a cause of perception.²³ It has been taken as a (form of) sense relation. For others such as the Mimāṃsā, this is a means. For them this knowledge is (caused by) the means of non-perception (*anupalabdhi*)²⁴ as in the case of knowing that 'the jar is

23. *Tarkasaṅgraha*. formula 4.

24. Kumārila's *śloka-vārtikā* and *Nyāyabindu*. (ch. 2).

not on the table'. However the Vaiśeṣikās are justified in saying that non-perception is a phenomenon to be known.

The great master Dharmakīrti has dealt with non-perception in the *Nyāyabindu* in detail. Although (he) has not taken it as a means, it has been described as a phenomenon to be known.

Both the element of non-existence of *vaibhāṣikās* and the non-perception of the Buddhists and the *Mīmāṃsikās* are attempts at analysing the same phenomenon in two ways. This may well be compared with 'emptiness' (*suññatā*) of the Theravādins.

The Four Cornered Emptiness: It is to view the nature of no-soulness through four corners, viz.

1. I am not anywhere (*nāham kvaṇa*): does not see an 'I' anywhere.
2. Not in anything that belongs to any other phenomenon: (*kassaci kiṇcaṇatasmim*): does not see anything identical with 'I' in anything that belongs to any other phenomenon.
3. Nowhere is there anything that belongs to me (*na ca mama kvaṇa*): does not see 'another' anywhere.
4. Not anything anywhere (*katthaci kiṇcanatattthi*): does not see 'another' that belongs to one self in anything of oneself.

This is how 'I-making' (*ahamkāra*) and 'mine-making' (*mamaṅkāra*) are described.

The textual 'pahāna pariññā' (comprehensive knowledge by eradication) and the conditions of absence (*natthi*) and disappearance (*vigata*) refer to the element of non-existence.

Āryan Inference and Logic

It is known that knowledge derived from logical means is inference. That the Āryans too get this (kind of) knowledge is admitted in Buddhism. The Buddha has taken inference as 'logic' (*tarka*). When once the Buddha announced that a certain deity approached him and uttered some stanzas starting from 'idam hi tam jetavanam', Ananda said the following: "undoubtedly, it must be the deity Anāthapiṇḍika for he is well-disposed towards Sāriputta knowing the latter's virtues. Thereupon the Buddha praised Ananda and said: " You know what could be known by logic (*yāvatakam ānanda takkāya pattaḥham anuppattam tayā*). This shows that inferential knowledge applies to the Āryans. In this context, the prior perception is to know that to be well-disposed towards those who are without defilement is a meritorious deed leading to heavenly abodes.

Among the above-mentioned four āryan knowledges, the conventional knowledge is the convention of the Āryans. It is fourfold: They are 1. say what is seen on what is seen (*diṭṭhe diṭṭhavāditā*), 2. say what is heard on what is heard (*sute sutavāditā*), 3. say what is felt on what is felt (*mute mutavāditā*) and 4. say what is cognized on what is cognized (*viññāte viññātavāditā*). They will be described in the chapter on conventional knowledge.

The difference between the Āryan and the worldling with regard to conventional knowledge is: the former does not take worldly conventions as pertaining to the soul-view whereas the worldling, at least till he attains the state of stream-entrance, is unable to get himself wholly rid of the self-view. Therefore, for the Āryans, convention is a view²⁵, or a mere convention and not a reality; but it is a reality for the worldling.

‘He takes what is seen as a mere seen’ (*diṭṭhe diṭṭhamattam bhavissati*)²⁶ describes how the aryan receives objects. There is a slight difference between ‘saying what is seen on what is seen’ and ‘taking what is seen as a mere seen’. The first refers to how the Āryan expresses himself whereas the latter signifies how he thinks (or receives objects). It is not the nature of the Āryan to take such objects as forms as desirable etc. However, it is not proper to compare ‘taking what is seen as a mere seen’ with the Mahāyanic (e.g. of Dharmakīrti, Śrī Gñāna etc.) descriptions of perception, namely, that the object of perception is own-nature and that it is non-conceptual.²⁷

The own-nature and non-conceptuality of the Mahāyanists and the Hindus pertain only to worldly perception. The ‘taking what is seen as a mere seen’ advocated by the Buddha pertains to transcendental (āryan) knowledge. Once the Buddha said to Māluṅkyaputta that he will end suffering then and there if he were to follow the method expressed by ‘taking what is seen as a mere seen’ etc.²⁸ This shows that ‘taking what is seen as a mere seen’ is not a form of perception, but to not take such objects (of perception) as (worthy of) attachment, views etc.

25. *Sammutiyoṭi diṭṭhiyo* (N. *Mahāvyaṭha aṭṭhakathā*.)

26. (U.- *Bodhivagga*) and (S.- *Chālavagga*).

27. *Nyāya Praveśaya* by Kotahene Paññākitti.

28. *Yato kho Māluṅkyaputta, diṭṭha suta muta viññātabbesu dhammesu diṭṭhe diṭṭhamattam bhavissati sute sutamattam bhavissati mute mutamattam bhavissati viññāte viññātamattam bhavissati tato tvam Maluṅkyaputta, na tena... nevidha na huraṃ na ubhayamantarena ehevanto dukkhassati.* (S.- *Chālavagga*).

CHAPTER III

ON CONVENTIONAL KNOWLEDGE

1. Conventional truth is what has been designated (*pragñapti*).¹

Of the two truths referred to above, the conventional truth will be discussed in this chapter. In the worldly convention, such designations as 'being', 'person', 'stone', '(one) walks', '(one) stands' etc. are in order. Although such things are not valid in the absolute sense, they are taken as existent in the conventional sense. Even the Aryans make use of these conventions. (Therefore) such conventions as 'person' etc. are designations alone.

2 To know it, is knowledge or *vigñāna* (knowing).

The Aryan does not perceive conventions through craving, measuring and views. Therefore this situation is described as 'wisdom' (*paññā*) in the transcendental sense. The knowledge of the worldling is mundane, and hence it has been described by such terms as 'gñāna' (knowledge), 'vigñāna' (knowing), 'citta' and 'mana' (mind).² The Buddha too has asserted the identity of citta, mana and vinnana.³

3. Knowing is a single phenomenon, but, like (in the case of) fire, depending on the modes of arising, it is sixfold.⁴

It is known that 'vigñāna' is to know the six objects, form etc. through the six senses, eye etc. Nevertheless the Theravāda analysis of 'the origin of knowledge' is subtler and more complex than that of the other systems. In particular, one has to examine, in this context, the Buddha's

1. *Katame dhammā paññatti? Ya tesam tesam dhammānam saṅkhā samaññā paññatti vohāro nāma nāmakammam nāmadheyam nirutti vyañjanam abhilāpo ime dhammā paññatti. (Dhammasaṅgaṇi.)*

2. *Lokuttara dhammam patvā paññā jeṭṭhakā lokiya dhammamhi patvā cittam jeṭṭhakam. (Atthasālini-padabhājanīya.)*

3. *Yanca kho etam bhikkhave vuccati cittam itipi mano itipi viññāṇam itipi (S.Mahavagga).*

4. *Sabbam rūpam manoviññānena viññeyyam. (Vibhaṅga-ñāna kathā), (M. Mahātaṇhāsāṅkayasutta, S. Āsivisa vagga).*

own statements according to which the *vigñāna* is one, but depending on its modes of arising, it is sixfold. It is not possible to derive any knowledge from the five *vigñānas* starting from eye-*vigñāna*; their function is only to connect with the object.⁵ They are mere doors for the objects, and the function of knowing is done only through mind (*manas*). This has been illustrated with the following simile: Suppose there is a city covered by a wall with six entrances. The master of the city stands in the middle of the city. Messengers entering from all six entrances would come to him in order to get their business attended. In the like manner, objects comparable to messengers arrive at the mind, which is comparable to the master of the city in order to get their business attended (*nagarasāmiti viññānassetam adhivacanam S. Āsivisa sutta*.)

Furthermore, a fire burning due to wood is called 'wood-fire' and a fire burning due to grass is called 'grass-fire'; in the like manner, *vigñāna* arising due to the eye is called 'eye-*vigñāna*' and the one arising due to the ear is called 'ear-*vigñāna*'. This similarly applies to the rest.⁶

In the Buddhist accounts of the doors of the faculties it is quite usual to classify them either as five or as six. When mind is added to the five faculties, eye, ear, nose, tongue and body, they are called 'six faculties'. The faculty or the door of mind has concepts (*dharma*s) as its objects. The belief in six faculties is also shared by such systems as Mīmāṃsā, Vaiśeṣika, Jaina and Nyāya. Mahāyanists (e.g. Dharmakīrti) take this (knowledge associated with faculties) as two: faculty-knowledge (*indriyagñāna*) and mind-consciousness (*manovigñāna*). All these testify to the fact that the belief in six faculties is universal in the Indian philosophy.

4. It is fourfold: what is seen, heard, felt and known.⁷ These are the varieties of perception.⁸

Knowledge derived from the six senses has been classified in the above manner. 'What is felt' refers to the knowledge derived from nose, tongue and body. 'What is known' is what Mahāyanists take as 'mind-consciousness' (*manovigñāna*).

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5. *Pancahi nīvaraṇehi na kiñci paṭivijānāti aññatra abhinipātamattā. (Vibhanga-ñāna kathā).*
 6. *Yam yadeva paccayan paṭicca aggi jalati tena teneva saṅkham gacchati. kaṭṭham ca paṭicca aggi jalati kaṭṭhaggitveva saṅkham gacchati, evameva yaññadeva paccayam paṭicca uppajjati viññānaṃ tena teneva saṅkham gacchati (M.- Mahatanhāsāṅkhaya sutta).*
 7. *Cattāro ariyavohāra diṭṭhe diṭṭhavāditā sute sutavāditā mute mutavāditā viññāte viññātavāditā. (D. pāṭika and dasuttara suttas.) (A. Catukkanipata and Atthasālini-padabhājanīya).*
 8. *Rūpāyatanaṃ na sutam na mutam na viññātam. (Vibhanga- dhammahadaya).*

Reception of Objects:

The five objects, form, sound, smell, taste and touch (viz. earth, fire and air) are forms themselves. They enter through two doors: form comes into contact with eye-sensibility, and simultaneously touches the mind-door or causes the movement of life-continuum (*bhavaṅga*). It is comparable to a bird's touching the branch of a tree and the simultaneous appearance of its shadow on the ground. This happens with forms belonging to the present. In the pure mind-door there is no contact with the sensibility. Although forms etc. become objects for eye etc. the one who experiences them is the mind. This is confirmed by the following word of the Buddha: *Mano tesam gocaravisayam paccanubhoti*. All these considerations lead to the following conclusion: According to the Theravada Buddhist philosophy, the faculties become the objects of the faculty of mind (*diṭṭha suta ghāyita sāyita phutṭhavasena etāni ārammaṇāni āpāthamāgacchanti*-(*Atthasālini*); a consciousness cannot arise from the five faculties alone without the involvement of the faculty of mind. What become the objects of mind are concepts which will be described later.

5. What is seen with the eye is 'seen' (*drṣṭa*). The knowledge of what is seen arises due to the combination of the following six: eye, (visual) form, light, coordination (*samannāhāra*), thought (*ābhoga*) and attention⁹ These are the causes of visual perception.

This explains how the knowledge of what is seen or the eye-consciousness, which is the first category of perception arises. Generally the Buddha would say that this consciousness arises due to the contact between eye and form. Nevertheless, he has also explained the process in detail adding the other requisite factors. This analysis has been improved on by the later disciples and is presented in the Abhidhamma in a scholarly manner.

In this context, 'eye' is the one that belongs to the one who is living and not affected by bile and phlegm. 'Coordination' is the act of directing attention to the object. In certain places¹⁰, all three, thought, coordination and attention, have been taken as one. This makes the causes

9. *Yato ca kho āvuso ajjhattikam ce cakkhu aparibhinnaṃ hoti bāhirā ca rūpā āpātham āgacchanti tajjo ca samannāhāro hoti evaṃ tajjassa viññāṇabhāgassa pātubhāvo hoti.* (*Vibhaṅga-nānakatha*; M. Mahahatthipadopama sutta and *Atthasālini*.)

Cakkhuñca paṭicca rūpe uppajjati cakkhuviññāṇaṃ, tiṇṇaṃ saṅgati phasso. (*S. Saḷāyatana vagga*.)

10. See for instance *Abhidhamma mūlatika* and *Swarnasaptati* of the *Sāṅkhyans*.

of the knowledge of what is seen four. Attention is the act of rotating within the life-continuum of the action-mind-element (*kriyā mano dhātu*).

6. A visual form enters the fields of both eye and mind.

‘Entering the field’ means to reflect as in a mirror, to aim at and to contact. It is indispensable for knowledge. (In the word of the Buddha), this (entering the field) occurs also as ‘touch’ (*phassa*).

7. Following are the obstacles to the knowledge of what is seen: minuteness of the object, shortness of duration, extremity of distance, extremity of closeness and being in past or future. Although the objects may not enter the field due to these reasons, those objects are still the objects of (visual) form. Even in the case of divine eye, its objects are precisely those that have not entered the field, but not conceptual objects.

Even when the above-mentioned six preconditions are met, the following forms do not become the objects of vision: due to their extreme minuteness, such forms as subtle particles of dust and atoms; due to their short-livedness such forms as water dropped on a heated iron; and those that are extremely distant and extremely close. In the like manner, those forms the vision of which is obstructed by walls etc. do not become objects. However, even those forms that are not seen by the naked eye too are nothing other than the objects of form. What becomes the objects of the divine eye too are forms, but the door is mind. Although certain ancient teachers have held that forms that have not entered the field are objects of concepts, Buddhaghosa has concluded that even though these objects are experienced by mind they are still the objects of form.¹¹ This shows that what becomes the objects of the mind-door are not only the objects of concepts but also the five objects that belong to past and future. They are forms and not concepts.

The distinction between the objects of concepts and the objects of form will be made clear later. The eye usually is of ‘uneven intentions’ (*visamajjhāsayā*).¹² (At times) it would not enjoy well-polished walls etc. but it would the picturesque objects. In such cases, one not only opens one’s eye but also one’s mouth!

8. The maximum duration of matter is 17 thought moments.¹³ The minimum is one thought moment. It is necessary to spend all 17

11. *Ye pana anāpāthagatarūpādayopi dhammārammaṇamicceva vadanti te iminā suttena paṭikkhipitabbā, tāṇi manena paccanubhaviyaṃānānipi rūpārammaṇādīniyevāti ayamatto siddho hoti. (Atthasālini.)*

12. *Cakkhupetam visamajjhāsayam. (Atthasālini.)*

13. *Tam sattarasacittāyu vinā viññatti lakkhaṇā. (Abhidhammatthasangahacatutthapariccheda).*

moments in order to know matter fully, namely, the comprehensive perception of what is seen.

In order to know fully (or to perceive) the five, namely, form, sound, smell, taste and touch which are the objects of eye, ear, nose, tongue and body and the 22 forms (except two indicatives and four character forms) which are the objects of mind, it is necessary that 17 moments of mind pass. It takes only one moment to know indicatives and character forms. This can be understood by examining the method of thought-processes according to the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*.¹⁴ This thought-process method comprises the Theravada analysis of perception, and it does not seem that a subtler analysis is available in any other system.

In perceiving a form (an object) there must be a combination of all the above-mentioned causes. Of the 17 thought moments, what may be regarded as the first in the process is the fifth moment, namely, eye cognition. However the perception does not take place at this instance; but it does at the instance of determining.

According to Buddhist philosophy, the eye alone is not sufficient to see forms; mind also is required. Eye (the sentient organ of eye) is the object of mind and form is the object of eye. Eye (the sentient organ of eye) is a concept-object. Since no cognition is possible in the sentient organ of eye alone unassisted by the presence of mind what comes into the sentient organ of eye is the colour and the shape of a form. This is comparable to a reflection in a mirror. The 'transaction' between the form and mind by means of eye is called 'eye-cognition' and 'form-perception'. If an eye can see without (the intervention of) mind, even the eye of a statue will see!

How many times could a form be seen during a moment? It is only once, for what is seen in the subsequent moment is either its past-object or another form of that selfsame form. Once we see a flower (at the first

14. A mind-path (details available in the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*):

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

L Lv La As C Rt I D Im Im Im Im Im Im Im Rg Rg (L L)

L = Life continuum thought (*bhavaṅga*)

Lv = Life continuum vibration thought (*bhavaṅga calana*)

La = Life continuum arrest thought (*bhavaṅgupaccheda*)

As = Apprehending at the five senses thought (*pañcadvārāvajjana*)

C = Cognition of eye (*cakkhuviññāṇa*)

Rt = Recipient thought (*sampaṭicchana*)

I = Investigating thought (*santīraṇa*)

D = Determining thought (*voṭṭhapana*)

Im = Impulsion thought (*javana*)

Rg = registering thought (*tadālamhana*)

instance) what is seen subsequently is the past form of the same flower; or some other aspect of that flower, namely, its pollens or petals. One cannot step into the same river twice, for river is a flowing mass of water which would never return (to its former position). Hence, the next moment one is bound to step into a different flow of water, viz. into a different river.

We may draw the following conclusions on Theravāda explanation of the origin of knowledge by means of visual and auditory faculties etc. (the perceptual knowledge):

1. The objects belonging to the five doors will also enter the mind-door.
2. The objects only 'fall in' to the five doors, they do not cognize objects.
3. The knowledge mind-door derived from the five doors is called 'belonging to mixed mind-door'. This is the knowledge belonging to the five faculties. It is the perception derived from what is seen, heard and felt.
4. Of 'what is seen, heard, felt and known' the first three are (called) 'belonging to mixed mind-door' and the fourth ('what is known') is regarded as 'belonging to pure mind-door'.
5. The pure mind-door is twofold: associated with the five doors and occurring independently.
6. The cognitive process of a form perceived initially through the visual faculty may recur in the mind. This recurrence is what is 'associated with the five doors'. It is comparable to the echo of a bell¹⁵.
7. There is more than one way for the independent origination of knowledge in mind. They do not necessarily produce perception, for the objects are forms belonging either to past or to present but not concepts. Nevertheless, one's knowledge of the nature of those forms has concepts as its object.

(The details will be given in the account of the perception of what is known.)

Various ways how the independent mind-door receives objects:

1. Through objects received earlier by the five faculties (namely, the colour and the shape of such objects),
2. By receiving similar objects,
3. By hearing others' words,

15. *Pancahi viññāṇehi na kiñci paṭivijānāti aññatra abhinipātamatā. (Vibhaṅga.)*

16. *See Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha tikā.*

4. By hearing something similar to what was heard earlier'
5. By faith,
6. By inclination,
7. By reflection on reasons,
8. By conviction based on reflection on theories,
9. By the power of various actions (karma),
10. By the disturbance of elements,
11. By psychic powers,
12. By the influence of gods,
13. By partial understanding,
14. By realization etc.

In the analysis of thought-processes, those pertaining to the five doors have been classified as i. very big, ii. big, iii. small and iv. very small; the thought-paths belonging to the door of mind have been classified as i. illuminated and ii. unilluminated. What belong to the perception of what is known are those that belong to the mind-door, and the details of these will be given later.

Duration of a Form

Thought-process is the process of thought that takes place in the act of understanding an object. The duration of a form is seventeen thought-moments which become fifty-one when multiplied by the three briefer instances of each moment, namely, nascence, existence and disintegration. The longest life-span of a form is 51 briefer moments and the shortest is one thought-moment which comprises three briefer moments.

There are some points to be considered in the Abhidharmic account of 'the duration of a form':

1. What is form?
2. What is the duration of a form?
3. What kind of form has the duration of 17 thought-moments?
4. What is that form which becomes the object when a certain number of thought-moments (say, 2, 4 or 15) of that form have passed?

Forms and Their Duration

The Abhidhamma refers to 28 forms which are the aspects of the aggregate of form. Form is evanescent and mind is still more so. During the life-span of one form 17 thought-moments pass which means that a form has 17 times longer span of life than that of a thought. This suggests that 17 seventeen thoughts have to pass in order to comprehend a form fully.

How can we understand this? We do feel the change of thoughts and we do see the change of forms, but not at such a great speed. A tender leaf of *Asoka* is slightly red, and within one or two days it turns an extreme red; the light red is no longer there and it has been substituted by dark red which, in another few days, turns green. We do see this change of forms, but we do not see the process of this change taking place. What really does undergo such a change? They are forms, namely, such primary forms as earth, water, heat and air. How many such primary forms are there in an *Asoka* leaf?— Practically more than millions. An atom and the split parts of an atom too are such forms. Now the leaf is not one form but a combination of primary forms or a mass of atoms. The primary forms in this object are in the process of constant and instantaneous birth and disintegration which lasts for 17 moments. Therefore forms have a life-span of 17 thought-moments.

We are able to see the birth, existence and the disintegration of those primary forms also in greater magnitude. The manner of such an appearance is also considered a form; it is a 'character form'. We perceive it in three ways: First we see a tender leaf of *Asoka*, and subsequently we see the leaf in maturity; the forms that comprised the tender leaf are no longer in the mature leaf, nevertheless, it is the same leaf. In this process, the leaf represents the integration (*upacaya*) form; the mature leaf represents the *jaratā* decayed form; and to know that both are identical is the *santati*, continuity-form. The object of this perception is mass and not individual atoms.

What is that form which has a life-span of 17 thought-moments in a thought-path?

A Jasmine is a flower which would not exhaust its life-span by being an object to an eye or by one's knowing that it is a flower. We know that flower continues to be. The flower is a mass of forms. Within the flower, such primary forms as earth etc. and the forms of colour, smell, taste and substance (*ojā*) constantly undergo a process of birth and disintegration which, of course, we are not able to perceive at once. We do see this afterwards (*viz.* when the flower is withered). The life-span of a mass of forms that existed when the flower was first seen may have been 17 thought-moments. What is seen after the lapse of 17 thought-moments is a mass of forms originated anew. This much is clear, but what kind of form is it which has lasted two, four or fifteen thought-moments within big, small or very small thought-paths?

The maximum life-span of a man is 100 years. Suppose we see a man 90 years old and 10 more years remaining. Is this perception of ours comparable to perceiving a form which has passed about 15 thought-

moments and has 2 moments remaining (viz. perceiving a very small object)? Or is it the case that the life-span of the very small object has passed as in the case of the man? Do all forms (primary forms and atoms) have an equal span of life, or do they differ from one another in this respect? Nothing has been said on this matter. This is problematic.

It is wrong to take a life-span of a form as that of a mass of forms. Such objects as flowers, trees and fruits are masses of objects for it is clear that they have longer life than 17 thought-moments. The life-span of a primary form such as earth may be taken as 17 thought-moments, but such a form does not fit the case of a form which has passed about 15 thought-moments. In the thought-path pertaining to the five doors what is taken as form is a mass of forms and not primary (atomic) forms. Therefore what is meant by 'life-span of a form', according to our understanding, is the time required for the comprehension of a form (composite form). It is necessary that there must pass 17 thought-moments in order for the full comprehension of a form to take place. What gets decreased is only the thought-moments and not anything that belongs to the form. By decreasing the thought-moments what gets decreased is not the form but the understanding thereof. Therefore I think that the life-span of a form has to be understood as 'the life-span of the comprehension of a form' According to this interpretation, there are four stages of comprehension involved in the perception pertaining to the five doors:

1. Very big (registering term)(*atimahantārammaṇa*)
2. Big (impulsion term) (*mahantārammaṇa*)
3. Small (determining term) (*parittārammaṇa*)
4. Very small (empty term) (*atiparittārammaṇa*)

The duration of the knowledge of the objects of the mind-door is shorter. Such objects which are either illuminated or unilluminated last thirteen or eleven moments maximum and in some case it can be as short as one thought-moment.

Two indicating forms and four character forms have a life-span of one thought-moment.

In any analysis of perception of reality according to the Theravada, it is necessary that the above-mentioned classification of the nature of the objects is highlighted. One must examine the simile of the mango (see below) in this context. When one goes through all the 17 moments one does not easily forget the object; even if that happens, it is easier to recollect it, for it is in one's mind.

The sense perception is comparable to the following: a man who is asleep under a mango tree is awakened by the sound of a mango falling, picks it up, eats it and goes to sleep again. The object in this context is

very big. As the man may not go beyond seeing the mango, an object may reach the faculty but may not reach the stage of impulsion; then it is small. The rest has to be understood in this manner.

Own-Nature and General Nature

This is an interesting and deep phenomenon. In order to understand this clearly one must, for a moment, forget everything said on this in the other systems of philosophy and view the matter purely from the Theravāda point of view. The Theravādins also have admitted that a form has both its own-nature and a general nature: Before examining this, we need to examine the Buddha's account of 'characteristics'.

The Buddha has said that there are three characteristics of form and formless phenomena, namely, impermanence, suffering and non-substantiality. He has said that all phenomena except nirvāṇa has these characteristics. However, non-substantiality is common to nirvana too.¹⁷ Are these three signata the own-nature or the general nature of phenomena? Own-nature has been defined as the unique characteristic of phenomena (form etc.).¹⁸ The three characteristics such as impermanence etc. cannot be own-nature for they are common to all phenomena and shared by all.¹⁹ From this it is clear that what becomes the object of the aryan perception is general nature of the phenomena. Nevertheless, the contemplation on the own-nature also belongs to the transcendental perception.²⁰

Form is what is subject to disintegration; it does not have the character of feeling. Therefore disintegration is the own-nature of form. Here 'disintegration' means the changing character of matter. It is the own-nature.

Furthermore, it is said that, in understanding the phenomena, one must know their 'characteristics, taste,²¹ appearance and proximate phenomena'. Even in this classification what comes first is the own-nature of forms etc., not their general nature. All these lead to the conclusion that, in realizing truth, the Āryan perceives both the own-nature and the general nature of phenomena.²²

17. *Sabbe dhammā anattā. (Dhammapada.)*

18. *Salakkhaṇam nāma dhammānam anaññasādhāraṇa sabhāvo. (Vism.)*

19. *Rupam aniccam vedanā aniccā ādinā nayena dhammānam sāmāññalakkhaṇam āropetvā pavattā lakkhaṇārammaṇika vipassanā paññā tīraṇa pariññā nāma. (Vism.)*

20. *Ruppanalakkhaṇam rūpam vedayitalakkhaṇā vedanāti evam dhammānam paccatta lakkhaṇa sullakkhaṇa vasena pavattā paññā ñāta pariññā. (Vism.)*

21. 'Characteristics' and 'taste' are used synonymously. (Vism.)

22. This does away with Dharmakīrti's view (*Nyāyabindu* ch. 1. formula: 6 & 7.)

In perceiving forms, there cannot be a similarity between the characteristics an Ārya and a worldling would see in them. The ārya sees the three signata, and he does not grasp them as worthy of craving, conceit and views. Nevertheless, the Ārya too, following the convention of the world, is engaged in the discourse of perception. 'To say what is seen as seen' is the conventional perception of the Ārya. Here the manner of perceiving a form between an Ārya and a worldling must be similar. When both an Ārya and a worldling says that they have seen a man on the road,²³ there cannot be a difference in the etymological meaning of what they say, for it is a mere convention. Nor is there a difference of components that causes perception in the two. Now what characteristic of the form (of the man) was the object of this conventional perception of 'what is seen'- own-nature or a general nature or both? This has to be analysed according to the Theravāda and not according to the other philosophies.

Distinction Between Own-Nature and General Nature

Form is an element. (Sound, smell, taste and touch too are elements.) Taken separately, it is many, namely, man, tree, stone etc. Each of these forms has a name. Each has its sub-divisions which are ultimately the same. For example: man is a form; it is different form such others as elephant, tree and stone. The name of that particular form is 'man'. Man has sub-divisions, namely, Europeans, Africans, Asians etc. They themselves are (the sub-divisions of) man.

What is the own-nature of this element called 'man'? What is its general nature? Man's own-nature is his unique nature which is not shared by non-humans. Straight walk, speech and wearing clothes etc. are his own-nature; but to eat, sleep and walk etc are his general nature. What is unique to all men is a general nature of each individual man. Therefore there must be a different own-nature for each man. For example, for a dark man darkness may be his own-nature; but among dark men it becomes a general nature. This shows that any own-nature may turn out to be a general nature in the process of generalization. However, in the final analysis, every form has one or more own-natures. This is not to mention that there can be a number of general natures. Own-nature is the unique characteristic as exhibited in the case of a child who recognizes its mother merely by seeing. The statement, 'I have seen elephants' is a result of a perception of a unique character of elephants not shared by any other animal.

23. The arhant uses conventional language to report to the Buddha what they perceived.

When I say that ‘I have seen the valiant elephant of Panamure’ the own-nature of elephants become the general nature; what becomes the own-nature is something unique to the elephant of Panamure. These considerations lead to the conclusion that own-nature is the unique character of the subject.

What is referred to by ‘*nānattakāya*’ (diverse figure) in the doctrine is own-nature; ‘*ekattakāya*’ refers to the general nature. Furthermore, ‘*vemattatā*’ (diversity) and ‘*ekattatā*’ (one-ness) in the *Netti* also refer to own-nature and the general nature respectively.

According to the Theravāda Buddhist philosophy, what becomes the object of eye is only the sphere of form. It is a visible (*sanidassan*) form. The rest is all non-visible (*anidassana*).²⁴ The sphere of form is nothing other than colour and shape etc.²⁵ Therefore perception is not through physical eye but through mind. Mind also perceives the thought-objects (namely, the perception of what is known). The distinction between ‘what is seen’ and ‘what is known’ is subtle. It will be clarified in the analysis of ‘what is known’.

In the classification of ‘*lakkhaṇa, rasa, paccupaṭṭhāna, padaṭṭhāna*’ the proximate reason (*padaṭṭhāna*) has an affinity to own-nature.

Own-Nature and General Nature in Other Philosophies

Dharmakīrti, the author of the *Nyāyabindu*, defines ‘own-nature’ in the following manner: “own-nature is that (characteristic) the proximity or the distance of which makes a difference in the way of perceiving an object.²⁶” According to this, there can be more than one own-nature depending on the stages of the same perception. What was own-nature before may become a general nature after.

Seeing from a distance someone coming, one may say: “someone is coming”. If that concludes his perception, the own-nature in that context is only the human-ness of one who comes; being live is the general nature. If he were to see further he would know that it is a woman. Now the own-nature is the person’s femininity. Human-ness referred to earlier now becomes a general nature. Seeing still further he would know that it is his mother. Now femininity becomes a general nature and her ‘motherhood’ becomes the own-nature.

24. *Katamam tam rūpam sanidassanam? rūpāyatanam, idam tam rūpam sanidassanam.* (Dhammasaṅgani- rūpakanda).

25. *Katamam tam rūpam rūpāyatanam? yam rūpam catunnam mahabhūtānam upādāya vaṇṇanibhā sanidassanam sappatigham nīlam pītam: dīgham rassam: ninnam thalam chāyā ātapo āloko andhakāro abbhā mahikā dhūmo...* (Dhammasaṅgani-rūpakanda).

26. *Yasyārthasya sannidhānāsannidhānābhyām gñānapratibhāsastat svalakṣaṇam.* (*Nyāyabindu*-formula:6).

Thus own-nature is not one particular thing unique to the object (form) in discussion. It is not a unique characteristic shared by this particular mother and the other mothers. Neither is it something not unique (it is not a characteristic shared by such others as mother-in-law, father, brother or sister of the person concerned). Dharmakīrti says that the object of perception is own-nature and the object of inference is general nature.²⁷ According to the Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy, the only absolute truth is own-nature.²⁸ It is their view that general nature is not a truth but a mere name. Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas do not talk about own-nature, but they have a basic category called ‘distinction’ (*viśeṣa*). According to their view, ‘distinction’ is the characteristic which distinguishes one matter, say, earth-element which is permanent from another similar matter. The distinction between an atom of earth and an atom of water is ‘distinction’. Among their seven categories, they also have ‘generality’ (*sāmānya*) which signifies the general nature. They classify perception first into two, worldly and non-worldly, and then the latter again into three, the first of which is the perception of the general nature. According to them to know that all men are mortal is a non-worldly perception of general nature. How can this conclusion be drawn without actually seeing that all men die? Nevertheless it is a perception for them.

In western philosophy own-nature or ‘distinction’ and general nature comes in the analysis of categories. In classifying something they include distinction (species) as sub-group of the generality (genus). It is believed that a category contains both these characteristics (denotation or generality and connotation or distinction). In the like manner propositions, according to their characteristics, are divided into two: general (universal propositions) and special (particular propositions). Any details of these are not called for in the present context.

Theravāda Conclusion

It has already been mentioned that, according to the Theravāda, perception is twofold as ‘ārya’ and ‘conventional’ and that the conventional perception is common also to the ārya. This compels us to conclude that both own-nature and the general nature of an object can be the field of the conventional perception which is of what is seen, heard, felt and known. This was mentioned in the chapter on the Āryan knowledge.

In perceiving an object one perceives first the general nature; own-nature follows. In the thought-path upto determining, thoughts

27. *Anyat sāmānya lakṣaṇam sonumānasya viśayah. Ibid.*

28. *Tadeva paramārtha sat. Ibid.*

perceive the general nature of the object, during the rest, it is the own-nature. One may argue that what becomes object of faculties is the own-nature and what does not become object of faculties is the general nature; but this is erroneous, for the same form contains both.

There are a few difficulties to be resolved:

1. Is it the case that only own-nature is the object of perception (as held by the Mahāyānists)?
2. Are there instances where only the general nature is the object of perception (as held by the Naiyāyikas)?
3. Is it the case that the two become objects together and not alone?

The solution of these difficulties depends on how one interprets these natures. It is possible for own-nature to be either a form-object or a subtle form which belongs to a concept-object. For example, there is a story of a woman who, fleeing from her husband, laughed aloud showing her teeth, on seeing a monk in his alms-round. The husband who was following asked the monk whether he saw a woman. The monk thereupon said: I do not know for sure whether it was a man or a woman; but I did see a skeleton passing on the road. What is the monk's knowledge in question here? Since he admitted seeing it must be the perception of what is seen. How do own-nature and the general nature apply here? The attention of the monk was focussed on her teeth just when his eyes met the woman's figure. Concentrating on the object of teeth, he became an arhant; but did not know that the object of perception was a woman. In this context, what nature of the woman did the monk see? In other words, what are the relevant own-nature and the general nature? It is possible that the monk who was in his alms-round did not look at the woman. Hearing the sound of the laughter his eyes may have automatically turned in that direction only to see a set of teeth. The monk was in his usual contemplation of repulsiveness of human figure and this may have made him perceive teeth as bones. His assertion that he saw a skeleton is the result of this. The own-nature in this context is the (bones of) teeth; there are other bones, such as skull, ribs etc. which comprise the general nature. Since the monk took what is seen merely as seen he became an arahant by focussing on the same.

9. Knowledge arising due to the combination of ear, sound, space, coordination, attention and thought (*ābhoga*) is the perception of what is heard. Contact is the common factor in here.

Necessary components of the perception of what is heard are enumerated here. Just as light for seeing forms, space is necessary for hearing sounds. 'Ear' means the unobstructed and undamaged element

of ear. 'Sound' is the sphere of sound.²⁹ As in the case of the perception of what is seen, sounds too have their own-nature and general nature. The feminine voice can be distinguished from that of masculine; that is its own-nature. Mother's voice can be distinguished among feminine voices; that is its own-nature. Sound enters the ear, but becomes an object of the mind.

Usually the faculty of hearing is of 'hole-intention' (*bilajjhāsaya*) for sound always comes through space or holes. Even in a completely covered space one hears sounds through holes. Most of the obstructions pertaining to sight do also pertain to hearing. How 'what is heard' has been taken as means in other logical systems will be described later.

10. Form-object and sound-object are non-present-perceivers (*asampattaggāhi*).

Non-present-perception refers to the nature of deriving knowledge by the faculties without physically reaching the objects. This is clearer in the case of perception of what is seen, but not so in the case of what is heard. The contact between the faculty and the object is 'contact' (*phassa*), but not 'reaching'. The contact between eye and form refers to eye's entering the field of vision, but not to form's impinging on the eye. It is also through contact that ear hears noise. But did the noise actually touch the ear? If it did, then it is 'present-perceiving' and if it did not, then it is 'non-present-perceiving'. Even the commentators are not in agreement on this matter.³⁰ Some took even 'what is seen' as 'present-perceiver'. However, the view of Buddhaghosa is that it is a 'non-present-perceiver'. It is clear that it is only the reflection of a form but not the form itself that reaches the eye. Nevertheless, the approach of the sound is different. It is clear that sound is a kind of matter (which explains how sound can be taped). It is a question whether this matter approaches ear without any change. We have to conclude that it does, provided there were no obstructions. The movement is in accordance with the speed of sound. It is comparable to how waves gradually reach the bank when a stone is thrown into the waters of a river.

Knowledge deriving from hearing a sound is the perception of what is heard. What is perceived through it is not a form but a sound. There is also a means called 'what is heard' which is not a perception, and this will be described later.

29. *Katamam tam rūpam saddāyatanam? Yo saddo catunnam mahābhūtānam upādāya anidassano sappatigho bherisaddo...sattānam nigghosos dhātūnam sannighātasaddo vāta-udaka-manussa-amanussa saddo...(Dhammasangani.)*

30. *Aṭṭhakathāyam pana āpāthagatattāva ārammaṇam sampattam nāma. (Aṭṭhasalini).*

- 11. What is known through the organs of nose, tongue, and body is called ‘what is felt’ (*muta*). They are present-perceivers. Due to their common characteristics they have been taken together.**

This describes the perception of what is felt. The commentary explains this as the perception produced by touching, bumping and poking.³¹ Smell, taste and touch, the elements of earth, fire and air are felt only when they touch the relevant faculty. Therefore they are ‘present-perceivers’.

- 12. Nose-consciousness arises due to nose, smell, air and attention; tongue-consciousness due to tongue, taste, water and attention; and the body-consciousness due to body, contact, reality (*bhūta*) and attention.**

These knowledges originate by air touching nose, water touching tongue and primary forms touching body. The faculty of smell is of ‘space-intention’ (*ākāsajjhāsayā*). The cattle smelling earth would look up to the sky in order to perceive smell. One would pick up a pinch of fragrant powder with two fingers and inhale it looking upwards. Smell travels with the air. Tongue is of ‘village-intention’ (*gāmajjhāsayā*). Even the ascetics meditating in the forest would return to the village in order to taste spicy food. Water is needed for taste to be felt. Even dry food needs to be moisturized with saliva when eating; if not, one would not feel the taste. Body always yearns for the primary objects. Hence it is of grasping-intention (*upādinna-kajjhāsayā*). It is because of this that people would use their hand as a prop if they do not have a pillow to rest their head while sleeping, and would press even a ripe fruit in order to make sure whether it is ripe.

- 13. The perception called ‘what is known’ arises due to the combination of life-continuum, mind, concepts (object), seat of heart and attention.**

The perception of what is known is subtle and deep. Any comparison with the other systems may confuse the matter. Therefore, as we did in the discussion of own-nature, this needs to be studied purely on Theravāda grounds.

It was mentioned earlier that mind gets involved in the perception of five doors while it itself perceives such objects as forms.³²

- (1) If five faculties always co-operate with mind and both the five faculties and mind receive such objects as forms, it is difficult

31. *Mutvā ca munitvā ca gahitam āhaccagantvāti attho. (Papañcasūdanī, Atthasālinī and Sāratthadīpanī.)*

32. *Mano tesam gocaravisayam paccanubhoti. (M.- Mahavedalla sutta).*

to understand how mind can perceive an object (concept-object) all by itself.

- (2) When forms seen in the past or belonging to the future are perceived by mind those forms are said to be form-objects and not concept-objects.³³ If so what is concept-object?
- (3) Is it the case that there is no perception of concept-objects within the perception of form-objects or *visē versa*?
- (4) If not, what is the difference between the two?
- (5) Further, what is the reason for the existence of a separate perception of what is known when the five perceptions (perception of what is seen etc.) also involve a cognitive aspect?
- (6) How can this be understood?

All these questions ultimately lead to one consideration: The solution of the problem depends on a clear understanding of 'concept-object'.

In elucidating this point according to Abhidhamma, it is necessary that we examine mind-element and mind-consciousness-element first.

In the three perceptions of what is seen, heard and felt the role of mind is secondary and not independent. We say that one reads with the help of a pair of spectacles knowing that it would not help one who has lost his eye-sight. Thus we give more prominence to spectacles. In the like manner although the perception of what is seen is impossible without the help of mind-element we do not call it mind-consciousness; instead we call it eye-consciousness. In this context, the mind-element is represented by the fifth in the thought-path, apprehending-at-the-five-senses-thought and the seventh, the recipient thought. This suggests that the mind associated with the five faculties is called 'mind-element', and that it belongs to the present.³⁴

When mind acts independently it perceives objects directly as in the case of one reading a book without the help of glasses. This is called 'what is known' or the mind-consciousness. (Note how impulsion thoughts occur immediately after the apprehending-at the-mind-door

33. *Atthasālini* says; *Tāni anāpāthagata rūpādi ārammaṇāni rūpārammaṇādiniyeva*. However that they were taken to be concept-object is also suggested by another statement: *Ye pana anāpāthagatā rūpādayopi dhammārammaṇamicceva vadanti te iminā suttena paṭikkhipitabhā*.

34. *Paccuppannam rūpam eva cakkhuvīññānādīhi chahi veditabham manovīññānam pana atītampi anāgatampi vijānāti*. (*Atthasālini* p. 265 Hevavitarana edition).

are considered concept-objects for they are a kind of force generated by conditions.

How do subtle forms become concept-objects? For they are not perceived by the five faculties.

Water-Element Matter

Water-element is contained in water in high degree. When we touch water what we feel is not water-element but such other elements as earth. When we see water we do not see the water-element but its colour and shape etc. Water-element has flowing and binding as its nature.⁴² Although mirage betrays flowing nature it is not water-element. Due to their high containment of water-element, salt dissolves and lead heats. A drop of water fallen on dry dust would create lumps, and this is due to the binding nature of water-element. This phenomenon is known by mind, and hence it comes under concept-object.

Matters of Feminine-ness and Masculine-ness

These cannot be known by the five faculties. They are comprehended by mind with the help of the five faculties. There are so many 'ness'es in the world: human-ness, woman-ness, man-ness, bull-ness, ape-ness, dog-ness etc. Among them, feminine-ness and masculine-ness is of particular importance. The faculty of sex has been divided into two. This can only be understood by mind. When we say that a particular man has a feminine walk we actually refer to the feminine-ness. This is comprehended by mind and hence it a concept-object.

Heart Basis Matter

It is the Buddhist belief that heart is the basis of mind. Consider how heart beat changes when an object capable of producing intense emotions is felt. Those yogins who can read others' mind do so by taking note of the colour of the blood in the heart. Therefore heart is a type of matter, and it cannot be known by the five faculties. Hence it a concept-object.

Life-Faculty Matter

We know that an image does not have life even though it may look quite alive. This is because it is devoid of life. Nevertheless, in a living being, we know that there is life. Life-faculty is a subtle form, known by mind, and hence it is a concept-object. There is a constituent of thought with the same name, but it belongs to mind, but this belongs to matter.

42. *Ābandhanalakkhaṇā āpodhātu, paggharaṇalakkhaṇā āpodhātu brūhaṇarasā sangahapaccupaṭṭhanā.* (Vism.)

In one who is in the 'absorption of cessation', there is no name-faculty of life but only matter-faculty of life.

Nutriment Matter

This too cannot be known by the five faculties. There is a close relation between life-faculty matter and nutriment matter. One is internal and the other is external. Life is continued by the combination of the two. The essence of food which cannot be seen is a kind of power comparable to vitamins. This essence not visible to the naked eye is still matter; it is subject to mind and is a concept-object.

Space Element Matter

We know space element as represented by a cavity, opening or room. What we actually notice is the gross matter. Space element is not perceived by the five faculties. If there is a hole on a wall what we perceive is the absence of gross matter. Therefore separation is its character. Even if we accidentally put our hand in a hole we do not feel space; what we feel is gross matter. This is not felt by the body either. Therefore it is subject to mind. It is a concept-object. Many discourses indicate that there is a close affinity between space element and nibbāna element. There is a deep secret in these two elements insofar as they are wholly devoid of the four gross matter.

Bodily Expression Matter

'Expression' is to indicate. When indication is done with the body it is called 'bodily expression'. By the manner of the movements of the body we know that one is engaged in a particular activity. The mode of movement is a matter known by eye. The state of mind produced by that movement in the onlooker is bodily expression matter, and it is known by mind.⁴³ For example: when a surgeon amputates a hand or a leg one does not get angry with him; but when the same thing is done by an enemy the reaction is wholly different. The identical act produces different attitudes depending on the difference of 'expression'. Expression is understood by even animals. That explains why a dog or a cow would run away when one takes a stone or a stick with harmful intention.

The goodness or badness of a karma has to be determined depending on its 'expression'. Innocence or otherwiseness of (a person involved in) a crime has to be decided on similar grounds. Although 'expression' has been categorized among matter it is in reality a constituent of

43. *Ayam hatthādīnam ākāro cakkhuvīññeyyo hoti viññatti pana na cakkhuvīññeyyā manovīññeyyā eva. (Atthasālini- Hevavitarana edition p. 96).*

thought associated with matter. It is mind-born. That is why it is a concept-object.

Vocal Expression Element

One's intention felt through one's words is 'vocal expression'. Sound audible to ear is an object of the faculty of hearing;⁴⁴ but through it the listener comes to know the intention of the sayer. This is a concept, and hence it is a subject of mind. It is taken as matter since it is caused by vocal matter.

There is a difference between an order issued by a king and an order issued by one who is performing the role of a king in a play. The difference of the 'vocal expression' explains this. Like bodily expression, vocal expression too is felt by even animals. This explains why certain animals follow vocal orders given by men.

The goodness or badness of vocal karmas has to be determined depending on the 'expression' concerned. When the Buddha said to Brahmin Kasibharadvāja that the Buddha too ploughs, sows; and earns his living by doing so (*ahan ca kasāmi ca vapāmi ca kasitvā ca vapitvā ca bhuñjāmi*) he did not utter a falsehood for the 'expression' was not bad. The apparently harsh words by parents and teachers to their children and pupils are not really so for they originate from good 'expression'. Any other similar instances have to be determined according to the 'expression' concerned.

It must be borne in mind that both bodily expression matter and the vocal expression matter are born of mind.

Lightness, Plasticity and Pliability

These three types of matter exist together, but differ depending on where they exist. Hence they are also called 'alteration matter' (*vikāra rūpa*). Although the *Abhidhamma* limits these characteristics only to living beings, they are also applicable to non-living objects. These three exist both physically (lightness etc. of body) and mentally (lightness etc. of mind). Lightness is *lahutā*; plasticity is *mudutā*.

Pliability is *kammaññatā*. Whether physical or mental, this characteristic is felt only by mind and not by the five faculties. This might appear to one as tangible matter (e.g. earth, fire and air) subject to the sentient matter of body; but because the tangible matter is merely a gross element its heaviness or lightness, stiffness or plasticity, and pliability or otherwiseness cannot be known by the faculty of the body. It is a concept and known by the faculty of mind.

44. Nyāyins call this '*tātparyā*'

Growth, Continuation, Decay and Impermanence

These signify four stages or characteristics present in one phenomenon. There is nothing psychological or physical that is not subject to these characteristics. *Upacaya* is the origination; *santati* is continuation; *jaratā* is decay; and *aniccatā* is to disintegrate or perish. No one can know through the five faculties the originating stage of any phenomenon. One may only know that origination has taken place. It is a concept and hence a concept-object perceivable by the faculty of mind. It is a subtle form for it was caused by matter. This applies to the other three too. These four types of matter are not caused by (such phenomena as) karma, thought, season and nutriment.⁴⁵

B. Thoughts and Constituents of thought: It is clear that they are concept-objects. For example, by means of one's physical expressions we come to know that one is angry. This is a concept-object, namely, the feeling of hate (*dosa*).

C. Nibbāna: It need not be said that it is a concept-object known by the faculty of mind. This cannot be perceived by the five faculties.

D. Designation: '*Paññatti*' refers to names in use: e.g. man, mother, tree, stone, Asoka, Lumbini etc. There is nothing that does not have a name in the world. If there is one it may be called 'name-less' which itself is a name. Is it possible to perceive 'name' by the five faculties? If the name 'man' is perceived by eye, any other name connoting man (in any other language) should not refer to man for what is perceived by eye is only colours and shapes.

Furthermore, forms perceived by the faculty of eye are not perceived by the faculty of ear. Sounds perceived by the faculty of ear are not perceived by any other faculty.⁴⁶ For example, 'Nehru' is a name and a designation. If the owner of the name is an object to be perceived by the faculty of eye one must not be able to perceive it through the faculty of ear. For one who is acquainted with Nehru both seeing and hearing would enable him to know Nehru. In this case, the object is neither matter nor sound. it is a concept, a designation and known by mind.

45. *Jāyamānādi rūpānam sabhāvattā hi kevalam
Lakkhaṇāni na jayanti kecihīti pakāsitam
(Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha.)*

46. *Cakkhuviññānassa gocaravisayam sotaviññānam na paccanubhoti, sotaviññānassa gocaravisayam cakkhuviññānam na paccanubhoti.... (Dhammasaṅgani.)*

A Non-Commentarial Method Concerning Means

The experience of knowledge caused by the dual combination of what is seen and what is heard passes through three stages. In this context, 'what is seen' refers to the knowledge derived from the five faculties, which comprises only the perception. 'What is heard' is not a perception but knowledge derived from report, namely, the means of (authoritative) words.

The figure of the Gotama, the Buddha, can be an object of our mind only by means of report. Following what has been seen or heard, to visualize another similar figure belonging to the future is caused by the 'dual combination'. That is how the figure of the future Buddha Maithreya can be an object. This (means) contains the characteristics of both inference and simile which may be either true or untrue, and due to the selfsame reason, rejected by the commentators.

Although this method was not accepted by the ancient commentators, Buddhaghosa finds place for it in his *Atthasālini*.

Conclusion

Now we are clear on the phenomena perceived by the faculty of mind. Due to the instantaneity of the life-span of mental and material phenomena it is difficult to know the distinction between the perception associated with the five faculties and the perception of what is known. It is as hard as trying to identify the waters of individual rivers once they reach the ocean. But it is true that there does exist a difference. This difficulty is further aggravated by the inseparability of certain matter (from each other) and the simultaneous arising and ceasing of thoughts and their constituents (a nature shared by all mental phenomena). This compels us to conclude that the experience of a concept-object is contained in the experience of matter-object.⁴⁷ For example, in using a new dress, its colour and the shape comprises the visual object; the sound it emanates due to its freshness comprise the auditory object; its smell the olfactory object; its smooth touch the tactile object and the happiness, (perhaps) arrogance etc. caused by using it comprise the mental object. Thus the same object causes different perceptual experiences. However, these various experiences may not be simultaneous.

Comparison With Other Systems

Dharmakīrti, the author of the *Nyāyabindu* has classified perception into four categories: sense perception, perception by mind, self-percep-

47. *Idam pana ekavattūsmimpi nānārammaṇavasena labbhati yeva.* (*Atthasālini*-Hevavitarana edition p. 94).

tion and yogic perception. The last is similar to the Theravada Arya perception or realization.

It seems that the first three of these perceptions occur in a single Theravada thought-path. In a thought-path comprising 17 thought moments, the first five (namely, life continuum, life continuum vibration, life continuum arrest, apprehending-at-the five-senses thought and the five consciousness such as that of eye) may be taken as the sense perception; the subsequent three moments (namely, recipient thought, determining thought and registering thought) as the perception by mind;⁴⁸ and the seven impulsion thoughts may be taken as the self-perception. The impulsion thoughts may be taken as the self-perception for they contain such universal factors as feeling and ideation. They take those forms perceived by eye as sense perception and those forms perceived with a closed eye as the perception by mind. Since the analyses of the two groups are not compatible in all respects a fuller comparison is out of the question.

The analysis of perception by the Sankya tallies with that of the Theravāda in many respects. Nevertheless, it has taken a different route as a result of its belief in a 'self' (I-making). However, the two systems are in agreement in holding that perception is impossible with the five faculties alone without the assistance of mind which, according to both the Buddhists and the Sankhyas, is neither atomic nor everlasting but subject to arising and ceasing and produced by causes and conditions.

The analysis of perception by the Nyāya cannot be compared with that of the Buddhists. The Nyāya takes the perception of what is seen, heard and felt as 'external' and what is known as the internal faculty (faculty of mind). The subtle matter (concept-object) believed by Buddhists is not an object of mind perception. Furthermore, their analysis of the non-worldly perception into three categories is confused. Among them, the first, 'perception of general characteristic' may be compared with the Buddhist 'knowledge by inference' which is an Arya means, but representative of yogic knowledge according to Mahayanists. The second, 'perception of the characteristics of knowledge' is a groping in the dark by the Nyayins. For worldly objects it may be taken as an inference and for non-worldly objects the same may be taken as '*anvaya gñāna*'. What they call 'the perception of the characteristics of knowledge' is to know without physical contact such phenomena as the coldness of ice, roughness of a stone and the tenderness of a leaf which are usually not known otherwise. The third, namely, perception born out

48. *Svavisayānantarā visayā sahakārinendriyagñānena samanantarapratyayena janitam tanmanovigñānam* (Nyāyahindu sutra. 5.)

of Yoga may be compared with the Mahayanic Yogi perception and the Theravada realization.

Non-Conceptual and Conceptual

Like the analysis of own nature and general nature, the analysis of conceptual and non-conceptual nature too occurs differently in different Indian systems. Its analysis in perception is extremely subtle. '*Vikalpa*' refers to imagination, namely, the indubitable knowledge. When an object is perceived by eye, to know it as 'something' and to understand its relation with its name is imagination.⁴⁹ When one perceives a rose, one first perceives it as something and subsequently, going by one's prior knowledge, concludes that it is a rose. Imagination represents the process of knowledge between these two instances. It is a (form of) conscious imagination. To know an object as 'something' is taken as 'non-conceptual' since it is without imagination, but to know (something) as a rose is taken as conceptual. The non-conceptual stage may be compared with the fifth thought moment (moment of eye consciousness) in the Theravada thought-path associated with the five doors; the eighth determining moment may be compared with the conceptual stage. There is no controversy over determining the conceptual and non-conceptual stages in perception. However, there does exist a controversy among Indian philosophers, on the nature of the influence of these stages in the process of perception: the Mahayanists take the instance of non-conceptuality as the *menas* of perception⁵⁰ whereas the others prefer the conceptual instance.

The Nyāya idea of the perception of recognition (*pratyabhigñāna*) is nothing other than the Buddhist 'ideation' (*saññā*). It is to know the own nature by seeing. There are certain things we do without thinking. For instance, in a deep contemplation, one may take a bath without minding the water. Actions of this nature may also be taken as non-conceptual.

Theravāda Method

Although the distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual has not been stated in the Tripitaka it may well be applied in the Theravāda analysis. In doing so, we may hold that the non-conceptual perception advocated by Dharmakīrti will be attained at the stage of realization involved in the aryan knowledge. 'To take what is seen as mere seen' is also the vision of the Arya. He does not catch by his knowledge the

49. *Abhilāpasansargayogyapratibhāsapratītiḥ kalpanā. (Nyāyabindu.)*

50. *Kalpanāphodhamahhrāntam pratyakṣam nirvikalpakam, vikalpa vastunirbhāsa-dasanvādādūpaplavah.*

convention which is conceptual although he would use such conventions as 'mother', 'father' etc. in expressing his conventional knowledge. Such usage comprises a concept-object for it (viz. motherness) is perceived by mind and not by eye which catches only colors and shapes.

Following this we may conclude that both conceptual and non-conceptual have been used by the Theravādins in their analysis of perception (of what is seen, heard, felt and known). Conceptual knowledge refers only to what is known, and hence the view of Dharmakīrti may be compared only with the sense perception.

15. Non-being called emptiness itself is a phenomenon to be known. It is (the same as) non-availability (*anupalabdhi*). It is a concept-object.

What is comparable to the element of non-being of Nyāya etc. is *suññatā* or emptiness, or non-availability of Mīmāṃsaka etc. This was described in the chapter on the Ārya knowledge. In this context, the difference is the worldliness. Is the object of this the space-element which is a concept-object?

16. Distortions and doubt⁵¹ in sensation, view and mind are hindrances to perception.

The Nyāya shows three non-veridical forms of experience, namely, confusion, doubt and reasoning which are detrimental to perception. Confusion, according to the Theravāda, is the distortion of sensation, view and mind. It is due to the distortion of sensation⁵² that one takes a mirage to be water. This is identical with *māyā* which is manifold.

Doubt here refers to oscillation of mind. There cannot be a doubt on something perceived. If there is then it is not perception. Although the Nyāyins have held that reasoning is not a realistic form of experience,⁵³ it is true that inferential knowledge which is a form of a veridical experience is a result of reasoning. According to Buddhism, realization which is also perception is 'beyond reasoning'. This view is due to the fact that if the apprehension of the invariable concomitance is flawed the reasoning too becomes flawed, and since the apprehension of the invariable concomitance is always unperceived it may cause concluding truth as untruth and vice versa. Furthermore, the doctrine (*dhamma*) is something that needs to be realized; reasoning applies only

51. *Katamā tasmim samaye vicikicchā hoti? Yā tasmim samaye kaṅkhā kaṅkhāyanā kaṅkhāyitattam vimati vicikicchā dvelhākam dvedhāpatho sansayo anekamsagāho āsappanā अपariyogahanaṁ thambhitattam cittassa manovilekho. (Dhammasaṅgani.)*

52. Cf. *pravṛtti visanvāda* of Nyāya.

53. *Vyāpyaropena vyāpakāropastarkah. (Tarkasaṅgraha.)*

for those things that need to be inferred. Therefore, the doctrine is beyond reasoning and unfathomable by the same.

17. Perception of ‘what is known’ which is undistorted by the above-mentioned is a definite means (of knowledge).⁵⁴

What is known is twofold: perceived and unperceived. The unperceived will be described in the next chapter. It was already mentioned that concept-objects, which belong to the door of mind but associated with the five doors, become the objects of the perception of what is known. This (perception by mind) may be shown as a definite means in the Theravada tradition for what one has realized in one’s own mind would not undergo change whereas the other (what is known by non-perception) would, and hence is indeterminate.

54. *Mā anussavena, mā paramparāya, mā itikirāya, mā piṭakasampadānena, mā takkaḥetu, mā naya hetu, mā ākāraparivitakkena, mā diṭṭhijjhānakhantiyā, mā bhabbarūpatāya, mā samaṇo no gaṇṇī, yadā tumhe bhaddiyā attanāva jāneyyātha ime dhammā akusalā... atha tumhe bhaddiyā, pajaheyyātha. (A.- Kalamasutta).*

CHAPTER IV

INFERENTIAL KNOWLEDGE

1. Inference is to know with the help of what is perceived what is not perceived.

What occurs as '*anumāna*' in the other systems occurs as '*anvayagñāna*' in Theravada Buddhism. It was described in the chapter on Arya knowledge. The subject matter of the present chapter is an analysis of its position in worldly matters.

2. In other systems, this is included in '*anumāna*'. It is the inference for the sake of oneself (*svārthanumāna*).

Of the two forms of inference, one for the sake of oneself and one for the sake of others, inferential knowledge may be compared with the former. Inferential knowledge is to gain (draw a conclusion), based on a previous perception, a definite knowledge on something not perceived. It is to reach the unknown through the known. The simile by Sariputta discussed in the chapter on the Ārya knowledge (p. 23) clarifies this point. The door-guard, having examined the entire wall and not finding a single hole, comes to the conclusion, using his inferential knowledge that none can enter except from the main gate. His earlier perception is that one may enter from holes. The inference-for-oneself he made is that none can enter since there aren't any holes. This may be expressed logically in the following manner:

Entering is possible only where doors are available.

Where there is no door no entering.

Here there are no doors; hence no entering.

Sāriputta heard that Sunakkhatta who left the order of the Saṅgha was talking ill of the Buddha amidst people. When Sāriputta reported this to the Buddha he said that Sunakkhatta lacks a 'dhamma-inference' (*dhammanvaya*) on the Buddha. In this context 'lack of dhamma-inference' refers to the fact that Sunakkhatta was not aware of such virtues as worthiness of the Buddha and his ten powers and four masterliness etc. Since he was not aware of those virtues he was not in a position to recognise them. The prior perception he lacked was knowledge or

recognition of those virtues and as a result of this lack of knowledge he was unable to gain the inferential knowledge.

3. **The object of the inferential knowledge is perceived by the faculty of mind. The objects are (visual) forms belonging to either the past or the future and to concepts.**

The object of inferential knowledge is perceived by the faculty of mind. Its objects are visual forms of past or future and concepts. On seeing smoke one concludes that there is fire. The object is fire which is not in the field of vision; it is a form but not a concept. To know that there is fire is the knowledge. What was seen was smoke; the idea of mutual inseparability of fire and smoke results from one's prior knowledge without which the inference is impossible. The prior perception in this context is to have seen and known the relationship between fire and smoke. That relationship has to be caused by the invariable concomitance and must be one of mutual inseparability. If these criteria were not met inference would fail and become a farce. Although it is possible to infer the presence of fire on seeing smoke the vice versa is not possible for it is not certain. The counter example is a heated iron. Smoke is produced when wetness is combined with fire. Wetness is the condition.

In 'where there is smoke there is fire' the cause of that conclusion is not the cause of the fire, for fire is not caused by smoke. Nevertheless smoke is produced where there is fire which indicates that fire is the cause of smoke. However our inferential knowledge of the presence of fire is caused by the presence of smoke.

It is true to say that 'where there is smoke there is fire'; but the vice versa is not true for the invariable concomitance is wrong. Fire is more pervasive and smoke is less pervasive. Smoke indicates fire; hence smoke is the subject. What is inferred is fire; hence it is the object. This indicates that cause is always either subject or object which is the cause of knowledge.¹

Suppose one who has never seen fire with smoke but has heard that where there is smoke there is fire happens to see a smoke and concludes that there is fire. Of what nature is this knowledge? Is it an inference or something else? Since he does not have prior knowledge of the mutual inseparability between smoke and fire this cannot be an inferential knowledge. It belongs in auditory knowledge for it is based either on a report of one who has experienced the phenomenon before or on what is

1. In 'the hill is fiery': 'hill' is the minor term; 'fiery' is the major term; smoke which is the cause of this inferential knowledge is the middle term.

said in a book. It is the means of sound. Nevertheless, when it is proved methodically it no longer is based on sound but an inference (inference for the sake of others).

‘Anumāna’ in the Tripitaka

The term ‘anumāna’ occurs in the Tripitaka only in a few instances.² Although there is a discourse in the Majjhimanikāya which bears the name ‘Anumāna’ the term itself occurs only once in the body of the discourse.³ The context suggests that the term has been used not as a means of experiencing reality but to denote a general sense of understanding something self-referentially, namely: seeing a morally bad person disliked by others one comes to know that the same would be applied to oneself if one were to be morally bad. The method opposite to this has been called ‘*upamāna*’ by the Buddha, namely, through one’s knowledge that one does not like harm one comes to know that others too would not like harm.⁴ Nevertheless, inference occurs in the lists of knowledges in the Tripitaka in designations other than ‘*anumāna*’. For instance, ‘*anvaya*’ or ‘*dhammanvaya*’ referred to earlier is one such.⁵ However this does not mean that there is no difference between inference in the other systems and the ‘*anvayagñāna*’ in the Tripitaka. The commentators have compared the ‘*anvayagñāna*’ with inference. ‘*Nayaggāha*’ too refers to the same. However, ‘*anvayagñāna*’ is self-inference whereas ‘*nayaggāha*’ is other-inference.

The Term ‘Takka’

The term ‘takka’ which occurs frequently in the Tripitaka⁶ refers to what it is supposed to refer usually. Takka is not a means but a method of thinking and an instrument of means, usually, of inference (as a means). This also becomes an aspect for one who takes tradition as a means.

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2. In the commentaries and in such (non-commentarial) works as the *Milindapañha* and the *Saddhammopāyanaya* ‘anumāna’ has been taken as a means.
 3. *Tatrāvuso bhikkhunā attanāva attānam evam anuminitabham yo khvayam puggalo pāpiccho...ayam me puggalo appiyo. Ahañceva kho panassam papiccho...ahampassam paresam appiyo.* (M. m. Anumānasutta)
 4. *Attānam upamam katvā na haneyya na ghātaye.* (Dhammapada.)
 5. *Dhammanvayoti dhammassa paccakkhato ñānassa anuyogam anugantvā uppannam anumānamnanam nayaggāho vidito.* (DA.- Sampasadaniyasutta).
 6. Cf. ‘*takki vimamsi*’, ‘*takkapriyāhatani*’, ‘*takkāyapattabham*’, ‘*takkagāhapaṭipadā*’, ‘*takkāsayaṃ*’, ‘*takkahetu*’, ‘*takkavaddhano*’, ‘*dhammatakkam*’, ‘*atakkāvacara*’ and ‘*takkikā*’. (usages)

There are instances where the Buddha has used the term 'takka' to refer to inferential knowledge.⁷ The Buddha also took 'takka' as (leading to) dogmatic views.⁸ Nyāyins too have described takka as (leading to) a kind of wrong knowledge. Nevertheless, it is not necessarily so, and this will be made clear later. It is of interest to note that not only the Buddha but also his opponents have discounted (the validity of) takka. His opponents have criticized the Buddha as one who is expounding a doctrine which is '*takkapriyāhata*'⁹ ('supported by takka') while the Buddha himself have responded to them by saying that the users of takka prevail only insofar as the Buddhas are not born in the world.¹⁰ All these suggest that takka does not lead to the absolute truth. In the analysis of the sixty-two dogmatic views¹¹ and in the classification of the teachers,¹² those views and the teachers who depend on takka have been grouped together. The Buddha maintained that all those are (instances of) untrue and dogmatic grasp of views.¹³

The commentators have classified the takkikas into four groups and include good takkikas in the fourth:¹⁴

- i. Hearing the statement of the Buddha that he was (formerly) the king Vessantara, one argues, on the basis of tradition, that if it was the Buddha himself who was Vessantara then there must be a soul which is unchanging and permanent and grasps a dogmatic view. He is the takkika of tradition.
- ii. Having recollected two or three past lives one draws the conclusion, based on the knowledge that one existed earlier, that soul is ever-lasting. He is called the takkika of past-life- recollection.
- iii. One who argues, on the basis of one's present prosperity, that at present he is prosperous, was in the past and will be prosperous in the future and draws the conclusion, is called the takkika of prosperity.

7. *Takkāya pattabbam tayā anuppattam.* (M.- *Anāthapiṇḍikasutta*).

8. *Takkañca diṭṭhisu pakappayitvā.* (Sn.)

9. D.- *Soṇadaṇḍasutta*).

10. *Evam obhāsitamattameva takkikānam-yāva sammāsambuddhā loke nuppajjanti; Na takkikā sujjhanti na cāpi sāvakā-duddiṭṭhi na dukkhā pamuccati.* (U.)

11. (D. *Brahmajālasutta*).

12. *Eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā kevalam saddhāmmattakena diṭṭhadhammābhiniññāvosanā pāramippattā ādibrahmacariyakam paṭijānānti seyyathapi takki vīmamsi.* (M. *Saṅgāravasutta*).

13. *Takkayatiti takko vā assa atthiti takki, takkam katvā vitakkevā diṭṭhi gāhino etam adhivacanam.* (DA.)

14. (DA. *Brahmajālasutta*).

- iv. One who argues that when this is that is and in the absence of that this is not is called the pure takkika.

All these four suggest that takka is a means of knowledge, namely, to draw a conclusion on something unknown based on something known through either perception or non-perception. The Buddha rejected this on the basis that it is not always true.

Takka is a Constituent of Thought.

In order to understand takka better, it is necessary to know its place in the Abhidhamma where it occurs as '*vitakka*'.¹⁵ '*Saṅkappa*' too means the same, and it is a constituent of thought. Among those thoughts pertaining to the sensual plain this is not available only in the ten consciousness-thoughts, namely, in the thoughts pertaining to the perception of five senses.¹⁶ If takka exists in all those thoughts related to the unperceived, takka must be included in all means (of knowledge) other than perception. This can be either wholesome or unwholesome. In the former it is called '*sammāsaṅkappa*' and in the latter it is called '*micchāsaṅkappa*'. This suggests that '*saṅkappa*' means takka. Saṅkappa is to think, and it is nothing other than the constituent called '*vitakka*'. It was mentioned earlier that vitakka occurs in what is not perceived. In the perception associated with the five sense organs it is not available. This shows that perception is empty of saṅkappa which means that it is non-conceptual (*nirvikalpa*) or aloof from conceptualization. This suggests that Dharmakīrti's analysis of perception agrees with that of the Theravada in many respects.¹⁷

What is meant by tarka in such usages as 'argumentation' and the 'science of logic' is a device either to support or to refute a proposition not known by perception. As a science, it (logic) is a highly developed field of study. Logic is needed both to know for oneself something not perceived and to impart one's knowledge to someone who does not know. It is not our intention here to discuss logic in the pre-Buddhist Indian literature or in the post-Buddhist systems of Indian philosophy. Nor is it our intention to go into details of the developments of logic

15. *Katamo tasmim samaye vitakko hoti? Yo tasmim samaye takko vitakko saṅkappo appaṇā vyappaṇā cetaso abhiniropaṇā sammāsaṅkappo. (Dhammasaṅgaṇi.)*

16. *Vitakko tāva dvipaṇcaviṇṇāṇavajjitā kāmāvacara cittesu ceva ekadasasu paṭhamajjhānacittesu cāti pañcapaṇṇāsacittesu uppajjati. (Abhidhammattha sangaha.)* 'Dvipaṇca' (ten) is counted by (multiplying as) wholesome and unwholesome.

17. *Kalpanāpodham abhrāntam pratyakṣam. (Nyāyabindu.)*

in Europe. Finally we may summarize the Buddhist view on logic as revealed in the Canon and the post-canonical commentaries as:

1. Tarka (logic) is a device to gain knowledge on phenomena which are not perceived.
2. It may be either wholesome or unwholesome.
3. Grasp on logic leads to dogmatic views (the opposite of which is the *apaṇṇakapaṭipadā*).¹⁸

18. (J. *Apaṇṇakasutta*).

CHAPTER V

ON WHAT IS NOT PERCEPTION

Knowledge deriving from means other than perception has been classified in many different ways in different philosophical systems. Mahāyānists have inference as the only other means. Nyāyins have inference, authority and simile in addition to perception. Some others take such means as *arthāpatti* and non-perception in addition to the means mentioned above. We have taken all these together in one unit: a-perception.

Inference covers a broad range of knowledge. It has been analysed variously and deeply. It is not our intention to go into details of such analyses in different systems. We already referred to a kind of inference called '*anvayagñāna*'; the rest of the inferential knowledge will be dealt with presently.

1. What is not an object of the five sense organs is what is not perceived. (There are objects both perceived and not perceived by the faculty of mind). (*Dhammārammaṇa*)
2. Its objects are past and future (material) forms and concepts. (They are the objects of the faculty of mind, and hence they are known by mind).

The category of the 'objects perceived by the faculty of mind' was taken by considering such phenomena as the realization of nirvāṇa and the perception of 'expression'-forms as kinds of perception. Nevertheless, this seems to go against certain Theravāda statements themselves. However our analysis results from giving more emphasis to the basic texts over the later commentaries. This (perception) seems to resemble Dharmakīrti's 'perception by mind' (*mānasa pratyakṣa*).

3. A-perceptions are supportive of perception.

The ultimate goal of Buddhism is perception, namely, the noble realization. Therefore all other forms of knowledge are considered supportive of it. However, in the field of conventional knowledge, all these are taken as forms of knowledge. One's knowledge passes through

several stages before it reaches (the stage of) perception. Some such intermediate stages are sufficient for the achievement of the desired purpose. These forms of knowledge, which may be either true or untrue, are supportive of perception.

The Theravāda method of correct knowledge follows an ascending order.

According to the Theravāda Buddhist philosophy perception or realization is the ultimate goal; but this is not the one involved in the perception of the five faculties. The faculty of mind ('what is known') involves a perception. All forms of knowledge prior to perception are supportive of it and are a-perceptions. Nyāyins follow the descending method of going from the highest, namely, perception, to the lowest. However, in the Theravāda, particularly in the word of the Buddha, the ascending method of going from the lowest to the highest has been adopted. Consequently, the lowest stage of knowledge, namely, faith is given first and the 'conviction based on reflection on theory' (*diṭṭhinijjhānakhanti*) last. The realization of the absolute truth comes last.

This applies equally to the worldly knowledge. The first step in knowledge is to hear. What is heard becomes knowledge-worthy only if it is accepted or believed in. This is (the knowledge deriving from) what is heard or faith. What has been believed in may prove to be untrue at the stage of realization; it is because of this reason that the Buddha described faith as having a twofold consequence. Nevertheless, according to the Theravāda, faith is the preliminary stage of knowledge. The seed of knowledge is what is heard or faith, namely, the act of belief.¹ Belief in what is heard leads to willingness (*ruci*) to realize what is so heard. It is the second stage of knowledge. This leads to the act of considering the 'ākāra' or causes and reasons etc. of what is to be realized. This third stage is called 'reflecting on reasons' (*ākāraparivitakka*). The process does not stop at that: one comes to a definite knowledge of what is to be realized by judging it with the help of a certain principle or view. This fourth stage is called '*diṭṭhinijjhānakhanti*'. One may stop at this or may proceed to realize the object of knowledge. Even if the person's willingness to know stops short of realization still the person has gained some knowledge; hence the above-mentioned stages are taken as means.

1. *Saddhā bijam...* (S. *Kasībhāradvājasutta*).

Saddhājāto upasaṅkamati payirupāsati sotam odahati dhammam dhāreti attham upaparikkhati tena dhammā nijjhānam khamanti chando jayati ussahati tulayati padahati paramasaccam sacchikaroti paññāya ca nam ativijjha passati. (M. *Caṅkhisutta*).

4. They are fivefold: Faith (*saddhā*), inclination (*ruci*), hear-say (*anussava*), reflection on reasons (*ākāraparivitakka*) and conviction based on reflection on theories (*ditṭhinijjhānakhanti*). They are of twofold consequence: true or not true. Due to that very same reason, they are considered indeterminate.

These five are means. They are not considered ‘anvayagñāna’ for they do not derive from perception. Nevertheless, one may gain knowledge by means of faith etc. They will be described later.

5. Those selfsame five phenomana are again divided into two: reflection by origin (*yonisomanasikāra*) and the spoken word of others¹ (*paratoghosa*).² Wisdom by reflection (*cintāmaya paññā*) and wisdom by hearing (*sutamaya paññā*)³ correspond to these two respectively.

1. The spoken word of others (Wisdom by Hearing):

- i. faith
- ii. inclination
- iii. hear-say

Authoritative Word.

- 2. Reflection by Origin (Wisdom by Reflection)
- 3. Reflecting on reasons=Inference for oneself
- 4. Conviction based on reflection on theories=simile and inference for the sake of others.

REFLECTION BY ORIGIN⁴

‘Yoni’ is the way or the right method. For example, the right method to produce fire is to use dry wood, not wet wood. In the like manner, the right method has been described by the Buddha as ‘yonī’⁵. A woman who force opens her womb so that her child can inherit its dead father’s wealth is one who employs a wrong (*ayoniso*) method⁶. Furthermore, reflection by origin also refers to the analysis by means of causes and effects⁷.

2. *Dve kho āvuso paccayā sammāditthiyā uppādāya parato ca ghoso yonoso ca manasikāro.* (M. Mahāvedallasutta) and (A. dasama nipāta).

3. *Sutamaya paññā.* N. *Sutamaye ñāṇam.* (Paṭisambhidāmagga.)

4. *Yoniso manasikarotīti upāyato kāraṇato aniccanti ādivasena manasikaroti.* (DA.)

5. *Seyyathāpi bhumija, aggigavesi sukkham kaṭṭham uttarāraṇim ādāya abhimantheyya bhabbo aggissa adhigamāya, yonihesam bhumija phalassa adhigāmaya.* (M. Bhūmija sutta).

6. *Ayoniso dāyajjam gavesati.* (D. Pāyāsisutta).

7. *Kimhi nu kho sati jarāmarañam hoti kimpaccayā jarāmarāṇanti. Jātiyā kho sati jarāmarañam hoti jātipaccayā jarāmarāṇam yoniso manasikāram ahu paññāya abhisamayo.* (S. Nidānavagga).

The Buddha has said: In the presence of what and on account of what do decay and death occur? In the presence of birth and on account of birth decay and death occur. Thus there was the dawn of wisdom through reflection by origin.

‘*Yoni*’ refers to the point of origin, root or the cause. An effect is produced by a cause. The selfsame effect subsequently becomes a cause and produces an effect. This shows that cause and effect may refer to the same phenomenon and that they are context dependent. Thus reflection by origin is identical with causal analysis. The conclusion one draws from such an analysis is not a perception. Nevertheless, it is a (form of) knowledge. In the other systems, this comes as ‘the inference for oneself’. In this context, factors that help inference are taken as ‘*Yoni*’. According to both the *Netti* and the *Vibhaṅga* this is the wisdom by reflection⁸. The reflection by origin is a means peculiar to the Theravādins. Among the five phenomena referred to earlier, ‘reflecting on reasons’ and ‘conviction based on reflection on theories’ are aspects of it. They will be described later. The fact that the above-mentioned phenomena are of twofold consequence should be applicable to reflection by origin too. In that case, the reflection by origin may be taken as representing the truth part; and the untruth part may be taken as represented by reflection by non-origin which is a fallacy.

The Spoken word of Others⁹

The Spoken word of others refers to the word of others or language. When we come to know something by listening to what others say this is the means of others’ voice. This comes in the Tripiṭaka as the wisdom by listening¹⁰. It was already said that this serves as a cause for the arising of the wisdom by reflection (noble perception or realization). In winning the āryan knowledge, the Buddhas and the silent Buddhas are helped only by reflection by origin; for the arahants, others’ voice has to precede reflection by origin. Even the great Thera Sāriputta had to have the help of the voice of the arahant Assaji.

In acquiring worldly knowledge, the mere others’ voice would be sufficient. It is an indeterminate means for it may be either true or untrue. When it is untrue it becomes a dogmatic view and an erroneous knowledge¹¹.

8. *Paccatta samuṭṭhitā yoniso manasikarā cintāmayī paññā. (Netti.)*

9. We do not agree with Nyāyācārya Abhayasinghe when he compares ‘others’ voice’ with ‘inference for the sake of others’ (*Bhāratīya Tarka Sāstraya* p. 141).

10. *Paratoghoso sutamayī paññā. (Netti.) Yoga vihitesu... parato sutvā paṭilabhati ayam vuccati sutamayī paññā. (Vibhaṅga.)*

11. *Paratoghoso diṭṭhitthānanti durakkhāta dhammasavanena diṭṭhi uppattito. Dve’ me bhikkhave hetu dve paccayā micchadiṭṭhiyā uppādāya parato ca ghoso ayoniso ca manasikāro. (Paṭisambhidāmagga Aṭṭhakathā - Hevavitārana edition p. 30).*

Faith, inclination and authority are included in here. It was mentioned that they are of twofold consequence. In the other philosophical systems they have been referred to by such terms as ‘verbal’ (*śābda*), authoritative word (*āpta*) and what is heard’ (*śruta*)¹².

Furthermore, according to the *Saddasāratthajālīni*, the Theravāda teachers have given the following three as the means of experiencing reality: accomplishment by perception, accomplishment by inference and accomplishment by confidence (*okappanasiddhi*)¹³. What is given here is nothing other than the means of perception, inference and faith. What is meant by *Okappanasiddhi*¹⁴ is nothing other than faith. This is a further proof for the fact that faith has been taken as a means.

6. The object of faith-means is either the doctrine or a trustworthy person, viz., the content of the oral communication of such a person. It is a conceptual object and hence it is known by mind.

According to the word of the Buddha faith is twofold: rational and unfounded. To be convinced by reasons as in the case of the stream-entrant is rational faith. To be guided by the mere tradition as in the case of the brāhmins in the *Caṅkīśutta* is unfounded faith.

Faith as a Means

The Buddha has said that faith as a means¹⁵ is of twofold¹⁶ consequence. One cannot realize the noble truth by faith. Once the noble truth is realized faith disappears, or the Āryan becomes ‘faithless’ (*assaddhā*)¹⁷.

12. *Sutanti paccakkhato adisvā anussavena gahitam.* (*Atthasālini* - Hevavitarana edition p. 89).

13. *Paccakkhokappanasiddhi - anumāna siddhi vasā*
Attho tīdhā bhavatīti - atthaviññūhi pakasito

14. *Okappanalakkhanā saddhā.* (*Aṭṭhakathasu*)

15. The expression *kevalam saddhāmattakena* confirms this. This occurs in both *Pāsārāsisutta* and *Sangāravasutta* of the *Majjhimanikāya*.

16. *Pañca kho ime bhāradvāja, dhammā diṭṭhevadhamme dvidhā vipākā, api ca bhāradvāja, susaddahitan yeva hoti tañhā hoti rittam tuccham musā. No ce pi susaddahitan yeva hoti bhūtam taccham anaññathā...saccamanurakkhatā bhāradvāja, viññunā purisena nālamettha ekamsena niṭṭham gantum vattati idameva saccam moghamaññanti...saddhā pi ce bhāradvāja, purisassa hoti evam me saddhāti iti vadan saccamanurakkhati natveva ekamsena niṭṭham gacchati idameva saccam moghamaññanti. Ettāvatā kho bhāradvāja saccamanurakkhati ettā vatacā mayan saccanurakkhanam paññāpema natveva tāva saccānubodho hoti.* (*M. Devadahasutta* and *Cāṅkīśutta*).

17. *Saddahasi tvam sārīputta saddhindriyam bhāvitam...na khvāham ettha bhante bhagavato saddhāya gacchāmi...yesam nu etam bhante aññātam assa addiṭṭham aviditam asacchīkatam aphassitam paññāya te tattha paresam saddhāya gaccheyyum...(Niddesa.)*

Assaddho akataññū ca. (*Dhammapada.*)

for he has realized by himself. For example, one who has not seen Mahiyangana by himself would trust his father who has seen it by himself and would believe in the existence of the place called Mahiyangana; however when he subsequently visits the place himself his 'faith' would disappear for he has perceived it for himself.

Faith is necessary to follow a religion. For one who has not realized nirvana it is not a perception. It is a perception only for an Āryan. Is it possible for one who is not an ārya (one who is not at least a stream-entrant) to believe in nirvāṇa with (the help of) inferential knowledge? It seems impossible for he lacks any prior perception. Nevertheless he should be able to understand the characteristics of nirvāṇa depending on his intellectual ability. What is the means (of knowledge) used here? The knowledge of such a person may be of several standards. The initial means of his knowledge is faith. He believes in the doctrine; and comes to know about nirvāṇa by listening to the doctrine which is the 'the spoken word of others'. This knowledge is a result of the means of faith which is a concept-object. Although a sound of speech is an auditory object it is not counted here. What is counted is the knowledge which is a constituent of mind and hence a concept-object.

In the other philosophical systems this (faith) occurs in such names as word-means, authoritative statement and 'what is heard'. It is twofold: based on seen evidence and based on unseen evidence. When a court case is decided based on a medical certificate, the acceptance of the medical certificate as valid is based on seen evidence. When we believe that the earth is global or that a certain food has a certain vitamin we go by unseen evidence.

In one's day-to-day life faith-means is used frequently. The religious connotation of 'faith' confines the term to religious domain. Nevertheless, in its general use, faith is to believe in someone or something. For example, door-man informs the official that someone is there to see him; the latter believes this. But this belief is neither perception for he has not himself seen so far; nor is it an inference for he has not experienced any indication of someone's arrival in order to infer. The only source of knowledge is the word of the door-man which is the other's voice. This knowledge is based on the faith-means for it originates from the belief in the word of the door-man. There are innumerable similar beliefs in one's daily life which may be either true or untrue. Hence they were described as having a twofold consequence.

Accordingly it may be concluded that what comes as 'word-means' in the other philosophical systems is the faith-means in Buddhism and that it is of twofold consequence.

Such Mahayanist teachers as Dharmakīrti have not counted this as a means; they have counted only perception and inference. Nevertheless it may be included in inference. The reason for the Mahayanists' not taking faith as a means may be due to the fact that it is not (a means for) a definite and correct knowledge. Nevertheless, since faith has been described in the doctrine as a factor that safeguards¹⁸ truth it has to be counted among the indeterminate means. Furthermore the Buddha's statement to the Master Kāpaṭhika reveals how faith and hear-say have been used as means¹⁹.

Furthermore, there is an instance which suggests that faith-means has been understood as comparable to what the other systems take as the inference for the sake of the other. In describing three types of teachers, the Buddha describes the teacher who bases his teaching on mere faith as '*takkī vīmaṃsī*' (one who argues and inquires) terms which suggest the characteristics of inference. However this alone is not enough to compare faith with inference. The next category is constituted by one who bases his teaching, as in the case of the brahmins 'of three sciences' (*tevijjā*), on hear-say. This is the word-means. The Tathāgata belongs in the third category, namely, that of those based on perception.

Inclination

7. Willingness to do something is inclination. The quality of inclination is a concept. It is not perceived.

Inclination is a kind of faith. It comes under the means of authoritative word. There are instances where the Buddha refused to teach other-believers on the ground that they cannot understand the doctrine since their inclination lies elsewhere.

Inclination is willingness; it also means choice. In the presence of more than one, one's choice betrays one's inclination. According to the Abhidharma, inclination is the constituent of mind called willingness (*chanda*) which bears the character of willingness to do (something). How does inclination constitute the second stage of knowledge? For example: one hears a geologist saying that a certain mountain contains lead and trusts him. His knowledge has faith as the means. Not satisfied with this he further strives to get lead which indicates his inclination. If he does not desire he may not strive to get lead; in that case, his knowledge stops

18. *Saddhācepi bhāradvāja, purisassa hoti evam me saddhāti...iti vadan saccamanurakkhati.* (M. Cankisutta).

19. *Na khottha bho gotama brāhmaṇā saddhāyeva payirupasanti anussavāpettha brāhmaṇā payirupasanti; pubbeva kho tvam bharadvāja saddham agamāsi, anussavam idāni vadesi.* (M. Cankisutta).

at the level of faith. If he were to strive his knowledge reaches the stage of inclination which is the second stage. If he reaches the third stage of 'reflecting on reasons' by inferring the presence of lead with some suggestive clues he may actually acquire lead.

Furthermore, inclination is a mysterious power in man. The reasons behind one's inclinations are a mystery to the others. Nevertheless, inclination plays an important role in realizing the desired effect. It is due to this inclination which may also be called 'will' that a scientist discovers hydrogen, a man lands on the Moon and one commits suicide.

Hear-Say

8. Hear-say is to repeat what has been heard. It too is known indirectly (*parokṣa*).

Hear-say is what has been said or a rumour. The knowledge derived from both faith and hear-say are equal in validity. Both of them belong in the word-means for what is taken as true is what has been heard. But these two have different characteristics; hence they have been taken as sub-groups of the word-means.

Like faith, hear-say too has been described by the Buddha as having a twofold consequence; therefore this too has to be taken as an indeterminate means. The Buddha has admonished the Kālāmās not to accept anything on hear-say (*mā anussavena*). The Buddha is a perceptionist; but he does not discount hear-say etc. completely. The Buddha did not approve of the practice of the Brahmins of 'three sciences' (*tevijjā*) etc. for they did not practice what they preached, and what they said itself was not always true. Nevertheless, the ordinary Buddhist's belief in the path and the fruits largely depends on hear-say.

Difference Between Faith and Hear-Say

Although there is no difference between them insofar as they are means, since the Buddha has referred to them as two distinct means, it is necessary to examine them for any possible differences. In the later Abhidhamma literature, hear-say is dropped and only the other four means are referred to²⁰.

From the Buddha's statement to the Master Kapathika²¹ that, first the latter followed faith but subsequently he resorted to hear-say, it is clear that both faith and hear-say were taken as means by that time. The brahmin youngster's assertion that he took what was said by the ancient

20. cf. *Abhidhammamūlaikā*.

21. M. (*Cankīsutta*).

brāhmins in the Veda as invariably true²² testifies to his reliance on faith. His belief in the veracity of the Veda is based on his faith in it.

When the Buddha addressing Kāpaṭhika said that his faith is baseless, for no one among the teachers has personally experienced what they claim and hence they resemble a chain of blind people²³ Kāpaṭhika replied that he does not go by faith alone but he has hear-say too for his support²⁴. The hear-say in the present context cannot be something organized like a Scripture but a report brought down by people.

It may be said that Buddhists believe in the Tripitaka out of faith and that they believe that the Buddha visited Sri Lanka from hear-say. It is necessary to examine how 'the logician based on hear-say' who is referred to in the commentaries operates. There, it is said that the Vessantara Jātaka (birth-story) is believed in from hear-say²⁵.

Reflecting on Reasons

9. Knowledge of invariable concomitance is reflecting on reasons. It is known non-perceptually. It belongs in the inference for one's own sake.

Reflecting on reasons means to analyse causes. In other philosophical systems, this occurs as inference for one's own sake. The ancient teachers did not venture to elaborate on any other method for, in the Theravada, methods of dependent co-origination and 'Paṭṭhāna' have been given in detail. However, the Mahāyāna teachers and the others have taken this seriously. The entire discipline of logic may be said to have originated from this effort. It is not our intention to go into the details of it at the moment. Nevertheless, we will briefly outline the method of reflecting on reasons according to the Theravāda.

It was mentioned earlier that reflecting on reasons and convictions basing reflection on theories, are included in the 'reflection by origin'. The selfsame phenomenon has been described as wisdom by reflection. Later authors refer to this as 'method-grasp' (*nayaggāha*). This reflec-

22. *Yamidaṃ bho gotama porāṇaṃ mantapadam itihitiha paramparāya piṭakasampadāya tattha brāhmaṇā ekamsena niṭṭham gacchanti idameva saccam moghamaññanti.* (M. Ibid.)

23. Once a cunning person persuaded a group of blind people to pay him money to take them to a place with better living conditions. He got the blind group to hold each other's hands and led them for some time only to desert them and to escape with their money. The Buddha compared the Vedic tradition to a similar succession of blind people who could never see for themselves.

24. *Nakhottha bho gotama brāhmaṇā saddhāyeva payirupasanti anussavapettha brāhmaṇā payirupāsanti.* Ibid.

25. (DA. *Brahmajālasutta*).

tion of causes has been referred to in the Tripiṭaka in such terms as 'examination', 'seeing-by-mind', 'investigation', 'endeavour', 'assessment' and 'conclusion'.

In brief, reflecting on reasons is to reflect methodically or to reflect causally. In this context, *ākāra* refers to cause; *parivittakka* means to reflect.

In saying 'whatever that is of the nature of arising is subjected to the nature of cessation': 'arising' refers to cause; to reflect that whatever arises also ceases is reflection. To see that most of the visible phenomena are subject to birth and death is to reflect on causes. Based on this observation, to conclude that everything that is born is subject to cessation is invariable concomittance. It is an inference for one cannot observe all the phenomena. Thus the one who uses this mode of reflection is called a 'pure logician'.

10. To draw a conclusion on the knowledge of invariable concomittance is conviction based on reflection on theories (*diṭṭhinijjhānakhanti*). It too is a phenomenon to be known.

In '*diṭṭhi+nijjhāna+khanti*²⁶', '*diṭṭhi*²⁷' refers to view or to one's accepted principles; '*nijjhāna*' is the conclusive knowledge which is also called '*nijjhantī paññā*²⁸' (discriminating wisdom); '*khanti*' is to fit, or to accept. Forbearance too is called '*khanti*'.

When things do not agree with each other there cannot be any forbearance. Hence the meaning in both contexts is similar. When these three terms are taken together they denote a means, namely, in accepting something as true, to see whether the new phenomenon agrees with one's already accepted beliefs, and to accept if it does and to reject if it does not. When an expert in the Abhidharma understands 'friendliness' as 'non-hatred' he is using this criterion. In the like manner, the selfsame Birth Story of Vessantara is understood by an expert in the Dhamma as representing the perfection of charity and by a literary critic as representing the literary taste of kindness or valour. Simile in other systems is only somewhat closer to this.

26. *Amhākam nijjhāyivā khamivā gahitadiṭṭhiyā samenti.* (AA.)

27. In some places, this term appears as '*dhamma nijjhana khanti*' instead of '*dhamma...*' M (*Caṅkissutta*).

28. *Nijjhāyatīti anekavidhena cinteti.* (*Mahaniddesa A*) *Nijjhānapaññā-nijjhāyivā paññāya disvā.* (*Abhidhammamula tika.*) *Nijjhānam khamantīti olokanam khamanti idha sīlam kathitam idha samadhīti evam upaṭṭhahantīti attho.* (MA. Hevāvitāraṇa edition iv. p. 292).

Nijjhantīti nicchayakāraṇena. (*Patisambhidamagga A.*) (Hevavitāraṇa edition p. 471).

Nidhidhyāsitavyam. (*Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad.*)

Is 'conviction based on reflection on theories' similar to 'the conclusion based on the invariable concomittance' held by the other systems? Invariable concomittance is a necessary aspect of inferential knowledge. Any error in it may invalidate entire knowledge. In a sense, invariable concomittance is itself a principle and a philosophy upon which it is hard to build a complete (theory of) perception. Nevertheless it constitutes a knowledge based on a-perception.

To say that 'where there is smoke there is fire' is an invariable concomittance. It itself is a principle; a teaching and a discipline. Seeing smoke on the mountain, when one concludes that there is fire one's conclusion is based on conviction based on reflection on theories (knowledge of invariable concomittance).

The Buddha has emphasized that one cannot have knowledge, pure and personal, without these five means, faith etc²⁹. This compels us to conclude that they were taken as means of realizing truth. It must be mentioned that this knowledge is confined to worldly phenomena.

There is a means which does not occur among these five, namely, reflection which enables one to claim emancipatory knowledge³⁰. This assertion based on a statement in the *Samyuttanikāya* may seem to contradict the above-mentioned *Majjhimanikāya* statement. However, the apparent contradiction disappears when the former is understood as referring to either worldlings or the other religionists, and the latter to the Aryan or to one who is endowed with the right view.

Appearances

1. Untrue and looking untrue
2. Untrue but looking true
3. True and looking true
4. True but looking untrue

In their discussions of the causes of inference, the other philosophical systems refer to erroneous reasons as 'fallacies'. What is meant by them are any pseudo-reasons which have the appearance of reasons but are actually not. Both Hindu and Mahayana systems are very much in

29. *Ye te brāhmaṇā evam vādino sassato attā ca loko ca idam eva saccam moghm'aññanti, tesam vata aññatra saddhāya aññatra ruciyā...paccattam yeva ñāṇam bhavissati parisuddham pariyodātanti netam thānam vijjati.* (M. Pancattaya sutta).

30. *Atthi nu kho bhikkhave pariyāyo yam pariyāyam āgama bhikkhu aññatreva saddhāya...aññam vyākareyya? Idha bhikkhave bhikkhu cakkhunā rūpam disvā santam vā ajjhattam rāgadosamoham atthi me rāgadosamohoti pajānāti. Asantam vā...natthi me rāgadosamohoti pajānāti, api nu kho'me bhikkhave dhammā saddhāya vā veditabbā, ruciyāya vā veditabbā...nanu'me bhikkhave dhammā paññāya disvā veditabbnti.* (S. Navapurāṇavagga).

agreement in their analysis of the phenomenon. Mahāyānists additionally use the terms ‘fallacious proof’ and ‘fallacious perception’.

It is our effort to elaborate on the Theravāda account of appearances. Although the Theravāda has not developed a systematic theory of fallacy, the Tripiṭaka contains a vast amount of relevant information which is far more interesting than that of the other systems.

The term ‘*ābhasa*’ is used in the word of the Buddha in the sense of ‘appearance’ which is also its usual logical sense. However, in the word of the Buddha it is not necessarily erroneous appearance; it may be either true or untrue. In other words, the appearance of the phenomena may correspond to their true nature or it may not. Nevertheless, the appearance remains the same. Therefore ‘appearance’ in the Buddhist tradition is not necessarily a false appearance.

In the Theravāda, ‘appearance’ constitutes an important method of determining truth.

Fourfold Appearance

The Buddha has analysed the phenomenon of appearance in the *Mahā Kammavibhaṅgasutta* (analysis of karma)³¹. He has also elaborated it in the analysis of persons³². There are instances where the Buddha would not refer to certain specific concepts but would articulate the sense of such concepts³³. All these lead to the conclusion that true or untrueness of phenomena are fourfold depending on their appearance. The four are as follows:

1. Phenomena untrue and appearing untrue.
2. Phenomena untrue but appearing true.
3. Phenomena true and appearing true.
4. Phenomena true but appearing untrue.

The Buddha’s own analysis of the four categories is as follows:

1. **Bad karmas do not exist; by all means he is born in a good place** (*natthi pāpakammāni sabbo so (sabbaso?) sugatim upapajjati*): The two claims involved in here are false for there do exist bad karmas and it is impossible for one who commits such karmas to be born in a good place. Therefore the assertion is false, and appears false.

31. *Iti kho ānanda atthi kammam abhabbam abhabbābhāsam, atthi kammam bhabbam abhabbābhāsam, atthi kammam bhabbanceva bhabbābhāsan ca, atthi kammam bhabbam abhabbābhāsam.* (M. Mahākammavibhaṅga sutta).

32. *Cattāro udakarahadā uttāno gambhīrobhāso, gambhīro uttānobhāso uttāno uttānobhāso gambhīro gambhīrobhāso.* (Puggalapaññatti catukka niddesa).

33. *Cattāro ambūpamāpuggalā cattāri ambāni, āmam pakkavaṇṇi, pakkam āmavaṇṇi, āmam āmavaṇṇi, pakkam pakkavaṇṇi.* Ibid.

2. **Evil-doer is invariably born in a bad place** (*Sabbo so pāpi nirayam uppajjati*). Although this statement may appear plausible it is not so for even an evil-doer, due to some of his good past karmas may be born in a good place. Therefore this statement is untrue but appears true.
3. **Bad karmās exist; I see the evil-doer born in a bad place** (*atthi pāpakammāni passāmi pāpim nirayam uppannam*). In here the two claims are both true and appear true for it is true that bad karmas exist and that one may see such a person born in a bad place. Hence this represents a phenomenon both true and appearing true.
4. **I see an evil-doer born in a good place** (*passāmi pāpim nirayam uppannam*). Although this may look impossible it is possible for an evil-doer to be born in a good place due to his good past karma. This represents a phenomenon true but appearing untrue.

Details of this analysis are available in the *Mahākammavibhangasutta* in the *Majjhimanikāya*.

The following analysis by the Buddha in the *Puggalapaññatti* also provides an example:

1. **Person shallow and appearing shallow** (*uttāno uttānobhāso puggalo*). This describes a person who is shallow both in his external behaviour and internal attitudes.
2. **Person shallow but appearing-deep** (*uttāno gambhīrobhāso puggalo*): This describes a person who pretends to be substantial but is actually not.
3. **Person both deep and appearing-deep** (*gambhīro gambhīrobhāso*): Person looking substantial and actually is substantial in his character is described in these terms.
4. **Person deep but appearing shallow** (*gambhīro uttānobhāso*): This describes a substantial but unassuming person whose external behaviour does not betray his inner depth.

The same fourfold category which is seen in mangoes has been applied to people:

1. Raw and raw-looking mangoes.
2. Ripe but raw-looking mangoes.
3. Ripe and ripe-looking mangoes.
4. Raw but ripe-looking mangoes.

Comparison

Of these four modes, the first and the third do not pose a difficulty for, in them, there is no difference between how they appear and what they

actually are. The knowledge in both cases represents a reality, for there cannot be a doubt about cause or mode. The rest, the second and the fourth, can be erroneous with regard to causes or the modes. Therefore, according to the Nyayins, these two represent fallacies of cause. However, according to the word of the Buddha it is a reality for, although the appearance is misleading, reality is the same. For example: the ripeness of a mango, which is actually ripe but appears raw, is a reality; what is misleading is its mode; therefore only the mode (cause) is wrong.

The fallacious argument would be the following:³⁴ All mangoes that appear raw are actually raw; this mango appears raw; therefore this mango is raw.

In this context, the cause of the knowledge of the raw-ness of the mango is its raw-appearance which is not true in all cases, and hence misleading at times. Here we have a false cause which is a fallacy of cause. The resultant conclusion may or may not be true.

12. Examination of purity and impurity of what is said is removal (*parihāra*).

What is said has to be supported by correct causes and effects. If not, the meaning may be unreal. Therefore it is necessary that the errors in what is said are pointed out and corrected. The Buddha has pointed out the errors of what is said by others. He has called it either '*parihāra*³⁴' or '*paṭihāra*³⁵'. In contemporary parlance, it is to criticize or to correct. Removal is one of the fourteen guidelines that occur in the commentary to the *Netti*.

The great *Theras* of the past too used this term in the same sense³⁶. '*Codanā parihāra*' (removal of criticism) is an aspect of the ancient system of grammatical education. The author of the *Saddasāraṭṭhajālini* claims that 'there is no removal if all (the causes) can be seen (*sace hi*

34. *Evam vādi kho bhikkhave aham nigaṇṭhesu na kiñci sahadhammikaṃ vādaparihāraṃ samanupassāmi.* (M. *Devadahasutta*).

Vādaparihāraṃ samanupassāmi. (MA.)

35. *Sace te bhante purimam saccam, pacchimam te micchā, sace pana pacchimam saccam, purimam te micchā. Ime kho bhante dasasahadhammikā pañhā āgacchanti, yadā tesam attham ājaneyyāsi atha mam paṭihareyyāsi saddhim nigaṇṭhaparisāya.* (S.)

Nanu evam bhante sappatihīrakatam bhāsitaṃ āpajjati. (D. *Paṭṭhapāda sutta*).

Appaṭihīrakatanti paṭiharanavirahitaṃ niyyāṇikaṃ vuccati. (DA. The term 'paṭihira' also appears in the *Kathāvatthu*.)

It seems that 'paṭihīrakata' comes from 'paṭihara+i>' 'paṭihari+kata>' 'paṭihīrakata'. It means: 'what is proved'.

36. cf. such usages as '*dosaparihāra*' and '*codanāparihāra*' in the (*Subodhālankaraya*.)

passati sabham parihāro na sambhave. 148). In the Sankrit literature ‘parihāra’ occurs as a principle of debate³⁷.

To criticize what is said occurs in the Tripitaka as ‘*upārambha*’³⁸. This selfsame removal occurs in the *Netti* as *sodhanā hara* (purificatory removal³⁹). It is this same principle that has been described by such Mahāyāna teachers as Dharmakīrti as ‘*dūṣanā*’⁴⁰ and by the Nyāyins as ‘*nigraha sthāna*’⁴¹.

This ‘removal’ is a necessary element in debate. In a debate there is always the possibility of the debate being spoiled by the opponent by bringing out false charges. Hence the Buddha’s emphasis on criticism substantiated by reasons (*sahadhammikam vādaparihāram*). The others have named it *dūṣaṇābhāsa* or *jāti*.

An example for removal⁴²:

Saccaka: Man who takes his physical body as his soul establishes himself on the physical body and commits both good and bad karmas. I hold that my soul is my body.

Buddha: Saccaka, if you think that your physical body is your soul do you have control over your body?

Saccaka: No, I do not, Venerable Gotama.

Buddha: In that case, it is wrong to take physical body as soul.

The argument here is that, if something belongs to someone that person must have control over that thing. If one does not have such a control over something it is not appropriate to say that one owns it. It is clear that one does not have a control over one’s body. Therefore it is wrong to take one’s body as one’s soul. What is asserted in this context is the claim that body is one’s soul. But the claim is erroneous due to the fact that one does not have a control over it. To show this is criticism, and to say that body is not soul is the removal.

37. see *Carakasamhitā*.

38. *Te uparambhānisamsā ceva dhammam pariyāpuṇānti itivādappamokkhānisamsā ca*. (M. *Alagaddūpamasutta*).

39. *Suddhāsuddhiparikkhā hāro so sodhano nāma*. (*netti*)

40. *Dūṣaṇā nyūnatādyuktiḥ*. (*Nyāyabindu*.)
sāadhanadosodbhāvanāni dūṣaṇāni. (*Nyayapravesa*.)

41. *Nyāyasūtra*.

42. (M. *Cūlasaccakasutta*).

CHAPTER VI

ON METHOD

(*Nyāya*)

Methodical examination of causes and effects is foremost among the possible ways that are relevant to knowing something not perceived. It is this selfsame phenomenon that occurs in the word of the Buddha as ‘reflection by origin’ and in the accounts by disciples as ‘acquisition through method’ (*nayaggāha*).¹ This is a means of knowledge which is deep as well as wide. The field of what is not perceived is larger than that of what is perceived. Reasoning is the instrument used here. In other philosophical systems, this has been treated as an aspect of inference. The statement of causes and effects is the characteristic here. Its analysis which consists of innumerable aspects has to be done carefully. The following analysis based on the four aspects mentioned below is a result of examining the nature of the Theravāda analysis of knowledge by a-perception and the inferential knowledge in other philosophical systems.

1. Knowing the effect on seeing the cause.
2. Knowing the cause on seeing the effect.
3. Knowing something similar on seeing both the cause and the effect.
4. Knowing an object on seeing a mark of it.

Causal Relation

Before discussing these four aspects it is necessary to clarify the nature of the causal relation in Buddhism. According to Buddhism everything in the world is an effect of a cause, or a causally conditioned phenomenon (*paṭicca samuppāna*)². Such an effect is not produced by

1. DA. (*Sampasādaniyasutta*).

2. *Katamo cassa ariyo ñāyo paññāya sudiṭṭho hoti-iti imasmim sati idam hoti imassa uppādā idam uppajjati yadidam avijjā paccayā sankhārā* A.
Ñāyapatipannoti kāraṇapaṭipanno (DA. *Pāsādikasutta*).
Ñāyena viharissāmiti kāraṇena viharissami (DA. *Sakkapañhasutta*).
Ñāyassa adhigamāyāti ñāyo vuccati ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo (DA. *Mahāsatipatṭhānasutta*).

a single cause but by many causes. For example, a tree is an effect the cause of which is a seed. Nevertheless there are many other factors such as earth, water and light which serve as additional causes. Subsequently the effect (tree) itself becomes the cause of a new seed which causes another tree. This shows that cause and effect are not exclusive categories; but inter-changeable. However, our need at the moment is not a general survey of causal relations but a study of the causal relation of a given phenomenon. This is what pertains to reasoning.

It has been already said that an effect may have more than one cause. Among such causes there may be one or several causes which are indispensable and some other causes which are not. The indispensable cause is called 'cause' (*hetu*) and non-indispensable causes 'condition' (*paccaya*)³.

In a causal analysis according to Buddhism, there is no clearer, deeper or a more comprehensive way than examining the 'dependent co-origination'. Although its primary use is disentanglement of (the riddle of) the existence of being, it is applicable to all animate and inanimate phenomena in the universe. The other way of analysing causality is '*paṭṭhāna*' which is equally interesting. A fuller analysis of the two methods will be done later. In the present context we have used all such terms as *hetu*, *pratyaya*, *kāraṇa* and *nidāna* to denote *hetu* or cause⁴.

Doctrine of Single Cause⁵

One may raise the following four questions in an analysis of causality:

1. Does a single cause produce a single effect? No.
2. Does a single cause produce many effects? No.
3. Do many causes produce a single effect? No.
4. Do many causes produce many effects? Yes.

In such contexts as 'volitional formations arise on account of ignorance' and 'a seed produces a plant' the cause is not single. It is clear that there are many other causes for the arising of a plant in addition to a seed. The plant itself is constituted by such phenomena as colour, smell, taste and (nutritive) essence.

Ñāyadhammanti kāraṇadhammam. (MA.)

Ñāyoti upāyo. (SA)

3. *Asādhāraṇa lakkhaṇo hetu, sādharmaṇa lakkhaṇo paccayo; añkurassa uppattiyaṃ bījāṃ asādhāraṇam, paṭhavi āpo ca sādharmaṇā.* (*Netti parikkhāra hāra*).
4. *sa hetu sappaccayāti ettha hetupi paccayopi kāraṇasseva nāma.* (DA. *Paṭṭhapādasutta*).sutta).
5. *Ekato hi kāraṇato na idha kiñci ekam phalam atthi, na anekam, nāpi anekehi kāraṇehi ekam, anekehi pana kāraṇehi anekameva hoti.* (Vism.)

It must be borne in mind that the use of the singular (eg. cause) is merely to denote the cause which is fundamental, known, indispensable and timely. Apart from that, there is no room for a doctrine of a single cause in Buddhism.

Doctrine of Opposite Cause⁶

It is the Buddhist view that a cause may produce effects both homogeneous and not homogeneous to itself. What follows are examples of homogeneous effects: By performing meritorious deeds (one) attains happiness; A seed of *kohomba* produces a *kohomba* plant; Ignorance produces demeritorious volitional activities. What follows are examples of heterogeneous results: Granulated sugar etc. produce alcohol; (It is believed that) Guava leaves etc. produce butterflies; Ignorance produce meritorious volitional activities; Thoughts are produced by seeing visions.

Although it is believed that eating *maññokkā* makes one grow large and that eating ginger makes one comfortable by controlling air, bile and plegm, if *maññokkā* and ginger are eaten together, that will kill the person. This is a further example for a cause producing a heterogeneous effect.

It has been further elaborated in the *Visuddhimagga* how causes produce effects that are homogeneous or not homogeneous; similar or not homogeneous in such aspects as location, nature, function etc.

The reason for causes producing heterogeneous effects is that phenomena are causally conditioned. 'Dependent' means the combination of multiple causes.

The Aryan knowledge on causality is twofold: comprehension of meaning and comprehension of *dhamma*. What follows is a summary of various aspects of them given in the commentaries.

Comprehension of meaning refers to the knowledge on effect; comprehension of *dhamma* refers to the knowledge on cause. This twofold knowledge is comprehended only by the Aryans classified as 'novice' (*sekha*) and 'non-novice' (*asekha*).

The method of determining through reasoning the accuracy of the knowledge on something not perceived has been explained in both Nyāya and the Theravāda. The basic characteristic of such efforts is to understand the causal relation. The effect represents the knowledge. In the search of its cause, we may come across either the real cause or a psuedo-cause which is described as a fallacy of cause in logical systems. Knowledge (effect) obtained following such a fallacious cause is

6. *Viruddho c' āviruddho ca - sadiś' āsadiśo tathā*
Dhammānam paccayo siddho - vipākāc' eva te ca na (Vism.)

erroneous. Therefore the method of determining the right cause has been expounded by various teachers and philosophers in different ways. This method is obtained in the Indian Nyāya as inference for oneself and for the others and in Western logic as induction and deduction. There is no such distinction in the Theravada. Nevertheless, it is our intention to elucidate the procedure followed in the word of the Buddha.

Effects of Karma and Causal Relation

It is known that, according to Buddhism, karma is volition. Karma is twofold: good and bad; and it is a constituent of mind. Are the effects of karma included in the category of mental or in the physical? According to the Abhidhamma there are 'effect-thoughts'. It is stated (in the Abhidhamma) that one experiences either agreeable or disagreeable eye-consciousness etc. due to good or bad karmas which are nothing but volitions. This shows that both karma and its effects are mental phenomena. Giving is a karma which has as its volition a thought of non-craving. If giving results in receiving wealth, wealth is a physical phenomenon and not mental. If so, how can a non-physical phenomenon produce a non-mental effect? This is a deep matter. Receiving wealth really means owning wealth; ownership is an aspect of mind, and it is nothing other than the eye-consciousness etc. which are the effects of good deeds. One must not misunderstand this situation by thinking that, if owning is a mental factor, how can a matter of craving come about as the result of a matter of non-craving. It is true that one can develop a craving for wealth once acquired. Nevertheless, the effects are merely to experience them through sensory organs, eg. eye-consciousness etc. but not the craving. A good deed cannot produce a bad result.

This shows that karma is the cause and its outcome is the effect. Nevertheless, there are no effects in karma, but effect is born out of karma⁷. The cause is one; effect is another.

For a person who walks into an illuminated room in the night there is no question of his knowledge of the presence of light for both the effect and the cause (lamp and light) are clearly visible. For one who sees smoke and fire on a mountain there is nothing to be inferred about fire for it is perceived. Nevertheless

(i) one who sees mounting dark clouds knows 'rain'⁸. Here the rain is the effect; clouds are the cause. What the person saw was clouds, not rain. This is to know effect by seeing the cause.. In this context, the

7. *Kammam natthi vipākamhi - vipāko kammāsambhavo*

Tasmā punabbhavo hoti - evam loko pavattati. (Vism.)

8. This is 'pūrvavat' (like what preceded) inference of Nyāyins.

effect (rain) which was the object of knowledge is a phenomenon belonging to the future.

(ii) In the like manner, when one knows by seeing the rays of the morning Sun in the room that the Sun is risen it is an inference. The cause is the rising of the Sun; the rays of the Sun are the effect. This is to know cause by seeing the effect⁹. In the like manner, one infers rain by seeing muddy water in the river. In these contexts, the cause, the Sun and rain, belong to the past.

Seeing smoke in a mountain one infers the presence of fire. Smoking is due to the presence of fire. Therefore the cause of smoke is fire; smoke is the effect, and it is the smoke that was seen. In this context too one infers the presence of the cause by seeing the effect. Some have got confused by mistaking smoke to be the cause. Actually smoke becomes the cause of inferential knowledge (that there is fire) but not of the fire. The only difference here is that (the effect) belongs to the present.

(iii) A criminal who sees another similar criminal being beheaded knows that he himself will get the same punishment. In this context, 'committing of the crime' is the cause; being beheaded is the effect. To know that he himself will get the same punishment because of the sameness between himself and the other criminal is the knowledge in this context. Although it is possible to take 'seeing' what is done to the other as the 'cause' of the knowledge, what really serve as cause and effect are actions themselves.

Further examples are: to be reminded of a friend by seeing one resembling that particular friend; to understand the impermanency of phenomena by seeing a withered flower, and Cullapanthaka's realization, by seeing the pure piece of cloth being soiled, that mind which is naturally pure gets defiled by external defilements. These represent cases where one infers something similar by seeing both the cause and the effect.

In brief, this is to infer what is described by a simile by seeing the simile. Both the Buddha and Nagasena have made frequent use of this method.

iv. It is true that to infer the bearer of the characteristic by seeing a particular characteristic is 'the inferential knowledge born of association of the character'. However, there is a difference, namely, that it does

9. This is the '*śeṣavat*' (like what is left) inference of the Nyāyins. The next category in the Nyāya, '*sāmānyato drṣṭa anumāna*' (inference by general characteristics) resembles the Buddhist characterization of the matter *upacaya, santati jaratā*. These are conceptual objects and are perceived by the faculty of mind. Therefore in the Theravāda this has been included in the perception of what is known. It is the same inferential methods that is applied in knowing such changes of Nature as the waxing and waning of the Moon and maturity of flowers and leaves etc.

not require an 'invariable concomittance'. To infer that there has been a flood by seeing leaves and grass scattered is different from inferring fire by seeing smoke.

Where there is smoke there is fire; but where there are leaves and grass scattered there need not be a flood. Therefore the inference is not dependent on invariable concomittance. Therefore what is indicated here is only an indicative knowledge (*sagnapti*) which we encounter quite often. The specific reason in this matter is to know the relation between the cause (*linga*) and what is to be proved (*sādhya*). Still the relationship is not that of inseparability. The relationship between the two is not made by 'exhaustive invariable concomittance' (*purṇavayāpti*).

ANALYSIS OF METHOD

Certain statements of the Buddha suggest that there existed (by the time of the Buddha) a 'method' used in epistemological exercises. An example is the Buddha's well-known exhortation to the Kālāmās: 'not on account of method (*mā nayahetu*)'¹⁰. The commentators elucidate it in the following manner: *naya gāhenapi mā gaṇhittha* (do not accept on considering method either). The word 'naya' has many senses. The most general sense is 'method'. This also can be interpreted as 'law'. The term 'nīti' which usually refers to law does not seem to have been used in the word of the Buddha. Instead what is used is 'naya'. Nevertheless the two words are etymologically similar. What is meant by 'naya' is the means to achieve a certain end. Although 'nyāya' and 'naya' are used very often synonymously there is a slight variation in the meaning.

It is our intention to examine the Theravāda analysis of method. The Buddha has also used '*pariyāya*' to refer to method. The word of the Buddha itself contains a number of methods. In addition, there are so many other methods elucidated by the Theras who canonized, compiled and commented on the doctrine. Buddhaghosa once described the entire word of the Buddha as an ocean of methods¹¹. The *Netti* refers to five methods to be used in elucidating the doctrine. The compilers of the Abhidhamma refer to two methods applicable to the Āryan knowledge. Thera Nagita, the author of the *Saddasāratthajālīni* describes 75 methods applicable to words and another 39 methods applicable to their meaning. This shows that the Pali literature is quite rich in methods. However we will select only a few which we think most appropriate.

10. A. & Kathāvatthu

Nayasahassapaṭimaṇḍitam sotāpattiphalaṃ

11. *Katamo nayasāgaro? teṭṭakam buddhavacanam.* (Atthasālini.)

Method of Dependent Co-origination

We would call dependent co-origination the phenomenon of cause and effect. ‘Cause’ (*hetu*) and ‘condition’ (*paccaya*) are the same¹². The *Netti* points out a minor difference according to which ‘cause’ refers to the primary or to the indispensable cause while ‘condition’ refers to any optional causes¹³. The commentators take the two terms as synonymous¹⁴. In the well-known dependent co-origination formula ‘*hetu*’ is not used; instead what is used is ‘*paccaya*’. Therefore the terminology goes like ‘conditionality’ (*idappaccayatā*) and ‘condition-mode’ (*paccayākāra*) but not as ‘causality’ (*idam hetutā*) or ‘cause-mode’ (*hetvākāra*).

The Buddha’s analysis of conditionality is twofold: dependent co-origination method and *paṭṭhāna*-method. In understanding the first, we have to be cautious regarding the use of the two terms ‘dependent’ (*paṭicca*) and ‘condition’ (*paccaya*). The term used is ‘dependent co-origination’ but not ‘conditioned co-origination’.

The fact that the commentator Buddhaghosa has strived hard to clear the terminological difficulty involved here is testified by his long discussion in the *Visuddhimagga* which runs through several pages. *Paccaya* (‘condition’) is a noun; what is conducive to existence or to the origin (of a phenomenon) is a condition. It is also the indispensable cause¹⁵. *Paṭicca* (‘dependent’) is an adjective connected to a verb. Both have their etymological origin in ‘*i*’ to go. This may be translated into English as ‘dependent on’ or ‘in order to’. The statement ‘*cakkhuñca paṭicca rupe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññāṇam*’ is translated as ‘depending on eye and visual form there arises eye-consciousness’. ‘*Avijjā paccayā saṅkhārā*’ is translated as ‘depending on ignorance, volitional activities arise’. In both cases, ‘*paṭicca*’ and ‘*paccaya*’ were translated as ‘depending on’. However, the more exact meaning according to the word of the Buddha¹⁶ and the commen-

12. *Sahetu sappaccayā.*

Ko hetu ko paccayo.

Tasmātiha ānanda eseva hetu etam nidānam esa samudayo esa paccayo “sahetu sappaccayāti ettha hetu pi paccayo pi kāraṇasseva nāman. (In such places as DA. Poṭṭhapadasutta).

13. ‘*Mulaṭṭhena hetu upakāraṭṭhena paccayo*’ (*Vism.* and *Netti.*)

14. “*Paccayo hetu kāraṇam nidānam sambhavo pabhavoti ādi atthato ekam, vyañjanato nānam*”. (*Vism.*)

15. “*Paṭicca etasmā etiti paccayo, yohi dhammo yam dhammam apaccakkhāya tiṭṭhati uppajjati vā so tassa paccayoti vuttam hoti. Apaccakkhāya nam pavattatiti attho*”. (*Vism.*)

16. In such contexts as “*telañ ca paṭicca vaṭṭiñca...*”, “*kaṭṭhañca paṭicca valliñca...*”, “*cakkhuñca paṭicca rupe ca...*” and *hetum “paṭicca sambhūtam...*” ‘*paṭicca*’ refers to congregation.

tators¹⁷ is ‘congregation’ or ‘union’. Thus the meaning of ‘*paṭicca samuppāda*’ is ‘co-origination’.

The congregation of conditions denoted by ‘*paṭicca*’ indicates the rejection of such wrong views as eternalism, doctrine of no cause and wrong cause and creationism. Co-origination denoted by ‘*samuppāda*’ indicates the rejection of the following wrong views: annihilationism, nihilism and denial of the efficacy of action. Since the term ‘*paṭiccasamuppāda*’ indicates the unbroken continuity of the phenomena due to the congregation of conditions, we have to conclude that what is meant here is the **Middle Path**.

How did the Buddha present the account of causes or the explanation of conditions through the method of dependent co-origination? The Buddha did it through the formula ‘*avijjā paccayā saṅkhārā*’ etc. The general law behind the formula is: ‘*Asmim sati idam hoti; imassa uppādā idam uppajjati*’ (When this is, this is; by the arising of this, this is). There are two parts to this law. One is *imasmim sati idam hoti*, namely, to say that this is, when this is, is one aspect of causal relation or one aspect of dependent co-origination. The second is *imassa uppādā idam uppajjati*, namely, this arises when this arises is another aspect of causal relation and another part of dependent co-origination. The reason for these two parts is that there are two aspects governing causal relations: **one governs the condition of existence whereas the other governs the condition of arising**.

It seems that the condition of existence co-exists with the effect itself. A tree is possible when earth, water and fertilizer etc. are available, and they are the conditions of the existence of a tree. The existence of a tree is dependent on the existence of these factors. The first part of causal relation, viz. *imasmim sati idam hoti* has to be understood in that manner. The same method applies to *avijjā paccayā saṅkhārā*. The ignorance becomes the condition for the existence of volitional activities, but not for their arising. Therefore the other part (*imassa uppādā idam uppajjati*) does not apply here. How does the idea of a congregation of conditions apply to dependent co-origination? It is true that it was mentioned that ignorance is the condition of the existence of volitional activities. Nevertheless, ignorance here does not mean only one phenomenon, but many phenomena. Along with ignorance, craving and many other similar factors are considered. This should make clear how a congregation of factors would cause a particular situation. Although it

17. “*Paṭimukhamitoti vutto hetusamūho ayam paṭicco.*” (Vism.)
“*Paccayasāmaggim pana paṭicca nā pacckkhāyāti.*”
“*Paccayatāya aññoñṇam paṭicca yasmā samam saha ca dhamme.*”
“*Paccayasamaggi paridipakena paṭiccapadena.*”
“*Paṭiccati nāvinā apaccakkhivāti attho.*”

is said that trees and creepers exist due to the earth it is clear that there need to be some additional factors for their existence.

The next part comprises the condition for the existence which is indicated by *imassa uppādā idam uppajjati*. This too is a causal phenomenon, the relevance of the cause is not for existence but for arising. When we say that a seed is the cause of a tree what we mean is that the seed is instrumental in the arising of the tree, but not for its existence. In this instance too the multiplicity of conditions apply, for a seed placed on a table would not produce a plant; it needs to be supplemented by many other factors. The statement *sankhārapaccayā viññāṇam* in the dependent co-origination formula signifies a relation belonging to the second category, namely, the condition for arising. The details have to be understood following the Abhidharma.

This shows that the dependent co-origination method applies to two phenomena, namely, arising and existence. Even this relation is not of a single cause but of multiple causes or due to a congregation of causes. This is comparable to the effects of karma which are twofold, namely, those effects of karma which cause existence and those that cause rebirth.

Paṭṭhāna Method

The second method in the causal analysis is the paṭṭhāna method. This is a deep phenomenon. Patthana is the co-existence of conditions (*paccayaṭṭhiti* or *paccayaṭṭhāna*). It also signifies the variousness of conditions. There are 24 conditions which are grouped into four categories according to their meaning. We do not go into details of these conditions for they have been described in detail in the 8th chapter of the *Abhidhammatthasangaha* and in the *Visuddhimagga* and the *Paṭṭhāna*. What is given here is only a brief account of them insofar as they comprise a method relating to causal analysis.

It was already said that dependent co-origination is to point out the effect of a congregation of causes (or conditions). Patthana is the determination of the specific condition under which that particular effect was produced.

There are reasons to take the 24 conditions as comprising a kind of method. When we say ‘*avijjā paccayā saṅkhārā*’ it is the method of dependent co-origination. However, in a deeper analysis of specific conditions of volitional activities we have to refer to such patthana methods as object-condition and inducement-condition which is the paṭṭhāna method.

Following this one may understand how one phenomenon becomes the condition for another phenomenon. Usually what has been analysed according to this method are mental and physical phenomena (that

comprise human personality). However, it need not be confined to them alone; it is equally applicable to any phenomenon. An analysis of any one condition would show this. For example, let us examine how the **object-condition** becomes instrumental for good and bad elements (*kusala* and *akusala*).

1. How does a kusala assist another kusala by being its object-condition? Suppose, having made a donation, one subsequently re-thinks the matter and becomes glad at his good deed. His act of donation is a kusala, or a thought of non-greed. The subsequent gladness (regarding what he did) too is a kusala. This shows how one kusala becomes the condition for another kusala.
2. How does a kusala become the condition for an akusala? Having made a donation if one were to repent his act it is a case in point, for repenting is an act of greed (which is akusala).
3. How does a kusala become the condition for an indeterminate (act)? The case of arahants who review their path having come out thereof is an example. In this case, the first path-thought is a kusala; the rest is indeterminate.
4. How do akusalas become condition for kusala? If one were to fight with an enemy first and subsequently were to take pity on him, it represents a case in point. The anger and pity involved in the process represent akusala and kusala respectively.
5. How do akusalas become condition for more akusalas? Having fought with an enemy (anger) one contemplates continuing the same (anger).
6. How do akusalas become condition for the indeterminate? When an arahant contemplates his past defilements his present contemplation is indeterminate; the past defilements which became the condition for contemplation are akusala.
7. How do indeterminates become condition for indeterminates? An arahant's contemplation of fruits and the nirvāṇa is a case in point.
8. How do indeterminates become the condition for kusala? By seeing the statues of the Buddha one generates kusala thought. Here the image of the Buddha is an indeterminate phenomenon.
9. How do indeterminates become the condition for akusala? One generates a thought of stealing by seeing a property. The property is an indeterminate matter. The stealing thought conditioned by it is an akusala.

Although this analysis has been applied mainly to psycho-physical phenomena, it is equally applicable to other phenomena too. What follows are a few examples:

1. There are fish in the ocean. Here the ocean assists the fish as the non-abeyance-condition.
2. "Lamp having extinguished, there was darkness": Here the extinguishing of the lamp was either the presence-condition or the abeyance-condition.

Furthermore there can be more than one condition acting in one single effect. For example, a tree is a phenomenon born of conditions. There is more than one condition for the arising and the existence of a tree. What follows is an analysis of such conditions according to the Patthana:

A tree arises from a seed. The seed was the co-nascence and the *karma* condition. The tree was the effect-condition. The tree exists due to water, fertilizer etc. They are the inducement-condition. The tree is situated on a mountain which is the non-abeyance-condition and the presence-condition. The tree grows due to rain which is the post-nascence-condition. The tree exists due to Sun which is the pre-nascence-condition. The tree continues to exist, a fact which indicates the existence of the life-faculty of matter which is the reciprocal-condition and the presence-condition. Thus we may see more than one condition acting in one phenomenon.

These 24 conditions may be sub-divided into four according to their significance. According to the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*, they are as follows:

1. The following categories come under the object-condition: the object-dominance-condition which is a kind of dominance-condition; the base-object-basis which is a kind of basis-condition; the object-pre-nascence which is a kind of pre-nascence-condition and the base-object-pre-nascence and dissociation conditions which are kinds of dissociation-condition.
2. The following conditions are included in the inducement-condition: contiguity, immediate contiguity, habitual recurrence, absence and dissociation.
3. In the *karma* condition are included its two categories, namely, asynchronous and weak.
4. The following conditions and many others are included in the presence-condition: nutriment, faculty, cause, co-nescence, reciprocal, result, absorption, path, association, non-abeyance and post-nascent.

Furthermore, in the *Netti* a method called 'the pattern of dispensation' is given. In addition to it, seven more methods of pattern are given in the commentary. They are the extensions of the aspects of the mode of conveying called 'teaching'. They are: satisfaction, danger, emancipation, satisfaction and danger, satisfaction and emancipation, danger and emancipation and satisfaction, danger and emancipation.

Four Significance-Methods Required for the Knowledge of Causation

1. Method of similarity;
 2. Method of difference;
 3. Method of non-manipulation;
 4. Method of uniformity.
1. **Method of similarity** is to see the correspondence between cause and effect involved in the existence of beings. In one who sees this nature, the annihilationist view disappears. However, by misunderstanding this nature one might get into the eternalist view.
 2. **Method of difference** is to see the difference between the cause and the effect. By seeing this correctly one sees fresh causes producing fresh effects and abandons the eternalist view. However, by misunderstanding this one might take cause and effect as wholly unreal and end up in annihilationism.
 3. **Method of non-manipulation** is to (know) the automatic process involved in causation, namely, the fact that effect does not 'think' that it will produce the effect; but the process takes place without any manipulation. One who sees this correctly, knows that there is no doer and gives up the belief in a soul. One who misunderstands this falls into the view of non-action (denial of the efficacy of action).
 4. **Method of uniformity** is to see the uniformity between cause and effect, namely, that the effect is in conformity with the nature of its cause and not otherwise. One who sees this correctly gives up the views of non-causation and non-action. However, one who misunderstands this falls into the views of non-causation and determinism.

Methods in Cause and Effect Analysis

They are Eightfold:

- i. 'Whatever...that' method
- ii. 'If' method
- iii. Temporal method
- iv. Analytical method
- v. Syllogistic method
- vi. Simile method
- vii. Case method
- viii. Particle method

i. 'Whatever...that' Method:

It is customary in the Pali language to express causal relations in sentences with 'whatever...that' (*yam...tam*) form. For example: *yam kiñci samudayadhammam sabham tam nirodhadhammam* - whatever has the nature of arising (that) has the nature of cessation. What is indicated is the fact that arising causes cessation. Here arising is the cause and cessation is the effect. If the particular thing was not born then it would not be ceased. The underlying principle is that everything that arises ceases.

Furthermore in *yadaniccam tam dukkham* - 'whatever is impermanent is suffering' impermanence is the cause; suffering is the effect. What is indicated is the fact that all impermanent phenomena are suffering. In this manner, all the sentences of the form 'whatever...that' may be analysed as causal statements.

ii. 'If' Method:

The Buddha has expressed certain causal statements using a negative subjunctive mood. For example: *No ce paṭhavidhātuyā assādo abhavissa nayidam sattā paṭhavidhātuyā sārājjeyyum* - 'If there were no enjoyment in the earth-element people would not have clung to it'. Here the enjoyment is the cause; clinging is the effect. In other words, enjoyment causes clinging.

*Sace bhāyatha dukkhassa - sace vo dukkhamappiyam
mā kattha pāpakam kammam - āvi vā yadi vā raho*

'If you fear suffering and if you dislike suffering do not engage in evil activities either in public or in privacy'. Here fear is the cause; not committing evil deeds is the effect. In other words, it is due to the fear of suffering that people do not commit evil deeds.

iii. Temporal (*Bhāva* - Locative) Method:

The causal statements have been made in locative case in Pali language. For example: *Imasmim sati idam hoti, imasmim asati idam na hoti* - 'When this is, this is; when this is not, this is not'. *Avijjāya sati saṅkhārā honti* - 'Volitional activities occur when ignorance is present'. Here the cause is ignorance; volitional activities are the effect. *Ninnam thānam unnamati gacchante lokānayaṅke* - 'When the leader of the world walks uneven places become even'. Walking of the Buddha is the cause; becoming even is the effect.

iv. Analytical Method:

The Buddha has at times indicated causal relations by analysing the phenomena. The analysis of phenomena is made by using such concepts as 'all', 'certain' and 'other'. For example, in *sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā* - 'all compound phenomena are impermanent' the impermanence is due to their being compound phenomena. The compound nature is the cause, and it means that all those phenomena that come under this category are taken to be causes. The effect is the impermanence.

'In *tayo*' *me puṅgalā andho ekacakkhu dvicakkhu* - 'There are these three persons: blind, one-eyed and two-eyed'. These three persons were categorised on the ground that they are persons and not trees or stones. Therefore being a person is the cause; 'two-eyed' etc. are effects. In here, persons denotes genus and blind etc. species.

(In a grammatical sentence), the direct subject or object refers to cause and the indirect subject or object refers to the effect.

v. Syllogistic Method:

It was already said that to realize something unperceived following something perceived is inference which is also the inference for the sake of oneself. However the inference for the sake of other may be taken by the commentarial term '*nayaggāha*' which is to make a causal statement by employing logical terms. What follows is an example: It is obvious that eye is impermanent. If asked whether or not eye is impermanent one should answer in affirmative. Based on this, a conclusion is drawn to the effect that 'eye is impermanent'. The next step is to conclude that whatever is impermanent is suffering. This shows that suffering is due to impermanence. Here impermanence is the cause; suffering is the effect. What was already known was the impermanence of eye; based on that piece of information what was inferred was the sorrowful nature of the eye. In a formal statement, 'eye is impermanent' (*cakkhu aniccam*) indicates the cause; 'whatever is impermanent is suffering' (*yadaniccam tam dukkham*) indicates the effect.

It is possible that this selfsame effect may subsequently become a cause to produce another effect. *Yam dukkham tadanattā* - 'whatever is suffering is no-soul' where 'whatever...that' method has been used is an example. However this is a different matter. The former instance was taken as representing inferential knowledge for it was dependent on former knowledge that eye is impermanent. It must be born in mind that entire system of logical reasoning is included in here.

vi. Simile Method

In order to explain a point, the Buddha has used similes. Simile is analysis by making use of comparison and (what is) compared (*upamā* and *upameya*). Following is an example: O, Monks, as a vessel of water turned down would naturally discharge its content and would never retain any water in, in the like manner, the monk who practises the eightfold path will definitely empty his unwholesome elements and will never retain them¹⁸. In this context, the monk knows how a vessel turned down would discharge its content. He further comes to know how the unwholesome states are avoided by the eightfold path. The cause is the simile of discharging water. The effect is what is compared, namely, the knowledge of avoiding unwholesome states. This is how one form of knowledge causes another. This has frequently been used in the dialogue between Milinda and Nagasena.

Any pair of comparison and compared may be explained by means of cause and effect.

Furthermore, it is quite usual in the doctrine to imply (what is) compared or the effect by referring to the comparison alone. Such means are known as 'methods' (*naya* or *nyāya*). What follows are a few of them: Blind-lame method (*andhapaṇṇu naya*), Lion-vision method (*sīhāvalokana naya*), Frog-leap method (*maṇḍukagati naya*), River-flow method (*nadīsota naya*), Ship and cart method (*nāvāsakata naya*), 'Bird on the tree' method (*rukḥhasakuna naya*), Crow-vision method (*kakaalokana naya*), Moon-charmer method (*candakanta naya*) and Deer-foot-print method (*migapadavalaṅgana naya*).

Blind-Lame Method: The blind and the lame earn their living with mutual help. In the like manner when two phenomena are combined and produce the desired effect by mutual assistance it is called the blind-lame method. For example, mind and matter exist in this manner. This is identical with the 'reciprocal condition'. In this context, the method

18. "Seyyathāpi bhikkhave kumbho nikkujjo vamateva udakam no paccāvamati evameva kho bhikkhave bhikkhu bhāvento ariyam aṭṭhaṅgikam maggam vamateva papake akusale dhamme no paccāvamati." (S. Balakaraṇīyavagga).

is the simile the statement of which facilitates knowing the effect. The same procedure may be applied to the rest of the methods. Details may be found in the *Saddasāratthajālīni*.

vii. Case Method

Cases are such divisions of nouns as subject and object. It is interesting to analyse how grammatical cases have been used in order to convey causal relations. It is customary in Pali language to express the causal sense by means of the fifth case. Nevertheless it is worth examining how the other cases too are used in conveying causal relations.

The First Case

In a sentence direct author (*prakṛti kartr*) and indirect author (*vikṛti kartr*) respectively denote cause and the effect. But when used as the subject author (*ukta kartr*) it generally refers to the cause.

In (sentences such as) ‘the doer of meritorious deeds became a deity’ (*puññakāro devo ahosi*) and ‘the stone became a statue’ (*pāsāṇo paṭimā abhavi*) the *prakṛti* subject (the doer of meritorious deeds and the stone) is the cause and the *vikṛti* subject (deity and statue) is the effect.

Transitive First

In (sentences such as) ‘Craving gives birth to man’ (*taṇhā janeti purisam*) it is clear that craving is the cause and the man is the effect. What is meant is that man is born owing to craving.

Object Case

In the relation between subject and object, the latter is always the effect; former is the cause. In ‘dharma definitely protects one who follows the dharma’ (*dhammo have rakkhati dhammacārīm*), the dharma is the cause and its protecting the follower is the effect. The protector and the protected refer respectively to the cause and the effect.

Subject Case

Doer in the passive voice too represents the cause. In ‘the world is carried by mind’ (*cittena nīyati loko*), mind is the cause and the act of being carried is the effect. The only difference is that the sentence is in the passive voice.

Instrumental Case

It is clear how the instrument can become the cause. In ‘suffering is avoided by energy’, energy is the cause; the avoidance of suffering is the effect.

Dative Case

In a causal relation what is said by dative denotes the effect. In ‘the eightfold path has to be followed for the knowledge, understanding and eradication of these defilements’ (*imesam bhikkhave āsavānam abhiññāya pariññāya pahānāya ayam eva ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo bhāvetabbo*), what is said is that the practice leads to the cessation of defilements. Here the practice is the cause; knowledge, understanding and eradication are effects, and they have been given in the dative case.

Ablative Case

It is often found in the doctrine that the ablative has been used to indicate the cause. For example, in such instances as *avijjā paccaya sankharā* (‘conditioned by ignorance volitional activities occur’) and *pemato jāyati soko* (‘grief originates from lust’) the ablative has been used. In these two instances ignorance and lust are causes and volitions and grief are respective effects.

Genetive Case

Genetive is used with a noun which denotes the cause. In *dhajo rathassa paññānam-dhūmo paññānamaggino* (‘flag is the sign of a (armoured) vehicle; smoke is the sign of fire’) the vehicle is the actual cause of the existence of the flag for the latter serves only as the mark of the vehicle and not vice versa. Therefore the effect is the flag.

Locative Case

It is clear that location is the cause. In the phrase *sīle patitthāya naro sapañño* (‘a wise man having established himself on virtue...’) virtue is the cause; the act of establishing is the effect. In *yo imasmim dhammavinaye-appamatto vihessati* (‘whosoever is vigilant in this dispensation...’) dispensation is the location or the location for one’s abode. In the present context, one lives in the dispensation because it is there. Therefore the dispensation is the cause; living is the effect.

This shows that it is possible to acquire a good knowledge in causal relations by studying how grammatical cases express such relations.

What follows is how the same causal relation can be expressed in all cases:

First case: *Bījam rukkho hoti* (Seed becomes a tree.direct and indirect author).

Object: *So bījam rukkham karoti* [He makes the seed (to grow) into a tree].

Subject: *Bījena rukkho sampajjati* (Due the seed, the tree comes to be).

Instrumental:	<i>Bījena rukkho hoti</i> (A tree occurs by means of the seed).
Dative:	<i>Bījam rukkhāya sanvattati</i> (A seed exists for the purpose of a tree).
Ablative:	<i>Bījato rukkho hoti</i> (A tree occurs on account of a seed).
Genetive:	<i>Bījassa rukkho hoti</i> [A (potential) tree is (in the possession) of the seed].
Locative:	<i>Bījasmim rukkho hoti</i> (A tree is possible in the presence of a seed).

This shows that subject and dative cases represent the effect and the rest of the cases represent the cause.

viii Particle Method

There are many particles used in the word of the Buddha to denote the cause. Such particles as *paticca*, *upanisā*, *nissāya* and *sandhāya* are some of them. For example:

- i. *cakkhuñca paṭicca rupe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññāṇam* ('Conditioned by eye, in the presence of a visual form, the eye-consciousness arises'). Eye and visual forms are causes; eye-consciousness is the effect.
- ii. *Dukkhupanisā saddhā* ('Suffering causes faith'). Suffering is the cause; faith is the effect.

GUIDE METHOD (*Netti Naya*)

The only means in the Pali literature to analyse the teaching methodically is the Guide method. Nevertheless it is not a system of logic, but a method adopted in elucidating the doctrine. Both the *Nettipakaraṇa* and the *Petaṭakopadesa* emphasize the fact that they comprise nothing but a method of analysing the discourses of the Buddha¹⁹. A sermon becomes quite successful when analysed and elucidated according to the methods of the *Netti*. However it is not our intention to describe all the methods in it. What we will refer to is only its method of elucidation.

Points Contained Therein

1. Every discourse contains two aspects, namely, verbal content (= *bhāṇjana*) and meaning. (= *attha*)
2. Of them words consist of letters, words, verbal content, etymology, presentation (*niddesa*) and manner (*ākāra*).

Meaning consists of the following six: explaining (*saṅkāsanā*), displaying (*pakasanā*), divulging (*vivaraṇā*), analysing

19. *Panca naya sasanassa pariyetthi; Navavidha suttanta pariyetthi. (Netti)*

(vibhajanā), exhibiting (uttānīkamma) and designating (paññatti). These twelve are called 'thread'.

3. Modes of conveying are sixteen. In its commentary, three of them have been described as methods.
4. There are five methods recommended: plotting of directions (disālocana), conversion of relishing (nandiyāvatta), trefoil (tipukkhalā), lion's play (sīhavikkīlita) and hook (aṅkusa).
5. Root-terms are 18 (9 wholesome and 9 unwholesome), and their details are available in the *Netti*.
6. Analysis of discourses is threefold: indication (uddeśa), demonstration (niddesa) and counter-demonstration (paṭiniddesa).

Of the five methods, the following three are meaning methods: conversion of relishing, trefoil and lion's play. The following two are action methods: plotting of directions and hook. What follows is a brief account of each of these methods:

1. **Conversion of Relishing** refers to whirlpool in a river. Like a piece of wood caught up in a whirlpool beings are tossed into the ocean of samsara by craving and ignorance. Such beings are rescued by calmness and insight meditations. The method which elucidates this matter is conversion of relishing.
2. **The cleansing triad** is the threefold cleansing or spreading like lead. This is to describe the defilements as caused by craving, hatred and delusion and the purification as caused by non-craving, non-hatred and non-delusion.
3. **Lion's play** is to describe how such perversions as the view of soul are driven away by the lion-like Buddhas, silent Buddhas and the disciples.
4. **Plotting of directions** means to survey regions or to determine whether something is wholesome or not wholesome. Friendliness, kindness, participatory joy and equanimity are four directions. The sermon guided by those four is called 'plotting the directions'.
5. **Hook** is a form of sermon given by drawing all wholesome or unwholesome matters relevant to a particular subject.

Following is the use of principles of the *Netti*:

1. **The person who gains knowledge from what is condensed must be instructed, in a manner which makes the doctrine good at the beginning, with points emphasizing emancipation, by indication with letters and words, through the method of conversion of relishing by the two modes, namely, explaining and displaying.**

From this he achieves the states of **mind-freedom** and **freedom by wisdom** through the wisdom made of what is heard and what is thought.

2. **The person who gains knowledge from what is expanded** must be instructed, in a manner which makes the doctrine **good at the middle**, with points emphasizing **disadvantages** and **emancipation**, by **demonstration**, through the cleansing triad by two modes of **divulging** and **analysing**. This way he achieves realization through the wisdom made of what is heard.
3. **The person who is guidable** must be instructed, in a manner which makes the doctrine **good at the end**, with points emphasizing **gratification**, **disadvantages** and **emancipation**, through the method of **lion's play** by two modes of **exhibiting** and **designating**. This way he gains a mere verbal understanding.

Method of Conveying (*hāranaya*)

The sixteen modes of conveying have been understood as constituting a kind of method. Furthermore, they supply us with an interesting way of analysis which facilitates knowledge and scrutiny in the doctrine. They are, in brief, as follows:

1. **The mode of conveying a teaching (*desanāhāra*)**: This is to elaborate the meaning of a discourse by such categories as gratification, disadvantages, emancipation, fruit, means and injunction. Even if only one among such categories has been stated in a particular discourse, the present mode demands that the rest too must be added.
2. **Investigation (*vicayahāra*)**: This is to explain (a passage) by its verbal meaning.
3. **Construing (*yuttihāra*)**: To determine the aptness or otherwiseness of a particular phenomenon.
4. **Footings (*padaṭṭhāna*)**: To inquire into the bases or underlying principles.
5. **Characteristics (*lakkhaṇa*)**: To assume what is not stated in a discourse from what is stated.
6. **Fourfold array (*catubyūha*)**: To describe the four factors, namely, language, purport, source of the sermon and consecutive sequence.
7. **Conversion (*āvaṭṭa*)**: To convert the phenomana opposite to one another.
8. **Analysis (*vibhatti*)**: To analyse into basic principles.
9. **Reversal (*parivattana*)**: Reversing to opposite phenomena.
10. **Synonyms (*vevacana*)**: To give equivalent terms.

11. Designation (paññatti): To propose various designations (names).
12. Ways of entry (otarana): To give entry to such phenomena as dependent co-origination, faculties, aggregates and bases.
13. Clearing up (sodhana): To examine in order to determine correctness or incorrectness.
14. Determining (adhiṭṭhāna): To determine that particularity is only an aspect of generality.
15. Requisites (parikkhāra): To analyse causally.
16. Co-ordination (samāropaṇa): To co-ordinate all the material relevant for a given phenomenon.

Synopsis of the Modes of Conveying

These modes of conveying may be summarized under the following categories:

1. By way of causes: Footings and Requisites.
2. By way of effects: Synonyms, Designation, Ways of Entry and Clearing Up.
3. By way of causes and effects: teaching, Investigation, Fourfold Array and Co-Ordination.
4. By way of the location of causes: Analysis.
5. By way of incompatibility: Conversion.
6. By way of compatibility and incompatibility: Conversion.
7. By way of method: Characteristics, Construing and Determining.

It must be borne in mind that while there are discourses explainable by each of these modes individually, there may be discourses explainable by more than one mode (combined treatment of modes).

What is *Netti* (Guide)?

Netti is the method of research applied to the doctrine. The etymological meaning of the term is 'guide' or 'the act of guiding'. The Buddha has said that, in monastic legal matters, one must consult the 'dhamma-guide'²⁰. The *Netti* is a disciple-authored (text). The Sarvastivadins have their counterpart called the *Netripada*²¹. Their

20. ...sannipatitvā dhammanetti samanumajjitabbā, dhammanettim samanumajjitvā yathā tattha sameti tathā nam adhikaraṇam vūpasametabbam. (M. Sāmagamasutta). There are such other instances of the *Netti* as the following: 'bhavanetti', 'udakam hi nayanti nettikā' and 'bhagavam nettikā dhammadesanā'. The *Mahāvastu* (11:57) uses 'netri'.

21. *Netripadamiti śāstra nāma sthaviropaguptasya*. (Yashomitra's *Abhidharmakosavyākhyā*).

Gñānaprasthāna too deals with a similar subject matter. The *Netti* does to Pali literature what Yaska's *Nirukta* does to Vedic literature.

The content of the *Netti* has been summarized as the twelve terms, sixteen modes of conveying and five guide-lines which we have already referred to.

Method of 'Still-to-be-Guided Meaning' and the Method of 'Already-Guided Meaning'²². (Neyyattha, Nītattha)

What is said by the Buddha has to be understood either as meaning still to be determined or as meaning already determined. When the literal meaning of the word is not taken but a general meaning is attributed it is called 'meaning-still-to-be-guided'. The Buddha has used such terms as '*attā*' (soul) and '*puggala*' (individual) in this sense. What this indicates is the fact that there is no soul or an individual in the real sense. This method may be understood as the indirect use of language. The already-guided meaning is the direct meaning of a term. The Buddha's teaching on impermanence etc. has to be understood as bearing direct meaning. These two categories apply to the day-to-day use of the language too.

THE METHOD OF FOUR GREAT INDICATORS (Mahāpadesa)

The method to be followed in determining some undecided matter or some matter without a precedent has been described by the Buddha as the 'great indicator'. The Discourses²³ and the Discipline²⁴ each

22. *Dve'me bhikkhave tathāgatam abbhācikkhanti. Katame dve? Yo ca neyyattham suttantam nītattho suttantoti dipeti yo ca nītattham suttantam neyattho suttanto ti dipeti. (A. dukanipāta).*

*"Saddantarena nāpeto - neyyatthoti pavuccati
sayamevagamitattho - nītatthoti tathā mato"*
(Saddasāratthajālīni 94.)

23. *Idha bhikkhave bhikkhu evam vadeyya: "sammukhā' metam āvuso bhagavato sutam sammukhā paṭiggahitam, ayam dhammo ayam vinayo idam satthusāsananti. Tassa bhikkhave bhikkhuno bhāsitam neva abhinanditabbam nappaṭikkositabbam. Anabhinanditvā appaṭikkositvā tāni padabyañjanāni sādhuḥkam uggahetvā sutte otāretabbāni vinaye sandassetabbāni, tāni ce sutte otariyamānāni vinaye sandassiyamānāni na c'eva sutte otaranto na ca vinaye sandissanti, niṭṭham'ettha gantabbam addhā idam nac'eva tassa bhagavato vacanam imassa ca bhikkhuno duggahitanti. Itih'etam bhikkhave chaḍḍheyyātha. ...tāni ce sutte otaranti vinaye sandissanti niṭṭham'ettha gantabbam addhā idam tassa bhagavato vacanam, imassa ca bhikkhuno suggahitanti..." saṅgho...sambahulatthero...ekatthero... (D. Mahāparinibbānasutta).*

24. *Mahāvagga (bhesajjakkhanda).*

contains its own great indicator methods, and Buddhaghosa has described his own which is different from both²⁵.

In *mahā+apadesa*, ‘apadesa’ means ‘room’ or ‘points’²⁶. At times, the ‘great indicators have been also described as ‘exalted points’ (*sāmukkansikā*)’²⁷. The great indicators signify the method to be followed in determining, without violating the spirit thereof, something which is not covered by the already existing law. Taken as a means it is one, not four; and it may be called ‘authority’ (*āpta*) or ‘what is in accordance with authority’ (*āptānuloma*).

Great indicators given by the Buddha: In the Discourses: authority of the Buddha, authority of the community, authority of many elders and the authority of one elder.

In the Discipline: What is not appropriate, what resembles what is not appropriate, what is appropriate and what resembles what is appropriate²⁸.

The four indicators given by Buddhaghosa are: Discourses, What resembles discourses, Views of the authorities and One’s own view.

The purpose of the great indicators was to prevent the doctrine from the encroachment of individual views and to keep it intact. It is emphasized that one must not accept anything reported to have the authority of the Buddha, the community, many elders or one elder if it is not in accordance with the Teaching and the Discipline. Only the Discourses and the Discipline are taken as the means or the authority. This is comparable to the verbal means or the means of what is heard.

How is it Possible to Have Four Great Indicators?

In ancient times, the Teaching was transmitted orally. As a result those monks who had preserved the doctrine in their memory were considered authorities. Therefore it was quite possible for one to claim authenticity for one’s own view on the pretext that it was learned from

25. *Samantapāsādikā* Ā and DA.

26. *Mahāpadesoti mahāokaso mahā apadeso vā...kāraṇāniti attho* (DA. *Mahāparinibbāṇasutta*).

27. *Cattāro sāmukkansikāti cattaro mahāpadesā*. (Vinaya A.)

28. i. *Yam bhikkhave mayā idam na kappatīti apaṭikkhittam tañce akappiyam anulometi kappiyam paṭibāhati tam vo na kappati.*

ii. *Yam bhikkhave mayā idam na kappatīti na appaṭikkhittam tañce kappiyam anulometi akappiyam paṭibāhati tam vo kappati.*

iii. *Yam bhikkhave mayā idam kappatīti ananuññātam tam ce akappiyam anulometi kappiyam paṭibāhati tam vo na kappati.*

iv. *Yam bhikkhave mayā idam kappatīti ananuññātam tañce kappiyam anulometi akappiyam paṭibāhati tam vo kappati.*

(*Mahāvagga: bhesajjakkhanga*).

the Buddha, or from the community, or from a learned member of the community. However if it was accepted merely on that basis the teaching would lose its integrity. The great indicators suggest that there are four authorities in the Buddhist dispensation, but must not be accepted if what is attributed to them does not accord with the teaching in general. Therefore, the four great indicators are not actually a classification of authorities or means but a list of matters rejected as invalid authorities. The real purpose of the four indicators was to establish the teaching as the true authority.

The same applies to the four indicators given in the Discipline. Therein too the actual authority is only the teaching. The four indicators allow what is in accordance with the Discipline to be adopted and what is not in accordance to be rejected even when those matters are not being directly referred to in the Discipline. The presence of the four aspects is due to the manner of analysis. In actuality there is only one means: authority.

1. What has not been considered inappropriate is inappropriate if it resembles what is inappropriate.
2. What has not been considered inappropriate is appropriate if it resembles what is appropriate.
3. What has not been considered appropriate is inappropriate if it resembles what is inappropriate.
4. What has not been considered appropriate is appropriate if it resembles what is appropriate.

For example:

1. Riding a bicycle is not prohibited for monks by their discipline; but it resembles what is not appropriate (*asañvara*) for monks; hence it is taken as inappropriate.
2. A cup of tea in the afternoon has not been prohibited as inappropriate, but resembles what is appropriate; hence it is appropriate.
3. wearing a wrist-watch has not been approved, but it resembles what is inappropriate because it is a kind of ornament; hence it is not appropriate.
4. To carry a watch in the inner coat is not approved, but it resembles what is appropriate for one needs to know time; hence it is appropriate.

The significance of the above guide-lines is that they help those who are in doubt as to what is appropriate and what is not. Since it is not practical to have a rule for every minute matter, the Buddha made this

special provision. Furthermore, such a provision is required to prevent both doing what is not appropriate on the pretext that it is not prohibited and not doing what is appropriate on the pretext that it is not approved.

The purpose of the provision is to establish the convention that, in determining what is appropriate and what is not appropriate, what is already in the Discipline has to be taken as the criterion for what is not in the Discipline. In this practice, there is some resemblance to inference. Nevertheless since the conclusion is not an inference based on perception but one based on authority it is not an inference proper.

The third (kind of) great indicators described by Buddhaghosa are discourses, what resembles discourses, the view of the authorities and one's own view. The commenatarial account of these four is not quite clear. The first two have been approved as authorities; but the last two have been prohibited if they do not agree with the teaching. This suggests that the four are different in their outlook; nevertheless they have been grouped together. This is a matter to be investigated.

What is the Authority of Discourse and Discipline?

In enumerating the great indicators, what the Buddha referred to as the authority is 'Discourse and discipline'. Buddhaghosa and the *Nettipakaraṇa* are not in agreement in their explanation of the content of this authority. According to Buddhaghosa 'discourse' includes the Discipline and either the canon of discourses, or the canons of discourses and the Abhidharma or all three canons including that of discipline; Discipline consists of either the disciplinary rules in the *Khandhaka*, or the entire canon of discipline, or the cause of disciplining such defilements as lust²⁹. The *Nettipakaraṇa* says that the great indicators need to be compared with the Discourses, made agreeable to the Discipline and established in the '*dhamma*-nature (*dhammatā*). According to the *Netti*, 'Discourses' refer to the four noble truths; 'Discipline' to disciplining lust, hatred and delusion; and '*dhamma*-nature' to the doctrine of dependent co-origination. In the ultimate analysis, both accounts refer to the Teaching which is the sole means. All these suggest that the actual criterion is only the 'resemblance to the Teaching'.

Considered as means of knowledge these four cannot be taken as four separate means. These are in reality not means but prohibitions. As we have already mentioned, in the other philosophical systems, to take a teaching as a means is to accept an authority. In Buddhism, faith itself was taken as authority, for one needs faith in order to accept the Teacher's word as the means. Nevertheless there seems to be a slight

29. (DA. *Mahaparibbāṇasutta*).

difference between that faith and the means adopted in the great indicators.

The difference may be indicated in the following manner: To know something not perceived following something perceived is inference. In the like manner, to know something which is not authoritative following what is authoritative is a great indicator. In this context, authority is the teaching of the Buddha. The procedure is to draw conclusions on what is not said by the Buddha following what is said by him. Therefore this may be regarded as obtaining knowledge following what resembles the authority or what resembles the Discourses. The relation between perception and inference and that of between authority and the great indicators is similar. 'Resemblance' alone is the difference.'

APANNAKA METHOD

The commentators explain 'apanṇaka' as *apanṇako'ti aviruddho advejjhagāmi ekansagāhiko* - 'apanṇaka' is to be 'non-disagreeable, non-dichotomous and well-blending'. This is a technical term in Buddhism. In the *Jātaka*, there is one *apanṇaka jātaka*. The Tripitaka refers to the 'apanṇaka' practice in several instances. The opposite of 'apanṇaka' is *takkagāha* or 'grasp of (mere) logicity'. The etymology of 'apanṇaka' is not quite certain. It is hard to trace its root. Rhys Davids surmises that 'apañṇaka' has some relation to 'apañhaka (without a question)³⁰. In the *Apanṇakasutta* of the *Majjhimanikāya*, in *apanṇakam me tatrappatti bhavissati* the term is used as an adjective which means 'definitely' or 'without any question'. It seems that the meaning of the term is 'definitely'. An analysis of the apañṇaka-practice taught by the Buddha to the Sāleyyaka brāhmins³¹ would reveal its content.

The Buddha refers to five views prevalent during that time and points out how an intelligent person should behave towards those views. The views are the following: 1. Nihilism: the tenfold wrong views such as, this world does not exist, the next world does not exist etc. 2. No-action view: to deny the effects of good and bad actions; 3. Non-causation: to believe that purification and defilement of beings take place uncaused or for no reason; 4. denial of formless existences: to deny the existence of the formless worlds; and 5. denial of the extinction of becoming: to accept the existence of the formless world but to deny the existence of nirvana. It is known that these ideas were held by the Six Teachers. Since these ideas contradict one another the Sāleyyakas did not wish to accept any one as true. Hence their confession that they did not believe in any teacher.

30. *Apanṇaka* may be the Prakrit form of *apañhaka* or *apanṇaka*.

31. *Apanṇakasutta* (M.)

Apaṇṇaka Practice

What follows is a brief account of what the Buddha taught the Sāleyyakas:

In the world there are those who outright deny the existence of life after death and there are others who affirm the same. The nihilist who denies the life after death would not do wholesome deeds but would indulge in unwholesome activities and thereby would accumulate bad karmas owing to his wrong view.

An intelligent person would analyse nihilist's situation in the following manner: "If there were no life after death this man will have a bad name in this very life and will be blamed by the wise; if there were a life after death then he will definitely be born in a woeful place. In this manner, this man will lose in either situation. Having taken the apaṇṇaka practice wrongly, he looks after only the this-worldly aspect and misses the wholesome aspect".

One who believes in the existence of the life after death, owing to his right view, would give up the unwholesome and practice the wholesome and thereby accumulate good karmas. An intelligent person would analyse this person's situation in the following manner: "If there is a life after death this person will definitely be born in a happy state. If the view of those who deny the life after death is true he will still be praised by intelligent people for his good conduct. In this manner he will be victorious in either situation. having taken the apaṇṇaka practice rightly he looks after both aspects by abandoning what is unwholesome".

The Buddha said that the intelligent person would assess the situations of one who denies the efficacy of karmic actions and one who denies causal relations in the like manner.

The intelligent person would analyse the situation of one who denies the existence of formless worlds in the following manner: "I do not know whether or not formless worlds exist. It is not appropriate for me to believe in their existence without actually knowing the fact. Nevertheless, even if the view of those who deny the formless worlds is right surely there is the form-world, and I will be born there. If the view of those who believe in the formless world is right then I will be definitely born there. Therefore it actually does not matter for me whether the formless worlds exist or not".

The intelligent person would analyse the situation of those who deny the possibility of nirvana, the extinction of becoming: "I do not know whether or not nirvana exists. It is not appropriate for me to make a definite conclusion without actually knowing the fact. Even if nirvana were not there, there must be formless worlds, and owing to my practice of meditation, I will be born there. If nirvana were to exist I

will attain the peaceful state in this very life. In any event, the practice of meditation is good for either. I will be born in the formless world or attain nirvana. Thus in not believing in the existence of nirvana one is closer to attachment, and in believing in its existence one is closer to detachment”.

As the present discourse reveals, the *apaṇṇaka* practice adopted in the teaching of the Buddha is remarkable. It shows the right attitude one must adopt towards things one does not know for sure. In this attitude there is no ‘logical reasoning’ involved, no hesitation or partiality.

The *Apaṇṇaka jātaka* contrasts the *apaṇṇaka* practice of the future Buddha with the ‘logical’ approach of the foolish businessman. The two were getting ready to venture on a business trip with five hundred carts full of merchandise. They know that both will lose if they go together. Therefore one has to go first. In order to decide on this they get together and discuss. In the process, one follows the *apaṇṇaka* practice and the other the ‘logical’ approach.

The future Buddha who initiated the discussion was in the opinion that it did not really matter who goes first but that one must go first. For one who believes that he gains in either way there is really no conflict. He does not hesitate (*advejjhaḡāmi*), therefore his approach is ‘definite’ (*ekamsa paṭipadā*). Since it allows the freedom of choice for the other it involves a sacrifice; hence it is a practice leading to a happy state (*nīyyāṇika paṭipadā*). Since it does not involve assessing ‘logical’ reasons it is not based on ‘logical considerations’ (*atakkagāha*). The foolish businessman chose to leave first considering only the advantages of doing so. He reasoned that by leaving early he would be able to make use of the undamaged roads, have fresh grass for his cattle and fresh supplies for his men, and that he will be able to sell his goods at any price he wishes. This decision is a result of ‘logical’ reasoning, hence it is based on ‘logic’ (*takkagāha*)³². This method causes conflict for it compels one to win over the other, hence it is a method of conflict (*viruddha paṭipadā*). Since the decision is not based on definite conclusions it is uncertain (*anekamsa paṭipadā*).

The *jātaka* story further elaborates on the differences of the two approaches, and reveals that the foolish businessman who chose to leave first got into trouble which he could not foresee, and that the future Buddha was victorious.

32. *Apaṇṇakam jhānam’ eke - dutiyam āhu takkikā*
etadaññāya medhavi - yam gaṇhe tadapaṇṇakam. (J.)

Is Apanṇaka Practice a Form of Optimism?

Optimism is to believe that everything is for the good and that there is some good in everything. An optimist would see only the bright side of life, and he will strive to come out of any bad situation. The opposite of this is pessimism, namely, to see only the dark side of things. The Buddhist philosophy is not pessimistic for the Buddhists aim at the extinction of suffering. Thus it seems that the optimistic attitude (of Europeans) is comparable to the apanṇaka practice of Buddhism in many, though not in all, respects.

Apanṇaka Practice is a Buddhist Method.

The factors that serve to determine knowledge are means. Such phenomena adopted in epistemology as perception, inference and authority are examples. Authority is the means adopted in believing something on the basis of the trust one has in the source. Usually this is the means adopted in religious practice. The trust-worthy source in this context is the Teacher (of the particular religion). The apanṇaka method is for those who do not adopt authority as a means. The apanṇaka itself is both a means and a method. This is neither a perception; nor is it an inference based on what is perceived. Logical reasoning is an aspect of inference, hence apanṇaka which does not involve logical reasoning cannot be inference; but inference is an aspect of apanṇaka.

This discussion suggests that apanṇaka cannot be compared with any epistemological means such as perception, inference or authority. Nevertheless it is a means of knowledge for it takes (us) to a conclusion. Since this does not constitute a physical or verbal action it does not come under virtue. Since it is an epistemic psychological attitude it is a form of method.

Although the Buddha taught this method to Sāleyyakas who did not believe in any religion the method may well be used, in their many different practical questions, by both those who believe and those who do not. One cannot expect answers for all one's questions from a religion. Even when a solution is available, one may not be aware of it; or even if one were to be aware of it one may forget it. Under these circumstances, the best method to be adopted is apanṇaka. It is said that this method is a 'property' of the Buddhas and the silent Buddhas³³.

It seems that the method may be employed in determining any uncertain matter. For example let's see how this method may be used in

33. *Ayamhi apanṇakapaṭipadā nāma sabbesam buddhaccekabuddha buddhaputtānam paṭipadā.* (J.)

determining whether or not there is a fact behind the belief that the Buddha visited Sri Lanka.

The visit of the Buddha is not a matter of our perception. Nor is it an inference based on what is perceived. Nevertheless the Buddhists believe this on the authority of such literary sources as the *Mahāvamsa* and the *Dīpavamsa* and the folk-lore. A belief based on authority lasts till our trust in the authority lasts. The belief falls apart once the trust falls apart. It is hard for a non-Buddhist or for one who does not trust the *Mahāvamsa* etc. to accept this claim. How is it possible for us to make use of the *apaññaka* in this context? The following steps may be considered:

1. (According to the folk-lore) it is possible that the Buddha visited Sri Lankā.
2. (In the opinion of those who deny folk-lore) it is also possible that the Buddha did not.
3. We pay homage to Sripāda with the belief that the Buddha visited Sri Lanka.
4. If the Buddha had visited Sri Lanka in actuality we would gain 'merit'.
5. If the opposite was true and the Buddha did not visit Sri Lanka still the religious practice motivated by the belief would result in both generating 'merit' and spreading a good name for us.
6. In this manner, we gain irrespective of the factuality of the belief that the Buddha visited Sri Lanka.

In this manner, an intelligent person would conclude that it is right to pay homage to the Buddha whether he visited Sri Lanka or not. This method which is truly a Buddhist method may be applied to any situation.

METHOD OF TAKING (ONLY) WHAT HAS NOT BEEN TAKEN (*Agahitaggahana Naya*)

It is customary to describe a unitary and single phenomenon in many different ways. Such descriptions are of two sorts: description by meaning and description by word. Furthermore, any phenomenon may belong either to mind or to matter. For example:

- i. How a material element may have different terms with the same sense: earth-element (which is one) is denoted by such terms as material form, sound, smell, taste and touch.
- ii. How a term denoting a material element may be used in different senses: The same word '*paṭhavi*' which denotes a

material element is used in different contexts in different forms to produce different senses.

- iii. How the same mind-element may have different denoting terms, to give the same sense: it is the selfsame thought of *amoha* (non-delusion) which is used, in different contexts, as *paññā* (wisdom), *sammādiṭṭhi* (right view), *dharmavicaya* (scrutiny of concepts) and *vīmaṃsā* (intelligence).
- iv. How the term denoting a mind-element may be used in different senses: The selfsame term '*saddhā*' (faith) is used in different contexts such as faith as power, faith a dominant factor and faith a constituent of enlightenment.

This is a method used in explaining the phenomena. Nevertheless it is important to avoid the error of repetition in such explanations. It is a valuable asset in epistemological writings, and hence it may be taken as a special kind of method. Following the convention of the Theras we will adopt Buddhaghosa's term *agahitaggahana*³⁴ to refer to this. The purpose of the method is to take only what is not taken.

For example, the method followed in reducing the thirty seven enlightenment-leaning phenomena into fourteen is this³⁵. If one were to organize the three Pitakas by avoiding its many repetitions the method followed is this. When this method is followed there is no room for repetition. As a method, as we saw above, it may be applied to both material and mental phenomena both at connotation and denotation levels. This comes under the method of analysis (*vibhaṅga*) and has to be understood as a form of *dhammanijjhānakkhanti*.

TWO-CORNERED METHOD

Two-cornered questions represent a wide-spread method used in debates by both eastern and western philosophical traditions. During the time of the Buddha many brāhmins and ascetics formulated two-cornered questions and came to debate with the Buddha with the intention of winning. The Tripiṭaka shows how the Buddha refuted all such arguments. Furthermore, it is recorded that venerable Nāgasena successfully faced two-cornered questions presented by king Milinda. In the *Milindapañha* such questions are referred to as 'sheep-questions'

34. *Agahitaggahanaṇa paṇ'ettha... samatimsa dhammā honti.* (Atthasālini- Hevāvitāraṇa edition p. 136).

35. *Chando cittam'upekkhā ca - saddhā pāssaddhi pītiyo
sammādiṭṭhi ca saṅkappo - vāyāmo viratittayam
sammāsati samādhīti - cūddasete sabhāvato
sattatimsappabhedenā - sattadhā tattha saṅgaho.*
(Abhidhammatthasāṅgaha ch. 7).

(*meṇḍakapañha*) for like a sheep who would take its opponent by either horn, those who argue with these questions contrive to catch their opponents by either of the arguments. In western logical systems, these questions have been referred to as 'dilemma', and, furthermore, there are trilemmas and polylemmas too. Very often the purpose of the debates armed with such questions is not so much to unearth the truth as to win over the other.

Two-Cornered Questions of Niganthanāthaputta³⁶

Once Niganthanāthaputta persuaded prince Abhayarāja to confront the Buddha with some two-cornered questions which the former himself formulated. The idea was to win over the Buddha so that the prince's prestige will be increased. The question is as follows:

i. Does the Buddha admit that he utters unpleasant words? If he does, the next question would be: what is the difference between the Buddha and an ordinary worldling? If he does not, the next question would be: how can he explain the following unpleasant words to Devadatta which angered him: "Devadatta is incorrigible and bound to a woeful state lasting a long period of time?"

It was expected that the question would put the Buddha to an uneasy situation where he finds himself caught up in a contradiction.

The prince invited the Buddha to his house for lunch and at the end of the meals he asked the question. The Buddha found that the question cannot be answered directly in the affirmative or negative but that his response needed specification if he were to not distort his position. By way of answering, the Buddha asked the prince who had his infant child in his lap what would he do if he finds his child suffocating with a foreign object in his throat. The prince admitted that he would right away extract it even if it causes pain in the child. At this instance the Buddha said that he too would utter unpleasant words provided that such words are true and helpful and timely. The answer devastated the prince's hopes of gaining a victory over the Buddha.

A Two-Cornered Question by the Buddha³⁷:

The Jainas believed that all happiness and misery are due to past karmas, and that in order to liberate oneself from misery one must exhaust all bad karmas by following rigorous ascetic practices. The two-cornered question formulated by the Buddha in order to highlight the contradictory situation in which Jainas were involved is the following: If one's present misery is due to one's bad past karmas the Jainas

36. M. *Abhayarājakumarasutta*

37. M. *Devadahasutta*

have definitely behaved badly in their past lives (because they are suffering now). However if it is not the case that everything is due to past karmas, the ascetic practice of Jainas is of no avail for they are suffering for no reason. What the Buddha wished to highlight was the fact that, whether the view that everything is due to past karmas is true or not, what the Jainas do is misguided.

Two-Cornered Questions of the King Milinda³⁸

A large number of King Milinda's questions to Venerable Nāgasena were two-cornered. In the *Milindapañha* they have been referred to as *meṇḍakapañha* or 'sheep-questions'. What follows is just one among such questions:

King Milinda:

- i. If the Buddha were omniscient he could have known the nature of Devadatta. The Buddha ordained him, and he subsequently caused great harm both to himself and to the dispensation. This shows that the Buddha did not know it beforehand. Therefore the Buddha is not omniscient.
- ii. If the Buddha ordained him knowing what would happen in the future the Buddha is not endowed with incomparable kindness. Therefore the Buddha is unkind and hence he is not omniscient. Thus whether the Buddha ordained Devadatta knowingly or unknowingly he is not omniscient.

Venerable Nāgasena:

If the Buddha were to not ordain Devadatta he would have caused a greater harm to the world. The fact that he was ordained reduced this damage. Therefore the Buddha is omniscient since he did it knowingly. Furthermore he could practise virtues at least for a short period of time since he was ordained by the Buddha, and this practice enabled him to see his fault in the end. As a result he will be freed (from his woeful state) one day. Otherwise this could never have happened. The Buddha is omniscient precisely because he ordained Devadatta in order to reduce the gravity of his criminal behaviour. For the very same reason the Buddha is omniscient.

This is how Venerable Nāgasena successfully answered Milinda's two-cornered question.

38. *Milindapañha*

Western Method

In western logical systems, similar two-cornered questions have been analysed well and the way to answer them too has been explained. Since it is not necessary to go into the details of those matters, we will just refer to an example: Kaliph Omar who conquered Egypt went to an Alexandrian library and said the following to the librarian: If the books in this library are identical with the Quoran in content they are redundant. If they are different from the Quoran they are dangerous. In either case they must be destroyed.

The librarian faced the question successfully in the following manner: If these books are identical with the Quoran in content they are not dangerous. If their content is different from the Quoran they are not redundant. In either case they must not be destroyed.

HOW THE METHOD OF CAUSALITY IS USED IN OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS:

The various modes of causal analysis outlined above are no different from the method of other philosophical systems³⁹. Therefore it would be an interesting epistemological exercise to formulate some of those analyses in syllogistic forms adopted by those systems.

The statement '*yan kiñci samudayadhammam sabham tam nirodhadhammam*' ('Whatever is in the nature of arising is in the nature of cessation') is a logical formulation of the Buddha. Of the constituents of syllogism it provides an example for (the constituent of) 'example'. Nevertheless in this one constituent the Buddha actually included all five constituents, namely, thesis, reason, example, application and conclusion. What this means is that all these five constituents may be included in two categories, namely, cause and effect. By giving this example alone the Buddha implied the conclusion: *Ahampi nirodhadhammamihi* ('I too am of the nature of cessation'). (This may be compared with the case of one with an angry disposition, who having heard the statement that all those with angry dispositions are non-arahants, comes to the conclusion that he himself is a non-arahant). The above statement of the Buddha may be reformulated in the form of a syllogism in the following manner:

Thesis:	I am of the nature of cessation.
Reason:	Since I am subjected to the nature of arising.
Example:	Whatever is in the nature of arising is in the nature of cessation.

39. "*Hetuvidyātmako nyāyah. (Kāvyādarśa.)*"

Application: I too am of the nature of arising.
 Conclusion: therefore I too am of the nature of cessation.

Of these five aspects thesis, application and conclusion are varieties of effect; reason and example are varieties of cause. Thus the five constituents are nothing but causes and effects.

Furthermore, a statement of the Buddha may be analysed according to the affirmative and negative methods of the Nyāyins:

- i. Affirmative method: *Asmim sati idam hoti, iṃassa uppādā idam uppajjati* ('When this is, this is; with the arising of this, this arises'). For example, *Viññāne sati nāmarūpam hoti* ('When consciousness is present, the psycho-physical combination arises').
- ii. Negative method: *Imasmim asti idam na hoti, iṃassa nirodhā idam nirujjhati* ('When this is not, this is not; with the cessation of this, this ceases'). For example, *viññāne asati nāmarūpam na hoti* ('when consciousness is not present, the psycho-physical combination does not occur').

Both these statements are nothing but the expressions of the causal method. The presence condition and the absence condition of the *paṭṭhāna* are also equal to these two methods.

Given below are a few statements of the Buddha presented in the form of syllogisms:

Buddhist:	European
i.	
<i>Cakkhu aniccam</i> (Eye is impermanent.)	All As are Bs.
<i>Yam aniccam tam dukkham</i>	
(Whatever is impermanent is suffering.)	All Bs are Cs.
<i>Yam dukkham tam anattā</i>	
(What is suffering is no-soul).	All Cs are Ds.
<i>Tasmā cakkhum anattā</i>	
(Therefore eye is no-soul).	Therefore all As are Ds.
This is an example for a sorties.	
ii.	
<i>Sabbe sattā āhāraṭṭhitikā</i>	
(All beings depend on food).	All Ms are Ps.
<i>Aham satto</i> (I am a being).	All Ss are Ms.
<i>Tasmā aham āhāraṭṭhitiko</i>	
(Therefore I am dependent on food).	Therefore all Ss are Ps.
An axiom for an affirmative syllogism.	

iii.

Avītarāgā no arahantā M is not P.
(Those who are not without attachment are not arahants).
Aham avītarāgo (I am not without attachment). S is M.
Tasma n' āham arahā (Therefore I am not an arahant). S is not P.
(This is an axiom for negative syllogism).

The *Aṅguttaranikaya* has a lot of examples for the European Disjunctive Categorical Syllogism. What follows is one.

Micchādiṭṭhikassa bhikkhave dvinnam gatīnam aññatarā gati pāṭikañkhā nirayo vā tiracchānayo vā ('The person with wrong views has to expect either of the two states: woeful state or beastly existence'). This is similar to: Tissa is either honest or brave; Tissa is not honest; therefore he is brave.

The logical method used by the Buddha in the *Anattalakkhaṇasutta* is similar Modus Tolens of Europeans: *Rūpaṃ ce hidam bhikkhave attā abhavissa nayidam rūpaṃ ābādhāya sanvatteyya; yasmā ca kho bhikkhave rūpaṃ anattā, tasmā rūpaṃ ābādhāya sanvattati* ('If the material form were one's soul it would not cause suffering; since it causes suffering the material form is not soul'). The syllogistic form of this argument is the following:

1. If the material form is soul it does not cause suffering.
(European): If P then Q
2. It is not the case that material form does not cause suffering.
Not Q.
3. Material form is not soul. Therefore not P.

An example for Modus tollens:

1. *Yattha paṭiṭṭhitam viññānam virūḷham atthi tattha nāmarūpassa avakkanti*. (Where there is consciousness established there descends the psycho-physical combination). (If P then Q).
2. *Paṭiṭṭhitam viññānam* (Consciousness is established). (P).
3. *Avakkantam nāmarūpaṃ* (Psycho-physical combination has ascended). (Therefore Q).

ANALYSIS

A reference to the invariable concomitance is a necessary requirement in 'reflection on reason' and the 'conviction based on reflection of theories' which are forms of inference. The invariable concomitance of the phenomena has to be rectified through the method of analysis. Analysis (division or classification) is a well-developed subject in western epistemology. According to the Theravada, analysis is the ultimate

ground for the realization of truth. In the canons of Discourse and Discipline this method is available as a general feature; however, in the Abhidharma analysis it is the most wide-spread characteristic.

How the Ultimate Elements are Analysed:

The analysis of the elements available in the *Dhātukathāprakaraṇa* is very interesting. Therein the two methods, i. inclusion and non-inclusion (*saṅgha-asaṅgha*) and ii. association and dissociation (*sampayoga-vippayoga*), have been further analysed into 14 methods. The method of inclusion and non-inclusion is to determine whether or not a particular element is counted among the other elements⁴⁰. For example, (A) in how many aggregates is the material form included? It is included only in the aggregate of material form; not in the rest (namely, the aggregates of feeling, perception, volition and consciousness). (B) In how many 'bases' is the material form included? Material form is included in eleven (out of twelve) bases (namely, the bases of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, material form, sound, smell, taste, touch and phenomena). It is absent only in the base of mind. (It is useful to keep in mind that subtle forms are contained in the base of phenomena). (C) In how many elements is the material form included? Of the 18 elements (namely, the elements of eye, ear, nose tongue, body and mind; material forms, sound, smell, taste, touch and phenomena; the consciousnesses of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind) material forms are included in eleven elements excepting the element of mind and those of the six kinds of consciousness.

Association and Dissociation Method:

Association means inseparability; or the fact that certain phenomena arise and cease simultaneously and share the same location and object. Of the five aggregates with how many aggregates is the material form associated? In none, for one cannot say either it is associated or not not associated in itself. But one can say that it is included in itself. From how many aggregates is it dissociated? From 4 aggregates, namely, feeling, perception, volition and consciousness). The rest too should be known following this method.

Vibhaṅga is to analyse. *Vibhāga*, *vibhajana* and *bhājana* too mean the same. The term *vibhajja vāda* which is used to refer to the teaching of the Buddha testifies to the importance of analysis within the Buddhist tradition. The belief in a soul can be removed only through analysis. It is a deep subject. Nevertheless we will confine ourselves to a few points relevant to our immediate task.

40. *Gaṇanūpagamattam hi saṅgahattā. (Pancappakaranatthakathā.)*

In the analysis of phenomena, what is to be analysed has to be a genus, and what is analysed has to be a species. In the statement, “The four noble truths are fourfold, namely, suffering, origin, cessation and the path”, ‘truth’ refers to the genus; suffering etc. are species.

The Buddha has used several methods in the analysis of phenomena:

1. By generality
2. By particularity
3. By number
4. By being and non-being

1. The method of generality is to describe a phenomenon as a whole without analysing it. Usually ‘*sabba*’ (all) has been used to implement this method. In such statements as *sabbe sattā āhāratthitikā* (‘All beings depend on food’), *Sabbe sankhārā aniccā* (‘All compound phenomena are impermanent’) and *Sabbe dhammā anattā* (‘All phenomena are no-soul’) ‘all’ does not refer to everything in general, but it is limited by the noun to which it is an adjective. Therefore ‘all’ applies only to those phenomena (namely, to beings, compound phenomena and phenomena) and not to others.

There are instances where ‘all’ has been used alone (not as an adjective). Nevertheless, in such instances what is meant is ‘all belonging to a particular group’. For instance in *sabbe tasanti daṇḍassa* (‘All fear harm’) ‘all’ refers to all those who are not arahants. (When we say that ‘all students are present in the school today’ ‘all students’ refer to all students in that particular school, but not to *all* students.)

2. The method of particularity is to highlight the particular aspects of a phenomenon. The terms used are *ekacca* or *eka* (certain). In *idha pana bhikkhave ekacco samaṇo vā* (‘Monks, a certain monk in this world...’) and *Santi bhikkhave eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā aparantakappikā* (‘There are certain ascetics and brahmins who believe in the past life’) ‘certain’ implies that there is a class of monks or ascetics and brahmins who do not belong in the categories referred to.

At times, *ya* and *ta* (some...who) nouns have been used to particularise a certain group. In *Ye kho te bhonto samaṇabrāhmaṇā saññīṃ attānam paññapenti tesam eke paṭikkosanti* (‘Some blame those ascetics and brahmins who believe that the soul is capable of perception’) the group of ascetics and brahmins who believe that the

soul is capable of perception are distinguished from those who do not believe so.

3. The method of number is often found in the Tripiṭaka. The *Aṅguttaranikāya* is exclusively a numerical analysis. The *Abhidharma* too is predominantly so. The discourses are well-known for their numerical classifications. When a discourse says that *ekapuggalo bhikkhave loke uppajjamāno uppajjati* ('There is one person who being born in the world...') it implies that the rest of the people born in the world are distinguished from him. The *Puggalapāṇṇatti* too follows a similar method. What follows is an example:

Individuals Afflicted with Illness:

1. Those who do not recover whether or not they receive good care.
2. Those who recover whether or not they receive good care.
3. Those who recover only if they receive good care.

Any person afflicted with illness must be included in one of the three categories. In other words, this category exhausts all people afflicted with illness. In here, 'those afflicted with illness' refer to genus; the three categories are the species. The four truths too may be analysed in this manner.

4. The method of being and non-being is to take a particular species of a genus and to take the rest (everything else in the universe) as contrary to it. For example, in *hetu dhammā*⁴¹ *na hetu dhammā*⁴² (phenomena that are causes and phenomena that are not causes) and *sappaccayā dhammā appaccayā dhammā* (phenomena that are with conditions and phenomena that are without conditions) the second category in each classification consists of everything that is not covered by the first category. This is comparable to classifying all human beings as Asians and non-Asians (contraries). This is only an elaboration of the 'analysis' referred to earlier as an aspect of the causal method.

Who will be able to make a comprehensive analysis of the methods adopted in the teaching of the Buddha which was described as an ocean of methods by the ancient teachers? The present work is just a drop from that ocean of methods.

41. Affirmative

42. Negative

CHAPTER VII

SOME ADDITIONAL METHODS

Taking the clue from Buddhaghosa's statement that the entire word of the Buddha is a ocean of methods, many a great savant has produced treatise on methods applicable to the doctrine of the Buddha. One such treatise is *Saddasāratthajālīni*, authored by Nāgita Thero of Myanmar about five hundred years ago (Buddhist Era: 1900). It is written in poetry form and consists of 9 chapters. The content comprises 75 methods relevant to terms and 39 methods relevant to their meaning.

The number of methods differ from teacher to teacher. Some other Masters have described a form of method called 'proximity method' (*upacāra naya*), again, with varying number of sub-divisions. The *Visuddhimagga* enumerates four modes of analysis to be used in analysing doctrinal concepts. They are characteristic (*lakḥaṇa*), function (*rasa*), manifestation (*paccupaṭṭhāna*) and proximate cause (*padaṭṭhāna*).

Some of the methods described in these works differ from one another only by their names. In addition to methods pertaining to the doctrine, there are methods based on grammatical analysis too. We have already referred to some of these methods (in the previous chapter). In the present chapter, in addition to Buddhaghosa's four aspects of analysis, we propose to discuss another 36 methods from the *Saddasāratthajālīni* which we think relevant.

1. Methods conducive to the understanding of doctrinal terms:

This is fourfold according to the *Visuddhimagga*: i. characteristic which refers to the nature of a phenomenon; ii. function or 'what it does'; iii. manifestation or manner of comprehending a phenomenon; iv. proximate reason or indispensable condition. For example, in understanding what fire is we may make use of this fourfold division in the following manner: i. the character of the fire is heat; ii. its function is to burn; iii. its result (manifestation) is (causing) mildness and iv. its proximate condition is the other great elements.

For a comprehensive understanding, it is necessary to analyse any phenomenon according to this fourfold analysis. In the *Visuddhimagga*,

Buddhaghosa analyses such phenomena as the four great elements, the four noble truths, doctrine of dependent co-origination, threefold discipline, aggregates, elements and spheres following this mode of analysis.

2. Proximity Method (*upacāra naya*):

This method pertains to different modes of significance which, very often, extend beyond the literal meaning of the words concerned. For example, when we say that ‘chair speaks’ we do not mean that chair actually speaks; but we mean that the person who occupies the chair speaks. This method has been enumerated by many teachers in different manners. For example, the *Dharmapradīpikā* describes it under four items:

- i. being-in-there (*tāsthya*): ‘Beds shout’ means that those who are on the beds shout.
- ii. being-its-nature (*tāddharmya*): ‘he is a lion’ refers to his nature which resembles that of a lion.
- iii. being-co-existent-with-it (*tatsāhacarya*): ‘Enter the sticks’ refers to those who hold sticks.
- iv. being-in-proximity (*tatsāmīpya*): ‘Cow-herds of the river’ refers to cow-herds who live by the river.

Some Proximity Methods from the *Saddasāratthajālīni*:

- i. Cause proximity method (*hetūpacāra naya*): ‘Sugar is phlegm’ means ‘sugar causes phlegm’.
- ii. Effect-proximity method (*phalopacāra naya*): ‘Phlegm is sugar’ (The phlegm which is the effect of sugar is taken as equal to its cause, namely, sugar).
- iii. Equal-proximity method (*sadisopacāra naya*): This is similar to ‘being-its-nature’ method.
- iv. Location-proximity method (*tānupacāra naya*): This is equal to ‘being-in-there’ method.
- v. Co-existence proximity method (*thanūpacāra naya*): It is similar to ‘co-existence method’.
- vi. ‘Adjacent proximity method (*samīpopacāra naya*): It is similar to ‘being-in-proximity method.

Power of words:

This is threefold. They too are a kind of proximity methods. These three powers of words enable one to understand their meaning in three different ways.

- i. **Literal power** (*abhidhā śakti*): The literal meaning of words used in a sentence. For example, 'bring a cow' means exactly what those words mean.
 - ii. **Indicative power** (*lakṣhaṇā śakti*): A subordinate meaning of a word. For example, 'village in the river' refers to a village by the river, but not inside the river.
 - iii. **Figurative meaning** (*vyañjanā śakti*): This is possible when words bear a meaning outside of their literal and indicative meanings. For example, 'He is a lion' does not refer to a lion, but to one who resembles a lion in some respects.
3. **Method of homonyms** (*silesa naya*):
Use of words similar in form but different in meaning.
 4. **Methods of pragmatics** (*kākuviśiṣṭatā naya*):
To understand a statement according to the intention of the speaker. For example 'What have you done' can be either a question or an exclamatory statement depending on the mood of the speaker.
 5. **Retrieval method** (*peyyāla naya*):
The method of implying what is in the middle by stating what is in the beginning and in the end.
 6. **Method of deer-foot-print** (*migapadavalāṅjana naya*):
It is the same as the above method.
 7. **Method of retaining one** (*ekasesa naya*):
Instead 'mother and father', to say 'fathers' which implies both.
 8. **Majority method** (*yebhuyya naya*):
'Mango grove' does not have magoes alone; but it is so called because the majority of the trees in the grove is mangoes.
 9. **Usual method** (*tabbahula naya*):
An elephant is called 'forest-roaming' for he usually roams in forests.
 10. **Lamp method** (*padīpa naya*):
Words which illuminate (the context) are referred to by this method.
 11. **Leader method** (*padhāna naya*):
When the leader of a group is referred to it is implied that his followers too are referred to. For example, 'The king arrived' indicates that his retinue also arrived.

12. Nearest method (*āsanna naya*):

‘Guard fish against crows’ indicates that crows are the closest to (attack) the fish.

13. Method of taking one aspect (*ekadesa gahaṇa naya*):

‘Upto gotrabhu’ (a stage in meditational practice) indicates that all the aspects upto *gotrabhū* are implied.

14. Method of taking one (*ekaggahaṇa naya*):

When one is referred to, the rest which accompanies what is referred to is also implied. For example, ‘He received the white parasole’ indicates that he received the rest of the royal paraphernalia too.

15. Lion-vision method (*sīhāvalokana naya*):

Like a lion who surveys all the four directions, certain rules apply to all instances. For example, the grammatical rule that ‘no rule can contradict the word of the Buddha’ (*jinavacanayuttamhi*) applies to all rules.

16. Frog-leap method (*maṇḍukagati naya*):

Some rules, like the leap of a frog, would apply to only certain situations.

17. River-flow method (*nadīsota naya*):

Like the flow of a river, some rules apply to all instances without any exception.

18. Whirlpool method (*āvatta naya*):

To include matters not directly mentioned. For example, in describing the stanza ‘*sabha papassa akaranam*’ one must refer to virtue, concentration and wisdom.

19. Crow-vision method (*kākolokana naya*):

An act that resembles the crow’s act of seeing with only one eye at a time.

20. Chance method (*avutta siddhi naya*):

This refers to the phenomenon of the emergence of an unexpected outcome or to some incident due to chance. This method is also called ‘book-worm method’ for a book-worm may, by accident, carve letters.

21. Semantically reflective method (*anvattha naya*):

It is to appropriate the name of an object with one of its characteristics as in the case of 'go' (cattle) which means 'one who travels'.

22. Method of attribution (*ārudha naya*):

In the Pali language, 'mayura' (peacock) is defined as 'mahiyam ramatiti, mayūro' (Mayura occurs in the sense that it enjoys the earth). Although all the other animals too are believed to enjoy the earth, Mayura has been attributed with that habit in particular.

23. Change method (*vipallāsa naya*):

It is to alter (reverse or change) the grammatically accepted gender, case, number, time and person or the letters within a word.

24. Number (singular and plural) method (*vacana naya*):

This is to use plural instead of singular to indicate respect (e.g. *Bhante, tumhe gacchatha* Sir, you may go) and to use singular instead of plural to indicate inseparability etc (e.g. *Mahajano agacchati* a great mass of people comes).

25. Category/denotational method (*liṅgattha naya*):

To indicate the pure sense of a word which is neither transitive nor intransitive is (in the Pali language) called ... (e.g. *Visuddhimaggao, Dhammapadam*).

26. Negation method (*paṭisedha naya*):

Negation is twofold: adhesive negation (*prasajya*) and neutral negation (*paryudāsa*). 'one who does not eat salty food' implies that he eats other kinds of food; it is adhesive negation. 'Faces that have not been exposed to Sun' is neutral negation for it does not imply anything further.

27. Method of appropriateness (*ocitya naya*):

It is to understand the meaning of a term according to the context. The Pali word 'rohita' means either fish or deer; what the term means in a particular sentence depends on the context.

28. Repetition method (*āmendita naya*):

This refers to the practice of repeating terms or sentences in order to express such emotions as fear, anger, impatience, curiosity, surprise, elation, grief and love or an act of praising.

29. Etymology method (*nirukti naya*):

It is fourfold: i. bringing-in a letter (*rājā+iva>rājāriva*), ii. changing a letter (*hinsa>sinha*), iii. substituting a letter (*nijaka>niyaka*), and iv. deleting a letter (*mehanassa khassa māla>mekhalā*).

30. Purification method (*parihāra naya*):

It is to check a statement against faults. In the *Netti* this occurs as 'clearing-up' (*sodhana hara*). It is also called the 'avoidance of errors'.

31. 'Emergence-of-a-new-situation' method (*abhūta tadbhāva naya*):

This refers to the act of creating a new situation by using 'i' with the verbal roots 'kara' and 'bhū' (for example: *dhavalīkaraṇa* - to make white something which is not white; *andhībhūta* - to make someone who is not blind, blind).

32. Method of selection (*niddhāraṇa naya*):

To distinguish one from a group. For example: *Manussesu khattiyo sūratamo*: 'A warrior is cleverer among human beings' or *Ānando arahatam aññataro*: 'Ananada is one among the arahants'. In these instances either locative or genitive case is used.

33. 'Co-existence-with-other-words' method (*saddantara sāhacariya naya*):

A term gets a meaning other than its usual by being joined to some other word. It is fourfold: association, dissociation, co-existence and opposition. For example, in *savaccham dhienum ānaya* ('bring the cow along with the calf') *dhenu* does not refer to a female horse; but when used as *avaccha dhenu* (calf-less cow) it refers to a female horse not to a cow. In *sāriputta moggallāna* ('Sāriputta and Moggallāna') 'sāriputta', due to the fact that it is used with 'moggallāna', refers to the arhant Sāriputta of the time of the Buddha and not to any other Sāriputta.

34. Puzzle method (*pahelikā naya*):

Puzzles are those statements with concealed meaning. Sixteen modes of such statements have been enumerated. In the Buddha's own discourses, such statements as 'having killed both mother and the father' (*mātaram pitaram hantvā...*) (alluding to the destruction of craving that causes suffering) are given in the form of puzzles.

PALI / SANSKRIT - ENGLISH GLOSSARY

akkhara	letter
akriyavāda	no-action view
agahitaggahaṇa	taking what has not been taken (non-repetitive method)
aṅkusa naya	hook - method
aññamaññapaccaya	reciprocal condition
aṭṭhakathāmuttikanaya	methods outside commentaries
atakkāvacara	beyond the scope of logic
atidūrata	extremity of distance
atiparitta	minuteness
atimahanta	very big
adriṣṭārtha	unseen evidence
adhiṣṭhāna (<i>adhiṭṭana</i>)	determining
anātma	no-soul
anāgāmi	non-returner
anitya	impermanent
aniyata	indeterminate
anupalabdhi	non-perception (non-availability)
anumāna	inference
anussava	hear-say, tradition
antarindriya	internal faculty
andha-paṅgunyāya	blind-lame method
anvaya nāṇa	knowledge by inference/inferential knowledge
— naya	inference-method
apaṇṇaka	non-disagreeable
apadāna vibhakti	ablative case
apratyakṣa	not perceived
abyāpāra naya	method of non-manipulation
abhāva	non-being / non-existence
abhaiññā	super knowledge
abhūta	non-reality
amulikā saddhā	rootless faith
artha	meaning/significance

avarohaṇa krama	descending order
avyākṛta	indeterminate
asampattagāhi	non-present perceiver
assaddha	faithless
ākāra-parivitakka	reflection on reasons
ākāravatī saddhā	rational faith
ākāsa	space
ādhāra vibhakti	locative case
āpāthagata	entering the field
āpodhātu	water-element
āpta	authority
ābhāsa	fallacy
ābhoga	thought
ārammaṇa	object
ārya	noble (one)
ārohaṇa krama	ascending order
āloka	light
āvaṭṭahāra	conversion - conveying
āhacca vacana	authoritative word
āhāra rūpa	nutriment matter
itthibhāvarūpa	feminine-ness - matter
īśvara nirmaṇa vāda	creationist view
uccheda	annihilation
uttanī kamma	exhibiting
uppāda	arising
udāharāṇa	example
uddesa	indication
upacaya	growth
upanaya	application
upamā	simile
upādeya	phenomena to be acquired
ubhatokoṭṭika-pañha	two - cornered question
ubhaya Sambandha	dual combination
ekakāranavāda	doctrine of single cause
ekattatā	one-ness
ekatta naya	method of similarity
okappana siddhi	accomplishment by confidence
otarana	ways of entry
kammaññatā	pliability
kappiya	appropriate

karāṇa vibhatti	instrumental case
karma vibhakti	object case
karma pratyaya	karma condition
karma vipāka	effect of karma
kakolokana naya	crow- vision method
kāya viññatti	bodily expression
kālārtha naya	temporal method
ghāṇa	nose
cakkhu	eye
catubyūha hāra	conveying by fourfold array
candrakanta naya	moon-charmer method
citta	mind
— khana	thought - moment
— vīthi	thought - path
cintāmaya paññā	wisdom by reflection
cet naya	'if' method
cetovimutti	mind - freedom
chanda	willingness
jaratā	decay
jāti	birth
jivhā	tongue
jīvitindriya rūpa	life - faculty matter
jñānadarshana	knowledge - vision
jñāna bādhaka	obstacles to knowledge
ñāna vāda	knowledge - view
ñāya (nyāya)	method
— patipanna	one who walks in the right path
jñāna lakshana pratyakṣa	perception of the characteristics of knowledge
tarka	logic
tarkagrāha	grasp on logic
darsana bhūmi	stage of vision
diṭṭha	what is seen
diṭṭhi	view/theory
— nijjhanakkhanti	conviction based on reflection on theory
diṭṭhe diṭṭha vāditā	say what is seen on what is seen
diṭṭhe diṭṭhamattatā	nature of taking what is seen as mere seen
disālocana naya	method of plotting the directions
dukkha	suffering
dūsana	criticism
dūsanābhāsa	false criticism

druṣṭārtha	(based on) seen evidence
desanā hāra	mode of conveying a teaching
dosa	hatred
dhammatā	nature / uniformity
— naya	method of uniformity
dvidhā vipaka	twofold consequence
dhammanetti	dhamma-guide
dhammapaṭisambhidā	comprehension of dhamma
dhammārammaṇa	concept - object
dhamme ñāṇa	knowledge in dhamma
dhammanvaya	dhamma - inference
dhātu	element
na āruppavāda	'no-formless - existence' view
natthikavāda	nihilism
nadisota naya	river - flow method
nandiyāvaṭṭa naya	method of conversion of relishing
na bhava nirodha vada	'no extinction of becoming' view
naya	method
nayaggāha	grasp of method
nānatta naya	method of difference
nigamana vidyā	deduction
nigrahassthāna	censurable points
niddesa	demonstration
nirutti	etymology
nirvikalpa	non-conceptual
nissaraṇa	emancipation
nitattha naya	the method of 'already guided meaning'
netti	guide
neyyattha naya	the method of 'still to be guided meaning'
nyāya (ñāya)	'right path'
pakasanā	displaying
paccaya (pratyaya)	condition
paccakkhasiddhi	accomplishment by perception
paccupaṭṭhāna	appearance
pañcadvarānubaddha	associated with the five doors
pañcakkhandā	five aggregates
paññā (prajñā)	wisdom
paññatti (prajñapti)	designation
paticca (pratitya)	dependent
— samuppanna	dependently co-originated
— samuppāda	dependent co-origination

Paṭiniddesa	counter - demonstration
parihāra	removal
paṭhamā (prathamā)	the first (case)
pada	word
padaparama	mere verbal understanding
padaṭṭhāna	proximate reason
pamāṇa	means
paratoghosa	word of others
parasamaññā	systems of others
paramasacca	highest truth
parikkhāra hāra	conveying by requisites
paricchede ñāṇa	knowledge in analysis
pariññā (parijñā)	comprehensive knowledge
paritta	small
parivattana hāra	conveying by reversal
parihāra	removal
pahāna (prahāṇa)	eradication
purisa bhāva	masculine - ness
prajñā	wisdom
pratijñā	thesis
prameya	what is measured
phassa (sparsha)	contact
phoṭṭhabba	touch
bahutokotika	multi - cornered
bilajjhāsaya	'hole - intention'
buddhāpadesa	Buddha - indicator (authority of the Buddha)
byañjana	verbal content
bhanga	break
bhavanga	life - continuum
bhāvanā bhūmi	stage of cultivation
bhāvanāmaya paññā	wisdom born out of cultivation
bhūta	true
— rūpa	primary form
mandūkagati naya	frog - leap method
majjhimā patipadā	middle path
mana	mind
manasikāra	attention
manindriya	faculty of mind
mano viññana	mind - consciousness
mahanta	big
mahāpadesa	great indicator

migapadavalanjana nyāya	method of dear-foot-print
misramanoḍvārika	belonging to mixed mind-door
muta	what in felt
mute mutavaditā	to say what is felt on what is felt
mudutā	plasticity
mendaka pañha	sheep - question
yat-tat naya	'whatever... that' method
yukti hāra	conveying by construing
yogijñāna	meditative knowledge
yoniso manasikāra	reflection by origin
rasa	taste
rukkha sakuna naya	'bird - on - the - tree' method
ruci	inclination
rūpa	form / matter
— āyusa	duration of matter
— ārammaṇa	object of form
Lakkhaṇa (Lakṣaṇa)	characteristic
— rūpa	character - form
— hāra	conveying by characteristics
lahutā	lightness
vacī viññatti	vocal expression matter
vatthu parittatā	minuteness of the object
vicayahāra	conveying by investigation
vicikicchā	doubt
viññatti	expression
viññāna (vijñāna)	consciousness
viññāta	what is known
viññate viññata vadita	to say what is cognized on what is cognized
vinaya	Discipline
vipāka	result
vippayutta	dissociated
vibhatti naya	case - method
— hāra	conveying by analysis
vibhajanā	analysing
vibhaṅga	analysis
— naya	analytical method
vivaraṇā	divulging
visesa	distinction
viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva	qualifier - qualified relation
visunsiddha	occurring independently (separately)
vemattatā	diversity

vevacana hāra	conveying by synonyms
vyatireka	negative
vyavahāra	convention
— ñāṇa	conventional knowledge
— satya	conventional truth
vyāpti	invariable concomittance
śabda (-Śābda)	sound
śāśvata (sassata)	eternal
śuddha manodvārika	belonging to pure mind-door
saddhā (Śraddhā)	faith
sakkāya diṭṭhi	self - view
saṅkāsanā	explaining
saṅgaha	inclusion
sacca (Satya)	truth
— anuppatti	arrival at truth
— anubodha	partial comprehension of truth
— anurakkhaṇa	safeguarding truth
sacchikiriya (Sākṣhātkaṇa)	'making it in one's eye' (perception)
saññā (sañjñā)	sensation
sadda (śabda)	sound
— āyatana	faculty of sound
saddhā	faith
— pamāṇa	faith - means
sanidassana	visible
santati	continuation
savikalpa	conceptual
samannāhāra	coordination
samāropana hāra	conveying by co-ordination
sampattagāhi	present - perceiver
sampradāna vibhakti	dative case
samprayukta (sampayutta)	associated
sammādiṭṭhi	right view
sammuti	convention
sammutiyāñāṇa	conventional knowledge
sāmānya	generality
— lakṣāna	general character
sāsana paṭṭhāna	the pattern of dispensation
siha vikkilita	lion's play
sīhāralokana naya	lion - vision method
suññatā	emptiness
suta	what is heard
sutamaya ñāṇa	knowledge by hearing

sutamayī paññā	wisdom born out of hearing (learning)
sute sutavaditā	to say what is heard on what is heard
sutta	discourse
— anuloma	what in agreement with discourse
sekha	novice
sodhana hāra	conveying by clearing - up
sotapatti	stream - attainment
svalakshana	unique characteristic
svasaṇvedana	self - perception
svārthajñā	knowledge for one's own sake
hadaya	heart
hetu	cause
hetuphala	cause and effect
hetvābhāsa	fallacy (of reason)

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ENGLISH VERSION OF *“Theravāda Nyāya”*

The present work, authored by the Venerable Hegoda Khemananda Thero and translated into English by Dr. Asanga Tilakaratne can certainly be considered as the first-ever attempt at presenting a systematic and comprehensive version of Buddhist Logic and Methodology as could be gathered from the earliest Buddhist literary sources. Though mainly based on the Theravada sources, both canonical and para-canonical, it takes into consideration the parallel data in other systems of Indian thought so as to bring the subject into a wider perspective and to presenting it with a greater measure of precision. Its great merit is to be seen in the light it throws on the earliest Buddhist technical terminology pertaining to logic and methodology, an important aspect of Buddhist studies which has remained upto now rather less exhaustively dealt with. The over-all effect of this study is the provision of a new dimension for a proper understanding of the word of the Buddha.

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