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BUDDHIST STUDIES IN HONOUR OF I.B. HORNER

I.B. HORNER

BUDDHIST STUDIES IN HONOUR OF I. B. HORNER

Edited by

L. COUSINS, A. KUNST, AND K. R. NORMAN



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R.E. AND C.W. IGGLEDEN

ISALINE BLEW HORNER

President of the Pali Text Society

A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

In accepting the invitation to write a brief biography for inclusion in a volume to be published in honour of the distinguished Pāli scholar Isaline Blew Horner, it is by no means an easy matter to condense into a so comparatively short space the many journeys and interesting events of her life, and even less easy to give adequate mention to her long and productive association with Pāli scholarship to which she has made, and is still making, such substantial and valuable contributions.

Of this latter most dominant aspect of her life surely 'self discipline in scholastic industry' must be one of the most fitting ways in which to refer to her sustained hard work and tenacity of purpose, resulting as it has in the successful completion of a variety of tasks, many assuming very considerable proportions. Not only has she applied herself over the years to studying, editing, translating, writing and occasionally lecturing on the Pāli language and its literature, but for years she has managed to combine these activities with the taking over and almost single-handed running of the Pali Text Society, founded in 1881 by Professor T.W. Rhys Davids; indeed to many today the names Pali Text Society and I.B. Horner have become almost synonymous.

Born in 1896 at Walthamstow in Essex she received part of her early education at Prior's Field, then a progressive school near Godalming in Surrey. It appears that during those very early days the subjects which appealed to her most were history, then perhaps French. Her love of gardens, wild flowers and plants was also a keen source of interest, and today still, in the room which is her study and which houses a copy of every main publication for which the Pali Text Society has ever been responsible, there is always an example of some well tended plant life or flowers.

With the subject of Buddhism possibly her first remembered acquaintance was made at the age of about twelve years when she happened to be staying with relations in Kent. Some time during that visit Professor Rhys Davids and his wife Caroline were both invited to lunch, thus providing Dr. Horner, as a little girl, with the opportunity for the first and actually only time in her life of seeing and personally speaking with Professor Rhys Davids. Appropriately enough she asked him a question concerning Buddhism, although probably prompted by hearing others discussing the subject at that time. In

her own words recalling the event today she says of the Professor, "He was charming and, although I cannot remember what he said on that occasion, I do remember that he in no way spoke down to me as a mere ignorant child; that was never his way."

In 1914, upon completion of her years at Prior's Field, she went up to Cambridge where at Newnham in 1917 she successfully sat for her Tripos in the Moral Sciences, following this in 1918 by becoming assistant to the librarian at Newnham. After two years in that capacity she was appointed acting librarian from 1920-21, 1921 being the year which marked the first of numerous visits to Ceylon. Always she has enjoyed the duties of librarianship, and has on occasion rather deprecatingly referred to herself as being, "Really only a not very well trained librarian!" Her liking for and ability in that direction has shown itself in more than one respect, for not only has she been the most generous promotor and mainstay of the extensive collection of Pāli literature within the Pali Text Society itself, but her own college, Newnham, owes its fine library extension to her great generosity. The new extension, known as 'Horner', was completed in 1962, and as a grateful mark of recognition for that immensely advantageous enlargement to the existing Yates Thompson library a bronze bust of her is exhibited within the main hall of the extension.

Her knowledge from so many angles concerning books and manuscripts is very wide and has proved of great value not only to the Society. She has always made a particular point of trying to help students, and any who have applied to her, with advice regarding their own individual manuscripts, not infrequently accepting the request to go right through such originals both from the aspect of checking the subject matter as well as rendering the typescript suitable for the printers. There must be many who owe the final publication of their work to her experienced and unstinting help and advice.

Even the menial task of packing books for despatch is a labour she has readily and with proficiency undertaken at any time, in fact it became a regular duty which she looked after without hesitation during and immediately after the war years when help for the Society in those matters was at a low ebb.

Her initial visit to Ceylon, commencing with arrival on Christmas Day 1921, is redolent of memories; one immediate and seasonal, if utterly inconsequential recollection being that of the sight of various English planters, at the well known hotel where she stayed, attempting to waltz to the strains of "O, come all ye faithful ..."! However, this introductory visit was not of long duration, but it was, Dr. Horner says, during her first few days there that Buddhism made a very great impact on her.

From Ceylon she journeyed on to India, there to stay for about two years with a sister of the then principal at Newnham, who was residing in a small house in Mysore. In 1922, from Mysore, she ventured for the first time over to Burma where, although she was only there for three weeks, she had the fortunate opportunity to be taken round Pagan by Professor G.H. Luce, actually spending three or four nights at that wonderful ancient capital city of Burma made famous in the time of King Anawrahta. On her return to India she applied herself to learning colloquial Tamil from a local munshi, having already acquired a little knowledge of classical Tamil as a result of some earlier studies. She also continued to find out about and experience as much as possible of Indian village life and Hinduism until her departure for England in 1923, her homeward journey taking her via Kenya and South Africa. On the subject of Hinduism she implied that at one time Hinduism might well have been her eventual choice of subject for later study had she been able at the appropriate juncture to have gone back to India to pursue on the spot such a course.

During her absence from England in 1922 Professor Rhys Davids had died; thus, following her return home in 1923, the relations in Kent sought to encourage her to invite Mrs. Rhys Davids' counsel on the matter of possible future research, and offered to write to Mrs. Rhys Davids themselves. Demonstrating some of the characteristics of that quality which she terms "Being a rugged individualist", she implored them not to do so and instead wrote herself to Dr. Kenneth Saunders at the University of California, Berkeley, but who was at that time, it turned out, actually in Cambridge. As a result of her letter they later together paid a visit to Luzac & Co., where on his advice she purchased a copy of *Dhammapada*, and subsequently she undertook to catalogue his books for him. When, however, Dr. Saunders suggested she should write a thesis on 'The Rosary', she found it impossible to stimulate sufficient interest; and finally, writing of her own accord to Mrs. Rhys Davids, embarked on the road of Pāli studies along which, until then, really only the pioneer had fared so far as the Western scholar was concerned.

From 1923 to 1936 she was not only a Fellow but also librarian at Newnham, and it was during this period that she wrote her first book in connection with Buddhist studies, entitled *Women Under Primitive Buddhism*, published in 1930. Also during that period, actually in 1928, she became the first Sarah Smithson Research Fellow, with the aim of research in Pāli studies, taking a break in 1929 when there arose yet a further opportunity to visit Ceylon and India once more.

In 1931, after seven years as Master of Peterhouse, Cambridge, Lord

Chalmers on his retirement passed to Dr. Horner his entire collection of splendidly bound Pāli texts and other Oriental works. The moment of receiving those volumes must have been one of great stimulation and encouragement towards the further study of the subject, and they still form a substantial section of Dr. Horner's fine library of Pāli literature. Numbered amongst that collection were Lord Chalmers' own translation of the *Majjhima Nikāya* under the title of *Further Dialogues of the Buddha*, possibly the first translation of the *Majjhima Nikāya* ever made into English, also his translation for the Harvard Oriental Series of the *Suttanipāta*, entitled *Buddha's Teachings*, the preparation of which gave Dr. Horner her first taste of proof reading and indexing.

In 1933 she edited the third volume of *Papañcasūdanī*, the commentary on the *Majjhima Nikāya*, her first major editing work. The first two volumes had already been edited by J.H. Woods and D. Kosambi in 1922 and 1928 respectively. In 1934 her second publication in the Buddhist field appeared, entitled *The Early Buddhist Theory of Man Perfected*.

On leaving Newnham in 1936 she went to Manchester, where her friend Eliza M. Butler had been appointed as the first woman professor to the chair of German at the University there, and continuing with her own work of editing *Papañcasūdanī* was successful in concluding volume four for publication in 1937. The year 1938 saw not only the publication of the final section of this same work, volume five, but also her translation of the first of the six volumes of *Vinaya Piṭaka*, under the title of *The Book of the Discipline*, dealing with that section of the Pāli Canon containing the rules of conduct for observance by bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs, details of the founding and growth of the Buddhist Saṅgha, etc. Another trip to Ceylon and India was fitted in as well during that same busy year.

Due to the war the next few years from 1939 onwards were somewhat distracting for any consecutive scholastic pursuits, but in spite of air raids and coping with the type of duties incumbent upon one at such times the editing of *Buddhavaṃsa Aṭṭhakathā* was completed, and the continuation of translation of a substantial portion of *Vinaya Piṭaka* was also achieved, volume two coming out in 1940 and volume three in 1942.

In 1942 while Dr. Horner was still in Manchester Mrs Rhys Davids died, thus leaving the Pali Text Society without a president or hon. secretary, since she herself had undertaken both those duties. With the acceptance by Dr. Rouse of the presidency, Dr. Horner made good her promise to Mrs. Rhys Davids to take on the work of hon. secretary, which office, from the Society's point of view, she so beneficially held until 1959 when she herself became President. The death of her mother in 1943, still of course during

the war, brought Dr. Horner to London to care for her father, and after his death in 1946 she remained on in London.

Having earlier edited *Madhuratthavilāsini*, the commentary on *Buddhavaṃsa*, that volume was now published and she continued with the translation of *Vinaya Piṭaka* until her first post war visit in 1948 to Ceylon, India and also once again to Burma. The publication of *Living Thoughts of Gotama the Buddha – An Anthology*, on which she had worked jointly with Dr. A.K. Coomaraswamy, also appeared in that year.

She went again to Ceylon in 1950 to attend the foundation meetings of the World Federation of Buddhists, and while there, at the ninth Doña Alphina Ratnayake Trust Lecture, spoke on 'The Basic Position of Sīla'.

1951 and 1952 were the years of publication respectively of the translation of volumes four and five of *Vinaya Piṭaka*, leaving only the concluding sixth volume, *Parivāra*, for translation which she finally completed and had published in 1966.

During the period between 1954-1959 her translation of *Majjhima Nikāya*, entitled *Middle Length Sayings*, was produced in three volumes – i.e. the 152 discourses in the *Suttanta Piṭaka* of the Pāli Canon classified as of middle length. Also published during that time was a little volume, *Ten Jātaka Stories*, set with the Pāli and corresponding English translation on facing pages, a most instructive method of presentation for the student, and notably now being reprinted in Thailand. Her section on 'The Teaching of the Elders' in the volume entitled *Buddhist Texts Through the Ages*, of which Dr. E. Conze was the editor, was also published during this period, and during 1954 yet again she journeyed to Ceylon, India and Burma.

The death occurred in 1959 of Dr. W. Stede (co-editor with Prof. Rhys Davids of the *Pali-English Dictionary*), who had succeeded Dr. Rouse as President of the Pali Text Society on the latter's death in 1950. Although Dr. Horner tried very hard to persuade Professor Sir Ralph Turner, a council member for very many years, to follow Dr. Stede by accepting the presidency, he declined on the grounds that he was trying to diminish rather than increase his responsibilities. So it was Dr. Horner herself who in the end accepted the position, combining it with that of hon. treasurer and relinquishing the post of hon. secretary.

Another of Dr. Horner's smaller works, *Anthology of Early Buddhist Poetry*, was published in Ceylon in 1963 during which year she was once more a visitor to that island. Of greater importance in 1963/64, though, was the publication of her translation *Milinda's Questions*, the well known work giving an account of the traditional dialogues between the Arahatta Nāgasena and the Graeco-Bactrian King Milinda (Menander). An original translation of

this, made by Prof. Rhys Davids in 1890, had appeared in the Sacred Books of the East series of Oxford University Press. It had long been out of print, so to provide a new translation, now published in the Pali Text Society's own Sacred Books of the Buddhist series, was not only to retain for the West in the English language that particular contribution to knowledge, but was also to render a service to students engaged in Buddhist studies.

In 1964, in recognition of her long years of work in the field of Pāli translation and indefatigable support of Pāli studies in general, the University of Ceylon awarded her an honorary doctorate in literature. As she was unable to go to Ceylon at the time for the bestowal of the award, the High Commissioner for Ceylon here in England at that date, her friend of so many years' standing, Dr. G.P. Malalasekera, officiated on behalf of the Chancellor of the University at the ceremony which took place at the Ceylon Residence in London, where a reception in her honour was also given on the same occasion.

As mentioned previously, 1966 saw the publication of the translation of *Parivāra*, the sixth and final volume of *Vinaya Piṭaka*. This marked the conclusion to one of the most lengthy, solid pieces of translation work, the subject matter of which in many cases is not easy of interpretation, requiring specialized knowledge, particularly in the instance of traditional considerations.

For several years she has held the position of General Reviser to the Copenhagen *Critical Pāli Dictionary*, which involves reading the articles in proof, an activity of which she has of course by now a large experience.

She has contributed a variety of articles and reviews to such learned publications as the *Indian Historical Quarterly*, the *Hibbert Journal*, *Ceylon Journal*, the now defunct *Indian Culture*, etc. Journals, too, such as that of the Mahābodhi Society and the *Middle Way* of the Buddhist Society, have published many of her contributions, the total number of which to date must approach the figure of two hundred or more.

In addition to becoming an Associate of Newnham in 1931, the years from 1939-1949 saw Dr. Horner elected to the Governing Body of the College at a time when things were not perhaps at their easiest, that particular period introducing all the complications of war and immediate post war conditions.

It might be mentioned here that her earlier years at the College were not narrowly confined to scholarly activities; she also exhibited a competence other than academic, rising to the status of captaining the Newnham & Girton Combined Tennis Team. Perhaps, though, it has been a quality akin to that giving rise to her rather telling underarm spin service, that in later years,

in another category has shown itself as the driving force behind what was to become her future work. One aspect of this work has been notable not least for the successful attainment of arranging, on behalf of the Pali Text Society, for one or more — frequently more — works per annum to be regularly served, as it were, into the printers' court for publication, this in order to accord with the Society's original aims. Her conscientious adherence to the achievement of this aim has secured for the Society a high score in the academic field.

There have been several instances in the life of the Society when, but for the unstinting financial backing by Dr. Horner personally, certain works might never have been published, and for over a quarter of a century now it has been largely due to her efforts, as already observed, that the flow and standard of output has been maintained at such a constant level.

During 1969, when she decided to leave Dawson Place, her home and the headquarters of the Society for so many years, and to move to a new abode, she set up a trust fund for the Society, the income from which would permit of the employment of a paid officer to undertake some of the administrative work which was increasing almost daily. This was yet another example of her concern for the work of the Society, and in this case a very obvious support for its future.

By no means has every one of Dr. Horner's visits to Ceylon and Southeast Asia been noted here, neither yet has mention been made of her fairly extensive travels in Europe, especially her several instructive and pleasurable short periods in Greece. Her fondness for the sun is possibly one facet of the attraction which both Sri Lanka and Greece hold for her, and in such strongholds of antiquity her ever keen interest in archaeology is obviously well capable of provision, to an almost inexhaustible degree. In 1933-1934 the visits in particular to Lesbos were of special interest since she was able there to join her friend, the archaeologist Winifred Lamb, who was then leading a dig at Troy II levels. That of course provided an enormous stimulus to what was to Dr. Horner an already absorbing subject.

All her life she has had an affection for cats, and no friends could have had more care and attention than the four footed companions who from period to period have been leading members of her household.

At the time of being consulted on the matter of details for these rather sketchy biographical notes Dr. Horner expressed the wish that somewhere it might be recorded how very appreciative she is of the active co-operation given by the members of the Pali Text Society Council. Quoting her verbatim, on the general and individual assistance given, she said, "Members are being of enormous help — I value this tremendously."

One cannot conclude without observing that if one regards the Pāli scholar in the field of almost a century ago, referred to earlier as pioneers, then Dr. Horner must surely be regarded as a veritable settler, worker extraordinary, preserver and promoter in the Western world of the Pāli language, the study of that language and its literature.

In 1981 the Pali Text Society will be celebrating its centenary. That this should be possible is in no small measure due to her labours, her time and generosity of spirit. The Society has indeed a very great President.

Waltham – St.-Lawrence

THE IMPIOUS BRAHMAN AND THE PIOUS CAṆḌĀLA

The *Chavaka-Jātaka*¹ (No. 309, *Ja* III 27-30) tells the story of a gluttonous brahman who violates the sacred prescription that the teacher must not sit on a lower seat than his pupil, in favour of the king who provides excellent food and an easy life for him. The anti-brahmanical tendency of the story is poignantly enhanced by the device that its real hero, who exposes and corrects the brahman, is a chavaka² — the bodhisatta as a caṇḍāla blaming and admonishing a brahman and a king. What gives some additional interest to this anecdote is the fact that it is quoted in the *Vinayapitaka* (*Vin* IV 203, 27ff). It is there told by the Buddha as the motivation or justification of, and as an introduction to, the *sekhiya* rule: *na nice āsane nisiditvā ucce āsane nisinnassa agilānassa dhammo desetabbo*. By stating that even at the past time of the story (*tadā pi*) he had disapproved of the teaching of a mantra to one sitting on a higher seat, the Buddha identifies himself with the caṇḍāla, which shows that the *Vin* quotation, too, is technically regarded as a *jātaka*.

Unfortunately the four gāthās of the little ākhyāna have, in both texts, suffered considerably in transmission and, partly in consequence of this, also in explanation and translation. It is hoped that the following attempt at restoration and interpretation will be accepted as a modest contribution to the knowledge and appreciation of pre-, or at any rate non-, buddhist anti-brahmanical ascetics' poetry.

Both *Ja* and *Vin* relate, in different prose wording, that the caṇḍāla's pregnant wife has a dohaḍa for mangoes when they are not in season. To save her life, the caṇḍāla steals a mango from a tree in the king's garden which is *dhuva-phala*, bearing fruit all the year round. While he is still in the tree, the king and the brahman appear, and he overhears the unrighteous lesson. Realizing that teacher and pupil are as *adhammika* as he is himself in stealing the king's mango, he lets himself down or (*Vin*) falls from the tree and addresses the sinful couple with the first gāthā (*Ja* E^e:)

sabbam idam carima-vatam ubho dhammam na passati ...

Vin E^eS^e have instead as the conclusion of the prose introduction: "*sabbam idam ca parigatan*" *ti tatth'eva paripati*, followed by the gāthā: *ubho attham na jānanti, ubho dhammam na passare ...*. There follows in *Vin* the remainder of the gāthās without any intervening or concluding prose; not even the changing speakers of the stanzas are indicated.

Two things are at once obvious: *passare* (also read by *Ja* C^eS^e) is the original reading as against the ungrammatical sg. *passati* of *Ja* E^e; and the mean-

ingless words *sabbam* ... *parigatam* are in reality the first gāthā pāda; the difference between them and the pāda of *Ja* quoted above actually reduces itself to *Ja ri ma va* as against *Vin pa ri ga*. If we remember that all of Oldenberg's sources were in Burmese script, in which the omission of a tiny horizontal stroke will change a *ma* into a *pa*, and a small opening at the bottom of a closed circle will change a *va* into a *ga*, we may confidently assume that *pariga* is the result of a misspelling or misreading of the two akṣaras *ma* and *va* plus an inversion of the order of (original) *ri ma*³. The genuine Burmese reading, found in *Vin* B^e and in Fausböll's Burmese MSS B^{id}, is *carimam katam* – a typical attempt by Burmese scholars to make a (to them) obscure passage intelligible. It is this reading which is commented upon by Buddhaghosa (*Sp* 896,10), as his explanation *sabbo ayam loko samkaram gato nimmariyādo* shows.

But what does *carima-vatam* really mean? Sanskrit *carima* is a synonym of *antya*, and this commonly also denotes “a man of the lowest caste”. I see no difficulty in assuming the same meaning for the *carima* of *Ja*. The indignant caṇḍāla exclaims: “All this is *carama-vrata*, an untouchable's conduct or practice” – you two are behaving no better than a caṇḍāla stealing the king's mango.

The odd śloka pāda *ubho attham na jānanti* quoted above from *Vin* is missing in *Ja*; conversely, the even pāda *ubho dhammam na passare* is followed in *Ja* by another even pāda: *ubho pakatiyā cutā*, which is missing in *Vin*; two more pādas forming a normal half-śloka conclude the stanza, which thus in both versions consists of *five* pādas: in *Vin* an odd pāda concealed in the prose plus a normal four-pāda śloka; in *Ja* two normal half-ślokas with a redundant even pāda in between. The (I hope convincing) combination of the two versions results in the six-pāda śloka printed and translated below. What has happened in *Ja* is that of *three* pādas beginning with *ubho* the middle one was simply left out by inadvertency, while in *Vin* after the disappearance of the real first pāda in the prose the resultant gap in the first gāthā was filled with the odd pāda *ubho ... jānanti*, whereafter the now redundant even pāda *ubho pakatiyā cutā* was omitted – the result being an apparently normal four-pāda stanza *ubho attham ... adhiyati*.

Before turning to gāthās 2-4 we still have to discuss the considerable variants of the last two pādas of gāthā 1. Pāda 1^e: *Ja* E^eC¹⁹²⁷ *sajjhāpayati*, C^e *mant' ajjhāyati*, S^e *mante nāpeti*, *Vin* all: *mantam vāceti*; 1^f: *Ja* E^eC¹⁹²⁷ *yo ca dhammam adhiyati*, C^eS^e *yo ca mantam adhiyati*, *Vin* all: *yo cādhammen' adhiyadhiyyati*. In pāda f, *dhammam adhiyati* is a palpable corruption of an original *yo cādhammenā*^o; the reading of C^eS^e is a secondary attempt at introducing the object *mantam* into this pāda too. Even more conspicuous

is the secondary nature of the three different attempts to introduce the *mantam/mante* of the prose tale into pāda e, the worst solution of the problem being the one offered by C^e, where *ajjhāyati* has not even the required causative meaning. Actually, an object *mantam/mante* is not necessary in either pāda, and the *sajjhāpayati* of E^eC¹⁹²⁷ (with the old *-ayati*, not *-eti*, and yielding a correct vipulā-pāda) is undoubtedly the original reading.

The answer to the caṇḍāla's reproach put into the brahman's mouth is his naive self-condemnation: "I do not practise the dhamma of the ṛṣis because the king feeds me so well." Gāthā 2^{ab}: *sālīnam bhojanam bhuñje suci mam's' ūpasecanam*, is a 'prefabricated' half-śloka. It occurs, with *odanam* instead of *bhojanam*, *Ja* III 144,25; slightly damaged at the end, *Divyāvadāna* 559: *sālīnam odanam bhuktvā śuci mam'sopasevitam*; transformed into āryā, *Mahāvastu* III 271,10: *sālīnam odanam śuci aneka-sūpa-vyañjanopetam*. *Th* 842^{cd} reads: *sālīnam odano⁴ bhutto suci mam's' ūpasecano*, and we find exactly this form of the line in *Vin*; in the context of our story, the active version of *Ja* is certainly to be preferred. Also it seems certain that the form of the second half of the stanza found in *Ja* (see below) has become in *Vin*: *tasmā dhamme na vattāmi, dhammo ariyebhi vaṇṇito*.

The last two gāthās (3,4) are the final vituperation and exhortation by the caṇḍāla. They appear in *Vin* in reverse order (4,3), and it is hardly possible to find a cogent reason for preferring either order. As on the whole (and with important exceptions!) *Ja* has turned out to be the better and more original version, I have followed it in this respect.

As to the text of gāthā 3, *Ja*'s *mahā loko* gives better sense than *Vin*'s voc. *mahābrahme* ("wander about, the world is wide ..."), and the honorific "great brahman" does not seem to be quite suited to the context. At the end of pāda d, *Ja* has *ivābhida*, *Vin* *iva bhidā ti*; the metre demands *ivābhidā* (*iva* + aor. *abhidā*).

Gāthā 4 is identical in both versions, yet pāda c contains an ancient corruption. It appears in *Ja* and *Vin* as *yā vutti vinipātena*. The desperate attempts of commentators (from Buddhaghosa onwards) and translators to construct and translate the second half of the stanza are hardly worth recording. It is abundantly clear that we have to correct *yā* to *yo*, correlating this to the *taṃ* of pāda a, and to combine *vutti* and *vinipātena* into a compound. The reason for the corruption is probably that *vinipāta* was, as a matter of course, taken in its more usual connotation as a synonym of *niraya* or *duggati*; this made a combination with *vutti* impossible, and once the compound was dissolved it seemed necessary to make the relative pronoun agree in gender with the fem. *vutti*.

Reconstituted text

Caṇḍāla:

1. sabbaṃ idaṃ carima-vataṃ! ubho dhammaṃ na passare,
ubho atthaṃ na jānanti, ubho pakatiyā cutā:
yo cāyaṃ sajjhāpayati yo cādhammen' adhiyati.

Brahman:

2. sāliṇaṃ bhojanaṃ bhuñje suci maṃs'ūpasecanaṃ,
tasmā etaṃ na sevāmi dhammaṃ isibhi sevitam.

Caṇḍāla:

3. paribbaja, mahā loko, pacant' aññe pi pāṇino,
mā tvaṃ adhammo ācarito asmā kumbhaṃ ivābhida!
4. dhir-atthu taṃ dhana-lābhaṃ yasa-lābhañ ca, brāhmaṇa,
yo vutti-vinipātena adhamma-caraṇena vā.

Caṇḍāla:

1. All this is untouchables' practice! Both of them do not know the dhamma, both of them do not understand the meaning (of the rule), both of them have fallen from the (ritual) standard⁵ – this one who is teaching and he who is learning in an unrighteous fashion!

Brahman:

2. I eat pure food (consisting) of best quality rice with meat sauce, therefore I do not practise that dhamma practised by the ṛṣis.⁶

Caṇḍāla:

3. Turn wandering mendicant – great is the world, there are other creatures (not only this wretched king) who cook (for wandering ascetics) – lest unrighteousness practiced by you break you as a stone⁷ (breaks) a pot!

4. Shame on that gain of wealth and gain of fame, brahman, which (is obtained) by ruin of good conduct and practice of unrighteousness!

Buchholz in der Nordheide

NOTES

¹ Abbreviations as in the *Critical Pāli Dictionary*. C¹⁹²⁷ = *Jatakaṭṭhakathā*, Colombo 1927.

² On *chavaka*, *chapaka* < *śvapaka* or *śvapaca* cf. my *Āryā-Strophen des Pali-Kanons*, Akademie Mainz, 1967, p. 279. My suggestion that the form *chavaka* might be influenced by *chava-dāhaka* of *Ja* V 449,4* (repeated by Bollée, *Kuṇāla-Jātaka*, p. 112) is rendered untenable by the *chavaka*-Jātaka which had escaped my attention.

³ I am unable to explain how *parigatam* got into *Vin* S^e too. Could it have been taken from *Vin* E^e?

⁴ This nominative clearly shows that *sālīnam* is not an adj. but the gen. pl. of *sālī*. Edgerton's objection (*BHSD* s.v. *śālīna*) "but all odana was normally composed of rice" overlooks the fact that there are very different qualities of rice (and other grains), *sālī* being the best one. To set all doubts at rest, it is sufficient to quote the Skt. compound *śāly-odana*, "boiled rice (of a superior kind)" according to Apte (*Skt.-Eng. Dict.*). There is a Skt. adj. *śālīna* derived from *śālā*; an adj. *śālīna* derived from *śālī* does not exist, and both the lemmata *sālīna* in *PED* and *śālīna* in *BHSD* must be deleted.

⁵ *prakṛti* = "a model, pattern, standard (especially in ritualistic works)" (Apte, *Skt.-Eng. Dict.*).

⁶ In this context, the word *ṛṣi* looks like a vague reference to 'vedic' religion.

⁷ *asmā*, *Ja* cty. correctly: *pāsāṇo kumbham iva*, Buddhaghosa: *yathā udaka-kumbham pāsāṇo bhindeyya*. That the word could easily be misunderstood as a pronominal ablative is shown by *Ja* S^e reading *tasmā*.

THE *PRADAKṢINĀ-SŪTRA* OF CHANG TSIANG-KUIN

The *Pradakṣinā-sūtra* (Ch 0048, 13-71, first edited in my *Khotanese Buddhist Texts* (1951), 72-74) is so named in line 62. It is, however, concerned with the *pradakṣinā* of the *caitya* (*bāśa*, loc. sing., older *balśa*, rendering Buddhist Sanskrit both *caitya* and *stūpa*). It is therefore parallel to the BS *Caitya-pradakṣinā-gāthā* (Tibetan, Peking edition No. 697). Though highly divergent this text has been valuable in confirmation. Susumu W. Nakamura published a study of *pradakṣinā* in the *Semitic and Oriental Studies* presented to W. Popper, 1951, pp. 345-354. The five advantages of *satkārya-caryā* 'reverential conduct' are in the *Ekottarāgama* (Taishō, No. 125, 647a). In the Saka text there is reference to ten advantages.

The Saka *Pradakṣinā-sūtra* places the venue in the city of Śrāvastī when Śāriputra questioned the Buddha on the merits of *pradakṣinā*. He is named again in line 61 before the epilogue of Cā Tcyāṃ-kvina, who looks forward to birth in the Sukhāvati of Armyāyā. In the *Caitya-pradakṣinā-gāthā* also, Śāriputra is the questioner. A. Migot's monograph, 'Un grand disciple du Buddha: Śāriputra', sets out his career (*BEFEO* 46 (1954) 403-450).

The family name *Cā* 'Chang' of the writer is likely to be the family name of the ruling Chinese family in Ṣa-cū (Shachow), the name *Chang* (K 1174.3 ṭṣang from ṭ'iang). The two personal syllables have not yet been identified. The same name *Cā* occurs in *Cā Kimā-sanū* in the *Jātaka-stava* colophon 39v4 (where it is also written in Sogdian script) and in Chinese in my *Saka Portfolio* III, plate 49, 1.2.

In the first edition many obscurities remained which have now been cleared up. Improved readings are given in brackets. The handwriting is unskilled (*Saka Portfolio* IV, plate 90). Since the Saka Iranian Vocabulary is now nearing completion, notes are not appended here.

A translation follows which may interest my old friend and colleague Miss Horner whose services to Pāli studies have been immense; it may also interest scholars who know the Tibetan and Chinese parallel texts.

In Saka the *pradakṣinā* is expressed by *hvaranṭiñā tvamdanu tsute* 'he went to the right hand with reverence', but it was also shortened to *tvamdanu* alone, which here in latest Saka has become *tvada*, *ttauda*, *ttūda*.

THE *PRADAKṢINĀ-SŪTRA*

- (14) Siddham. So it has been heard one time: the Buddha was staying in the

city of Śrāvastī, in the garden of prince Jitta (Jetavana) with a large assembly. The great *dharma-senāpati* Śāriputra, the *sthavira*, at the time came with reverence (*aurga*) to the omniscient Buddha. He so asked about a doubt, Teacher, omniscient Buddha, great destroyer of sorrows, How many advantages (*hāva*, BS *ānuśamsā*) has anyone who goes with reference (*ttauda*) to the *caitya*? The omniscient Buddha spoke with the *brahma-svara* voice, Well have you asked about this doubt. Listen, I will explain to you. If anyone while I am present or when later I have entered nirvāṇa, honours the relics (*śarīra-ka*) or (*ā ja*) the imaged Buddha, being a person with skill (*upāya*) utters praise, brings flowers to the *caitya*, places a bell (*gai ṇiyi*), and burns incense, a *pūjā-karma*

- (20) with banners, standards (*dhvaja*, *patākā*), then comes with reverence, does honour (*satkr̥tya*), presents (*byāva*) the Buddha with incense, as many as the atoms are when he comes with reverence, from one *krośa*-measure here in this place as far as the Golden Circle layer (*kāṃcana-cakra*), they vanish; at his birth he goes not at all to the *apāya*-. Without repulse he attains to the favour of the *devas*, Śakra and Brahmāna both, in the exalted circle of the *cakravartin* rulers. As many as the sand-grains (*grīcā*) the many beings he teaches to attain *bodhi*. Joy from good fortune does not exist which would please him who lacks the mental concept of *punyas*. If he gets, of the whole earth, one hundred thousand golden *niṣka*-ornaments, for him the advantage must be known to be (not) great. He who strides one step to the *caitya*, as many steps here he goes, for every step if he gets *niṣka*-ornaments made from *Jāmbunada* gold set with *ratna*-jewels, for him the advantage must be known to be very small, because in this birth he has no *punya*. For those who believe on the Buddha there is no perdition (*jiga*), it is not known. Him who goes with reverence to the *caitya* with good pure mind (*śirana aysimūna vasuna*), many *devas*, *devatās*, *nāgas* will keep in protection, all troubles will vanish, all these distresses (*upadrava*) will cease, he will escape birth in the *akṣaṇas* (the eight bad circumstances), he will suffer no distress at all. Wise (*haju ttā*), mindful, true, he will be perfect with marks of distinction, with (fine) dress and with (fine) appearance,
- (30) handsome, excellent. When he gets birth among the *devas*, his *tejas* is more excellent than the *devas*', when he falls among men, he is born in a wholly great family (*gotra*). He gets, there and there in every birth, where he enjoys much wealth (*artha-bhoga*). He gets all the gifts with joy. Greed, desire, lust, it never enters his mind at all. Happy is his dwelling who goes with reverence to the *caitya*. Truth, favour, gratitude, faith, that he lacks in no birth. Of the concentrated ones (*ekāgra*) he becomes a *devatā*; he penetrates the whole of the elements (*dharma*). Where he takes birth, in every birth, he remembers

past lives (*jāti-smara*). He so sits in his mother's womb like a *ratna*-jewel undefiled. He causes no harm to his mother at time of birth assuredly, being honoured, splendid, good to look upon, delighting (*māna*-), dear to all (*brri*, with incomplete *b*-). They too, the strength-robbing goblins (*yakṣa*), the *kalaputana*-demons, the *bhūta*-ghosts, horrific ones, have no power over him at all; they get no entrance, chance, as far as *bodhi*. His body is born pure, good, wherein he has bodily stature (*saṃsthāna*), possessing a fine appearance, pure, good. *Kāma-dhātu* and *Rūpa-dhātu* he enjoys (*hamasa*) at all times. By *devas* honoured always, he goes with reverence to the *caitya*; he extends in his place, famed as far as the *devalokas* (*bvari*, older *bure*), good, valorous, vigorous, active, unharmed, he dwells mighty in the land,

- (40) hero (*kabi*), he whose enemies (*sākyi*, from *sāni*) are broken in fight. There in the *apāya* (*pātsa* to render BS *apāya*) he does not undergo birth, he who comes with reverence to the *caitya*. He who moving in past (*byārivā*) births has acted with mind, body, tongue (the four *saṃskāra*), his acts (*karma*) are all cleansed and perish. When he shares that exalted *punya* with the beings, thereby in the *traidhātuka* he duly ripens to *bodhi*. He fulfils the six *pāramitā*-perfections, the ten *bhūmi*-stages, the *pratisaṃvid*-knowledge, the four intrepidities (*vaiśāradya*), many *saṃādhānas*, exalted powers (*bala*), the *bodhipakṣya dharmas* (assistant to *bodhi*), the omniscient *dharma-rāja*, exalted *manojavā*-magic, *ṛddhi*-powers, a physical form (*rūpakāya*) possessing the thirty-two marks, the eighty splendid *anuvyañjanas*, brilliant, as the golden mountain shines.

Such abundant advantage he gets here. With the assistance of good thought (*citta*) he prospers. He rightly has understood (*bāsti*, older *busta*) this and this of the acts (*karma*). In a life-stage (*varga*) sorrow is seen to oppress the beings, it becomes severe in the three *apāyas*. He has the favour to make a *praṇidhāna* to exalted *bodhi*.

Faith is to be known here as a beginning towards *bodhi*. He in whose mind there is no faith does not retain his good fortune.

- (50) This man from his going to the *caitya* has this extent of advantage, he who brings flowers, plants to the *caitya*, even one lump of clay he places on it, he brings umbrellas, standards, burns incense, in love, with faith, he has at every *caitya* the ten advantages.

So they stand expounded in *sūtras*. Therefore truly now with faith in the three *ratna*-jewels, *punyas* are to be gained, pure, exalted at all times, so that there does not arise at the last (*usta*, older *ustamu*) regret (*namā*, older *numāna*) on the score of gratitude (*kr̥tajñatā*).

O my mother and father, pitiful sorrowful beings, henceforth do you practice (*varttyara*) in the good way the ten *karmapathas*. He whose moral

practice (*śīla*) is low, he is thereby born here among men. He whose practice is medium, he thereby goes at once to the *devas* (*thyau jastā jsāvi*). He whose practice is strict, he thereby at once enters *nirvāṇa*. Therefore when now he exalts the *kalyāṇa-mitras* who know the eight-membered path (*aṣṭāṅga-mārga*) towards right (*samyak*) *bodhi*, after them effort must be exerted. Do you discard all evil action, of men (*huna*), so that for you human birth is not wasted. In this way guard your mind, let it not follow objects of sense (*vi-śaya*), so that it does not grasp the memorised teaching (*āsā ni*), make trouble for you.

- (60) They attain exalted fortune of the *devas*, or later beyond the worlds (*lo-kottara*), wholly freedom from confusion (*apramāda*), there doubt of it is to be destroyed (*ja vara byamā tcirī*). The omniscient Buddha spoke, Śāriputra, you being now content, teach for the beings the *upadeśa* (*u(va)diśa*).

The *Pradakṣiṇā-sūtra* is fully ended according to desire.

(EPILOGUE OF CĀ TCYĀM--KVINA)

I who felt content, through ignorance am obscured (*padū* for BS *mūḍha*), now indeed, but I desire through the *upadeśa*, may troubles (*upadrava*), diseases cease. If only I can get control in *samādhāna*-trances, I shall see, through teaching (*sikṣā*) in *abhijñā*-powers, *ṛddhi*-powers (*rada*), *pratisamvid*-knowledge, the Buddhas everywhere, those beyond cognitions (*nirvikalpa*). I shall penetrate the best knowledge (*jñāna*) of the five-staged (*pañca-gati*) beings. By force of this *punya* may I be enlightened in mind, a lamp-bearing (*dīpakara*) Buddha in *naraka* and among *preta*-ghosts, those also who are *tiryagyoni*-animals, if only the beings' severe sorrows, harsh (*nirūḁsa*) death (*kālakriyā*), at the time of last departure, may be calmed. I shall see Amitāyus Buddha with his assembly. May I be born in Sukhāvatī upon a lotus filament. May Amitāyus Buddha foretell for me

- (70) attainment of *bodhi*.

Cā Tcyām-kvina wrote in love (*brriya*, with incomplete *b-*) of *bodhi* for the disappearance of troubles (*piḁā*).

Obeisance.

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ON A FRAGMENT OF *VIMĀNĀVADĀNA*,
A CANONICAL BUDDHIST SANSKRIT WORK

Several sources make reference to the *Kṣudrakāgama* or *Kṣudraka*, the fifth part of the *Sūtrapitaka* of schools preserving the scriptures in Sanskrit. It corresponds to the *Khuddakanikāya* of the Tripitaka in Pāli. Unfortunately, neither a complete Sanskrit text of this collection nor a complete translation thereof into any other language is known to us. Therefore, even very fragmentary material is welcome for more information about this collection of 'minor texts' in Buddhist Sanskrit tradition.¹ From the lists of texts forming the *Kṣudrakāgama* it is clear that there were major differences in the traditions concerning the titles, order and number of texts incorporated in this collection.² Of the texts mentioned in these lists, the *Udāna* — generally known with its secondary title as *Udānavarga*³ — was edited in the original Sanskrit text by Franz Bernhard from manuscript fragments found in Central Asia and other sources.⁴ *Arthavargiyāṇi Sūtrāṇi* and *Ityukta* (or *Ityuktaka*, *Itivṛttaka*) were translated into Chinese and incorporated into the Chinese Tripitaka⁵, but only quotations or rather small fragments of the other texts in the *Kṣudrakāgama* are available.

An important addition to our knowledge about the collection of 'minor texts' was provided by the fragments of a manuscript from the Berlin Turfan collection listed as No. 49 in Waldschmidt's catalogue and bearing the number 464 in the collection itself.⁶ The manuscript is in a very fragmentary state of preservation, not a single leaf being complete. Most fragments are extremely small so that the identification of the texts is rather difficult. In my edition of the *Anavataptagāthā* and *Sthaviragāthā*⁷, I have argued that this manuscript contained the following five texts⁸: (1) *Udāna* (i.e. *Udānavarga*), (2) *Anavataptagāthā*, (3) *Sthaviragāthā*, (4) *Vimānāvadāna*, and (5) *Pretāvadāna*.

Anavataptagāthā is the title of a fairly large collection of *avadānas* which is, in a slightly different version, also found in the *Vinaya* of the Mūlasarvāstivāda school. It was misnamed *Sthaviragāthā* by Nalinaksha Dutt in his edition princeps of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-Vinaya*.⁹ The sequence *Anavataptagāthā* — *Sthaviragāthā* — *Vimānāvadāna* in the manuscript raises no doubt, since we find the end of the *Anavataptagāthā* with the beginning of the *Sthaviragāthā* in fragment 464d, and the end of the *Sthaviragāthā* with the beginning of the *Vimānāvadāna* in 464g.¹⁰ Equally there can be no doubt that *Pretāvadāna* followed the *Vimānāvadāna*, this being also the order of the corresponding

texts in the Pāli scriptures. We have no clue in the fragments to show where the *Udāna* was placed, but it seems probable that it was the first text, as it occurs in the lists of minor canonical texts in the *Divyāvadāna*, in the *Vinaya* of the *Mūlasarvāstivādin* and in the complete *Samyuktāgama*¹¹.

The manuscript belongs to the Sarvāstivāda school.¹² In my edition of the *Anavataptagāthā* and the *Sthaviragāthā*, I classified the texts in this manuscript as 'canonical' texts belonging to the *Kṣudrakāgama* of the Sarvāstivādin, and this was accepted in recent works on early Buddhism¹³ so that there is no need to repeat the arguments here. Consequently, we have to accept the fact that the Sarvāstivādin included certain texts in the *Kṣudrakāgama* which are not named in any of the lists of 'minor' canonical texts known to us. The absence of the *Anavataptagāthā* in the lists of the Mūlasarvāstivāda tradition is, of course, not surprising in view of the fact that this text was incorporated in the *Vinaya* of this school, and, therefore, was no longer handed down as a separate work.

The last two works in this manuscript — the *Vimānāvadāna* and the *Pretāvadāna* — are not named in other sources. The titles of the works remind us of the *Vimānavatthu* and the *Petavatthu* of the Pāli Tripiṭaka. Sanskrit versions of some stories of these two Pāli texts are known from several Buddhist Sanskrit works. The *Kaṇṭhakavimāna* (*Vimānavatthu* VII.7) corresponds very closely to the *Kaṇṭhakasya vyākaraṇa* in *Mahāvastu* (ed. by E. Senart) II.191-195.¹⁴ *Preta* stories are found in the *Avadānaśataka*, the *Vinaya* of the Mūlasarvāstivādin, etc.

In the Turfan manuscript 464, the title *Pretāvadāna* is attested to by fragment 464 f verso 2, by 464 i and by 464 k No. 3, whereas the title *Vimānāvadāna* is not found in any of the available fragments. There can be, however, hardly any doubt that *Vimānāvadāna* was the title of the text corresponding to the Pāli *Vimānavatthu*, if *Pretāvadāna* was the name of the text parallel to *Petavatthu*.

The first story of the *Vimānāvadāna* is found in fragment 464 q where it follows immediately after the end of the *Sthaviragāthā*¹⁵. It is on recto 5 — verso 2 of the leaf of which only four fragments representing less than one third of the original leaf are still extant. The text was already identified as parallel to a *Vimānavatthu* story by Mrs. Else Lüders in her provisional transliteration of the manuscript.¹⁶ The identification was mentioned in the annual report of the Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften for 1924.¹⁷

The understanding of the fragments is only possible with the help of the parallel in the *Vimānavatthu*, viz. the *Ācāmadāyikāvimāna* (II, 4; pp. 101-103 in E. Hardy's edition of the *Vimānavatthu* commentary). In this story Sakka

asks the elder Kassapa how the beggar-woman was reborn after offering rice-scum to the Thera (stanza 1-2). The Thera answers that she was reborn in the world of the Nimmānarati gods (stanza 3-5). Sakka thereupon praises the almsgiving of the poor woman and describes its extraordinary value (stanza 6-10). Verses 1-7 of the Pāli text run as follows:

<i>piṇḍāya te carantassa tuṇhibhūtassa tiṭṭhato</i> <i>daliddā kapaṇā nārī parāgāraṃ apassitā</i>	1
<i>yā te adāsi ācāmaṃ pasannā sehi pāṇihi</i> <i>sā hitvā mānusaṃ dehaṃ kaṃ nu sādisaṃ gatā</i>	2
<i>piṇḍāya me carantassa tuṇhibhūtassa tiṭṭhato</i> <i>daliddā kapaṇā nārī parāgāraṃ apassitā</i>	3
<i>yā me adāsi ācāmaṃ pasannā sehi pāṇihi</i> <i>sā hitvā mānusaṃ dehaṃ vip̐pamuttā ito cutā</i>	4
<i>Nimmānaratino nāma santi devā mahiddhikā</i> <i>tattha sā sukhitā nārī modat' ācāmadāyikā</i> ¹⁸	5
<i>aho dānaṃ varākīyā</i> ¹⁹ <i>Kassape supatitṭhitam</i> <i>parābhatena dānena ij̐hittha vata dakkhiṇā</i>	7
<i>yā mahesittam̐ kareyya cakkavattissa rājino</i> <i>nārī sabbāṅgākalyāṇī bhattu cānomadassikā</i> ²⁰ <i>etassācāmadānassa kalam̐ nagghati soḷasim̐</i>	7

Stanzas 8-10 are secondary additions with the refrain *kalam̐ nagghati soḷasim̐*; these verses are also found in *Vimānavatthu* IV, 5, 7-10.²¹

I give now the transliteration of the relevant portions of the above mentioned leaf 464 q containing the Sanskrit version; damaged letters are in brackets: .. means one lost *akṣara*; (!) marks evident clerical errors; and /// the passages where it is impossible to calculate the number of *akṣaras* with a reasonable degree of probability.²²

(recto 5) /// ākhyāhi me ma n.=ācāmadā ... 1 piṇḍāya te
v.c.[r]... [ṣ]ṇ [i] m=bhūtasya tiṣṭhataḥ ā ///

(recto 6) /// [c]etasā ... ham̐ kām [g]... mā(!)pa(!)sritāḥ
3 ity=e[v]... ktah [sth]... ḥpratyuvācā(!) ///

(verso 1) /// [d].vaḥ...[t]... modate... ma bhikṣāpradāyikā
.. [a]ho ... gatam̐ dānam̐ kā[ś] ///

(verso 2) /// *varttināṃ rājñāṃ stri (!)[r]. dayā |e.. .. āmadānasya*
[ka]lā śoḍaśīm 7 || kā tvam ka ///

The story ends with stanza 7, as is clearly seen from the manuscript.

I shall try to reconstruct the text as far as it is possible without too much speculation; reconstructed parts of the text are in parentheses. Stanza 1 was spoken by Śakra and it introduces the subject of *ācāmadāna* (almsgiving of rice-scum to the Sthavira); only its second half can be reconstructed:

— — — — — U — — — — —, — — — — — U — U — |

ākhyāhi me ma(hāsthavira phalā)n(y)ācāmadā(nataḥ) 1

Irregular śloka lines of the type assumed here are abundant in Buddhist Sanskrit poetry; a Middle Indian original reading *akkhāhi me mahāthero* is probable. The stanza has no parallel in the Pāli text, but the third pāda reminds one of a line often found in *Vimānavatthu* I, 1, 7; I, 2, 7; I, 3, 8; I, 4, 8; etc. *akkhāmi te bhikkhu mahānubhāva* which, however, belongs to the answer and is different in metre.²³

Stanzas 2-3 were also spoken by Śakra and correspond with Pāli stanza 1-2:

piṇḍāya te v(i)c(aratas tu)ṣṇim bhūtasya tiṣṭhataḥ |

ā — — — — — U — — — — —, — — — — — U — U — (2)

— — — — — U — — — — — (*suprasannena*) *cetasā* |

(sā hitvā mānuṣaṃ de)haṃ kām g(atim sa)mapāśritā 3

3 b is reconstructed on the basis of a parallel in MS 464 g (fragment 2, verso 5); and *ḥ* in the MS at the end of the stanza is, as often, only a sign to mark the pause.²⁴

The Sanskrit version now discontinues the dialogue and inserts in the next stanza the information that the Sthavira gives the answer; it seems that the answer commences in stanza 4 itself, but this part is lost. Stanza 5 belongs to the answer of the Sthavira²⁵:

ity evam (u)ktaḥ sth(avira)ḥ pratyuvāca U — U — |

— — — — — U — — — — —, — — — — — U — U — (4)

(Nirmāṇaratino nāma) d(e)v(ā)ḥ (santi maharddhikāḥ)

— — — *modate* — — —, — *ma bhikṣāpradāyikā* (5)

The story ends with Śakra's praise in stanza 6-7:²⁶

aho — — gataṃ dānaṃ Kās(yapa) — U — U — |

— — — — — U — — — — —, — — — — — U — U — (6)

(*yā cakra*)*varttināṃ rājnāṃ stri(ratnam) — — — dayā |*
e(tasyâc)āmadānasya kalā(ṃ nârghati) ṣoḍāśīm 7

The manuscript contains no title of the story. The second story of the *Vimānāvadāna* commences immediately after our stanza 7²⁷. Further fragments thereof are found on verso 3-4 of the leaf:

(verso 3) */// ḥ 1 prcchāmi deve m yā*
tvam saman[t]āt=pra[bh] . ///

(verso 4) */// garbbhe mayā pradi ///*

It is not possible to identify the story, but its second stanza is similar to a stanza in *triṣṭubh* metre occurring repeatedly in *Vimānavatthu* (I, 1, 3; I, 2, 3; I, 3, 3; I, 4, 3 etc.):

pucchāmi taṃ devi mahānubhāve
manussabhūtā kim akāsi puññam |
kenasi evaṃ jalitānubhāvā
vaṇṇo ca te sabbadisā pabhāsati |

Therefore, I propose to read:

prcchāmi deve u — u — —
— — u — — uu — u (puṇya)m |
yā tvam samantāt prabh(ā) — u — —
— — u — — uu — u — — |

There are other small fragments of the *Vimānāvadāna* among the material belonging to the same manuscript which will be published later.²⁸ A few preserved numbers of stanzas show that some of the stories were rather long (e.g. 17, 23, 25, 27 in fragment 464 l). The available pieces are much too small to provide detailed information on the *Vimānāvadāna*. It can be, however, inferred from the fragment published here that the *Vimānācadāna* was a collection not only of the same character as the *Vimānavatthu*, but was also based on the same tradition which, therefore, is older than either of these two works. Both works seem to be the result of a long development in which particularly the *Vimānavatthu* was enlarged by rather late additions and rearrangements of material from earlier texts, particularly the *Jātakas*.²⁹

NOTES

- ¹ On the *Ksudrakāgama* see Étienne Lamotte, *Histoire du Bouddhisme indien des origines à l'ère Śaka*, Louvain 1958, pp. 171-178; Étienne Lamotte, 'Problèmes concernant les textes canoniques "mineurs"', *Journal Asiatique* 244 (1956), 249-264; Egaku Mayeda (Maeda), *Genshi-Bukkyō seiten no Seiritsushi-Kenkyū, A History of the Formation of Original Buddhist Texts*, Tokyo 1964, pp. 681-784.
- ² See Lamotte, *Histoire*, pp. 177f.
- ³ See Franz Bernhard, 'Zum Titel des sogenannten "Udānavarga"', *ZDMG, Supplementa I, XVII. Deutscher Orientalistentag*, Teil 3, Wiesbaden 1969, pp. 872-881.
- ⁴ *Udānavarga*, herausgegeben von Franz Bernhard (Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, Philhist. Kl., Folge 3, Nr. 54), 2 vols., Göttingen 1965-1968.
- ⁵ *Taisho* No. 198 and 765. See P.V. Bapat, *The Arthapada Sūtra (Visvabharati Studies 13)*, Santiniketan 1951.
- ⁶ Ernst Waldschmidt, *Sanskrihandschriften aus den Turfanfunden* (Verzeichnis der orientalischen Handschriften in Deutschland, 10), vol. 1, Wiesbaden 1965, pp. 33f.
- ⁷ Heinz Bechert, *Bruchstücke buddhistischer Verssammlungen aus zentralasiatischen Sanskrihandschriften* (Sanskrittexte aus den Turfanfunden, 6), vol. 1, *Die Anavatapta-gāthā und die Sthaviragāthā*, Berlin 1961.
- ⁸ Bechert, *Bruchstücke*, pp. 47-49.
- ⁹ *Gilgit Manuscripts* (ed. by Nalinaksha Dutt), vol. 3, Part 1, Srinagar s.d., Introduction, p. 20; text: p. 172.
- ¹⁰ See Bechert, *Bruchstücke*, pp. 14f, 59ff.
- ¹¹ Lamotte, *Histoire*, pp. 177f.
- ¹² Additional evidence for this fact can be derived from the identification of the *Udānavarga* fragments in the manuscript as belonging to the Sarvāstivāda recension of this work. On these fragments see *Udānavarga* (ed. by Bernhard), vol. 1, pp. 42f (MS CH); on the recensions of the text cf. Lambert Schmithausen, 'Zu den Rezensionen des Udānavargah', *WZKS* 14 (1970), 47-124.
- ¹³ Cf. A.K. Warder, *Indian Buddhism*, Delhi 1970, pp. 341f., 520-522.
- ¹⁴ Cf. H. Kern, 'Deutung einer missverstandenen Stelle im Mahāvastu', *Indogermanische Forschungen* 31 (1912) 194-196 and *Verspreide Geschriften* van H. Kern, vol. 15, 's-Gravenhage 1928, pp. 75-77.
- ¹⁵ See Bechert, *Bruchstücke*, pp. 48, 60f.
- ¹⁶ On Mrs. Lüders' transcripts see Waldschmidt, *Sanskrihandschriften*, vol. 1, pp. XIX-XXI.
- ¹⁷ "Neu zusammengesetzt wurden Reste einer alten Handschrift, die Texte enthielt, die den Theragāthās, dem Peta- und Vimānavatthu und dem Therāpadāna des Palikanons entsprechen": Waldschmidt, *Sanskrihandschriften*, vol. 1, pp. XXf.
- ¹⁸ So most Oriental editions and *Simhala Vimānavastuprakaraṇaya* by Gammulle Ratanapāla (ed. by M. Sīlānanda and M. Dhammānanda), Colombo 1939, p. 64. PTS edition and Siamese edition have *moditācāmadāyikā*.
- ¹⁹ The reading *varākiyā* in the editions is metrically wrong; cf. *CPD* I, p. 538, s.v. *aho*. For similar forms of oblique of feminine i-stems cf. *Saddanīti* (ed. Helmer Smith), p. 448, note c.
- ²⁰ Edition *cānumadassikā*. Cf. *CPD* I, p. 235, and the parallel in *Vimānavatthu* IV, 5, 7.
- ²¹ See *Vinaya* II.156 and *Samyutta-Nikāya* I.211 for the prototype of these stanzas.
- ²² The approximate size of the leaf can be calculated from the reconstruction of the text of the first lines of this leaf, ed. Bechert, *Bruchstücke*, pp. 60f., 264 and the few better preserved leaves of this manuscript (*loc. cit.*, pp. 51f., 53f., 55, 59f.).
- ²³ For the use of the ablative case in *phalāny ācāmadānataḥ*, cf. Oskar von Hinüber,

Studien zur Kasussyntax des Pāli, besonders des Vinaya-Piṭaka (Münchener Studien zur Sprachwissenschaft, Beihefte, N.F., 2), München 1968, § 191, pp. 207f.

²⁴ The rather unusual meaning of *(sam)apāsritā* could be explained, if we had a play on words here with *apāsritā* at the end of stanza 2 which is lost but might be reconstructed as *parāgāram apāsritā* on the strength of the Pāli version.

²⁵ In 5 b the MS seems to read *d(e)vaḥ*, but we must read *devāḥ bhikṣāpraḍāyikā* reminds us of *Vimānavatthu* II, 10 (*bhikkādāyikavimāna*).

²⁵ The MS reads in 7 d *kalā* without *m*. We must, however, correct the phrase to read *na tasyâcāmadānasya kalām arghati śoḍaśīm* or *etasyâcāmadānasya kalām nârghati śoḍaśīm*. See *Dhammapada* 70 and *Vinaya* II.156, etc.; *Udānavarga* XXIV.17-29 and XXX.31 etc.; in non-Buddhist literature *Uttarādhyaṇasūtra* IX.44; *Mahābhārata* (crit. ed.) I. 94, 60; III. 171,3; VII. 86, 29 etc. and III.89, 19; etc.

²⁷ For the beginning *kā tvam k ...* I find no exact parallel in *Vimānavatthu*.

²⁸ In *Bruchstücke buddhistischer Verssammlungen*, vol. 2.

²⁹ On this aspect of *Vimānavatthu*, see Ludwig Alsdorf, *Die Āryā-Strophen des Pāli-Kanons* (Akademie Mainz, Abh. der Geistes- und Socialwiss. Kl. 1967, 4), Wiesbaden, 1968, pp. 80ff.; *ibid.*, 'Das Jātaka vom weiser Vidhura', *WZKS* 15 (1971) 54.

BUDDHISTS AND BUDDHISM IN THE EARLIER LITERATURE OF THE ŚVETĀMBARA JAINS

1. The teachings of Gotama Buddha having radiated over a much vaster part of the world and become the guiding principle in the lives of many more people than those of his countryman and contemporary Vaddhamāṇa Mahāvīra, it is only natural that the latter and his followers are less frequently mentioned in Buddhist works¹ than we find occurrences of the former in Jain texts. Thereby it can be found for reasons we can only guess that the information about each other in the canonical literature of both systems of spiritual emancipation is rather vague and confused. It is only in the post-canonical period, and especially when the Jains begin to write in Sanskrit, that in our sources the railings at undefined opponents with more or less ambiguous statements about their views makes way for more concrete philosophical arguing with the different schools, among whom the Buddhists gradually come to the front to such an extent that *Śākyādayaḥ* as a comprehensive expression for various heretics becomes dominating.

As in our handbooks, such as Renou and Filliozat's *L'Inde classique*, not much attention has been paid to the Jain sources for Buddhism the present paper intends to examine some of them, mainly earlier commentaries on texts of the *Siddhānta* and some works by Haribhadra. For obvious reasons it does not aim at being exhaustive.

2. The Jain view on Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha will be surveyed in their habitual order, first (2.1) in the *Āgamas* and afterwards (2.2) in the post-canonical scriptures.

2.1.1. The name of Gotama does not occur in the *Gaṇipīḍaga*², whereas *Buddha* which does is a title like *Ar(a)hat*, *Jina*, *Tīrthaṃkara*/*Titthagara*/*Titthaṃkara* etc. used by Buddhists and Jains alike for their respective emancipated persons.³

2.1.2 The impermanence of things — the theory of the five *skandhas* ('groups of phenomena') — is such a fundamental and unchangeable aspect of the Buddhist doctrine that no other than this can be meant in a *śloka* belonging to one of the oldest parts of the second *Anga*.⁴ Ignorance causes these groups to run on in this world's eternal stream of existence, without beginning or end — an epithet of *saṃsāra* in *Ardhamāgadhī*⁵ and Pāli as⁶ well as in BHS. Of the latter the *Āyāraṅga Cuṇṇi* (Ratlām 1941) 252,14

gives an interesting quotation from a Buddhist Sanskrit *sutta*: *aṇavadaggo 'yam, bhikṣavaḥ, saṃsāro* to which compare *Divyâvadāna* (ed. by Cowell and Neil), p. 197 *anavarâgro, bhikṣavaḥ, saṃsāraḥ* and *Samyuttanikāya* II 178,8 *anamataḥ 'yam saṃsāro*.

Within this doctrine the early contacts of the Jains must have mainly been with that current of interpretation which was represented by the Sarvâstivādins, who denied the existence of a soul. Apparently from this view they inferred a denial of *karman*⁷, too, which the Sarvâstivādins did not.⁸ The Buddha and his first disciples had not expressed themselves on the soul and the post-canonical *Milindapañha* is the first text to deny specifically that a soul exists.⁹ Moreover, an echo of ideas of the emptiness of this world which were already uttered in the Pāli *Abhidhammapiṭaka* and found their exponents also in the Mahāyānist *Śūnyavāda* can be recognized in *Sūy* 1,12,7.¹⁰

2.1.3. Probably just as little as its Lord is the Saṅgha or for that matter Buddhists in general mentioned by name in the Holy Scriptures of the Śvetāmbaras. They are implied in the comprehensive expression *akiriyavāin*¹¹ which they share with other groups in the fourfold division of the *darśanas* into *akiriyavāins*, *kiriyavāins*, *vinṇāṇavāins* and *viṇayavāins* (e.g. *Nandī* § 88; *Thāṇaṅga*, Bombay 1918-20, 8, 769 etc.) that comprise the 363 schools of thought.¹²

It is remarkable that the adherents of a rival system share the unfriendly epithets of other heretics: Its members are styled *bālā* (*Sūy* 1,1,1,17) and once they even feature as potential cannibals, because of their alleged view that acts are to be judged in the light or on the basis of the state of mind the doer happens to be in: "If a savage puts a man on a spit and roasts him, mistaking him for a fragment of the granary [mentioned in the preceding verse] [...] he will not be guilty of murder according to our views [... Vs. 28 ...] that will be a meal fit for Buddhas to feast upon" (Jacobi, *Jaina Sūtras* II, OUP 1895; *Sūy* 2,6,27f.¹³). This example of the Dhamma put into the mouth of a Buddhist¹⁴ can hardly have failed to produce its effect on the minds of generations of Jain hearers and readers, especially after their becoming strict vegetarians, which originally they were not.¹⁵ Otherwise stray criticism of the habits of heretics cannot unambiguously be referred to Buddhists.

2.2. The post-canonical period with its vast literature in Jain Māhārāṣṭrī, mixed Prākṛit and Sanskrit and, eventually, Jain Hybrid Sanskrit provides us with many more and clearer pieces of information. This is shown already by the fact that the texts actually mention the person of Gotama Buddha, his

Dhamma and its followers. Moreover, the many anonymous quotations in the commentaries, if we succeed in spotting them in extant works, enable us for instance to determine more exactly the opponents of the Jains and to refine, or at any rate extend, our insight into an important part of the religious and philosophical conflicts that stirred India for ages.

2.2.1. The word *Buddha* is used with regard to the founder of Buddhism, and not as a general title of those who reached final emancipation, in the early, anonymous *Cuṇṇi* on *Āyār(aṅga)* 1,2,5,3: “(the Path as taught by Jain teachers) [...] and not like the one propagated by Sāriputta and Moggallāna in the name of the Buddha”¹⁶. Śīlāṅka renders this passage literally into Sanskrit, but specifies the term ‘*Buddha*’ by the patronymic *Śāuddhodani(m dhvajīkrtya)*¹⁷. Similarly *Suddhoyaṇa-taṇaya* is used by Siddhasena Divākara in his *Sammasutta*¹⁸, but we also come across *Śākyamuni* (Śīlāṅka I 262a 6 on *Sūy* 1,15,2) and *Sugata*¹⁹.

The Buddha’s body is mentioned in an *āryā* versifying the five deadly sins (*pañcānantar[ī]yāni*)²⁰, and in a passage a little further in the same text (*Sūy* 1,12,10) — where the *akriyāvādins* are said to be averse to the science of omens and portents (as indeed Buddhists are)²¹ — both commentators narrate what looks like a legend²²: “Buddha having called his disciples told them: ‘there will be a twelve years famine; therefore do you go to another place’. When they were about to leave, he kept them back with the words: ‘these days there will be plenty of food’. — ‘How (is that)?’ — ‘Just now a being has been born of great religious merit. Mainly because of that there will be plenty of food.’ Since, therefore, according to them an omen could be this way as well as that, they decided to give up these sciences”²³. I am not sure of the meaning of *Buddha* here (it can in itself also simply mean ‘klug, weise’ [pWB]) the contents of the legend being found also elsewhere in Indian literature.²⁴ The context in *Sūy* would allow it to be understood in the Buddhist sense, yet in *Dīghanikāya* I 11,8 Gotama expressly condemns such *samaṇas* and *brāhmaṇas* as earn their living by foretelling a scarcity of food. That it was forecast is also a (Digambara) Jain tradition.²⁵

The stories of Gotama Buddha’s previous existences according to the Hīnayāna, that is the collection of several hundred *Jātakas*, are mentioned by Jinadāsa on *Sūy* 1,12,4, just before the *āryā* quoted above (*mātā-pitarau* etc.), when he argues that they do not fit the *Śūnyavāda*.²⁶

Not only the Buddha, but also the bodhisatta²⁷ is made mention of, e.g. in the *Vṛtti* (II 37a 11) on *Sūy* 2,1,49. The (Jain) Saints, it reads in the second Aṅga, have always condemned, and shall always condemn, any act of violence against living beings. Śīlāṅka comments hereon, that the Arhats and

Bhagavats do so merely of their own accord — not directed, physically or otherwise, by someone else, like the Buddhists through their bodhisattas (*na yathā Bauddhānāṃ bodhisattva-prabhāvāt kudyādi-deśanataḥ*). Furthermore by Abhayadeva in explaining Haribhadra, *Aṣṭakaparakarṇa* 15,6 when the latter argues against the *kṣaṇikavāda* ('theory of momentariness') and says "through the fatal effect of the (living being's last moment) no one can fail to cause this effect. Unless a distinction be made in the causative force there cannot be an end to destruction in this way (sc. by non-distinguishing — *aviśeṣeṇa*, Abhayadeva)"²⁸.

2.2.2. The Buddhist Dhamma may be referred to as *Buddha-śāsana* (e.g. *Cuṇṇi* 259,8 on *Sūy* 1,12,4), *Sakka-darisaṇa* (*Cuṇṇi* 40,12 on *Sūy* 1,1,1,19), *Sugata-mata* (e.g. *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, Ahmadābād V.S. 2489, Vs. 1671) etc.²⁹ The concepts which post-canonical works attack in it are essentially the same as in the *Siddhānta*, viz. the impermanence of the phenomena and consequently the denial of a soul and *karman*, and the idea of *Śūnyatā*,³⁰ yet we see also new topics arise which may originate partly in a greater interest in and a better knowledge of Buddhism, and partly in the currents of thought the main rival *darsāna* developed in the course of time, e.g. the *kṣaṇikavāda*.

The Buddha's view on human personality as consisting of five groups of everchanging phenomena (*dhammā*) was subject to various interpretations: it was believed for instance by the Pudgalavādins³¹ and the Vātsīputriyas³² that the *pudgala* ('person') neither differs from nor is identical with the groups. These Pudgalavādins are the opponents of both the Śūnyavādins³³ and the Skandhamātrikas who occur in an enumeration of *akriyāvādins* denying the *kiriya* as well as its effect: *kesimci phalam avi n' atthi; te tu jahā: (...)* *khandhamettiyā suṇṇavādiṇo logāyatigā icc ādi akiriyaavādiṇo* (*Cuṇṇi* 256,11 on *Sūy* 1,12,1). In another passage in his commentary (40,4 on *Sūy* 1,1,1,17) Jinadāsa refers to the same school as different from those who hold that the person (*ātman*) cannot be expressed³⁴ — an assumption of the Sāṃmatīya sect.³⁵

Scholiasts³⁶ as well as authors of independent expositions like Siddhase-na Divākara (about 300 A.D.) in his 15th *Dvātrimśikā* (vs. 10 foll.), which has Buddhism for its subject, argue against the tenet of the momentariness of the *dhamma*-groups³⁷ — a doctrine the Sarvāstivādins followed some centuries later by the Sautrāntikas, carried to extremes.

The *kṣaṇikavāda* leads the Buddhists to the assumption that there is no soul: *paralokānuyāyy ātmāiva na vidyate; niḥsāmānyam vastu kṣaṇikam ca* (*Vṛtti* I 168b 2 on *Āyār* 1,4,2,3) — a concept refuted e.g. by Haribhadra in

his *Yogabindu*, Ahmedabad 1968, vs. 458 foll. — and this in its turn the Jains surmise implies their not endorsing the common *karman* theory.³⁸

Further, from the non-existence of a soul some Buddhists were led to infer that only Evil really is and Good is not, as the commentators to *Sūy* 2,5,28 — a passage in which the admittance of the reality of Evil is required — inform us: *yathêṣṭhārtha-phala-samprāptiḥ kalyāṇam tan na vidyate sarvâśu-citayā nir-ātmakatvāc ca sarva-padārthānām Bauddhâbhiprāyeṇa (...). Nâikân-tena kalyāṇâbhāvo, yo Bauddhair abhihitah sarva-padārthānām aśucitvâsam-bhavāt sarvâśucitve ca Buddhasyâpy aśucitva-prāpteḥ, nâpi nir-ātmānaḥ sva-dravya-kṣetra-kāla-bhāvâpekṣayā sarva-padārthānām vidyamānatvāt, para-dra-vyâdibhis tu na vidyante sad-asad-ātmakatvād vastunaḥ. Tad uktam: “sva-para-satta-vyudâsôpādânâpādyam hi vastuno vastutvam” iti (Vṛtti II 132b 4 foll.; similarly *Cuṇṇi* 409,13 foll.).* I have not yet found support for this view in a Buddhist text.

Other tenets of the Bauddhadhamma mentioned by the Jains are e.g. the ten *kusalāni* or good acts, the counterparts of which are enumerated in a *śloka* quoted by Haribhadra, *Aṣṭakaprakaraṇa* Fol. 53a 4f. from a Buddhist source I could not identify:

*himsā-steyānyathā-kāma-paisūnyam paruṣānṛtam
sambhinnālāpa-vyāpādam abhidhyā-dṛg-viparyayam
pāpam karmēti daśadhā kāya-vān-mānasais tyajet*

These acts and their opposites lead to rebirth into one of the (five or) six *gatis* (“states of existence”) which word is etymologised in an *āryā* quoted by Jinadāsa (*Cuṇṇi* 259,7 foll. on *Sūy* 1,12,4)

*gantā ca nâsti kaścid; gatayaḥ ṣaḍ Bauddha-śāsane³⁹ prôktāḥ
gamyata iti ca gatiḥ syāt chrutiḥ katham śobhanā Bauddhī⁴⁰?*

The Jain reply to this couplet is: *kriyā karma-phalam na câsti asati kārake kutah karma, katham ca ṣaḍ-gatayaḥ?* (*Cuṇṇi*, l.c.).

Before we pass on to some of the schools mentioned in the Śvetāmbar literature a verse on *ahimsā* in a Buddhist text may suitably conclude these few remarks concerning the Dhamma: “a reference to *ahimsā* made in a *śāstra*” — Haribhadra says — “should be carefully considered”⁴¹ and his commentator Abhayadeva, explaining *śāstre* by Saugataśāsane, quotes the following *sloka*:

*sarve trasanti danḍena, sarveṣāṃ jīvitam priyam;
ātmānam upamāmatvā nâiva himsen, na ghātayet.⁴²*

As shown under 2.1.2, the theory of the Void (*śūnya*) apparently is the earliest Buddhist current of thought to have left traces of its contact with the Jains in their canon. Reasoning against its different interpretations by some Buddhist schools continues undiminished in mediaeval times.³⁴

Those entertaining such views are often associated with the Lokāyatas.

The concept of Voidness was used with a different meaning in the Mahāyānic Mādhyamika School, the Jains' acquaintance with which is testified by Jinadāsa's quoting from Nāgārjuna's *Mādhyamakakārikās* (vs. 15)⁴⁴ and according to Muncandra the adherents of *Kalpitaśāstra* and *Tattvānta* mentioned by Haribhadra⁴⁵ belong to it. Later sources usually name only three other principal Buddhist Schools in addition to the Mādhyamikas, viz. the Vaibhāṣikas, Sautrāntikas⁴⁶ and Yogācārins (Vijñānavādins)⁴⁷. Yet sometimes also less well known designations like Iṣṭatattvadarśanavādins⁴⁸, Sarvajīvasamānavādins⁴⁹ etc. are met with which denote the advocates of a view connected with a point under discussion in a given context, but who belong to one of the common Schools.

2.2.3. Beside the more general name *aphalavādin*⁵⁰ "upholding the theory that acts have no consequences" (because of the strict denial of an eternal soul in the brahmanical sense which could be affected by them) the commentators prefer to apply to Buddhists specific ones, too⁵¹: Prākṛit *Boddha*⁵², *Khandhamettiya*⁵³ (~ Sanskrit *Skandha-mātrka*), *Taccāṇiya*⁵⁴ (~ Sa. **Tāt-kṣaṇika*), *Sakka*⁵⁵ and Sa. *Bauddha*⁵⁶, *Śākya(-putra)*⁵⁷, *Sauddhodāṇiya*⁵⁸, *Sugatamatānusārin*⁵⁹ or *Saugata*⁶⁰.

The members of the Sangha — who together with the Jains themselves, *tāvasā*, *geruyā* and *Ājīvā* at *Pinḍa*N 445 make up the five kinds of *samaṇas*⁶¹ — are called *Bauddha-bhikṣukāḥ* (*Cuṇṇi* 429,13 on *Sūy* 2,6,29) or *Sugaya-sīsā* (*Pravacanasārōddhāra* I 94 Fol. 212 vs. 732; cf. *Sūy Cuṇṇi* 264,3 quoted above). Even the names of the Buddha's two chief disciples found their way into the Jain tradition: Sāriputta and Moggallāna. The oldest occurrence of the former is in the *Isibhāsiyāim*⁶² — a text which as to its diction and vocabulary stands close to *Āyāraṅga* and *Sūyagaḍa*, but stayed for some reason or other outside the canonical corpus. As the *Ardhamāgadhī* form lacks the *-r-* it has in Pāli, the scholiasts unfamiliar with this name in their Sanskritisation of it filled the hiatus between *Sā-* and *-iputta* with a *ta-kāra*; once even *Svātiputra* is found.⁶³ Not only the form, but also the order of the members of the *dvandva* compound changed, because the Jains apparently did not have a clear recollection of who was the first *agga-sāvaka*: *Cuṇṇi* and *Vṛtti* explain *Āyār* 1,2,5,3 where it says that the true monk should not be attached to things, this being the Path proclaimed by the Āryas — those who possess the right faith. Both commentators compare this attitude with that of the Digambaras (*Boṭika*) who have a way of their own which allows them to use a water-pot, a mat, fringes, horse-tail hair etc. — or that proclaimed by *Sāti-Moggallā* (*Cuṇṇi* 82b 6) and *Maudgali-Svātiputra* (*Vṛtti* I 122b 6), respec-

tively, in the name of the Buddha (cf. above under 2.2.1). One can read a nuance of slight in this addition as if in the view of the Jains the doctrine of the Buddha were badly misrepresented by his disciples. Perhaps a remark by Jinadāsa (*Cuṇṇi* 318,2 on *Sūy* 2,1,16) admits of a similar interpretation (see the note in my forthcoming edition of the *Sūyagaḍa*).

In censuring the habits and moral behaviour of rival *samaṇas* our later sources differ from the canonical books only in a tendency to details and even ridicule: it is no doubt not by mere chance that the interest in the first place concerns food and drink, which are subject to many regulations for the Jain *sādhu*. This tendency seems to appear for the first time in *Isibhāsiyāim* 38,2 foll.:

maṇunnam bhoyaṇam bhoccā maṇunnam sayanāsaṇam
*maṇunnamṣi agāramṣi maṇunnam jhāyae muni*⁶⁴

Furthermore, Haribhadra tells us the wellknown *kathānaka* of the *bhikṣu* who is seen to use his robe in fishing. Someone asks him about his queer behaviour and is told that the venerable one also tipples, steals, plays at dice, visits a brothel etc.⁶⁵ As to forbidden contacts with women, Śīlāṅka even blames a particular group within the Saṅgha, viz. those wearing black robes.⁶⁶

Some persons profess to be monks⁶⁷, yet as far as the Śākyas etc. are concerned they are hardly more than householders⁶⁸ and what sort of sermon can be expected from them though they are shaven-headed?⁶⁹ A passage the subject of which is not clear may contain a hint that some *sādhus* adopted the comfortable life of the *bhikṣus* and others and gave up the begging rules, the prohibition of bathing etc.⁷⁰

To conclude, the late *Avacūri* 83a 7 introducing *Piṇḍa Nijjuttī* 446 may be cited which gives us a curious description of the picture-like motionless way the *bhikṣus* allegedly ate their meals, with a malicious hint at their being extremely compassionate (in accepting gifts from the laity who wish to earn religious merit in that way — out of covetousness: *iha prāyaḥ Śākya-gairukā*⁷¹ *grhi-grheṣu*⁷² *bhuñjānā dṛśyante* (... follows *Piṇḍa*N text). *Ete Śākya-daya evaṃ niścalā bhuñjante, yathā citra-karma-likhitā iva, tathā parama-kārunikā ete dāna-rucayaś ca. Api ca kāma-gardabheṣv api brāhmaṇādiṣu dat-tam na naśyanti, kim punar amiṣu Śākya-diṣu tasmād etebhyo dātavyam iti.*

By systematically examining the vast commentarial and independent post-canonical scriptures of the Jains, especially the works of Haribhadra who in refuting the views of various Buddhist teachers like Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita, but also less famous ones like Śubhagupta, often mentions their names, the passages on the preceding pages could certainly be further extended; they will suffice, however, to give an idea of the way Mahāvīra's fol-

lowers saw their principal rivals and to complement here and there our knowledge of the latter gathered from their own books.

It may be finally remembered that the Jains adapted much religious and literary property from their surroundings – one factor which led them to this practice probably was, that already at an early time a great deal of their own tradition seems to have fallen into oblivion or was lost otherwise – and used it for their own purposes. They not only called their whole collection of sacred books *Gaṇipīḍaga*, after the name of the Buddhist canon, but were apparently also influenced in the titles of single works like *Paiṇṇā* (cf. *Paṭiṇṇakavagga* = *Dhammapada* XXI), *Lalitavistarā*, *Dharmabindu* and *Yogabindu* (cf. Dharmakīrti's *Hetubindu*) etc.

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NOTES

¹ Examined recently by B.C. Jain, *Jainism in Buddhist Literature*, Nāgpur 1972. Beside, the reader may be referred to my paper 'Anmerkungen zum buddhistischen Häre-tikerbild' in *ZDMG* 121, 1 (1971) 70-92.

² Maybe for the same reason as Schubring assumes for the disappearance of the *puvvas* (if this word does really mean '(rejectable) view of an opponent') viz. that to preserve them would leave the possibility of getting acquainted with them and this could provoke undesired heretical thoughts and acts (vide *Doctrine of the Jains*, Delhi 1962, § 37) – or because in its Ardhamāgadhī form *Goyama*, being the name of one of Mahāvīra's main disciples, could bring about a confusion. Yet in the case of e.g. *Kassava* (*Sūyagada* 1,6,7) there apparently was no such danger, the Śvetāmbaras knowing of Gotama Buddha's personal *sāvakas* only Sāriputta and Moggallāna (see below under 2.2.3), and that solely outside the canonical corpus as we have it now.

³ One special example may serve as an illustration: in a discussion with the Jain *sādhu* Adda his unnamed Buddhist opponent is made to say (*Sūy* 2,6,28):

*Purisam ca viddhūna kumāragam vā
sūlammi keī pae jāya-tee
pinnāya-piṇḍam saim āruhetā
Buddhāna tam kappai pāranāe*

This is probably the only reference to Buddhist Buddhas in the *Gaṇipīḍaga*. As a Jain title it occurs often, e.g. *Dasav(eyāliya)* 10,1 *Buddha-vayaṇe niccam citta-samāhiyo havejjā* "(a true monk) [...] should always concentrate upon the teaching of the Jinas" (Schubring, in E. Leumann's edition of the text, Ahmedabad 1932).

Uttarajjhāyā (ed. Charpentier, Uppsala 1922) 1,7 *Buddha-utta-niyāyatthī* (so read; see the remark in my forthcoming ed. of the *Sūyagada* at 1,1,2,20) *na nikkasijjai kaṇhui* 'one who desires the right path as taught by the Buddhas should never leave (his teacher? Cf. *Sūy* 1,14,4)'.
⁴ *Sūy(agada)* 1,1,1,17 *pañca khandhe vayan't ege bālā u khana-joino*.

⁵ *Viyāhapannatti* 5,9,225 (*Suttāgame* I 490,9) *Pāseṇam arahayā purisādāṇienam sāsae loe buie aṇ-āie aṇ-avadagge* (...).

⁶ Vide *CPD* s.v. *an-amat'-agga* and E.W. Burlingame's apparently forgotten paper 'Contributions to Pāli Lexicography I', *AJPh* 41 (1920), p. 69 foll.

⁷ *Sūy* 1,12,4 *lavāvasanki ya "anāgaehim no kiriyaṃ" āhaṃsu a-kiriya-vāi*. The Sāmkhyas also belong to the Akriyāvādins; see further Jacobi's notes to his translation of this line.

⁸ See e.g. E. Frauwallner, *Die Philosophie des Buddhismus*, 3Berlin 1969, p. 126.

⁹ *Milindapañha*, London 1962, p. 25 foll., 40 foll.

¹⁰ *Nāiccō uei, na attham ei; na candimā vaddhai hāyāi vā salilā na sandanti, na vanti vāyā: vañjho niyayo kasine hu loe*

In this connection it may be remembered that Mahāvīra destroyed various thoughts with a more or less heretical character in the minds of those who afterwards became his original disciples. Of Vyakta, for instance, we read in the *Āvassaya Nijjuttī* vs. 612 that he doubted the existence of the elements (*kiṃ manni pañca bhūyā atthi n' atthi? tti samsayo tujjham*) the Master tells him, and Haribhadra explains this by saying that if in reality the elements did not exist (as is upheld by the adherents of the theory of an absolute Void), 'it would be impossible to distinguish between sleep and non-sleep, a mirage and (a real city like) Pāṭaliputra etc.' (*na ca bhūtābhāve svapnāsvapna-gandharvapura-Pāṭaliputrādi-viśeṣo yujyate*, Āgamōdayasamiti ed. [Bombay 1916] Fol. 247 a 10 foll.). Cf. Hemacandra, *Triṣaṣṭiśālikāpuruṣacaritra* 10,5,121.

¹¹ "A person who denies either the soul's activity or its liability to be affected by acts or even the existence of souls altogether", cf. *Cuṇṇi* 256,10 (on *Sūy* 1,12,1) *akiriya-vāi nam kattā n' atthi phalam tv asti. Kesim-ci phalam avi n' atthi* (emendation after Puṇyavijaya's edition [in the press]).

¹² See table in F.O. Schrader, *Über den Stand der indischen Philosophie*, Leipzig 1902, p. 3 foll.

¹³ *Ahavā vi viddhūna milakkhu sūle pinnāga-buddhī naraṃ paejjā](...) na lippai pāṇi-vahena amham. — 28 — (...) Buddhāna taṃ kappai pāraṇāe.*

¹⁴ The passage in question is also proved to be Buddhist by the occurrence, in vs. 29, of the word *arūpa-dhātu*, the name of the highest plane of existence in the Buddhist 'Weltbild'.

¹⁵ Testified by *Dasaveyāliya* 5,1,73 *bahu-aṭṭhiyaṃ poggalaṃ animisaṃ vā bahu-kaṇṭa-yaṃ* and *Jambuddhāvappannatti*, Bombay 1920, 2,22 (Fol. 118a 10) *macchāṇḍiyāi*.

¹⁶ (*Esa magge āyarichim paveiye*)[...] *jahā vā Sāri-Moggallehi Buddha-vayī-karitaṭā pagāsitam* (!), *tahā navi* (Fol. 82,3 foll.). Is this a reflex of the tradition that Sāriputta elaborated the Abhidhamma? See hereon E. Lamotte, *Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien* I, Louvain 1958, p. 209.

'Buddha' referring to Gotama occurs also e.g. in Haribhadra's *Śāstravārttāsamuccaya*, Bombay 1929, vs. 464 and 466 (here he is given the epithet *mahāmuni* and compared to a good physician).

¹⁷ Ed. Bombay 1935, I 122b 6.

¹⁸ Edited by A.N. Upadhye (Bombay 1971) 3,48. According to the Editor in his introductory essay "Siddhasena and his works" (p. 36) Siddhasena belongs to the 4th or 5th century of the Vikrama-era and (p. 42) flourished earlier than Jinabhadra.

¹⁹ Nemicaṇḍra, *Pavayaṇasārōddhāra*, Bombay 1922, I 94 (Fol. 212) vs. 732 *Sakkā ya Sugaya-sīsa*; Hemacandra on *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, Ahmadābād V.S. 2489, vs. 60 and 1671. I did not succeed in finding the earlier references mentioned in the *Abhidhāna-rājêndrakośa* (ARK), viz. *Avāśyakabhāṣyavṛtti* and *Thāṇaṅga (vṛtti)* 2,1.

²⁰ *mātā-pitarau hatvā Buddha-śarīre ca rudhiram utpādya arhad-vadham ca kṛtvā stūpam bhittvā ca pañcāite Avicī narakam yāntī*

(quoted in Jinadāsa's [written 677 A.D.] *Cuṇṇi* 259,11* on *Sūy* 1, 12,4).

²¹ See *Dīghanikāya* I 9,4 which seems to be the Buddha's standpoint as against popular belief in body signs and dreams. The Jain attitude is similar: *Sūy* 2,2,25 foll. the sciences in question are severely condemned, yet the *Āṅgavijjā*, a handbook of the art of interpreting signs etc., belongs to the *Āgamas* of all sects but the Sthānakvāsīs.

22 Śīlāṅka speaks of a *śruti* (I 223b 4).

23 *Buddhaḥ kila śiṣyānām āhūyōktavān: "dvādaśa-varṣāni durbhikṣam bhaviṣyati; tena deśāntarāṇi gacchata." Te prasthitās tena pratisiddhāḥ. "Subhikṣam idānīm bhaviṣyati."* – "Katham?" – "Adyāivāikaḥ sattvaḥ puṇyavān jātaḥ; tat-prādhānyāt subhikṣam bhaviṣyati" (Cunni 264, 3 foll.).

24 With the Buddhists perhaps *Sihlavatthu*, Colombo 1959, 115,14* and 22*; in Sanskrit e.g. Daṇḍin, *Daśakumāracarita*, Bomcay 1940, p. 218,3; *Simhāsanadvātr.*, Story No. 25 in addition to the references given by N.N. Kher, 'The twelve-year famine during Candragupta's reign. The Jain tradition reviewed' in *Viśvêśvarānand Indological Journal*, vol. III (1965) pp. 93-98.

25 See W. Schubring, *Doctrine of the Jains*, New Delhi 1962, § 26, note 6.

26 *Abandhāni* (Puṇyavijaya reads *avandhyāni*) *ca karmāṇi paṇṇavanti* (Puṇy.: -enti). *Evam Jātaka-śatāṇy apadiśyanti* (Puṇy.: -śanti) *Buddhasya: tāni śūnyatve na yujyante* (Cunni 259,10; similarly in the *Vṛtti* I 219b 9). Jacobi, in a note to his translation of the *Sūy* stanza, wonders, how Śīlāṅka came to a knowledge of the number of Jātakas accepted by the Southern Buddhists. This is possible, however, because at least in the days of Hsüan Tsang (7th cent. A.D.) the Hinayāna was still flourishing in some parts of Western India. See also A.K. Warder, *Indian Buddhism*, Delhi 1970, p. 291 foll.

27 As I doubt the correctness of the Sanscritization -*tva*, I would prefer the form -*satta* to that in -*sattva*. Already Buddhaghosa offers (*Sāratthappakāsinī* II 21,3 etc.) several explanations of which the equation with *lagga*, i.e. the derivation from the root *sañj-*, at least seems worth consideration (rejected on not very satisfactory arguments by P. Oltramare, *La théosophie bouddhique*, Paris 1923, p. 250). A great many ancient and modern renditions, analyses and reflections from East and West are mentioned by Har Dayal in his monograph *The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature*, London 1932 (2Delhi 1970), pp. 4-9. Still more have certainly been made in the four decades that have passed since then.

In the earlier period – as was already remarked by E. Windisch, *Māra und Buddha*, Leipzig 1895, p. 211 – no sharp distinction was made between Buddha and bodhisatta, e.g. in *Suttanipāta* 408 the Saint is called a Buddha, though he is in fact still a bodhisatta.

I have not so far seen the interpretation **bodhi-śakta* 'fit for enlightenment'. This *satta*, from the root *śak-* 'to be able to, capable of, competent for' (MW), does not occur in *PED*, but even if it is not attested in canonical Pāli and will therefore not be included in *PTC*, there is no definite proof that it did not exist (in the language of the Urkanon or a related dialect). Semantically it might be compared to *arhat*: root *arh-* 'verdienen, einer Sache fähig sein' etc. (pWB); – 'to deserve, be worthy of; be entitled to; be able' (MW).

28 *Tasyāpi himsakatvena na kaścit syād ahimsakaḥ janakatvāviśeṣeṇa nāivam tad-viratiḥ kvacit* (ed. Ahmadābād, s. 1968, Fol. 59a 13). The scholiast explains *tasyāpi* by *mriyamāṇasya harināder antya-kṣaṇasyāpi*, *kaścit* by *ko'pi bodhisattvādir api* and *janakatvāviśeṣeṇa* by *Buddhāder lubdhakādeś ca anantara-kṣaṇasyōtpādakatve 'viśiṣṭatvāt*.

29 An early if not the earliest mention of the *Tipitaka* proper seems to be the *Sūy Nijjuttī* 31 where it is called *bhikkhu-samaya* which Śīlāṅka I 12a 10 glosses with *Śākyāgama*.

30 The latter tenets caused the Buddhists to be considered as *Nāstikas* – e.g. *Rāmāyana* (Bombay 1930) 2,109,34 *yathā hi coraḥ sa tathā hi Buddhas: Tathāgatam Nāstikam atra viddhi!* and see J. Filliozat in L. Renou et J. Filliozat, *L'Inde classique II*, Paris 1953, p. 387 – and put on a par with the Lokāyatas: Jinadāsa on *Sūy* 1,12,1 etc. Vide also Rāma on *Rāmāyana*, loc. cit.

31 Nāgārjuna, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (ed. by L. de la Vallée Poussin), Bibliotheca Buddhica IV, Petersburg 1903 (2Osnabrück 1970), p. 275,7; 283 note 4: Index, p.

627 s.v. *pudgalaskandhavādin*. See also the same author's *Etudes et matériaux, théorie des douze causes*, Gand 1913, Chapter IX, p. 60.

32 E. Lamotte, *Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien* I, Louvain 1958, p. 673 foll.; E. Frauwallner, *Philosophie des Buddhismus*, p. 87.

33 See e.g. A.K. Warder, *Indian Buddhism*, p. 343 foll.

34 *Śākyās tu kecin na vācyam* (sc. *ātmānam?*) [Pun̄yavijaya reads *naivācyam* (*naivānyam kecin ca nāpy ananyam*)] *tathā Skhandhamātrkā hetu-mātram ātmānam icchanti bījāṅkuravat, a-hetukam Sūnyavādikāḥ*:

*hetu-pratyaya-sāmāgrī prthag-bhāveṣv asambhavāt
tena tenābhilāpyā hi bhāvāḥ sarve sva-bhāvataḥ*

(edition 1950 reads *-lapyo hi bhāvah*).

35 Vide Frauwallner, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

36 Jinadāsa and Śīlāṅka on *Sūy* 1,12,4 where the latter calls the Buddhists materialists in disguise; *Vṛtti* I 221a 7 on *Sūy* 1,12,6 *Bauddhānām apy atyanta-kṣanikatvena vastutvabhāvaḥ prasajati*; *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, Ahmadābād V.S. 2489, vs. 1673 foll.; Haribhadra, *Śāstravārttāsamuccaya*, vs. 414-423; 464 foll.; *Śaddarśanasamuccaya*, vs. 7; Hemacandra, *Anyayogavyavacchedadvātrimśikā*, Bombay 1933, vs. 18 and his commentator Malliṣeṇa in his *Syādvādamāñjarī* ad locum.

37 The *Sūy Vṛtti* I 28b 5 calls its adherents *kṣanika-pañca-skandha-vādins*.

38 *Lavāpasāṅkiṇo* (*Sūy* 1,12,4) *Lokāyatikāḥ Śākyādayaś ca. Teṣām ātmāiva nāsti, kutas tat-kriyā taj-janito karma-bandhaḥ?* (*Vṛtti* I 218b 7) and similarly elsewhere.

39 Thus *Vṛtti* I 219b 7 on *Sūy* 1,12,5 instead of *Buddha-śāsana-proktāḥ* (*Cuṇṇi*). Two good *Sūy* Mss. read *Buddha-śāsane*, which is possible as well.

40 *Cuṇṇi* reads *bahvī*.

41 *Aṣṭakaparakaraṇa* 15,7:

*Upānyāsaś ca śāstre 'syāḥ kṛto yatnena cintyatām
viśayo 'sya yam āsādyā hanītaḥ sa-phalo bhavet.*

42 *Ibid.*, Fol. 59b 7. I am not sure that the couplet which is introduced by *yad āha* has actually been taken from a Buddhist text, but it appears to be so in this context, though the contents of the verse lines are neutral.

43 A few more references are: Siddhasena Divākara, *Dvātrimśikā* 15,2 and 11. Buddhism as represented in this *Dv.* is "undoubtedly influenced by ideas peculiar to the Mādhyamika-Yogācāra school" (P.L. Vaidya, *The Nyāvatāra of S. Divākara*, Bombay, 1928, p. xiii); the commentaries on *Sūy* 1,12,5 foll. from which the ensuing passage may be quoted: (...) *niḥ-svabhāvān bhāvānuktvā paścāj jāti-smaraṇāni jātakāni ratnāśrayam* (so Pun̄yavijaya; the ed. Ratlām 1950, reads *niranvayāśrayam*) *nirvāṇam ca pratipadyante. Evaṁ te sammisrī-bhāva-vādināḥ mīthyā-darśanāndhakārāḥ jātakenāitasyām* (ed. 1950, *jātakān etasyām*) *giri grhīṭāḥ: yadi sūnyam, katham jātakāni? katham smaraṇam? katham sūnyatā? Kim ca*

yadi sūnyas tava pakṣo, mat-pakṣa-nivāraṇaḥ (ed. 1950, *-nivāraṇam*) *katham bhavati? atha manyase na sūnyas tathāpi mat-pakṣa evāsau?*

(*Cuṇṇi* 260, 2 foll.).

And further e.g. Haribhadra, *Śāstravārttāsamuccaya*, Vs. 467 foll.; Hemacandra, *Anyayogavyavacchedadv.* 17.

44 After the Nāgārjuna quotation: *evam ayam vandhyo lokāḥ; vandhyo nāma sūnyaḥ. Athavā vandhyāvad a-prasavatvād vandhyo, Lokāyatānām hi na mṛtaḥ punar atpudayate. Etāvān eṣa paramātmā. Ta evaṁ darśanam bhāvayanti: galāgatyam api kurvāṇā nodvijante mātaram bhāginīm vā gatvā nānutapyante: yeṣām bandhābhāva eva te katham pāpebhyo nirvartsyante? Nivṛtti-mūlam vā dharmam dekṣyante? Evaṁ Śākyā api evaṁ vandhyāḥ* (*Cuṇṇi* 261,12 foll. on *Sūy* 1,12,7).

45 *Ete 'pi Kalpitâvidyāvādibhis Tattvântavādibhiḥ paramârthenâjinâdaya evêṣyante: bhrānti-mātram asad avidyēti vacanāt* (*Lalitavistara*, ed. Bhānuvijaya, Ahmadābād 1963, p. 223). Muncandra (died A.D. 1122) explains this as follows:

Tattvântavādibhir iti tattvântam tattva-niṣṭhā-rūpam nir-ākāram svaccha-samveda-nam eva vastutayā veditum śīlam yeṣām, te tathā taiḥ. Ete ca Sugata-śiṣya-caturtha-prasthāna-varttino "Mādhyamikā" iti sambhāvyate.

46 Both are mentioned e.g. in the commentary on Haribhadra's *Anekāntavyavasthā-prakarana*, Bhāvnagar s. 1999, Fol. 51b 11, 55a 9.

47 Haribhadra argued with the Vijñānavāda in his *Śāstravārttāsamuccya*, vs. 375-413; Hemacandra, *Anyayogav.*, vs. 16.

48 (Sarvajñatā-niṣedhaka-mata-nirāsaḥ-) *ete ca kaiścid iṣṭa-tattva-darśana-vādibhir Bauddha-bhedair anyatra pratihata-vara-jñāna-darśana-dharā evêṣyante "tattvam iṣṭam tu paśyatu" iti vacanāt* (Haribhadra, *Lalitavistara*, p. 210, 2 foll.). The quotation from which the name *iṣṭa*^o originates is the b-pāda of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttikā*, śloka 34 the a-pāda running *dūram paśyatu vā mā vā* usually cited in Jain texts with *sarvam* instead of *dūram* (see the note in my *Sūyagaḍa* edition at 1,1,4,7). The term, therefore, denotes Dharmakīrti and his followers.

49 (*Sarvajñasamānavādi-Bauddhamatam*) *ete ca sarva-sattvâivam-bhāva-vādibhir Bauddha-viśeṣaiḥ sāmānya-guṇatvena, na pradhānatayaṅgī kriyante "nāstīha kaścid abhājanah sattvaḥ" iti vacanāt* (Haribhadra, *Lalitavistara*, p. 86, 2 foll.). According to Muncandra's commentary the Vaibhāṣikas (Sarvāstivādins) are meant.

50 See e.g. Jinadāsa 39,7 on *Sūy* 1,1,1,15.

51 Kapadia's assumption, in his ed. of Haribhadra's *Anekāntajayapatākā* II, Baroda 1947, p. 274, that Muncandra's *āyāma* (ibidem I, Baroda 1940, p. 51, line 28, *āyāma-mate Bauddha-mate*) is an equivalent of *Bauddha* is probably based on a corruption of the text.

52 *Pavayaṇasārōddhāra-ṭīkā dvārā* 116 (according to the *Abhidhānarājêndrakosā*; the text itself was not at my disposal).

53 *Cunni* 256,11 on *Sūy* 1,12,1.

54 *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* vs. 1041 with Hemacandra's comm.; *Āyāraṅga Cunni* 252,14; *Cunni* (Āgrā 1960) IV 134,26 on *Nisīha-sutta* 16,36 *je bhikkhu anna-titthiḥim vā gāratthiḥim vā saddhim bhuñjai*. Jinadāsa's gloss hereon runs: *a n n a - u t t h i y ā Tacca(n) iyādi bambhanā (!), khattiyā gāratthā*.

55 *Pinḍa N(ijjutti)* 445; *Cunni* 251,7 on *Āyār* 1,7,1,3.

56 *Śīlāṅka* I 98b 3 on *Sūy* 1,3,4,13; id. I 262a 5 foll., II 154a 10 etc.

57 *Cunni* 257,5 on *Sūy* 1,12,1; *Vrtti* I 33a 8 on *Āyār* 1,1,2,2 et passim.

58 *Avacūri* (Gopipur, Surat 1958) 60a 4 on *Pinḍa N* 314.

59 Hemacandra, Introduction to *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* 1671.

60 *Avacūri* 29a 13 on *Pinḍa N* 143; Hemacandra on *Viśeṣāv.* 1674.

61 *Niggantha-Sakka-tāvasa-geruya-Ājīva pancahā samanā*

This line is often quoted, e.g. in the *Avacūri* 29b 3 on *Pinḍa N* 143 and by Haribhadra on *Nandī* 87 (Prākṛit Text Society ed., Ahmedabad 1966, p. 75,11), and plagiarized by Nemicaṇḍra, *Pavayaṇasārōddhāra*, Bombay 1922-26, I 94 Fol. 212 vs. 731. Cf. also *Vrtti* I 285b 4 on *Āyār* 1,9,4,11 where *parivrāt* takes the place of *geruya* (for which sect see note 71).

62 Edited by W. Schubring, Hamburg 1969, Ch. 38 between vs. 1 and 2, and in the colophon. These two couplets apparently deride the Buddhists, whereas the rest of the chapter is of an edifying, unpolemic character.

63 Also in Buddhist Sanskrit texts various forms of the name are found, vide Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary*, s.v. Sāriputra.

64 'Having enjoyed a pleasant dinner, and a pleasant seat and bed, a muni in a pleasant house meditates on pleasant things' (Jacobi in a note on *Sūy* 1,3,4,6 where he quotes

Śīlāṅka's *Vṛtti* I 97a 3). The *śloka* is also cited by Hemacandra on *Viśeṣāṇ* 1041. Cf. Śīlāṅka I 97a 4 foll. and 256b 2 foll. on *Sūy* 1,14,21, also Abhayadeva Fol. 426a 13 on *Thānaṅga* (Bombay 1918) 8,3,607 and Devendra on *Uttarajjhāyā* 3,8 (see Charpentier's ed., p. 292):

*mrđvī śāyyā prātar utthāya peyā,
madhye bhaktam pānakam cāparāhne
drākṣā-khaṇḍam śarkarā cārḍha-rātre,
mokṣas cānte Śākya-putreṇa drṣṭaḥ*

In Hemacandra's own commentary on *Yogaśāstra* 4,102 vs. 10 according to K.K. Handiqui, *Yasastilaka and Indian Culture*, Sholapur 1949, p. 373, note 5 (the *Vṛtti*, Bhāvnagar 1926, was not at my disposal) these lines are preceded by a couplet in which the lack of ascetic severity on the part of the Buddhist monks is condemned by the rhetorical question, how can one speak of *tapas* with regard to them, because they do three things a *sādhu* is not allowed to (but the former two of which *bhikṣus* may not do either), viz. to eat at night, to ask for food and to make no difference between pure and impure food (the latter is only partly true, fermented drinks and meat of animals especially killed for a monk or whose slaughtering he has seen or heard being prohibited). The text runs:

*divase ca rājanyām ca mukham āpṛcchya bhakṣatām
bhakṣyābhakṣyāvivekānām Saugatānām kutas īpaḥ?*

65 *Dasaveyāliya-vṛtti*, Bombay 1918, Fol. 54b; see E. Leumann, *ZDMG* 46 (1893) 603. The story does of course not occur in the *Niryukti*, as Winternitz, *Geschichte der indischen Literatur* II, p. 319, writes.

66 *Vṛtti* I 98b 3 on *Sūy* 1,3,4,13. See also my note on *Sūy* 2,1,18.

67 *Aṇ-agārā mo tti ege pavayamāṇā, Āyār* 1,1,2,2.

68 *Evam ete (!) 'pi Sākyādayo 'n-agāra-vādam udvahanti na cān-agāra-guṇeṣu manāg api pravarttante na ca gr̥hastha-caryām manāg apy atilaṅghayanti* (*Vṛtti* I 33a 11 on the above *Āyār* passage).

69 *Yadvā muṇḍāḥ santo ye kuṭumbinaḥ Śauddhodanīyās, te kiṃ kathayeyuḥ* (dhamma-kahā is spoken of)? — *Avacūri* 60a 4 on *Pinḍaṇ* 314.

70 *Tē aṇ-adhītācāra-gocarā bhikṣā-caryāsnāna-sveda-mala-parīṣaha-tarjjitāḥ sukha-vihāribhiḥ Śākyādibhir ātmasāt pariṇāmitāḥ* (*Vṛtti* I 241a 5 foll. on *Āyāraṅga* 1,7,1,3). For laxity in the Śvetāmbara *ganas* see H. v. Glasenapp, *Der Jainismus*, Berlin 1925, p. 341.

71 Jain Hybrid Sanskrit for Sa. *gairikā* because of Prākṛit *geruyā*. The oldest occurrence of these *parivrājakas* I found is in the *Cuṇṇi* 317,14 on *Sūy* 2,1,16. They wore ochre robes and carried a triple staff (*Pavayanaśārōddhāra* I 94 stanza 732 quoted by A.L. Basham, *History and Doctrine of the Ājīvīkas*, London 1951, p. 181; similarly the *Avacūri* on *Pinḍaṇ* 445).

72 In contrast to Buddhist monks their Jain counterparts may not enter the houses of those who provide them with food.

PĀLI *ibbha*, VEDIC *ibhya-**

Doubts and conflicting views have for a long time been expressed about the meanings of the Ved. derivative *ibhya-* and of the noun *ibha-* from which it is derived. It is therefore not surprising that the translation of the P/MIA counterpart *ibbha* has sometimes been debated.¹

The main views are summarized in *CPD* II 7, p. 307, s.v., but the redactors of this article seem to have felt somewhat uneasy when considering the contradictory shades of meaning of the word. For while *ibbha* has been glossed *gahapatika* by Buddhaghosa² and other commentators, and appears, in various instances, to imply an honourable status, it is evidently disparaging in one, at least, of its oldest P occurrences, viz. in the famous stock-phrase used by brahmans when, abusing the *samaṇas Sakyaputtiyas*, they call them “*muṇḍakā samaṇakā ibbhā kiṇhā bandhu-pādâpaccā*”.³ Miss Horner translates: “little shaveling recluses, menials, black, offscourings of our Kinsman’s heels”⁴. This translation, similar to T.W. Rhys Davids’ first renderings, is congruent with the context, and will certainly be generally accepted. But it may be appropriate to reconsider the matter for a moment, as stimulating opinions have been recently developed by D.D. Kosambi⁵ and by K.R. Norman⁶, both of them relating *ibhya-*, *ibbha* to *ibha*, ‘elephant’. On the other hand, the conclusions reached by L. Renou in *JAs.* 231 (1939)⁷ deserve to be kept in mind. L. Renou’s aim, in fact, was to consider “the Vedic elements in the vocabulary of classical Sanskrit” — MIA providing only subsidiary arguments to his demonstration⁸. He states how, in Ved., *ibha-* is nothing but “entourage (du prince), cour”; thus *ibhya-* means “rich”, (in servants), “rich”, and on the other hand, it serves (in *ŚBr*) as a collective designation for the “group of servants”, “train”⁹.

I would suggest that both these old meanings¹⁰ are preserved in P, even though the collective sense was perhaps already archaic at this stage, and though, in later MIA, only *ibbha* “rich” has survived (hence the synonyms given by commentators and lexicographers, *gahapati*, *aḍḍha*, *vaṇiya*).¹¹ The semantic derivation would thus have run parallel in OIA and MIA.

The P evidence has been conveniently collected by K.R. Norman and in *CPD*. Therefrom it will appear that, as far as P (and MIA) is concerned, no **ibha* “vassal” is attested, but solely *ibha* “elephant”¹². As for P *ibbha*, it is used as simplex or in compounds. Though the P compounds (leaving aside *ibbha-vāda*, infra, n. 39) are found in texts which are comparatively younger, it will be convenient to deal with them first.

Whether in *ibbha-kula* (*Th-a*)¹³ or in *brāhmaṇ'ibbha* (*Ja*, ślokaś)¹⁴, *ibbha* seems to refer to wealthy and respectable householders. In *Ja* VI 223,22* they are seen, with the *brāhmaṇas*, assembled around philosophers and holy men in order to listen to their discourses. It seems that the king shows regard to them (*ib.* 223,22*-23*?); their esteem is valued (228,8*).¹⁵

This is more or less congruent with Asoka's use in *Rock Edict* V. Here, the sovereign recalls how he has instituted superintendants of the Law, for the spiritual benefit of all those towards whom he feels responsible, i.e., all the sects, certain inhabitants of foreign kingdoms, and the members of his own Empire, among them *bābhanibhiyesu* (Dhauḷi ...).¹⁶

To be sure, in the above texts, the meaning of *ibbha* remains somewhat elusive. Nevertheless, it appears that the group formed by the *i.* and the *brāhmaṇas* is independent, distinct from the king's immediate retinue. No attack is directed against them: on the contrary, they seem to be respected. Thus, it is reasonable to render P *ibbha*, like Skt. *ibhya-*, by "wealthy, rich man".

From P (*brāhmaṇ'*)*ibbha*, it is probably not very far to AMg. (-)*ibbha*(-). The word is used in *Uvavāiya-sutta*¹⁷, in circumstances similar to those which are depicted in *Ja* VI 223 (supra). The presence of *ibbhas* is reported in the crowds that assembly around holy men: either among those who will follow the sovereign to the place of *samosaraṇa* (*Uvav* 38; 48), or, also, among those who have gone forth, and escort Mahāvīra (23).¹⁸ Leumann translates "reich"¹⁹. In fact, no very special meaning is required by the context. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that, in the enumerations where it recurs, *ibbha* is always preceded or followed by *seṭṭhi* / *siṭṭhi*²⁰. As, moreover, the stereotyped lists (liable to be amplified) which include *ibbha seṭṭhi* mention numerous state officers, it is not improbable that both these terms denote, not only "multimillionaire" traders, but important men, merchants and bankers, with an official function and a prominent social position.

But let us return to P. As simplex, P *ibbha* is always plural. It occurs in two successive triṣṭubhs of the *Bhūridatta-jātaka*, at the end of a violent charge against the brahmanical sacrifice²¹. This pamphlet expands into general considerations, sometimes only loosely connected with the initial topic. In particular, the five last stanzas are directed also against other forms of oppressions and oppressors. These are stated to pursue the same aims as the brahmins, though under different pretexts and disguises. The stanzas successively mention: (st. 180) the "king", with his council, *rājā ... pārisajjo*; (181-2) the "khattiyas' counsels" and the "three vedas", *khattiya-mantā ca tayo ca vedā*; further (183) *ibbhā*, along with the congregations of those who

make a living out of the three vedas, *tevijja-saṃghā*; and, (184) again the *ibbhā*²².

K.R. Norman writes that “the context here makes it clear that we are to take the word in the sense of ‘wealthy man’ ... or better still ‘merchant’ ”²³. But, although these stanzas state that *ibbhas* act in pursuit of money and wealth (*dhana-dhañña-hetu*)²⁴, and that “all the four” (*vaṇṇas*) feel the same about acquisitions and fame²⁵, there is no detail, in stanzas 183ff, which appears to be really typical of ‘rich’ men or merchants.²⁶ On the contrary, it could be argued that these two last triṣṭubhs only amplify what has already been said in the previous verses. Attacks had been directed against warriors and rulers, against king and princely policy: they are accused of deluding and robbing the people, just as the *tevijja*-brahmins do (*Ja* VI 214,5*-6* = 9*-10*); left to themselves, the subjects (*pajā*) would be happy (4*). It is now added, in altogether vague terms, that, moved by their greed²⁴, *ibbhas* and *tevijja-saṃghas* alike “execute (their) deeds far and wide on the wide-earth”²⁷. In stanzas 180-181-182, rulers had been termed *rājā* and *khattiya*: would it not very well suit the context if we take *ibbhā*, in st. 183-184, as a designation of the sovereign’s ‘escort of vassals’ — bands of chieftains and armed men who were their necessary allies in their plundering raids?

In five suttas of the *D*, *M*, *S*, *ibbha* occurs in the stereotyped insult *munḍakā samaṇakā ibbhā kiṇhā bandhupādâpaccā*. In four cases, it is (or might have been) addressed by brāhmaṇas to the Buddha or to “samaṇas Sakyaputtīyas”²⁸, whose (spiritual) lineage they scorn, whose life they criticize, while they extol the brāhmaṇa *vaṇṇa*. In one *M* sutta, on the other hand, the same formula is used, at the instigation of Dūsī Māra, by deluded *brāhmaṇa-gaḥapati*²⁹, who abuse the bhikkhus though these are “of good moral conduct”. This passage of *M* includes suggestive comparisons, which will be examined later.

Let us first consider the other occurrences of this insult. It recurs several times in the *Ambatṭha-sutta* of *D*³⁰, where it is refuted at length by the Buddha, and where it is “clear that in the abusive phrase the operative word is *ibbha*”³¹. Can a clue to the original meaning of the word be found in these pages? Is some hint given by the specific facts or traditions which are reported or alluded to in the course of the discussion? What are they?

It will be remembered that the young ‘brāhmaṇa’ Ambatṭha has been rude to the Buddha, and boasts of being so towards all “these little shaveling recluses ...”, the Sakiyaputtīyas. Questioned, he gives three reasons for his attitude. First, “fierce, rough, rash, violent is the Sakya breed”³²: they do not pay due honour and respect to the brāhmaṇas. Second, when Ambatṭha

visited them in Kapilavatthu, the Sakyas and Sakya-kumāras did not behave properly towards him, a 'brāhmaṇa'³³. Third, of the four existing 'classes' (*vaṇṇa*), three, *khattiyā ca vessā ca suddā ca* "are, verily, but attendants of the Brahmins"³⁴, whom they should respect; but this rule is impudently infringed by these *muṇḍaka s.i. k. b.*". The Buddha, to begin with, tries to soothe Ambaṭṭha, reminding him that the Sakyas, in their own home, are free to behave as they will³⁵. Then, seeing that Ambaṭṭha will not be pacified, the Buddha decides to confuse him. He shows that the two other arguments developed by this so-called 'brāhmaṇa' are erroneous. Thus, he demonstrates, that the khattiya, not the brāhmaṇa, "is the best among this folk who put their trust in lineage"³⁶. Further, he investigates Ambaṭṭha's and the Sakyas' lineage. Pressed by the Buddha's questions, Ambaṭṭha is forced to admit that the Sakyas are of true royal descent, though they have been obliged by circumstances to lead a marginal (sometimes violently criticized) life³⁷. That these princes, who had settled in a Sāka-grove, are brave and strong (*Sakya*), is an *udāna* proclaimed by their own father, the famous king Okkāka (*D* I 92,26-93,2). As for Ambaṭṭha, who is of the Kaṇhāyana-gotta, his eponymous ancestor is Kaṇha, the 'Black' one, the descendant of one of Okkāka's *dāsīs* (93,4-14)³⁸. Consequently, *Ambaṭṭha, ... ayyaputtā Sakyā bhavanti, dāsiputto tvam asi Sakyānam* (92,13 = 93,16), "the Sakyas are descended from lords, you are descended from a slave-girl of the Sakyas." Thus, the terms of the insult addressed by Ambaṭṭha to the Sakyas are to be reversed; not they, but he is black; and *he* is of mean origin, and could, to a certain extent, have been considered as a member of the Sakyas' household, or even property. Just as the proper name Kaṇha is a counterpart to the scornful *kiṇha/kaṇha* of the insult, *dāsiputta* answers the abusing *ibbha*³⁹. In any case, wealth has nowhere been considered in the present development. The emphasis lies first and foremost with birth and social standing⁴⁰, further — and consequently — with the character and conduct.

In this connexion, the *Agāṇṇa-sutta* of *D*⁴¹, in which the above formula is used, gives another interesting piece of information. It remarks that the Sakyas are known to behave, in the event, in the right and polite way. They do so towards Pasenadi Kosala, whose inferiors they are (*Sakyā ... rañño Pasenadi-Kosalassa anuyuttā bhavanti, D* III 83,25-27): they obey and serve him, salute him respectfully, pay him due homage⁴². Thus, though they are of free, noble lineage, yet the Sakyas have a suzerain: they are inferiors, and, to some extent, dependants. Their position is ambiguous⁴³.

No important relevant item is contained in the *Cankī*-⁴⁴ or in the *Lohicca-sutta*⁴⁵.

The *Māratajjaniya-sutta* (*M* I 332-338), it will be remembered, introduced

picturesque similes, three of which are particularly suggestive. Pressed by Dūsī Māra, the brāhmaṇagahapatikas rebuke the virtuous monks (334,13ff). They compare the bhikkhus, “when meditating” (*jhāyino*), to “an owl (*ulūka*) on the branch of a tree when tracking (*magayamāna*) a mouse”, to “a jackal (*khottu*) on the bank of a river when tracking (*m.*) fishes”, to “a cat (*biṭāra*) on the edge of a refuse heap when tracking (*m.*) a mouse”⁴⁶. Through these similes, Buddhist monks are compared with predatory animals of ill-omen, hunting and tracking the prey upon which they will pounce.

To sum up: while the bhikkhus or samaṇas Sakyaputtiyas are shown concentrating, as if gathering themselves like wild animals ready to attack their prey, the Sakyas and Sakya-kumāras are said to be noisy, turbulent and violent *ayyaputtas* of royal birth, and to behave like true feudatories of Pasenadi Kosala⁴⁷. These details, disseminated as they are across the various suttas where the *ibbha*-formula is used, are all consistent and convergent. If P *ibbha* ever had a precise specific meaning in the old language of the suttas, it cannot, in the above phrase, have been “wealthy”, nor “parvenu”⁴⁸. On the contrary, “vassals”, and, with a pejorative shade, “varlets”, “menials” (pl.), would suit all the sutta-contexts; what is more, this appellation appears to refer to actual facts.

Thus, both significations of Ved. *ibhya-* would have survived in P: on the one hand, “train of attendants”, troop of vassals (perhaps in *Ja* VI 214,13*; 17*), a collective designation which was liable to take a disparaging value (in the above insult), and soon became obsolete; on the other hand, “rich, wealthy”, etc., a meaning which is attested elsewhere in MIA, just as *ibhya-*, “rich”, is found in classical Skt. The evolution would, therefore, have been parallel in Old and in Middle Indo-Aryan. Moreover, if both these meanings did exist in P, *ibbha* is one more example of the connexions which have been shown to exist between Vedic and early Pāli vocabulary and stylistics⁴⁹.

Sèvres

NOTES

* Abbreviations as in *A Critical Pāli Dictionary*, Copenhagen, 1924-. Moreover, P (= Pāli), Pkt. (= Prākṛt), MIA (= Middle Indo-Aryan).

¹ Cf. “wealthy”, Childers, s.v. *ibbho*; “menial; a retainer”, *PED*, s.v.; “a menial”, *PTC*, s.v. It is noteworthy that, when inflected, the word is always plural.

2 For references, v. *CPD*.

3 References in *CPD*, s.v. *ibbha* – (*kinha*: v.l. and, occasionally *E^e*, *kanha*).

4 *M II Transl.*, London 1957, p. 365; cf. *ibid.* I, 1954, p. 397-8. Cf. T.W. Rhys Davids, *D I Trsl.*, London, 1899¹, p. 112: “menial black fellows”; id. and C.A.F. Rhys Davids, *III Trsl.*, 1921¹, p. 78: “vulgar rich ... menials”; E. Frola, *Canone Buddhista, Discorsi lunghi*, Torino 1967, p. 104-5: “servi”; p. 701: “solitari” (?); F.L. Woodward, *S IV Trsl.*, London 1956, p. 73: “menials”. Compare further R.O. Franke, *Dīghanikāya ... in Auswahl übersetzt*, Göttingen-Leipzig, 1913, p. 90: “protzigen Bauern (?)”, and v. n.6 (referring to Chalmers, *JRAS* 1894, p. 343 ‘naught but man of substance’): “wörtlich ‘reich’ wie Skr. *ibhya*... Hindeutung auf das Sakya-Geschlecht ...”. L. Renou, *Canon bouddhique pâli*, Paris 1949, p. 81ff (transl. of *Ambaṭṭha-sutta*): “enrichis”.

5 In ‘Combined Methods in Indology’, *IJJ* 6 (1963) 183-4.

6 In ‘Middle Indo-Aryan Studies VI’, *Journal of the Oriental Institute Baroda* 16 (1966) 113-9: 1. Pā. *ibbha-* an *Ājīvika*, 113-7.

7 In ‘Les éléments védiques dans le vocabulaire du sanskrit classique’, *JAs.* 231 (1939) 337-8, § 16.

8 He accepts Bühler’s surmise *i.* = “*vaiśya*”; hence “bas, vulgaire” (apparently without personal investigation). But cf. infra n. 18, 20 and 40 !.

9 Cf. id., *E(tudes) V(édiques et) P(āninéennes)*, Paris. For *ibha-*, *EVP* 8, 1961, p. 30 and 88 (*RV* 9,57,3) Soma hymn, *ibho rājā*, “Roi suzerain”; 17, 1969, p. 33 (*RV* 1,84,17, Indra hymn), “serviteur(s)”; further, 13, 1964, p. 7 and 95 (*RV* 4,4,1 Agni hymn), “escorte”. For *ibhya-*, 12, 1964, p. 13 and 86 (*RV* 1,65,7-8, Agni hymn), “vassaux” (both *EVP* 12 and 13 quoting Kosambi, ‘tribal savages’, *loc. cit.*, without comment). Cf. K.F. Geldner, *Der Rig-Veda. Aus dem Sanskrit ins Deutsche übersetzt*, Cambridge, Mass. 1951, and his notes ad *RV* 1,65,7-8; 9,57,3.

Moreover, cf. *PW*, s.v. *ibhya-*; Mayrhofer, *Etym.*, s.v. *ibhaḥ*¹, and s.v. *ibhyaḥ*, “wohl zu *ibhaḥ*¹” (ubi alia).

10 The disparaging value resulting from a secondary derivation from “vassals”, n. 43.

11 P references in *CPD*; also *ibbhā ti gahapatikā*, *Ja* VI 217, 12, cf. 229,18. — With *Abh.* 725d, *aḍḍho tathā dhanī*, compare the Pkt. and ‘deśi’ synonyms according to *Pālacchīnāmamālā* 101 *aḍḍhā ibbhā dhaṇiṇo* and *Deśināmamālā* 1,79, *ibbho vaṇie*, both quoted by K.R. Norman, *loc. cit.*, 114. Hemacandra adduces the following example: *ibbhāṇam iriṇam ... harisaṃ samuvvahai*, “to the *i.*, gold brings joy”.

12 Hence, *ibbha* defined as the possessor of a fortune “the size of an elephant”, colossal, *hasti-pramāṇa-draviṇa-rāsipatau*, *Abhidh-rāj* 2, 625 b.

13 Occasional v.l. *iddha-*, cf. *CPD*. Evidently well-to-do family (in which *theras* are said to be reborn, in consequence of their meritorious deeds).

14 “Brahmans and wealthy men”, Cowell and Rouse; “die Brāhmanen und die Reichen”, Dutoit. *CPD* compares *brāhmaṇa-gahapatika* (but v. infra, n. 40).

15 V. n. 16.

16 An often discussed passage (cf. *CII*, I, p. 33 and n. 6, ubi alia); “très obscur” (Jules Bloch, *Les inscriptions d’Asoka*, Paris 1950, p. 104, n. 10). Recently, D.D. Kosambi, *loc. cit.*; K.R. Norman, *loc. cit.*

Considering the fact that “all the sects” are explicitly mentioned at the beginning of the enumeration, *sa(v)va-pāsaṃdesu viyāpaṭā* (Dhauḷi, etc.), it seems improbable that (-) *jibhiya* refers to one particular religious group, whether *ājīvikas* or others.

It has been noted that there is a parallelism between Asoka’s expression and *Ja* VI 229,11* *brāhmaṇ’ibbhesu vyāvato* (said by a *rājā* who is drawing attention to the fact that he has been a righteous king, taking good care of all. On the contrary, 230,17*).

In the preceding śloka, a man recalls one of his former happy births, when he was the so-called *Bhāva-seṭṭhi*, and was honoured (*sammato*) by the *br.-i* (228,7*-8*).

17 Cf. Ernst Leumann (ed.), *Das Aupapātika Sūtra ...*, Leipzig 1883.

18 *Bahave Uggā b. Uggā-puttā ... rāṇṇā khattiyā māhaṇā bhaḍā johā pasatthāro ...*

aṇṇe ya bahave rāṭsara-talavara-kodumbiya-māḍambiya-ibbha-seṭṭhi-seṇāvai-satthavāha-ppabhitayo, many Uggas ..., princes, kṣatriyas, brāhmaṇas, and many others, kings, heads of town, of family, of port, i., s., generals, merchants ... , *Uvav* § 38 (p. 49,32); *aṇṇa-gaṇanāyaga-daṇḍanāyaga-rāṭsara-talavara-māḍambiya-kodumbiya-ibbha-seṭṭhi-seṇāvai-satthavāha-*, *ib.*, § 48 (p. 55,11); *bahave samaṇā ... bhadā johā seṇāvai pasatthāro siṭṭhi ibbhā aṇṇe ya bahave evam-ādīṇo uttama-jāi-kula-rūva- ... -juttā*, ...warriors, fighters, generals, advisers, s., i., and many such others, of good birth, family, appearance, ..., *ib.* § 23 (p. 34,18).

19 *Das Aupapātika Sūtra* ..., Glossar, s.v.

20 Cp. *Jinacariya* § 61 (ed. by H. Jacobi, *The Kalpasūtra of Bhadra-bāhu* ... , Leipzig 1879, p. 50,24), where, in the list of all those who are surrounding the king, the *siṭṭhi-seṇāvai-satthavāha* are preceded by the *-nigama-*, “*vaṇij*”.

21 *Ja* VI 206ff.

22 “Householder(s)”, Cowell-Rouse; “die Reichen ... diese reichen Leute”, Dutoit.

23 *Loc. cit.*, p. 114.

24 *Ja* VI 214,13*, st. 183; cp. 18*, *infra*, n.27; and 212,7*-10* (of brahmans).

25 *lābho alābho ayaso yaso ca*

sabbe te sabbesā catunnā dhammā,

ibid. 214,11*-12*, st. 182 (*catunnam pi vaṇṇānam*, *ibid.* 217,10).

26 In fact, it seems that more or less the same idea is developed, with the same words or the same formula, in st. 181-184.

As elsewhere, the ct. understands *ibbhā ti gahapatikā*, 217, 12'!

27 *kammāni kārenti puthū pathavyā*,

Ja VI 214,14* = 19* (said of the *ibbhas*) = 16* (of the *tevijja-saṃghas*). Cp. 214,1*:

rājā paṭhavim vjītvā,

“the king, having conquered the earth ...”

Further, the *ibbhas* are said to be “always eager, addicted to passions”:

niccossukā kāma-guṇesu yuttā, *ibid.* 18*.

Cp. *R V* 4,4,1 (Agni hymn):

kṛnuṣvā pājāḥ prāsitiṃ nā prthvīm
yāhī rājevāmavān ibhena ...

“Fais de ta masse comme un vaste filet! Marche comme un roi fougueux avec ton escorte” (translation L. Renou, *EVP* 13).

28 Cf. *D* III 84,16-17, where the Buddha invites Vāsetṭha (and Bhāradvāja), if asked who they are, to state that they are “*samaṇā Sakyaputtiyā*”.

The spiritual lineage has its share of the contempt expressed (by Ambaṭṭha) against the clan of the Sakyas and Sakya-kumāras (cf. n. 4).

29 This is an exceptional circumstance; but the (*brāhmaṇa-*)*gahapatikas* are deluded.

30 *D* I 87-110.

31 As pointed out by K.R. Norman, *loc. cit.*, 114.

32 “*Caṇḍā bho Gotama Sakya-jāti, pharusā bho G. S., lahusā ... , rabhasā ...*”, *D* I 90, 27-91,1.

33 *Ibid.* 91,10-24.

34 “*Imesaṃhi... catunnam vaṇṇānam tayo vanna ... brāhmanass' eva paricārakā saṃpajjanti, ...*”, *ibid.* 91,29-32 (translation T.W. Rhys Davids, *D I Transl.*)

35 *D* I 91,25-28.

36 “*Khattiyo seṭṭho jane tasmim ye gotta-paṭisārino*”, *D* I 99,8* = 14* = III 97,24* (transl. T.W. Rhys Davids). Thus, in any case, Ambaṭṭha will be a subordinate.

37 “*Te jāti-saṃbheda-bhayā sakāhi bhaginīhi saddhim saṃvāsam kappenti*”, “Through fear of injuring the purity of their line, they intermarried with their sisters”, *D* I 92, 27-29 (transl. T.W. Rhys Davids); cf. *DPPN* II, p. 971, n. 10, *ubi alia*.

38 He nevertheless became a great and powerful *isi*, as Buddha explains later on, *D* I 95, 34-97,3: “*uṭāro so Kaṇho isi ahosi*”, 96,5 = 97,3.

³⁹ Cf. the parallelism: *atibālham kho ayam Ambattho māṇavo Sakkesu ibbha-vādena nimmādeti* [cf. E^e v.l.; Sv E^eC^e], *D I 92,6-8* / *atibālham kho ime māṇavakā Ambattham māṇavam dāsiputta-vādena nimmādenti*, *ibid.* 95,34-96,2: Ambattha (/ the young brahmins) excessively want to humble the Sakyas (/Ambattha) by calling them (/him) *ibbha* (/dāsiputta).

⁴⁰ Hence, perhaps, the gloss *gahapatika* – a not very satisfactory one, considering that, in *M I 334,16ff*, the abusing phrase is spoken by *brāhmaṇa-gahapatikas*.

It has sometimes been assumed that *ibbha* perhaps denotes the members of one of the four *vaṇṇas* (cf., among others, *CPD*, s.v.: “perh. (almost) the same as *vessa*”). That this is not the case has been rightly emphasized by K.R. Norman (loc. cit., 114), referring to the well-known *vaṇṇa* list, quoted precisely in the *Ambattha-sutta*: “*cattāro me ... vaṇṇā, khattiyā brāhmaṇā vessā suddā*”, *D I 91,29-30* (= *D III 82,6-7*, in the *Aggaññu-sutta*, *infra*). However, there has been an old tendency to connect *ibbha* with social distinctions (*lato sensu*). For, in the *Aggañña-sutta* (where the above *vaṇṇa* list is quoted), the *brāhmaṇas* are reported to abuse *Vāsetṭha* (and *Bhāradvāja*) because they have left their original superior (*setṭha*), bright (*sukka*) brahman *vaṇṇa*, and have joined a “low” (*hīna*) one, viz. the *m. s. i. k. b.* (“*tumhe setṭham vaṇṇam hitvā hīnam attha vaṇṇam ajjhūpagatā, yadidaṃ muṇḍake ...*”, *D III 81,15-17* = 18-20).

Bound by Buddhaghosa’s gloss (*i. = gahapatika*), the *Dīghaattṭhakathā-ṭīkā*, for its part, underlines that the *ibbhas* are linked by the house link and thus are “low”, further (*infra*), that they are subordinate to brahmins; it therefore equates *ibbhas* and *suddas* (*ibbhe ti sudde, te pana ghara-bandhanena baddhā nihīnatarā ti āha gahapatike*, *III 47*, ad *Sv 862,8*; cf. *I 388,15*).

This comparison is found once in the parallel which is drawn between the condition of the *ibbha*, the elephant-mount, who “is under the control of others, not of himself”, and that of the *ibbhas*, who, “obeying the *brāhmaṇas*”, being “*suddas*”, “are under the control of others, not of themselves” (*yathā ibho hatthi-vāhana-bhūto parassa vasena vattati, na attano, evam ete pi brāhmaṇānam sussūsakā suddā parassa vasena vattanti, na attano ...*, 388, ad *Sv I 254,23*).

Is the identification of *ibbha* with *sudda* suggested by the presence, in the formula, of *kinha bandhupādāpacca*, this being understood as an allusion to the *śūdras*’ birth from *Brahmā*’s foot (for instance in the famous *RV 10, 90,12*)? Buddhaghosa had quoted another theory, which regards the *suddas* as born from *Brahmā*’s knee: the *samaṇas* stem “from the back of his foot” (*brāhmaṇā Brahmaṇo mukhato nikkhantā, khattiyā urato, vessā nābhito, suddā jānuto, samaṇā piṭṭhi-pādato’ ti*, *Sv I 254, 28-30*).

In any case, the qualification *bandhupādāpacca* is implicitly refuted in *D III 81,23ff* where Buddha ridicules the brahmins’ pretension to be born from *Brahmā*’s mouth, whereas their birth is conspicuously the same as that of other humans.

⁴¹ *D III 80-98*.

⁴² *Karonti ... Sakyā rañhe Pasenadimhi Kosale nipaccakāraṃ abhivādanam paccuṭṭhānam añjali-kammaṃ sāmīci-kammaṃ*, *ibid.* 27-29=29-31.

⁴³ From “vassal” *stricto sensu* to “dependant”, with various scornful implications, the transition is easy. That this status was sometimes resented seems to result from *Sn 422 (Pj)*; also *DPPN II 971-2*.

Ambattha and his ancestor *Kaṇha* also have an ambiguous position (cf. n. 38). Moreover, there are evidently various puns on *kinha*, *kaṇha*, “black” morally, physically...

⁴⁴ *M II 164-177*.

The *brāhmaṇa* Cankī of *Opasāda* praises the Buddha Gotama’s noble, pure, rich ... *khattiya* family (166-167), and the Buddha’s perfections. In the conclusion of the *sutta*, it appears that not only had Buddha’s *samaṇa*-hood been criticized by foreign brahmins, but also that his (and the *bhikkhus*’) higher knowledge had been doubted by *Bhāradvāja*: “*ke ca muṇḍakā s. i. k. b., ke ca dhammassa aññātaro*” (177,7-9). But the Buddha’s superiority is recognized and proclaimed (9-13).

45 S IV 116-121. Brahmanical students revile the *m. s. i. k. b.* — who are honoured by humble folk (*bhāratakānaṃ sakkatā ...*), 117,6-8.

46 I.B. Horner's translation. '*Ime pana m. s. i. k. b.: jhāyino smā jhāyino smā ti pat-takhandhā adhomukhā madhuraka-jātā jhāyanti ... Seyyathā pi nāma ulūko rukkhā-sākhāyaṃ mūsikāṃ magayamāno jhāyati ... evam ev' ime m. s. i. k. b. ... Seyyathā pi nāma kōtthu nadi-tīre macche magayamāno jhāyati ... evam ev' ime mundakā — pe — ... Seyvathā pi nāma bilāro sandhi-samala-saṅkatīre mūsikāṃ magayamāno jhāyati...*, M I 334,15-29. They are further compared to "an ass at the edge of a refuseheap, its burden removed", *ibid.*, 29-33. *Seyyathā pi nāma gadrabho vaha-cchinno sandhi-samala-saṅka-tīre jhāyati ... evam ev' ime ...*. But the parallelism, so striking in the first three similes, is lacking here (is it a later addition?).

47 *Mutatis mutandis*, the Sakyas and Sakyaputtiyas, as depicted by their detractors in the above suttas, bear some resemblance to the impetuous, noisy, plundering, Vedic chieftains and bands of warriors. Vedic *ibha-*, *ibhya-* are associated with *rājan-*, the sovereign king to whom Agni or Soma are compared: with his "escort" (*ibhena*), the king is impetuous, irresistible (*RV* 4,4,1), the *ibho rājā* are similar to the hawk (*ibid.*, 9,57,3), the king devours the *ibhyas* themselves (*ibid.*, 1,65,7-8). Cf. n. 27

48 Cf. n. 4. Moreover, this would suppose two successive semantic derivations, the second one attested in earlier P only ("rich (in attendants)" → "rich" → "parvenu").

49 Sylvain Lévi, *La doctrine du sacrifice dans les Brâhmanas*, Paris 1898, Introd., p. 11; Erich Frauwallner, *The Earliest Vinaya and the Beginnings of Buddhist Literature*, Roma 1956, p. 64ff; Armand Minard, *Trois énigmes sur les cent chemins*, Paris 1956, §§41a, 453 a (quoting L. Renou and D.S. Ruegg, on *vihāra*, *tathāgata*); etc. Recently, *CPD* II 7, s.v. *isikā*; Meinrad Scheller, 'Das mittellindische Enklitikum *se*', *KZ* 81 (1967) 31-35; Pierre Rolland, 'Le Boeuf et la Roue (A propos de Dhammapada 1 et Vārāha-grhyasūtra XV,22)', *IJ* 15 (1973), 40-42.

PRAŚĀSTRASENA'S
 ĀRYA-PRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀ-HṚDAYA-ṬĪKĀ

The *Heart Sūtra* is easily the best known of all the *Prajñāpāramitā* texts. Although a Mahāyāna work it is closely related to Pāli Buddhism which has occupied much of Dr. I.B. Horner's life. The greater part of the *Sūtra* is a discussion of that interpretation of the Buddha-dharma which Sāriputra, 'the generalissimo of the Dhamma', had formulated, and which culminated in the Abhidharma literature. And at the end, when the *prajñāpāramitā* is called a *mantra*, we are forcibly reminded of the obscure statement of *Niddesa*¹ which calls *paññā* a *mantā*, a term equated in another ancient text² with "in truth", as opposed to *musā*, just as in No. 57 of the *Heart Sūtra*.

This extremely brief and condensed text has naturally given rise to numerous commentaries. A few of the Far Eastern commentators have recently become accessible in English. Whether Shingon, like Kōbo Daishi (A.D. 830)³, or Ch'an and Zen, like Han-shan (ca. AD. 1620)⁴, Hakuin Zenji (ca. A.D. 1750)⁵ and Abbot Obora (ca 1940)⁶, they all have this in common that they tell us more what the text meant to them within their own culture than what the Indian original had intended to convey.

For that we have to turn to the seven Indian commentaries preserved in the *Tanjur*⁷, though the first and longest in the list, the *ṭīkā* of Vimalamitra⁸ (ca 800), is none too helpful. Laboured, over-elaborate and unsystematic, it does not always represent the main stream of Buddhist thinking. A lay Tantric, with often strange views, Vimalamitra could not maintain himself in Tibet against the orthodoxy of Kamalaśīla, and had to leave for China. Little light is thrown on the text of the *Sūtra*, and the commentary is evidently designed to act as a kind of pamphlet supporting its author's point of view in the struggles which took place in Tibet at the time. The commentary of Praśāstrasena⁹, on the other hand, is a straightforward, admirable and exemplary attempt actually to illuminate the text, and it represents the standard thinking of Pāla Buddhism — basically Mādhyamika, with some Yogācāra terms (at No. 10,43,etc.) and even a smattering of Tantra (at No.50). The colophon describes the work as a *deśārthaprakāśikā ṭīkā*. Some believe that the *ācārya* Praśāstrasena's real name was Praśastasena.

As it stands, this commentary is too long for the space allotted to me here. So I confine myself to giving the bulk of the direct comments on the *Short Text* only¹⁰. The *Sūtra* text which is commented upon here differs at times from that of the *Kanjur*¹¹ and of the Manchu editions of the seven-

teenth century¹², and I have noted such variations as seemed important.

According to Praśāstrasena the *Sūtra* can be considered from ten¹³ points of view, and it is to them that we now turn.

I. THE TITLE¹⁴

Here *ārya-prajñā-pāramitā-hṛdaya* is explained. As for *hṛdaya*, "one speaks of 'Heart' because this text contains the entire *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra* in one hundred thousand chapters (*le'u*)¹⁵; and because this is the highest teaching about the *prajñāpāramitā* in the ultimate sense, which gives the Tathāgata's doctrine all at once".

II. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE SERMON (*nidāna*)

This comments on the preamble, which describes the place of preaching and the audience.

III. THE MEDITATIONAL ATTAINMENT

This comments on the Buddha being absorbed in meditation on the splendour of the deep discourse on dharma.

IV. THE PRINCIPAL SPEAKER¹⁶

Here the Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara is introduced, his name explained, as well as his coursing in the perfection of wisdom and his seeing the five skandhas as empty.

V. THE ENTRANCE INTO WISDOM

This covers the question of Śāriputra, i.e. how one should train in perfect wisdom.

VI. THE MARK OF WISDOM

"Without knowing the mark of wisdom one cannot know its meaning. Avalokiteśvara replies to Śāriputra, saying:⁷⁻⁸ ONE SHOULD SEE THE FIVE SKANDHAS AS EMPTY THROUGH THEIR OWN-BEING. 'Empty' is five-fold¹⁷. (1) In so far as there are no curds in milk one speaks of something as 'empty' in the sense that it was not in what went before (*sṇa-nas*); (2) In so far as there is no milk in curds, one speaks of something as 'empty' in the

sense that it has demolished (*shig-nas*) (what went before); (3) In so far as there is no horn in the front of the hare's head it is 'empty' in the sense that it is absolutely (*śin-tu*) not there; (4) In so far as there is no bull in a horse, it is (mutually) 'empty' in the sense that one is not in the other (*gcig-la gcig; itaretara*); (5) To be empty of own-being (*ño-bo ñid med-pa'i*): means that all dharmas have no own-nature (*rañ-bshin med-pa*). It is the fifth which is meant here.

(10) **FORM IS EMPTY.** 'Form' means earth, water, fire and air. 'Empty' means that they are emptiness, because form shares the ultimately real Dharma-element's mark of emptiness. This mark of emptiness is non-dual, has transcended counting and number, has forsaken self and the false view of a self, and as a result of having forsaken both object and subject it has the mark of nondual Suchness. Because all dharmas in general are marked with emptiness they cannot be combined with one another, and that is why the four physical elements are markless and unsubstantial, without self or master, and they are really nothing because when broken up into atoms they are no more than emptiness. It is because it is emptiness through its own-being that "form is empty". For form to be empty of own-being is the same as to be empty in ultimate reality. And because for form to be empty of own being is not separate (*gud*) from its being empty in ultimate reality **EMPTINESS ALSO IS FORM.**

If the ultimately real emptiness is just the same as the own being of form as empty, and if form as empty is the same as to be empty in ultimate reality, how can one ever experience¹⁸ this? According to the *Āryākṣayamatīnirdeśa*¹⁹ the cognition of the Bodhisattva which enters the Dharma-element knows that that is not earth, water, fire or air, or that it is not marked with solidity, liquidity, heat or mobility. The Dharma-element is identical with all dharmas. And why? Because being identical in emptiness they are the same²⁰. Furthermore, one should cognize the emptiness of form as the emptiness of the Absolute²¹. In two ways (i.e. I, II) one speaks of form as empty. Form is threefold — imagined, discriminated and dharmic²²: The consideration of earth, etc. and of their marks of solidity, etc., by the foolish common people is 'imagined' form. Form which is the range of salutary discernment²³ is 'discriminated' form. 'Dharmic' form is defined as a Suchness which is free from form both as imagined and as discriminated. (I) "Form is empty" refers to dharmic emptiness in so far as imagined and discriminated form are absent in it. (II) With "emptiness is form" one sees that it is a fancy to think that the emptiness of dharmic form is separate²⁴ from form as imagined and discriminated. What is meant is that, when dharmic form is empty, imagined and discriminated form are so likewise.

(¹³)WHAT IS FORM THAT IS EMPTINESS²⁵, (¹⁴)AND [WHAT IS] EMPTINESS [THAT] IS FORM. (¹¹)EMPTINESS IS NOT SEPARATE FROM²⁶ FORM. Because the two, i.e. emptiness as the mark of form and the emptiness of the Absolute are undivided, since they are one single (emptiness). (¹²)FORM IS NOT SEPARATE FROM EMPTINESS. They are undivided because it is the mark of what is empty of own being that it has forsaken the two extremes, and is without growth and diminution. "What is form just that is empty" means that what is defined as²⁷ form is that which is defined as emptiness; "what is emptiness that is form", what is defined as emptiness that is defined as form.²⁸

(¹⁵)AND SO WITH (¹⁶)FEELINGS, PERCEPTIONS, IMPULSES AND CONSCIOUSNESS ...

Since the ultimately real Dharma-element is indivisible, how can one ever experience the five skandhas as empty through their own being? The *Āryākṣayamatīnirdeśa* says: "The skandha of form is like a mass of foam, because, when taken hold of, it cannot be kept together [in the hand]; feeling is like a bubble because, as lasting only for a moment, it is impermanent; perception is like a mirage, because it is misled by the thirst of craving; the impulses are like a plantain tree²⁹ because, when [the leaf-sheaths] are taken away, no core remains; consciousness is like a dream, because it takes hold of what deceives³⁰. Therefore the five skandhas have no self, [and they contain] no person (*pudgala*), no living being, no living soul, no personality (*poṣa*) and no 'manhood' (*puruṣa*). They are empty of self and what belongs to a self, not produced, not brought about, non-existent, [like] the space-element unconditioned. This shows that in their own being they are Nirvāṇa". ...

VII. THE RANGE OF WISDOM

Without knowing the range one can have no meditational development. So as to further the entrance into the yogic meditations he says: (¹⁷)HERE, O ŚĀRIPUTRA, ALL DHARMAS ARE EMPTINESS, "All dharmas": the five sense-faculties and their objective ranges, the [18] elements, the [12] sense-fields, conditioned co-production, etc. have the five skandhas for their foundation³¹. Since the five skandhas have been cognized as empty, their limbs also should be cognized as "marked with emptiness". Just as when the chief parts of a body have been understood to be empty, the same should logically be inferred for the feet, hands, etc. UNMARKED³². All dharmas are 'unmarked' because they have passed beyond marks and signs.

(¹⁹)UNPRODUCED, UNSTOPPED. 'Produced' means that it was not in the past and is later on; 'stopped' that it was in the past and is not later on.

But the own being of the Buddha, the Dharma-element and the emptiness of the Absolute have no beginning, and therefore also no end. That is why they are “unproduced and unstopped”. Because beings, even when they wander about in the five places of rebirth, as well as the own being of the Buddha, are without taints, they are ⁽²⁰⁾NOT DEFILED. Even when he has known the utmost, right and perfect enlightenment the Buddha is through his own being exceedingly (*lhag-par*) free of purity, and so NOT IMMACULATE³³. Since the Buddha's own being enters without loss into the body of even an ant or a beetle, one speaks of ⁽²¹⁾NOT DIMINISHED. Because the Dharma-body cannot increase, one speaks of NOT INCREASED³⁴. And why? Because it has gone beyond the verbal expression of imaginative thought and penetrates everything without measure. Because of the non-production of either karma or defilements the Dharma-element³⁵ is ‘not produced’. Because one cannot destroy that which has not been produced, it is ‘not stopped’. Because the Dharma-element in view of its natural purity is free of taints, it is ‘immaculate’. It is ‘not defiled’ because in its own being it is pure, and the adventitious defilements cannot de-purify it³⁶. Since the (non-)for-saking of the defiling factors does not diminish the Dharma-element³⁷, it ‘does not diminish’. Since at the time of increasing purification the Dharma-element does not grow, it ‘does not increase’.

Since the just described division into five separate skandhas has been shown to be empty, the five skandhas are empty in the sense that the signs (of their differences) are a fancy in the mind. Since they are not differentiated in what is empty, it is not logical to assume that form, etc. are more than names and verbal concepts, and so one should clear away these signs of fancies about (mere) words.

⁽²²⁾THEREFORE ⁽²³⁾IN EMPTINESS THERE IS ⁽²⁴⁾NO FORM, NO FEELING, etc. The five skandhas are empty through their own being. When words and verbal concepts are transcended, form, etc. have the mark of being undifferentiated. “There is no form”, etc., because of the non-existence of a sign of a verbalized concept. In emptiness the words “form”, etc. cannot be spoken. ⁽²⁵⁾NO EYE, EAR, NOSE, TONGUE, BODY, MIND. The six sense-faculties are dependent on the five skandhas and not other than they, and so they “are not”, for the reason that the five skandhas are not. ⁽²⁶⁾NO SIGHT OBJECT, SOUND, SMELL, TASTE, TOUCHABLE OR MIND-OBJECT. The six sense-ranges are through the force of ignorance karma-resultant ‘residues’. Only a corrupted thought seizes on what has been achieved as a conditioned fruit as if it were existent. They are said to be ‘not’ because in ultimate reality they are empty through their own being. ⁽²⁷⁾NO EYE-ELEMENT ⁽²⁸⁾ETC. TO ⁽²⁹⁾NO MIND-ELEMENT. The eighteen elements are non-existent,

because so are the inward sense-faculties and the six consciousnesses on which they depend; as well as the six outward sense-ranges and the six consciousnesses on which they rest; and because, in any case, the six consciousnesses have never been brought about.

⁽³⁰⁾NO IGNORANCE, ⁽³¹⁾NO EXTINCTION OF IGNORANCE, ⁽³³⁾NO OLD AGE AND DEATH, NO EXTINCTION OF OLD AGE AND DEATH. This refers to the range of someone who has set out in the vehicle of the Pratyekabuddhas. "Ignorance" arises from the view of a self; but the seizing on a self arises from something (i.e. a self) which does not exist; therefore is ignorance also a non-existent. When in a house darkness has lasted for a long time, and is then instantaneously nullified by the single flash of a lamp, nothing of substance becomes manifest. Just so when the notion of a living being has in due course thickened into the darkness of ignorance, once the intellectual light of the lamp of wisdom has nullified it instantaneously, nothing of substance becomes manifest. "Knowledge" (*vidyā*) is the extinction of ignorance (*avidyā*) merely as a verbal concept; where there is no ignorance, there is the word 'knowledge', but not its full reality (*pariniṣpatti*) and that is why "there is no ignorance". Nor is there an "extinction of ignorance". There is no ignorance where ignorance as a substantial entity has no existence. Since non-existence fails to manifest itself as an entity, there is also "no extinction".

⁽³⁴⁾NO ILL, ORIGINATION, STOPPING, PATH. This is the range of someone who has set out in the vehicle of the Disciples. The four Truths can be considered from three points of view — as wordly, as supramundane, and as supramundane in the ultimate sense. The worldly truth cognizes the ill in the five skandhas, in what originates, and in old age and death; the supramundane cognizes [the facts of] ill, origination, stopping, path; the supramundane [in the ultimate sense] ³⁸ cognizes the truth of ill by cognizing the non-production of the five skandhas, the truth of origination as that by which there is the conquest of becoming, the truth of stopping by cognizing that ignorance and the vicious propensities (*anuśaya*) do not exist in their own being, and the path by cognizing that in what is the sameness of Dharma there are no super-impositions.

Since thus all the Truths are in ultimate reality nothing by way of own being, how can one ever experience them? It is said in the *Āryākṣayamatisūtra*: "How does the Bodhisattva become skilled in the Truths? The holy truth of ill means that the mark of ill is understood as emptiness. Origination means that the five skandhas are caused by craving and false views, and that these cannot be without the super-imposition of grasping; that is the holy truth of origination. The cognition that the skandhas do not become in

the past or in the future, and do not abide anywhere, that is the holy Truth of stopping. When he has entered on the non-dual cognition he cognizes the four Truths by way of emptiness — that is how the holy Truth of the path has been demonstrated”.

⁽³⁵⁾NO COGNITION, ⁽³⁶⁾NO ATTAINMENT, AND NO NON-ATTAINMENT. This refers to the range of a Bodhisattva who has set out in the great vehicle. It is called ‘cognition’ because there is no duality in it, since it has abandoned the two coverings of the defilements and the cognizable³⁹. One speaks of “no cognition” because there can be no cognition in ultimate reality. “Attainment”, — it is [called] ‘obtained’ [now] because it was not [possessed] in the past. Even if there were an attainment, it would be empty; even if there were a fruit, it would soon be destroyed. The own being of the Buddha, in fact, abides equally everywhere in (all) living beings. Since that is empty both in the beginning and in the end, there is “no attainment”. In the ten successive stages, as they have been proclaimed, the residues of ignorance in the store-consciousness become finally extinct as a result of gradual effort. When the residues of ignorance have been extinguished, we have the Buddha’s mirror-like cognition of the Dharma-element which is an “attainment” in the sense that it is also a “non-attainment”, because there [on this level] verbal intimations are no longer valid.

VIII. THE VIRTUOUS QUALITIES OF WISDOM

Yet in spite of non-attainmentness one does attain the supreme enlightenment. Although the yogin’s supreme enlightenment is in its true nature just emptiness, nevertheless the fruit of the perfection of wisdom is not nothing, but it [actually] is. In order to generate zealous efforts [about it], its virtues are now declared. ⁽³⁷⁾THEREFORE, O ŚĀRIPUTRA, ⁽³⁸⁾THROUGH HIS NON-ATTAINMENTNESS THE BODHISATTVA ⁽⁴⁰⁾DWELLS ⁽³⁹⁾AS ONE WHO RELIES ON THE PERFECTION OF WISDOM. “Non-attainmentness” — because of the non-attainment of the fruit of the supreme enlightenment. “Dwells as one who relies on the perfection of wisdom” — he does not dwell on any sign. ⁽⁴¹⁾BECAUSE OF THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THOUGHT-COVERINGS — they are non-existent because all inner and outer signs are forsaken. ⁽⁴²⁾UNAFRAID: Here, because of the non-existence of the thought-coverings there is neither fear of [saṃsāric] becoming with its rebirths in the states of woe, nor anxiety about the deep meaning of the non-production and non-stopping of dharmas. ⁽⁴³⁾HE HAS RISEN ABOVE THE PERVERTED VIEWS. Here “perverted views” are the manifold views about the non-existent external objects which are the residues of ignorance

in the store-consciousness. It is because, as a result of his having fully understood the absence of self in both persons and dharmas, he has forsaken the coverings of both the defilements and of the cognizable, that he is "one who has risen above the perverted views". ⁽⁴⁴⁾HE HAS ATTAINED NIRVĀṆA⁴⁰. Everything is grounded in ignorance and defilement. Within the twelve links of conditioned co-production lies the root cause of saṃsāric becoming, and when they are terminated the end of the whole mass of ill also takes place — so it has been said. When one cognizes ignorance as not something which is, then there are no more ill or defilements. It is then that "he has attained Nirvāṇa".

IX. THE FRUIT OF WISDOM

⁽⁴⁵⁾ALL THE BUDDHAS ⁽⁴⁶⁾WHO APPEAR IN THE THREE PERIODS OF TIME HAVE, ⁽⁴⁷⁾BY RELYING ON THE PERFECTION OF WISDOM, ⁽⁴⁸⁾FULLY KNOWN ⁽⁴⁹⁾THE UTMOST, RIGHT AND PERFECT ENLIGHTENMENT. One speaks of a "Buddha", because he has won the eye of wisdom which enables him to emerge from the corruption of saṃsāra with its triple world. To be a "Buddha" means that, so as to become the Dharma-body, one achieves countless virtues, such as wisdom, cognition, transic concentration, the [32] marks, the [80] accessory marks, the [18] special dharmas, etc. "By relying on the perfection of wisdom", because they do not dwell in any signs. "All the Buddhas of the three periods of time" have arisen in conformity with the perfection of wisdom, and so this perfection of wisdom is the mother of all the Buddhas. "Utmost", i.e. risen above the triple world. "Right and perfect", because of the finality of the dharma which is Suchness free from falsehood. "Enlightenment", just the Dharma-element. "Fully known", because they have coursed in the perfection of wisdom by way of non-discrimination.

X. THE DHĀRAṆĪ OF WISDOM

For the sake of avoiding a fall (into sin and damnation) he says: ⁽⁵⁰⁾THEREFORE THEN TRUTH, NOT FALSEHOOD⁴¹. This means: Speech does not speak, and so the wishless leads to the truth of Speech⁴². Body cannot course, and so from the signless is the Truth of the Body. Thought has no intentions, and so from emptiness is the truth of the Mind. In this way, since the three doors to holy deliverance are not obstructed, the perfection of wisdom has removed all the marks of thought and there is, by way of ultimate reality, conformity to the indiscriminate objectivity (*don*) of the door to the

sudden (*cig char*, *yugapat* or *sakṛt*) entrance [into enlightenment]⁴³ — “truth and not falsehood”.

Because internally it has removed all the residues [of ignorance] from consciousness it is the ⁽⁵¹⁻⁵²⁾MANTRA OF THE PERFECTION OF WISDOM. Because externally it has removed all signs through having cognized their own being, it is ⁽⁵³⁾THE MANTRA OF GREAT KNOWLEDGE. Because it has removed all signs, both inward and outward, it is ⁽⁵⁴⁾THE UNSURPASSED MANTRA. Because it has brought about the fruit of Buddhahood it is ⁽⁵⁵⁾THE MANTRA WHICH EQUALS THE UNEQUALLED. Because it achieves the weal of all beings and allows them to avoid all the places of woe it is ⁽⁵⁶⁾THE MANTRA WHICH APPEASES ALL SUFFERING. ⁽⁵⁷⁾ONE SHOULD KNOW. This perfection of wisdom “should be known” as the cause of the achievement of Buddhahood. ⁽⁵⁸⁾THE MANTRA OF THE PERFECTION OF WISDOM HAS BEEN UTTERED⁽⁵⁹⁾ AS FOLLOWS: ⁽⁶⁰⁾GATE GATE PĀRAGATE PĀRASAMGATE BODHI SVĀHĀ. This is the mantra of the perfection of wisdom which brings merit both worldly and supramundane. Through worldly merit one cannot be harmed by the impact of the defilements and of Māra, and one is protected from them. The supramundane merit means that reliance on this dhāraṇī causes “wisdom and cognition”.

Dorset

NOTES

¹ II n. 497.

² *Sutta Nipāta* 159.

³ Y.S. Hakeda (tr.), *Kūkai, Major Works*, 1972, pp. 262-275.

⁴ Ch. Luk (tr.), in *Ch'an and Zen Teaching*, 1960, pp. 209-233.

⁵ E. Nishimura (tr.), in: D.K. Swearer, *Secrets of the Lotus*, 1971, pp. 190-211; cf. R. Blyth, in *Zen and Zen Classics*, VII, 1962, pp. 193-8.

⁶ T. Leggett (tr.), in *The Tiger's Cave*, 1964, pp. 15-125.

⁷ For the list see my *The Prajñāpāramitā Literature*, 1960, p. 74. They have all been reprinted in Y. Hariba, *Chibetto-bun Hannyashingyō Chūshaku Zensho*, 1958.

⁸ He has also translated the *Heart Sūtra* itself. — I owe my knowledge of this commentary to Peter S. La Sha, my student in Madison in 1964.

⁹ I have used a copy in 40 pages which was done in 1967 by the Ven. Da Lama Namgyal Dorje for the Department of Oriental Languages at Berkeley, and which I have at times compared with the Japanese reprint of Peking, 1957, vol. 94, pp. 292-6. This corresponds to the Narthang Tanjur at MA 328b7-340a5.

¹⁰ Both Long and Short texts have been edited by me in *JRAS*, 1948 = *Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies*, 1967, pp. 149-153. For a translation of both see my *The Short Prajñāpāramitā Texts*, 1973, pp. 140-143. To facilitate reference I have also given the numbering of my edition. The divisions of the commentary correspond to my own as follows: VI = II-III; VII = IV-V; VIII-VI, IX = VII, X = VIII.

- 11 Narthang, *Sna-tshogs*; also *Rgyud DA(=R)*. = K.
- 12 W. Fuchs, *Die mandschurischen Druckausgaben des Hsin-ching (Hṛdayasūtra)*, 1970.
- 13 *IOL* 122 (L. De la Vallée Poussin, *Catalogue*, etc., 1962) has reduced this to seven, leaving out II-IV. This commentary to the *Short Text* deserves separate study, also for the differences in the translation of the Sūtra, which is marked off in red.
- 14 *śes-rab-kyi miñ*.
- 15 *IOL* 124: because it contains the entire meaning (*don*, for *mdo*) of the "One Hundred Thousand".
- 16 *glen sloñ-ba*. This term is formed by analogy to *glen gshi(nidāna)*. I do not know the Sanskrit equivalent.
- 17 This list may be compared with *Lañkāvatāra* 74-5, where the last out of seven kinds of emptiness is our No. 4 which is described, with some reference to a saying preserved also in the *Majjhima Nikāya* III.104-5, and rejected as "the lowest of all". (4) is empty of what it is not, (5) of that which it is. The 24 kinds of *suññatā* in *Paṭisambhīdāmagga* II.177-184 are something quite different, and are unrelated to these divisions. It seems clear that the detailed exploration of the Void belongs to a fairly late date, when the schools had been completely separated for some time.
- 18 *mñion*; *gamyate*, *prajñāyate*; conceive, subjectively realize.
- 19 *Taishō*; No. 403, vii, tr. Dharmarakṣa, A.D. 308, *Tohoku* 175.
- 20 Because of *shes bsad de* I assume that the summarized extract from the *Akṣayama-tisūtra* ends here; so it is in the quotation just before No. 35.
- 21 *don dam-pa'i stoñ-pa ñid*, *paramārthasūnyatā*. Also "ultimately real emptiness". E. Lamotte, *BSOAS*, xxxvi 2, 1973, p. 323: *paramārthasūnyatā* (1) in the *nikāyas* and *āgamas*, emptiness in the proper sense of the term. i.e. beings have no self. (2) In the *Prajñāpāramitā*, as at P 196, the emptiness of the Absolute, i.e., of Nirvāṇa.
- 22 *yoñs-su brtags-pa*, *rnam-par brtags-pa*, *chos ñid-kyi*; *parikalpitam*, *vikalpita*, *dharma-tā*. The same division also in the Large *Prajñāpāramitā*, though with a different explanation; see E. Conze 'Maitreya's Question', in *Mélanges d'Indianisme à la mémoire de L. Renou*, 1968, p. 238.
- 23 *rnam-par śes-pa'i*, usually = consciousness, *vijñāna*. Here more = *jñāna*, as in *Nyāya-bindu*.
- 24 *logs śig*, *prthak*.
- 25 Kumārajīva, Hsüan-tsang, Vimalamitra, K and Fuchs omit Nos. 13-14, *IOL* 122 has it.
- 26 *gud na*; *prthak*; K *gshan*; *IOL* 122: *tha dad-pa*.
- 27 *gzugs-kyi mtshan-ñid gañ yin pa*. Literally: what has the mark of form.
- 28 Here a lengthy excursion has been omitted, of which I quote one sentence in note 39.
- 29 *kadalī*, usually *chu śiñ*; here: *chu skyes-kyi ltum-bu*.
- 30 These five similes are a standard list (except for the fifth, which is usually *māyā*, but with the same explanation), as in *Samyutta* III p. 142, with the comment of *Visuddhimagga* xiv. 224, very much like that of our text. For the *Prajñāpāramitā* see *Aṣṭādaśas*. f. 285a-b = *Pañcaviṃśatis*. f. 544a-b = *Buddhist Texts*, 1954, no. 148 (A. Waley). — In view of these similes it is difficult to see how 'realistic' doctrines could ever have been ascribed to Buddhists of any period.
- 31 *āśraya*; receptacle.
- 32 The Tibetan takes *śūnyatālakṣaṇā* as *śūnyatā-alakṣaṇā*. All the Chinese translators have understood "marked with emptiness", and so has *IOL* 122: *chos thams-cad-kyi stoñ-pa ñid-kyi mtshan-ma ste*.
- 33 No. 20: *rnam-par dag-pa*; *rnam-par dag-pa med-pa*. Vimalamitra, K, Fuchs: *dri-ma med-pa*; *dri-ma dan bral-ba med-pa*. *IOL* 122: *myi gtsaṇ myi brtsog*. Sanskrit: *amālā*, *a-vimalā*.
- 34 *bri-ba med-pa*; *'phel-ba med-pa*. But *gañ-ba med-pa* in Vimalamitra, K and Fuchs.

IOL 122: *myi 'phel myi 'bri*. Most Sanskrit sources have *na saṃpūrṇā*. Perhaps = 'diminishable' and 'increasable'.

35 In the Abhidharma the *dharmadhātu* is the 18th element covering the objects of the mind. In the *Prajñāpāramitā* it is the Absolute which is one single Dharma but in which all the others find their true being.

36 Vimalamitra in his commentary: "Because the defiled *kleśas* have no own being, all dharmas are 'not defiled'. Because they cannot be purified by means of removing the impurities, they are through their own being "immaculate" – for all dharmas through their own being are translucently pure (*prabhāsvara*)".

37 *kun-nas ñon-moñs-pa'i phyogs (pakṣa) spañs-pas na chos-kyi dbyiñs bri-ba med-pas*. "Non-forsaking" seems to give a better sense.

38 Both my texts give: *'jig-rten-las 'das-pa'i 'phags-pa'i*, instead of: *don dam-pa'i 'jig-rten las 'das-pa'i*.

39 "The obstacle of the defilements impedes the foolish common people, and that of the cognizable the Auditors" (cf. note 29).

40 *phyin = prāpya, saṃprāpta*. So also Fuchs. Vimalamitra, K: *mahā-nirvāṇasya niṣṭhām prāptaḥ* (or: *niṣṭhāgataḥ*). IOL 122: *thar-pa ni mya ñan las 'das-pa'o*. Sanskrit: *niṣṭhā-nirvāṇaḥ (prāptaḥ)*.

41 *de bas na bden te ma nor-ba ... (57) śes-par bya ste*. There is here a transposition between No. 50 and No. 56. The Sanskrit (50) *tasmā'j jñātavyam ... (57) satyam amithyatvāt*. K: *de-ltar bas na bden-par(!) śes-par byas te ... mi brdzun-pa dan bden-par śes byas te(!)*. IOL 122: *de bas na śes-par bya ste ... bden te myi brdzun-pas*. Vimalamitra's *bden te ma log-pa'i phyir* comes nearest to the Sanskrit. – The following explanation shows esoteric Tāntric mystification.

42 The text is here corrupt. *Peking* gives: *smon-pa med-pas de-dag-gis (Da Lama: gir) bden-pa'o*. It should be *tshig-gyi bden-pa'o*, corresponding to *lus-kyi bden-pa'o* and *yid-kyi bden-pa'o*.

43 This refers to Vimalamitra's short work: Peking 5306: *Sakṛt-prāveśika-nirvikalpa-bhāvanā-artha* (or-*pada*). ('The meaning of the sudden entrance through the meditation-al development which makes no discriminations'). Its counterpart is No. 5334: *krama-prāveśika-bhāvanā-pada*. The contents of Vimalamitra's treatise are described by G. Tucci in *Minor Buddhist Texts* II, 1958, pp. 115-121. As an advocate of "sudden enlightenment" Vimalamitra claims that the gradual method is suitable only for people who are confused in their minds (*rmoñs-pa*).

NOTES ON THE *BHIKṢUṆĪ-VINAYA* OF THE MAHĀSĀMṬGHIKAS

In 1932 Sylvain Lévi published one leaf of the Vinaya of the Mahāsāmghikas which had been found by Hackin in Bāmiyān in 1930.¹ In 1934 Rāhula Sāṅkrītyāyana photographed in the Žva-lu Ri-phug monastery² many leaves of manuscripts belonging to the Mahāsāmghika Vinaya. The Chinese Tripiṭaka contains the following Vinaya texts of the Mahāsāmghikas: Taishō no. 1425 Mahāsāmghika Vinaya (vol. XXII, pp. 227-549a); no. 1426 *Bhikṣu-prātimokṣa-sūtra* (pp. 549a-556a); no. 1427 *Bhikṣuṇī-prātimokṣa-sūtra* (pp. 556a-566). The Vinaya consists of the following sections: (a) *Bhikṣu-prātimokṣa-vibhaṅga* (pp. 227a-412b); (b) *Bhikṣu-prakīrṇaka-vinaya* (pp. 412b-499a); (c) *Bhikṣu-abhisamācārika-dharma-s* (pp. 499a-514a); (d) *Bhikṣuṇī-prātimokṣa-vibhaṅga* (pp. 514a-544c); (e) *Bhikṣuṇī-prakīrṇaka* (pp. 544c-549a). The texts, photographed by R. Sāṅkrītyāyana, have been edited in three separate publications. The *Bhikṣu-prātimokṣa-sūtra* (44ff.) was published in 1956 by W. Pachow and Ramakanta Mishra.³ The *Bhikṣu-abhisamācārika-dharma-s* (50ff.) was published in 1969 by B. Jinananda.⁴ Roth's edition of the *Bhikṣuṇī-vinaya* (80ff.) includes the *Bhikṣuṇī-prakīrṇaka* and the uddānas of the *Bhikṣu-prakīrṇaka*.⁵ The *Bhikṣuṇī-vinaya* consists of two parts: the Eight *guru-dharma* and the *Bhikṣuṇī-prātimokṣa-vibhaṅga*. The texts published by Roth correspond to the following sections of the Chinese version of the Mahāsāmghika Vinaya: 1. Eight *guru-dharma* — Taishō vol. XXII, pp. 471a25-476b8; 2. *Bhikṣuṇī-prātimokṣa-vibhaṅga* — pp. 514a-544c; 3. *Bhikṣuṇī-prakīrṇaka* — pp. 544c-549a; 4. uddānas of the *Bhikṣu-prakīrṇaka* — cf. pp. 426b, 442b, 446c, 455b, 464b, 478b, 483b, 485c, 488b, 493c, 495b, 496c, 497b and 499a. In the Taishō edition the Vinaya texts of the Mahāsāmghikas occupy 340 pages. The 174 leaves photographed by R. Sāṅkrītyāyana correspond to 63 pages, almost one-fifth.

We must be grateful that these important texts have been published. However, the usefulness of two of the three publications is seriously diminished by the fact that the editors have been unable to reproduce the readings of the manuscript accurately. A comparison of the photocopy of f. 25a, reproduced in Pachow and Mishra's edition, with the text (pp. 21-22), shows that the editors have misread the manuscript in several places. It is to be hoped that the new edition of this text by N. Tatia, which has been announced, will be more adequate. Many sections of the *Prātimokṣasūtra* are to be found

in the notes of Roth's edition of the *Bhikṣuṇī-vinaya* (for f. 25a see Roth, pp. 187-188). Jinananda's edition of the *Abhisamācārikā* is also far from being satisfactory. Dr. Roth has kindly put at my disposal photocopies of the texts, edited by himself and Jinananda. This has enabled me to ascertain that Jinananda has often misread the manuscript. The fact that his corrections of manuscript readings cannot always be accepted is a lesser evil. For details I refer to my review of Jinananda's edition which will be published in the *Indo-Iranian Journal*. It is very regrettable that such important texts have been edited so unsatisfactorily. The publication of facsimile editions would be highly desirable.

Roth's edition of the *Bhikṣuṇī-vinaya*, on the other hand, deserves full praise. Although the photocopy of the manuscript is often difficult to decipher, Roth has spared no pains to reproduce as accurately as possible the readings of the manuscript. Abundant notes explain difficult words and expressions and contain numerous references to parallel texts. The index of words (pp. 335-403) gives exact references and greatly facilitates the study of the text. A lengthy introduction (pp. I-LXI) deals in great detail with many aspects of the text and problems connected with it. The *Bhikṣuṇī-vinaya* and the other Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya texts are written in a Prākṛit which has been submitted to a process of Sanskritization. The introduction draws attention to some striking Prakritic features of the language of the text. More information on the language and the terminology is to be found in two separate articles, published by Roth in 1966 and 1968: 'Bhikṣuṇīvinaya and Bhikṣu-prakīrṇaka and Notes on the Language', *J. Bihar Res. Soc.* LII (1966) 29-51; 'Terminologisches aus dem Vinaya der Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādin', *ZDMG* 118 (1968) 334-348.

The Chinese version of the *Bhikṣuṇī-vinaya* corresponds very closely to the Indian text. During his stay in Göttingen in 1960 Professor Hirakawa Akira translated the Chinese version of the eight *Guru-dharma*. Hirakawa is at present working on a complete translation of the Chinese version of the *Bhikṣuṇī-vinaya* which will be very helpful for the interpretation of the Indian text. Roth plans to publish a complete translation of the Indian text. These two translations will be of great importance for the study of the Vinaya in general and especially for the Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya.

As Roth points out in his introduction, the *Bhikṣuṇī-vinaya* belongs to the Vinaya of the Ārya-Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādin (= Ma-L). The Chinese version belongs to the Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya. Roth remarks that the whole *Guru-Dharma* complex is placed before the *Bhikṣuṇī-prātimokṣa-vibhaṅga* whereas in the Chinese version of the Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya this section is to be found in the *Bhikṣu-prakīrṇaka-vinaya* (p. XXIX). Roth has also

discovered influences of a later period in the text of the *Bhikṣuṇī-vinaya*. As an instance he refers to the use of the term *yogācārā bhikṣuṇī*. The parallel of this Chinese passage (p. 541c2) does not render *yogācārā* and has only the word "good" (p. XLII). Consequently, the Ma-L *Bhikṣuṇī-vinaya* would differ from the Mahāsāṃghika *Bhikṣuṇī-vinaya* in two respects: the structure of the text and the use of terms belonging to a later period. However, these two facts do not inevitably point to such a conclusion. According to Roth's examination of the script the manuscript was written in the 11th or 12th century. A manuscript of that period does not necessarily reflect the structure of the original Ma-L *Bhikṣuṇī-vinaya*. It is quite well possible that the scribe was of the opinion that the *Bhikṣuṇī-vinaya* would be incomplete without the eight *guru-dharma*. As to the term *yogācārā*, it occurs quite often in the *Abhisamācārikā* (pp. 106.9, 107.14, 202.5, 213.3, 215.1, 217.8, 219.1). In most cases the corresponding Chinese text has "sitting in meditation" (*tso-ch'an*, Jap. *zazen*). The Chinese version of the *Abhisamācārikā* does not correspond as closely to the Indian text as the Chinese version of the *Bhikṣuṇī-vinaya*. It seems to be often abridged and the arrangement of the sections in the fourth and fifth vargas differs. Nevertheless, a confessedly cursory perusal of the Chinese version does not show up any important divergences in terminology or in disciplinary matters. A detailed investigation would have to be undertaken but, at a first glance, it seems that the differences between the Chinese version and the Indian text of both the *Bhikṣuṇī-vinaya* and the *Abhisamācārikā* are not greater than can be expected in texts which have been transmitted in different circumstances and languages.

The Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya is of course of foremost importance for Vinaya studies. Of information on other matters two points deserve to be mentioned. The *Bhikṣuṇī-vinaya* (p. 314; Taishō XXII, p. 546c27) mentions festivals for the birth of the Buddha (*jātimahā*), for his Awakening (*bodhimahā*), for his Setting in motion of the Wheel of the Law (*dharmacakramahā*), for Ānanda (*Ānandamahā*), and for Rāhula (*Rāhulamahā*). This probably indicates that Ānanda and Rāhula were held in high consideration by the Mahāsāṃghikas. The text also mentions the quinquennial gathering (*pañcavār-ṣika*).⁶

In his *Buddhist India* (London 1902; 9th edition, Delhi, 1970, pp. 46ff.) T.W. Rhys Davids remarks that writing is mentioned in the Vinaya but that there is nowhere the least trace of any reference to books or manuscripts.⁷ The *Divyāvadāna* contains a reference to ladies who at night were writing Buddhist texts on birch-bark with ink and a writing-reed (ed. by Cowell and Neil, p. 532, 9-11). The *Abhisamācārikā* not only mentions a written inventory (p. 50.10; Taishō XXII, p. 503a6) but also refers several times to *pusta-*

ka-s (p. 38.5,13 – Taishō XXII, p. 502a27, b6; p. 124.15-16 – Taishō XXII, p. 510b15). The Chinese text translates *pustaka* by *ching* which normally renders *sūtra*.

To conclude these few notes on the *Bhikṣuṇī-vinaya* I would like to draw attention to some passages where a different reading or an alternative interpretation may be suggested. All references are to page and line of Roth's edition. Reference to the Chinese version indicate page, column and line of the Taishō edition.

P. 6.8: *evam tu tāyi Bhagavato santike*. It is not possible to keep *tāyi*. Also a gen. *tāyino* is most unlikely because the word *tāyin* seems to have been used only in verses.⁸ Probably one must read *tādi*, a reading mentioned as possible by Roth in his note.

P. 23.6: Roth corrects the MS reading *paribhavane* to *paribhavanena*. It would be better to read *paribhavena* as in the parallel passages mentioned in the note.

P. 52.14: *ahan tāyo ... brahmacaryāto yācayāmiti*. Read *cyāvayāmiti* for *yācayāmiti*?

P. 61.15: *jyeṣṭha-paryāyatā karohīti*. Read *jyeṣṭha-parṣāya tāvat karohīti*. The *jyeṣṭha-parṣā* is the assembly of the monks (cf. p. 69.25). In the manuscript *ṣa* and *ya* are not easy to distinguish (cf. Roth p. 269, n. 4). In the *Bhikṣu-prātimokṣa-sūtra* (ed. by Pachow and Mishra) we find *bhikṣuparyāye* (p. 5.6) which must certainly be corrected to *bhikṣuparṣāye*. See also Roth p. 62.2, 10.

P. 81.4-6: *bhikṣuṇīyo grhiṇām upavasitehi vasanti / Rāṣṭrā nāma bhikṣuṇī / sā dāni aparasya Śākyasya udu-vasite vasati / sā dāni Rāṣṭrā tasya Śākiyakumārasya uddiśati*. Roth explains *udu-vasita* as "water-residence". The Chinese translation does not mention water-residences and, as far as I know, they are not mentioned in other Vinaya texts. I believe that one must read *upavasite*. As to *uddiśati* Roth refers to a parallel passage which has *uddeśan dadāti* "gives a hint". In the Vinaya *uddesa* is used regularly as meaning 'recitation' (cf. I.B. Horner's translation, vol. V, London 1952, p. 308, n. 1). The Chinese version has "she teaches sūtras".

P. 117 verse 20c: *an-āprcchati vartante*. Read *anāprcchya nivartante*.

P. 119 verse 8: Cf. *Dhammapada* 150, *Gāndhāri Dharmapada* 284, *Udānavarga* XVI.23.

P. 138.1: *Mallā nāmā Mallakalyo nāma nigamo*. Read *Mallānām Āmallakalyo nāma nigamo*. Cf. p. 139.16 *Āmalakakalyato*.

P. 141.6: *keṣāñcit kiṭena vā kāliñjena vā veṭhayitvā dahyati*. Read *kaṭena vā kilañjena vā* ? Cf. p. 260.7.

P. 169.5: *bimboya-dhānasya*. Read *bimbopadhānasya*.

P. 170.17: *saṃghasya bhaktakāṇi samādāyati*. Read *samādāpeti*.

P. 201.11: *ṛṣidhvajanena*. MS. *ṛṣidhvajena*. Cf. 201.23: *śramaṇa-cīvaran ti ṛṣi-dhvajam*.

P. 204: Five devaputras have fallen in love with Bharanī and decide to compose verses in praise of her. The verses are introduced as follows: *yo 'tra sarva-suṣṭhu adhyavasito bhaviṣyati sa grahīṣyati*. Roth translates: "He, who will have been determined to be praised the best of all in this [in composing a verse], he will gain [Bharanī]". *Adhyavasita* has here the meaning "attached to, covetous" (cf. Edgerton s.v.): "He who most of all is in love with her will obtain her".

P. 214: Bhadrā cooks her own food and gives some to her nephews. The nephews find it delicious (*mṛṣṭam*) and ask from where it comes. Bhadrā explains that it comes from their own house. They reply that in their house such delicious food is not cooked. This passage has been misunderstood by Roth (cf. n. 3).

P. 216, last two lines: *tāya tasya pāṇiya-mallakam mastake āpiṭṭitam*. Roth takes *āpiṭṭita* in the sense of *āpiḍita* "squeeze, press": "the water-pot was pressed upon his head by her". On p. 267, n. 6 Roth explains *pari-piṭṭita* by Pkt. *piṭṭiya*, "*pīṭā huā, tāḍita*". See also p.227.12: *ātmānam khaṭa-capeṭa-mustakehi piṭṭāyati*. I believe that *āpiṭṭita* must have the same meaning: "the water-pot was thrown (lit. struck) at his head by her". The Chinese translation is of no help here: "she sprinkled his face with water" (p. 530a-24).

P. 221.4: *strīṇām bastim sthapeti / mūdha-garbhām cikitsati*. Roth explains *basti* or *vasti* as a medical barrack for the treatment of women. See, however, Jolly, *Medicin* (Strassburg, 1901), p. 26: *vasti* "Klystier, Klystierbeutel".

P. 223.22: *karmaṇy enām rājā tena*. Read *karmaṇyenāṅgajātena* (cf. 269.7 and 308.5). Ibid. *parivātetī*. Read *paripātetī* ? Cf. p. 316.1-2: *so me devaro paripātetī*.

P. 224.1: Roth suggests translating *viṭṭālayati* as "to make impossible". The normal meaning "to make unclean, defile" (cf. 290.12 and 309.14) applies here.

P. 229.1: *na ca āghāta-vastūni*. Read *nava* etc.

P. 239, last line: add with MS after *prcchitavyā*: *atha dāni evaṃ pi na bhavati*.

P. 249.11: *asmākam Bhagavatā daṇḍa-karma prajñaptam / imā sāmōktikā*. Roth refers to Skt. Bhik. 130.22 (not 136.22), where the term *muktikā jñaptiḥ* occurs. According to him "*sāmōktikā* is a Vṛddhi-form of *samuktikā* designating a nun about whom a *sa-muktikā jñaptiḥ* has to be moved". I be-

lieve that one has to read *imāsāṃ muktikā* “but for them there is absolution”. One may compare Bapat’s translation of *vimokkha* in *saññāya abhāvena vimokkha* “getting absolved because of not knowing the precept” and of *mukti* in *naiva ajñānān muktiḥ* “ignorance of law is no excuse” (*Shan-Chien-P’i-P’o-Sha*, Poona, 1970, pp. LIV and 416, n. 11). The same expression occurs several times in the *Abhisamācārikā* but the manuscript readings vary greatly: p. 5.17-18: *asmākaṃ bhagavān daṇḍakarman dadāti dvitīyasthvirasya sontikā*; p. 6.2-3: *asmākaṃ bhagavāṃ daṇḍakarman deti / dvitīyasthvirasya sontikā*; p. 9.6: *asmākaṃ bhagavāṃ daṇḍakarman deti / eṣāṃ montiko*; p. 24.4-5: *asmākaṃ bhagavāṃ daṇḍakarman deti / dvitīyasthvirasya muntikā*; p. 24.14-15: *asmākaṃ bhagavān daṇḍakarman deti / dvitīyasthvirasya muttikā*; p. 28.11: *asmākaṃ bhagavān daṇḍakarman deti / imeṣāṃ muktikā*; p. 29.2-3: *asmākaṃ bhagavān daṇḍakarman deti / imeṣāṃ mottikā*; p. 35.12: *asmākaṃ bhagavān daṇḍakarman deti / imeṣāṃ muktikā*; p. 41.9: *asmākaṃ bhagavā[n] daṇḍakarman deti / imeṣāṃ muktikā* (the readings are based on the manuscript and not on Jinananda’s edition). It is sometimes difficult to distinguish *su* and *mu*. It seems probable that *muktikā* must be read everywhere.

P. 258.11: *anirmokāṃ*. Read with MS *upānāhāṃ anirmokāṃ*

P. 262.9: *aye hi strī*. Read *apehi strī*.

P. 263.11-14: *yadi viprakatā bhonti mṛttikā-karmena vā iṣṭakā-karmena vā / paliguddhā bhavanti vaktavyaṃ / āgametha tāvad bhaginiyo / tena te bhikṣū upasaṃkrāmitvā vaktavyāḥ / āyusmanto nivāsetha prāvaratha bhikṣuṇīyo praviśanti /*. Roth proposes to read *vāpaliguddhā*: “If they are not occupied one should say”. I believe that one must maintain *paliguddhā* and understand: “If they are naked or if they are occupied with clay-work or with brickwork, he [i.e. the doorkeeper] must say: ‘Wait a moment, sisters’. He must go to the monks and say to them: ‘Sirs, be dressed, cover yourself; the nuns will enter’.” The meaning “naked” for *viprakatā* is borne out by the Chinese version (p. 539a3) and by the words *nivāsetha prāvaratha*.

P. 277.17: *yadāvartī(ṭa) bhavati*. Read *yadā vartī-bhavati*. Cf. Edgerton s.v. *varttī-bhavati*, p. 81.15 (*ārya evam eva vartā bhaviṣyāmi*) and p. 219.4 (*atha khu pratigupte pradeśe sthātavyaṃ yāvad varttā bhavati*).

P. 287.6: *yatra śākhāni praveśayati*. Read *patraśākhāni*.

P. 287.8: *kim vikrīto*. Read with MS *kim mayā vikrīto*.

P. 306.5-6: *tathā prāvaritavyaṃ yathā dāni stanāpīḍitā bhavanti*. Read *stanā pīḍitā*.

P. 313.3: *stanāvaḍḍās caṃkramantiya utpatanti*. Read *stanā vaḍḍās* and not *stanā-āvaḍḍās* as suggested by Roth in note 2. Both *vaḍa* and *vaḍḍa* are used as epithet of *stana*, cf. Index s.v. *vaḍa*.

P. 318.11-12: MS *na dāni kṣamati bhikṣuṇīya onaddhā varcakuṭī kārāpa-*

ṣiṭum. Roth corrects to *onaddha-varcakuṭim*. More likely is *onaddhām varcakuṭim*.

P. 319.12-15: *taṃhi tadā nīyāḥ kṣiprasamāpattikāḥ / yāhi ca middham anokrāntaṃ tāḥ sratti vaihāyasam abhyudgatāḥ / yāvanta samāpattikā yāhi ca middham avakrāntaṃ tāyo kulaputrakehi grhya viheṭhitāḥ*. I suggest correcting *tadā nīyāḥ* to *tadānim* (or *dāni*) *yāḥ* and *yāvanta samāpattikā* to *yā dandhasamāpattikā*. In Pāli texts *khippābhīṇṇā* is opposed to *dandhābhīṇṇā*.

P. 321.9: *saṃgho vāsati vastusmin nāseti*. Read *vā sati*.

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NOTES

¹ *JA* CCXX (1932) 4-8. The text corresponds to Taishō no. 1425, vol. XXII, pp. 425c10-426a12. Roth mentions four palm-leaves (*Bhikṣuṇī-vinaya*, p. XIII) but Sylvain Levi refers to only one leaf (notre feuillet) and does not say that it is a palm-leaf.

² Cf. G. Roth, *Bhikṣuṇī-vinaya*, p. XIX. The *Žva-lu Ri-phug* hermitage is mentioned by Mkhyen-brtse who visited it in 1851, cf. Alfonsa Ferrari, *Mk'yen brtse's Guide to the Holy Places of Central Tibet*, Roma 1958, p. 60 and p. 143, n. 429.

³ *The Prātimokṣa-sūtra of the Mahāsāṃghikas*. Edited by W. Pachow and Ramakanta Mishra, Allahabad, 1956. Also published serially in the *Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute* IX (1952) 239-260, X (1952-1953), App. 1-48, XI-XII (1953-1955), 243-248.

⁴ *Abhisamācārikā* [Bhikṣuprakīrṇaka]. Edited by Dr. B. Jinananda. *Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series*, vol. IX. Patna, 1969.

⁵ *Bhikṣuṇī-vinaya* including Bhikṣuṇī-prakīrṇaka and a summary of the Bhikṣu-prakīrṇaka of the Ārya-Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādin. Edited by Gustav Roth. *Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series*, volume XII. Patna, 1970.

⁶ For the quinquennial gathering see J. Przyluski, *La légende de l'empereur Aśoka*, Paris 1923, 116-117; *Le concile de Rājagṛha*, Paris 1926-1938, 282-283; P. Pelliot in A. Godard, Y. Godard et J. Hackin, *Les Antiquités bouddhiques de Bāmīyān*, Paris 1928, 80-81; *T'oung Pao* 26 (1929) 184-185, *ibid.*, 28 (1931) 432-434; M.W. de Visser, *Ancient Buddhism in Japan*, I, Leiden 1935, 190-193; Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary* s.v. *pañcavarṣika*; Arthur Link, 'Shi Seng-yu and his writings', *JAOS* 80 (1960) 23, n. 42; V.S. Agrawala, 'Some obscure words in the Divyāvadāna', *JAOS* 86 (1966) 73.

⁷ See also M. Winternitz, *A History of Indian Literature*, I, Calcutta, 1927, 32-33; J.W. de Jong, *Buddha's Word in China*, Canberra 1968, p. 8.

⁸ Cf. Edgerton's *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary* s.v. *tāyin*. For *tāyin* and Pāli *tādin* see further E. Burnouf, *Introduction à l'histoire du Bouddhisme indien*, Paris 1844, p. 227, n. 1; *Le lotus de la bonne loi*, Paris 1852, p. 337; H. Kern, *The Saddharma-puṇḍarīka*, Oxford 1884, p. 25, n. 1; E. Hultzsch, 'A Buddhist Sanskrit inscription from Kōṭa', *JA* 14 (1885), 46, lines 6 and 11; E. Senart, *Le Mahāvastu*, II, Paris 1890, p. 543; R. Morris, 'Notes and Queries', *JPTS* (1891-3), 53-55; Th. Zachariae, *Die indischen Wörterbücher*, Strassburg 1897, p. 24, n. 7; L. de la Vallée Poussin, *Bouddhisme, Études et matériaux*, London 1898, pp. 105 and 391; J.S. Speyer, 'Buddhas Todesjahr nach dem Avadānaśataka', *ZDMG* 53 (1899) 122-123; L. de La Vallée Poussin, *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*, fasc. 1, Calcutta 1901, p. 75, n. 5; J.S. Speyer, 'Critical Remarks

on the text of the Divyāvadāna', *WZKM* 16 (1902) 349; F. Kielhorn, 'Nagpur Museum Inscription of Bhavadeva Ranakesarin', *JRAS* (1905) 619 and 624; L. de La Vallée Poussin, *Introduction à la pratique des futurs Bouddhas*, Paris 1907, p. 18, n. 2; 'Vedānta and Buddhism', *JRAS* (1910) 139-140; Sylvain Lévi, 'L'Apramāda-varga', *JA* (1912) sept.-oct., 242-243; R. Otto Franke, *Diḥhanikāya*, Göttingen-Leipzig 1913, p. 88, n. 2; E. Leumann, *Maitreya-samiti*, Strassburg 1919, p. 215; Vidhushekara Bhattacharya, 'The Gaudapāda-kārikā on the Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad', *Proceedings and Transactions of the Second Oriental Conference*, Calcutta 1923, 449-451; Sylvain Lévi, 'Maitreya le consolateur', *Mélanges Linossier*, II, Paris 1932, 357-8; *Mahākarmavibhaṅga*, Paris 1932, p. 93.3; *Abhisamayālamkāra*, Tokyo 1932-1935, p. 37.14; *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, Tokyo 1932-1936, p. 374.10; L. Finot, 'Manuscripts sanskrits de sādhanā's retrouvés en Chine', *JA CCXXV* (1934) 21; P.V. Bapat, 'Tāyin, tāyi, tādi', *D.K. Bhandarkar Volume*, Calcutta 1940, 249-258; *Samādhirājasūtra* (ed. by N. Dutt 1941-1954), pp. 28.14, 63.16, 178.17, 238.17, n. 13, 249, n. 8, 312.5, 407.15, 411.3, 416.6, 447.14, 449.9, 451.13, 613.2, cf. Murakami Shinkan, 'Samādhirājasūtra goi no kenkyū', *Hachinohe kōgyō kōtō senmon gakkō kiyō* 2 (1967) 88; Vidhushekara Bhattacharya, *The Āgamaśāstra of Gaudapāda*, Calcutta, 1943, p. 212, n. 2; Lin-Li-kouang, *Dharma-samuccaya*, I, Paris 1946, pp. 82-3, n. 1; *L'aide-mémoire de la vraie loi*, Paris 1949, p. 163, n. 17; Ernst Waldschmidt, *Das Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*, Berlin 1950-1951, pp. 190 and 400; D.R. Shackleton Bailey, *The Śatapathbrāhmaṇa of Māṇḍukya*, Cambridge 1951, p. 152; J.J. Jones, *The Mahāvastu*, II, London 1952, p. 318, n. 2; III, London, 1956, p. 446, n. 5; Ernst Waldschmidt, *Das Mahāvadānasūtra*, Berlin 1943-1956, p. 72.2; Heinrich Lüders, *Beobachtungen über die Sprache des buddhistischen Urkanons*, Berlin 1954, pp. 92-94; H. Nakamura, *Vedānta tetsugaku no hatten*, Tokyo 1955, 500-501; V. Raghavan, *Buddhist Sanskrit*, *Indian Linguistics* 16 (1955) 320; W. Pachow and Ramakanta Mishra, *The Prātimokṣa-sūtra of the Mahāśāṅghikas*, Allahabad 1956, p. 1: buddhena lokānucarena tāyinā-m-udeśitam prātimokṣam vidunā; Jakob Wackernagel – Albert Debrunner, *Altindische Grammatik. Nachträge zu Band I*, Göttingen 1957, p. 115; Bernard Pauly, 'Fragments sanskrits de Haute Asie', *JA CCXLVII* (1959) 245 and 247; N.G. Narahari, 'On the Word "Tāyin"', *Indian Linguistics* 21 (1960) 108-111; H. Bechert, *Bruchstücke buddhistischer Versammlungen*, I, Berlin 1961, p. 84.9; John Brough, *The Gāndhārī Dharmapada*, London 1962, p. 265; L. Alsdorf, *Les études Jaina*, Paris 1965, 5-6; Akira Yuyama, *Supplementary Remarks, etc.*, *IJJ IX* (1966) 100-101; Edward Conze, *Materials for a Dictionary of the Prajñāpāramitā Literature*, Tokyo 1967, p. 189; Ernst Waldschmidt, *Sanskrithandschriften aus den Turfanfunden*, II, Wiesbaden 1968, p. 26; F. Bernhard, *Udānavarga*, Band II, Göttingen 1968, p. 55b; Gustav Roth, '“A Saint like that” and “A saviour” in Prakrit, Sanskrit, Pali and Tibetan Literature', *The Shri Mahavira Jaina Vidyalaya Golden Jubilee Volume*, Part 1, Bombay 1968, pp. 46-62.

See also the Pāli dictionaries (Childers, Kern's *Toevoegselen*, PTS), Schmidt's *Nachträge*, Wogihara's *Sanskrit-Japanese Dictionary*, Wogihara's edition of the *Mahāvvyutpatti*, Tokyo 1915, part II notes p. 2, Mayrhofer's *Etymological Dictionary*.

ON THE *SARVAJÑATVA* (OMNISCIENCE) OF
MAHĀVĪRA AND THE BUDDHA

“May we have the vision of the Saint Mahāvīra:
The Saint, whose pure consciousness,
Like a clear mirror,
Reflects simultaneously all objects
— Both sentient and insentient —
Characterized by their infinite modes;
The Teacher, like the sun,
A witness and illuminator of the path of salvation.”¹

Sarvajñatva or omniscience is an attribute which, like omnipotence (*sarva-śaktimatva*) and omnipresence (*sarva-gatatva*), is considered to be a prerogative of God. The Vedic seers were well acquainted with the concept of omniscience, as can be seen from adjectives like *viśva-vit*, *viśva-vidvān*, *viśva-cakṣu* and *sarva-vit*, applied to the Vedic deities, and notably to Agni. We do not meet with the term *sarvajña* until the period of the *Muṇḍakopaniṣat*, presumably a pre-Buddhist text, where it comes to be used for the Brahman, the Absolute “from whom this, namely the *saguṇa* Brahman, comes to birth as name, form and food”.² In the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣat*² and in the literature of the subsequent periods, the term comes to be used exclusively to describe the *Īśvara* of philosophical systems like Yoga,⁴ Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, as well as the Purāṇic trinity of Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva. In all these cases the word is taken in its literal meaning, viz., the knower of ALL, with emphasis not only on the infinite content of this knowledge, but also on the ability of direct perception, independent of the mind and body.

However, the Upaniṣads also employ the term *sarvajña* in a metaphorical sense, where it becomes a synonym for *Brahmajña* or *Ātmajña*, the knower of the eternal Self. The Upaniṣadic seers are greatly preoccupied with the search for “that One thing by the knowledge of which all this is known”,⁵ and in keeping with their predilection for a monistic world-view, proclaim that the knower of Brahman knows all, indeed becomes All. Thus it is declared in the *Praśnopaniṣat*, that an aspirant “who comes to know that pure Imperishable, he knowing All enters the All”.⁶

It is evident that the term *sarvajña* in this passage, applied to an aspirant upon reaching the goal, has a different connotation than the one used in

describing the Brahman or the Īśvara. The aspirant as well as the Īśvara knows the nature of reality; but the latter is, in addition, an omniscient being, an excellence neither claimed for the aspirant nor presumed to be an invariable consequence of his knowledge of the Brahman. As Śaṅkarācārya in his *Bhāṣya* on the *Praśnopaniṣat* puts it, "the aspirant was previously the knower of the finite on Account of his *avidyā*, but with the removal of the latter he now becomes the All."⁷

It is obvious that in any doctrine of theism, monotheistic, pantheistic or even monistic, a human being, however great, may not be designated as a *sarvajña* in its primary sense, since such a designation could put him alongside God himself. As for the word *sarvajña* in its secondary meaning, although it can be theoretically applied to an exalted human being renowned for the knowledge of the Brahman, such as a Yājñavalkya, a Janaka, a Śvetaketu or a Śaṅkarācārya, one looks in vain for even one such reference in the entire Brahmanical literature, including the Upaniṣads.

Paradoxical as it may seem, the claimants to the status of an omniscient being (*sarvajña*) are to be found not in the theistic, but in the professedly atheistic schools, namely, Jainism and Buddhism, the two chief rivals of the Brahmanical tradition of ancient India. Vardhamāna Mahāvīra, the last of the twenty-four Tīrthaṅkaras of the Jains, and Siddhārtha Gautama, the founder of Buddhism, appear to represent the only two recorded cases of human beings who have claimed such a distinction; this claim is certainly a unique phenomenon in the entire history of human civilization. The Jain and the Buddhist scriptures provide indisputable evidence that the followers of these two religious leaders not only accepted their claims to omniscience, but considered omniscience to be the very essence of the enlightenment (*sambodhi*) which enabled the two great Saints to enunciate their respective paths of salvation. Being contemporaries who sojourned in close proximity in the region of Magadha, Mahāvīra and Siddhārtha, the two 'omniscient' beings, each unacceptable to the followers of the other, could not have long escaped critical comparison and a subsequent mutual repudiation of the other's claim for *sarvajñatva*. An attempt will be made in this paper to identify the major differences that exist between the Jains and the early Buddhists concerning the concept of *sarvajñatva*, and to trace the change which that concept undergoes in Mahāyāna Buddhism under the impact of the polemics initiated by the Mīmāṃsakas, who totally rejected the possibility of an omniscient being, whether human or divine.

Our earliest and most authentic source for the account of Mahāvīra's attainment of omniscience is the *Kalpa-sūtra*, the traditional canonical work on the lives of the Jinas. There we learn that soon after the death of his

parents, Mahāvira, aged thirty, renounced the life of a householder and became a mendicant (*muni*) in the order of his predecessor Jina Pārśva, the 23rd Tīrthāṅkara (850 B.C.). He led the life of an ascetic for a period of twelve years, engaged in severe austerities and deep meditation. Then,

during the thirteenth year, in the second month of summer, in the fourth fortnight, on the day called Suvrata, outside of the town called Jṛmbhikagrāma on the bank of the river Rjupālīka, not far from an old temple, in the field of the householder Sāmāga, under a Sāl tree, (the Venerable One), in a squatting position with joined heels, exposing himself to the heat of the sun, after fasting two and a half days without drinking water, being engaged in deep meditation, reached the highest knowledge and intuition, called *Kevala*, which is infinite, supreme, unobstructed, unimpeded, complete and full.

When the Venerable Ascetic Mahāvira had become a Jain and arhat, he was a *Kevalin*, omniscient (*sabbaññū*) and comprehending all objects (*sabba-bhāva-darisi*); he knew and saw (*jānamāṇe pāsamāṇe*) all conditions of the world, of gods, men and demons: whence they come, whither they go, whether they are born as men or animals or become gods or hellbeings, the ideas, the thoughts of their minds, the food, doings, desires, the open and secret deeds of all the living beings in the whole world; he the Arhat, for whom there is no secret, knew and saw all conditions of all living beings in the world.⁸

Although words like *sabbaññū* and *sabba-bhāva-darisi* are fully expressive of the state of 'omniscience' claimed for Mahāvira, the word *kevala*, being a Jain technical term, needs further elaboration. According to the Jains, knowledge (*jñāna* or *upayoga*), like bliss (*sukha*), is a distinctive quality (*guṇa*) of the soul (*jīva*) as opposed to the other five substances (*dravyas*) admitted by them, namely, matter (*pudgala*), the principle of motion (*dharma*) and of rest (*adharma*), space (*ākāśa*) and time (*kāla*). During the state of its bondage (*saṃsāra*), this innate quality of the soul, like the reflecting quality of a mirror covered by dust, is obstructed by the force of *karma*. This force, according to the Jains, consists of a special kind of subtle and invisible 'karmic' matter. When a soul, activated by ignorance of its true nature (*avidyā* or *moha*), pursues actions (through mind, speech, or body) which are tainted by passions (*kaṣāya*) such as attachment (*rāga*) or aversion (*dveṣa*), it begins to draw the karmic matter toward it as a wet cloth might absorb a dye. The accumulated karma acts like dust or wet cement, enmeshing the soul, as it were, and reduces the operation of its innate qualities. This accounts for the infinite variety of the knowledge of beings in bondage depending upon the amount of karma they have accumulated. According to this theory there is a direct relationship between the density (*pradeśa*) of the karmic matter and the organic growth and development of the sense-faculties and the mind. The less developed forms of life, such as plants, have only one sense, namely the tactile, since the souls undergoing that existence carry with them a larger and heavier burden of karma than, for example, those incarnated as elephants, which are endowed with all the five sense-organs and the faculty of

mind. At the human level, the density of karma is greatly reduced, and consequently, a human being is even capable of asserting his independence over the senses and the mind. At the lower levels of life the senses and the mind are instruments of knowledge, but at the human level, where these instruments reach their ultimate limit of growth, they are regarded as impediments, in as much as they prevent the soul from directly comprehending objects of knowledge. The knowledge of beings in bondage is necessarily indirect or 'mediate' (*parokṣa*) and hence incomplete (*vikala*); the infinite varieties and gradations of this mediate knowledge are broadly classified into the following four categories:

(1) *Mati-jñāna*⁹: Sensory cognition caused by the senses and the mind. Where appropriate, it also includes remembrance, recognition, induction and deduction.

(2) *Śruta-jñāna*¹⁰: Sensory knowledge followed by instruction, whether verbal or non-verbal. This also includes scriptural knowledge.

(3) *Avadhi-jñāna*¹¹: 'Clairvoyance'. This knowledge can be acquired by human beings through Yogic methods. It is comparable to the Buddhist concept of the 'Heavenly Eye' and the 'Heavenly Ear' (*dibba-cakkhu* and *dibba-sota-ñāna*).

(4) *Manah-paryaya-jñāna*¹²: 'Telepathy'. It is "that knowledge through which the objects thought of by the minds of others are known". It is comparable to the Buddhist *ceto-pariya-ñāna*.

Since the *avadhi* ('clairvoyance') and the *manahparyaya* ('telepathy') are merely the results of an increased power of mind developed by special yogic methods, they may be considered to be extensions of the first two kinds of knowledge, namely, the *mati* and the *śruta*. These two are present, in varying degrees of course, in all beings in bondage, including the vegetable kingdom. Consequently, the Jains admit an infinite variety of gradations in these two kinds of knowledge. The senses have competence only with regard to their appropriate objects within a certain range of time and space; the mind cannot operate very much beyond the data supplied by the senses. Therefore, even at the highest point of their development, whether achieved by conventional means or by yogic methods, the senses and the mind can cope with only a small fraction of the infinite mass of the knowables (*jñeya*). The latter comprises everything (*sarvaṃ*) that exists, viz., the infinite (*ananta*) number of souls (*jīvas*), the infinitely infinite (*anantānanta*) amount of matter (*pudgalas*), the principles of motion (*dharma*) and of rest (*adharma*), space (*ākāśa*) and time (*kāla*), and the infinite number of transformations (*paryāyas*) through which they all pass. These transformations are subject to a Jain law involving simultaneous origination (*utpāda*) of a new mode, destruction

(*vyaya*) of the old mode, and permanence (*dhrauvya*) of the substance (*dravya*).¹³

The Jain maintains that since *jñāna* is the innate nature (*svabhāva*) of the soul, the latter must, under proper conditions, be able to cognise the entire mass of knowables (*sarvaṃ jñeyam*). The amount of *karma* destroyed correlates directly with gain in purity of the soul and increase in the range of knowledge. Therefore, a total destruction of the forces of *karma*, together with the causes of their accumulation, must invariably result in perfect purity, which would automatically usher in the state of 'omniscience'. It would also be an irreversible state as there would be no further contamination of the soul by new forces of *karma*. In such a state, the soul, being totally independent of the senses and the mind, will, without any conscious effort whatsoever, directly and simultaneously mirror the whole range of the knowables. This is called *kevala-jñāna*,¹⁴ attained by the soul once it is totally isolated (*kaivalya*). The Jains maintain that *all* freed souls, whether they are exalted personages like the Tīrthaṅkaras, or are ordinary Arhats content with their own emancipation (*mokṣa*) must necessarily attain omniscience (*kevala-jñāna*). Mahāvīra had, according to the scriptures quoted above, attained to such an absolutely irreversible state of purity and omniscience.

Our task in defining the omniscience of Mahāvīra was fairly easy because of the precise and uniform meaning of the term *kevala-jñāna*, found in all Jain texts, whether applied to a Tīrthaṅkara or to an ordinary Arhat. Defining the 'omniscience' of the Buddha, however, is more difficult, as one meets with a bewildering variety of meanings in different Buddhist schools for such terms as *bodhi*, *samyak-sambodhi*, *tevijja*, *sabbaññuta-ñāṇa*, *buddha-cakkhu*, *anāvaraṇa-ñāṇa*, *sarvajñatā*, *sarvākārajñatā*, *prajñā-pāramitā*, etc. The problem is rendered even more complex by the refusal of even the Hinayāna schools to apply these terms to the Arhats, who also were believed to have attained *nirvāṇa*, and were therefore as free from *saṃsāra* as their 'omniscient' Master. Whatever be the precise difference between the status of an arhat and a Buddha, even a casual study of the Buddhist scriptures would show that the Buddha's 'omniscience' was of a different kind than that of Mahāvīra, and also that the Buddhists, aware of this difference, altered their interpretations in order to minimize it.

Of the many references to the enlightenment (*sambodhi*) of Siddhārtha Gautama, the one which most graphically describes that event, is to be found in the *Jātaka-Nidānakathā*, the traditional Theravāda biography of the Buddha. The account states that the *bodhisattva* spent the night of the full-moon of the month of Vaiśākha, seated under the Bodhi-tree, in deep meditation. In the first watch he gained remembrance of his former existences (*pubbe-*

nivāsānussati-ñāṇa); in the middle watch he attained the 'heavenly eye' (*dibba-cakkhu-ñāṇa*); in the last watch he revolved in his mind the Chain of Causation (*paṭicca-samuppāda*). As he mastered this, adds the text, the earth trembled, and, with the dawn, the Great Man attained 'omniscience' (*sabbaññuta-ñāṇa*).¹⁵

The use of the word *sabbaññuta-ñāṇa* is highly significant as it distinguishes the Buddha's enlightenment from the ordinary yogic perceptions like 'clairvoyance', 'telepathy', etc., and clearly identifies it with nothing less than omniscience. But the Buddhist commentaries are not too helpful in determining the content of this omniscience, the manner of its operation, and the conditions of its survival during the mundane activities following the enlightenment. In the case of Mahāvira, the word *sarva* (All) stood for the totality of knowables, viz., the six substances (*dravyas*) with their infinite modes (*paryāyas*).¹⁶ Are we to assume that in the case of the Buddha also, the word *sabba*¹⁷ indicated those momentary elements of existence admitted by the Buddhists, namely, the five *skandhas*, the twelve *āyatanas* and the eighteen *dhātus*, which were supposed to be suppressed and destroyed in the *nirvāṇa*? In the case of Mahāvira there is an emphasis on the knowledge of the infinite number of past and future modes of the eternal substances. The Buddha, being an advocator of the doctrine of momentariness, attached very little importance to the knowledge of past and future, as these were considered merely imaginary extensions of the present, devoid of reality. Would the Buddha, who had already gained knowledge of his previous births by mundane means, make it a function of the enlightenment to yield knowledge of the 'unreal' future? Finally, Mahāvira's own pure self (*śuddhātmā*) was the first and foremost object, and also the subject, of his omniscience. Is it likely that the Buddhists, distinguished by the *anātma* doctrine, would have considered the 'knowledge of one's own pure self' to be an objective of the omniscience of their Master?

The Buddhist scriptures, particularly those of the Theravāda school, indicate that unlike the Jains, who understood the term *sarvajña* in a literal manner, the early Buddhists used that term in a secondary metaphorical sense, namely, the 'knower of Truth', equivalent to the exclusively Buddhist term *tathāgata*. The *Mahāvagga* of the *Vinaya-piṭaka*, in which are described the events leading to the first sermon contains a passage which sums up those things which the recently enlightened Buddha was hesitant to speak about:

This *dhamma*, won to by me, is deep, difficult to see, difficult to understand, peaceful, excellent, beyond dialectic, subtle, intelligible only to the learned. But this is a creation delighting in sensual pleasure. ... So that for a creation delighting in sensual pleasure, this were a matter difficult to see, that is to say causal uprising by way of cause (*idaṃ-*

paccayaṭṭa paṭicca-samuppādo). This too were a matter very difficult to see, that is to say the calming of all habitual tendencies, the renunciation of all attachment, the destruction of craving, dispassion, stopping, *nirvāṇa*. And so if I were to teach *dhamma* and others were not to heed me, this would be a weariness to me, this would be a vexation to me.¹⁸

Three important words, namely, *dhamma*, *paṭicca-samuppāda* and *nibbāna*, stand out prominently in this passage. It contains a definition, albeit in a succinct form, of the *paṭicca-samuppāda* and *nibbāna*, the former providing an insight into the Buddhist path and the latter describing the fruits of salvation. But the crucial term *dhamma*, which undoubtedly constitutes the very essence of the Buddha's enlightenment, remains unexplained; indeed it is declared as being inaccessible to dialectic. It is not surprising therefore to see the silence maintained by the commentators regarding this term. The word, however, does appear elsewhere in the potent phrase *dhamma-dhātu-paṭivedha*,¹⁹ variously translated as 'discernment of the principle of truth', or 'full penetration of the constitution of *dhamma*'. The Pali Commentary explains the term *dhamma-dhātu* as *dhamma-sabhāva*, and, as Miss Horner rightly observes, the term stands for "the ultimate principle of own-nature, own-being, self-nature".²⁰ It is precisely in this sense that the Mahāyānist also understood the term *dharmatā* and developed their concept of the *dharmakāya*. As a matter of fact, the Mahāyānist logicians, notably Dharma-kīrti, as we shall see, gave currency to a new term, '*dharmajñā*', in preference to the older *sarvajñā*, and even maintained that the Buddha was superior to all other teachers on account of his being a 'knower of *Dharma*'. These references confirm our belief that for the early Buddhists also the 'omniscience' of the Buddha consisted in his 'knowledge of *dhamma*'.

We have seen earlier that omniscience was regarded by the Jains as an irreversible state. But they also believed that its acquisition was not coincidental with death, the final mundane event that would emancipate (*mokṣa*) the omniscient soul from the bondage of karma. Mahāvīra, for instance, lived for some thirty years after attaining the *kevala-jñāna* and, being a Tirthaṅkara, was credited with having founded and guided a fourfold Order of monks, nuns, lay-men and lay-women, until he died at the age of seventy-two. How does one explain the obvious inconsistency in admitting the simultaneous operation of omniscience and the mundane activities of teaching and preaching, not to mention the ordinary functions of the body, senses and mind? The Jains solve this dilemma by postulating two kinds of karma. First, there are four karmas called 'obscuring' (*ghātiyā*), which, wholly or partially, obstruct the full manifestation of the four infinite qualities of the soul, viz., knowledge (*jñāna*), intuition (*darśana*), bliss (*sukha*) and energy

(*vīrya*). Then there are four 'non-obscuring' (*aghātiyā*)^{2 1} karmas which, respectively, produce feelings of pleasure and pain (*vedanīya-karma*); project different types of bodies — human, animal, etc., — (*nāma-karma*); define a certain status — for instance the class and caste distinctions — (*gotra-karma*); and determine the longevity in a given existence (*āyu-karma*). The Jains maintain that only the destruction of the four 'obscuring' (*ghātiyā*) karmas is necessary for the manifestation of omniscience (*kevala-jñāna*). The remaining four karmas are by themselves powerless to effect either a diminution or a loss of the innate qualities of the soul. These *aghātiyā* karmas form a secondary bondage, forging the physical and mental apparatus for the soul which is kept in bondage by the *ghātiyā* karmas. The latter produce delusion, ignorance, etc., and thus perpetuate the cycle of new *aghātiyā* karmas. Once the 'obscuring' (*ghātiyā*) karmas are destroyed, the non-obscuring (*aghātiyā*) karmas, which were determined long before the present incarnation of a given soul, will run their normal course and then, when the time limit set by the longevity-determining (*āyu-karma*) karma has run out, the remaining three will also terminate, never to be renewed again. In other words, the Jains admit that even an omniscient being, as long as he lives in this world, must be considered as being subject to the laws that govern his physical existence. He can neither escape the dependence on his sense-faculties, nor dispense with the mind (both products of the *nāma-karma*), as long as he remains engaged in the mundane activities of teaching and preaching. It should be added here that, the major differences with the Jain theories of karma notwithstanding, the Buddhists also admitted that the Buddha was subject to the laws of mortals, that he too suffered injury and decay, and that he was as much dependent on the senses and the mind for his mundane activities as any other human being.

One might argue that the Jain omniscience (*kevala-jñāna*), especially as it was considered eternal and all-comprehensive, would not be compatible with any mundane activity whatsoever, as the latter must depend upon an ever changing advertence of the senses and upon the reflections of the mind on particular objects defined by time and space. The Jains, however, overcome this apparent incompatibility by arguing that mere presence of the sense-organs and of the mind, which are simply mechanisms formed out of special kinds of matter (*indriya-vargaṇā* and *mano-vargaṇā*), does not necessarily imply dependence on them. While it is true that during its impure state the soul is dependent on these instruments for the manifestation of knowledge, once the soul has attained omniscience, it will subsume the functions of the sensory knowledge (*mati-jñāna*) as well, merely giving the appearance of acting through these mediums. In short, the soul is the knower; the mind

and the senses become redundant once the omniscience is achieved. As regards the necessity of advertence, etc., the Jains argue that in actual fact the omniscient being does not engage himself in any activity; he nevertheless accomplishes the functions of teaching by an act of will executed prior to his omniscience, when he was pursuing the career of a Tīrthaṅkara, very much similar to that of a Bodhisattva. By virtue of now in his last birth being born as a Tīrthaṅkara, his *nāma-karma* will produce for him such a body and such an organ of speech that he will be able to impart the knowledge of truth without engaging in a volitional act.²² Accordingly, the Jains maintain that Mahāvīra, although for all intents and purposes he appeared to be a mortal human being even after the attainment of the *kevala-jñāna*, was nevertheless in permanent possession of his omniscience.

Several Pāli suttas bear witness to the fact that such a claim was indeed made by the followers of Mahāvīra. As a matter of fact, the Buddha is reported to have learnt of such a claim not by hearsay, but directly from a group of Jain ascetics; this is shown in the following passage in which he describes this encounter to Mahānāma the Sakyan:

“At one time I, Mahānāma, was staying near Rājagaha on Mount Vulture Peak. Now at that time several Jains (Nigaṇṭhas) on the Black Rock on the slopes of (Mount) Isigili came to be standing erect and refusing a seat; they were experiencing feelings that were acute, painful, sharp, severe. Then I, Mahānāma, having emerged from solitary meditation towards evening, approached ... those Jains; having approached I spoke thus to those Jains: Why do you, reverend Jains, standing ... experience feelings that are severe? When I had thus spoken, Mahānāma, those Jains spoke thus to me: ‘Your reverence, Nāthaputta the Jain (i.e., Mahāvīra) is all-knowing (*sabbaññu*), all-seeing (*sabba-dassāvī*); he claims all-embracing knowledge-and-vision (*aparisesaṃ nāṇa-dassanaṃ paṭijānāti*), saying: ‘Whether I am walking or standing still or asleep or awake (*carato ca me tiṭṭhato ca me suttassa ca jāgarassa ca*), knowledge-and-vision is permanently and continuously before me (*satataṃ samitaṃ nāṇa-dassanaṃ paccupaṭṭhitaṃ ti*).’²³

He speaks thus: “If there is, Jains, an evil deed that was formerly done by you, wear it away by this severe austerity. That which is non-doing of an evil deed in the future is from control of body ... speech ... of thought here, now. Thus by burning up, by making an end of former deeds (*purāṇānaṃ kammānaṃ tapasā vyantibhāvā*), by the non-doing of new deeds (*navānaṃ kammānaṃ akaraṇā*), there is no flowing in the future (*āyatim anavassavo*). From there being no flowing in the future is the destruction of ill (*kammakkhayo*), from the destruction of deeds destruction of ill (*dukkhakkhayo*), from the destruction of ill is the destruction of all feelings (*vedanākkhayo*), from the destruction of feelings all ill will become worn away (*sabbam dukkham nijjīṇaṃ bhavissatīti*).’²⁴

We have quoted this sutta rather extensively because it is remarkable on two counts: First, it gives a very accurate summation of the ancient Jain doctrine of *karma* and *mokṣa*. Secondly, it adds greater credibility to the Jain claims of the state of permanent omniscience for Mahāvīra, coming as it does from the scriptures of a contemporary and rival religious movement. Even the

words used in describing that alleged status appear to be authentic as they are repeated verbatim in several other suttas of the Pali canon. The Buddhists were no doubt reporting these claims to ridicule the Jains,²⁵ not so much because they regarded Mahāvīra as unworthy of such a distinction, but because they found the doctrine of permanent omniscience (*kevala-jñāna*) itself unacceptable, and even irrelevant for the pursuit of the Path. In the *Cūla-Sukuludāyi-sutta*, for instance, the wanderer Udāyi reports to the Buddha how he had met Mahāvīra (who had claimed omniscience in the words quoted above), and had asked him a question 'concerning the past' and how Mahāvīra had 'shelved the questions by asking another', etc. The Buddha, of course, as was his wont, did not engage in a refutation of the claim of Mahāvīra, but confidently asserted that 'anyone could ask him a question regarding the past', or 'concerning the future of creatures according to the consequences of their deeds'. Having said this he immediately showed his indifference to these super-knowledges (*abhiññās*) by declaring:

Wherefore, Udāyin, let the past be, let the future be. I will teach you *dhamma*: If this is, that comes to be; from the arising of this, that arises; if this is not, that does not come to be; from the stopping of this, that is stopped.²⁶

The passage clearly brings out the Buddha's annoyance at the idle curiosity of worldly men for the knowledge of the past and the future. It also draws our attention to the supreme importance he attached to the insight into the Dhamma which he had perceived. In the face of the extraordinary claims of the Jains for their Tīrthaṅkaras, however, it is inconceivable that the eager followers of the Buddha could have long refrained from pressing similar claims for their 'enlightened' Master. It is, therefore, not surprising to see the Wanderer Vacchagotta reporting what he heard to the Buddha and asking him to verify its truth. The entire passage of the *Tevijja-Vacchagotta-sutta* merits reproduction here as it appears to be the official Buddhist position put forth to encounter the popular notions about the Buddha's omniscience:

Reverend sir, I have heard: The recluse Gotama is all knowing, all seeing; he claims all-embracing knowledge-and-vision, saying: 'Whether I am walking or standing still or asleep or awake, knowledge-and-vision is permanently and continuously before me'. Reverend sir, those who speak thus ... are speaking of the Lord in accordance with what has been said and are not misrepresenting the Lord, with what is not fact, but are explaining in accordance with *dhamma*, and that no one of his fellow *dhamma*-men, of this way of speaking, gives ground for reproach?"

The answer given by the Buddha is, for once at least, categorical and final:

Vaccha, those who speak thus: (repeated) — these are not speaking in accordance with what has been said, but they are misrepresenting me with what is untrue, not fact.²⁷

To the further question by Vacchagotta:

Expounding in what way, reverend sir, would we be speaking in accordance with what has been said,

the Buddha expounds the Three-fold knowledge (*tevijja*), the true content of the Buddha's enlightenment:

Vaccha, expounding: 'The recluse Gotama is a threefold-knowledge man', you would be one who speaks in accordance with what has been said by me ... For I, Vaccha, whenever I please to recollect a variety of former habitations, that is to say one birth, two births... thus, do I recollect diverse former habitations in all their modes and details. And I, Vaccha, whenever I please, with the purified *deva*-vision (*dibba-cakkhu*) - surpassing that of men ... see beings as they pass hence and come to be ... according to the consequences of deeds, and I, Vaccha, by the destructions of the cankers (*āsava*), having realised here and now by my own superknowledge (*abhiññā*) the freedom of mind (*ceto-vimutti*) and the freedom through wisdom (*paññā-vimutti*) that are cankerless, entering thereon, abide therein. Vaccha, expounding thus ... no fellow *dhamma*-man of this way speaking could give grounds for reproach.²⁸

It should be noticed that the Theravādins regarded the first of these three *vidyās* (viz., the *pubbe-nivāsānussati-ñāṇa*, and the *dibba-cakkhu-ñāṇa*) as mundane powers (*lokiyā abhiññā*) unrelated to the Path, and hence accessible, in varying degrees, to persons adept in yoga. As for the third *vidyā*, viz., the *āsava-kkhaya-ñāṇa*, this was certainly a supermundane power (*lokuttarā abhiññā*), and was invariably found in those who had realized *nirvāṇa*. In other words, even the Arhats, whose enlightenment was admittedly of an inferior kind to that of the Buddha, could claim the 'threefold-knowledge' as described in the sutta quoted above. It goes without saying that the Buddha was either claiming for himself only that much knowledge which his disciples, the Arhats, were capable of achieving, or he was indirectly telling Vacchagotta that the latter's idea of omniscience (borrowed no doubt from the Jains), was fanciful and unacceptable to him. Unfortunately, Vacchagotta does not press further the point and, we are once more left in doubt about the precise nature of the Buddha's omniscience.

However, the Buddhists could not have long maintained their suspense on so fundamental a topic as the omniscience of their Master. Sooner or later someone acquainted with the Jain claim would have drawn comparisons between Mahāvīra and the Buddha, and confronted the latter, demanding a definite answer. The *Kaṇṇakatthala-sutta* of the *Majjhima-nikāya* provides us with what appears to be the Theravādin resolution on the controversy. The interlocutor in this sutta is not a Wanderer ascetic or a Buddhist monk, but significantly a layman, the king Pasenadi of Kosala, who, while known to the Jains as their benefactor, was also a great admirer and devotee of the Buddha. We are told that a Brahman minister of the King had heard from

the mouth of the Buddha a certain view pertaining to omniscience, and had reported it to the King. The latter had now approached the Lord in order to verify that speech. The dialogue merits a full reproduction:

King Pasenadi: I have heard this about you, revered sir: 'The recluse Gotama speaks thus: There is neither a recluse nor a Brahman who, all-knowing, all-seeing, can claim all-embracing knowledge-and-vision – this situation does not exist'. Revered sir, those who speak thus ... I hope that they speak what was spoken by the Lord, that they do not misrepresent the Lord by what is not fact, that they explain *dhamma* according to *dhamma*, and that no reasoned thesis gives occasion for contempt?

The Buddha: Those, sire, who speak thus: (repeated) – these do not speak as I spoke but are misrepresenting me with what is not true, with what is not fact.²⁹

King Pasenadi: Could it be, revered sir, that people might have transferred to quite another topic something (originally) said by the Lord in reference to something else? In regard to what, revered sir, does the Lord claim to have spoken the words?

The Buddha: I, sire, claim to have spoken the words thus: There is neither a recluse nor a Brahman who *at one and the same time can know all*, can see all – this situation does not exist.³⁰

Apparently the King was satisfied with the answer of the Buddha as he applauds him with the words "Revered sir, the Lord's words are well founded, and it is with good reason that the Lord says this".³¹ Whether the King had really grasped it or not, the full implications of the Buddha's statement were not lost on the commentators. They rightly understood the term *sabbam* (all) to mean "the whole past, future and present", and paraphrased the expression *sakid eva* as "with one 'adverting' (of the mind), one thought, one impulsion".³² It meant that the Buddhists defined 'omniscience' as an ability to know ALL objects but only one object at one time.

It is evident that no mortal could ever exhaust the infinite objects at the rate of knowing them 'one at a time'. It is doubtful if even that the Buddha, despite his mighty yogic powers, could have accomplished such an extraordinary feat, or would have admitted its possibility by any other human being! As a matter of fact, the non-Buddhist ascetics of the time were often sceptical about his alleged yogic powers and thought it rather strange, understandably enough, that he should not even know his own future after death! Time and again, the Pāli suttas allude to the unfavourable comments of these 'wanderer ascetics' concerning the Buddha's omniscience. In the *Pāsādika-sutta* of the *Digha-nikāya*, a sermon delivered upon hearing of a schism among the Jains following Mahāvira's death, the Buddha cautions Cunda the novice against being influenced by the doubts of outsiders:

It may happen, Cunda, that Wanderers who hold other views than ours may declare: Concerning the past Gotama the Recluse reveals an infinite knowledge and insight, but not so concerning the future, as the what and why of it ... Concerning the past, Cunda,

the Tathāgata has cognition reminiscent of existences. He can remember as far back as he desires. And concerning the future there arises in him knowledge born of Enlightenment (*bodhiyam*) to this effect: This is the last birth; now is there no more coming to be.³³

He affirms, moreover, the wide range of his knowledge in terms reminiscent of the Jain claim for Mahāvīra:

Whatever, O Cunda, in this world with its devas and Māras and Brahmas, is by the folk thereof, gods or men, recluses or Brahmans, seen (*dittha*), heard (*suta*), felt (*muta*), discerned (*viññāta*), accomplished (*patta*), striven for (*pariyesita*), or devised in mind (*anivucaritaṃ manasā*), – all is understood by the Tathāgata. For this is he called Tathāgata.³⁴

Despite such reassuring sermons, doubts seem to have persisted in the Saṅgha about the Buddha's omniscience. The silence of the *Kathāvatthu*, treasure house of the Buddhist controversies, on such a vital point probably suggests that during the Mauryan period it had not yet become a matter of contention among rival Buddhist schools. The problem was not entirely forgotten, however, as it surfaced during the reign of the Indo-Greek king Menander. In the famous *Milinda-pañho*, the King confronts the Venerable Nāgasena with a question of the omniscience of the Buddha. Nāgasena's answer is remarkable since it refutes at the very outset the notion of '*sata-taṃ samitaṃ*', the root of the whole controversy.

Yes, O King, the Buddha was omniscient. But the insight of knowledge was not always and continually (consciously) present in him. The omniscience of the Blessed One was dependent on reflection. By reflection he knew whatever he wanted to know.³⁵

Then, sir, the Buddha cannot have been omniscient, if his all-embracing knowledge was reached through investigation ... Moreover, sir, reflection is carried on for the purpose of seeking (that which is not clear when the reflection begins). Convince me ...³⁶

Nāgasena is, as usual, dogmatic and analogical. He reminds the King of the greatness of the Buddha, of how well endowed he is with the exclusive ten powers (*dasa-balas*), the four kinds of 'self-confidence' (*cātu-vesārajjas*), the eighteen *buddha-dhammas*, etc. He then compares the Buddha to an Imperial Lord (*cakkavatti*) who

calling to mind his glorious wheel of victory (*cakkaratana*) wishes it to appear, and no sooner is it thought of than it appears – so does the knowledge of the Tathāgata follow continually on reflection.³⁷

A more serious and probably final Theravāda attempt to deal with the problem is found in the *Paramattha-mañjūsā*³⁸ Dhammapāla's (sixth century A.D.?) commentary on the *Visuddhi-magga* of Buddhaghosa. While explaining the term *sammā-sambuddha*, the commentator points out that this is an exclusive title of the Buddha, indicating realization of the *sabbaññuta-nāṇa*

(omniscience), or *anāvaraṇa-ñāṇa* (knowledge free from all obstructions). Dhammapāla takes this opportunity to initiate a fairly long discussion on the controversies over the omniscience of the Buddha:

But, surely, the *anāvaraṇa-ñāṇa* is, according to *Paṭisambhidā-magga*, different from the *sabbaññuta-ñāṇa*. Not really. The same knowledge was spoken of in two ways, one with respect to the manner of knowing and one with respect to the objects known. Knowledge, which has its object the entire range of *dhammas* viz., the compounded (*saṃkhata*), the un compounded (*asaṃkhata*, i.e., *nibbāna*, etc., and the nominal (*sammuti*, i.e., personality, etc.) *dhammas*], is called *sabbaññuta-ñāṇa*. Because there is no obstruction, and also because of the absence of doubt it is called *anāvaraṇa-ñāṇa*. These two must be identical, for otherwise the *sabbaññuta-ñāṇa* would not be free from obstructions.

Even if we admit that these two are different, in the present context of defining the term *sammā-sambuddha*, they are to be considered identical because of the unimpeded operation of the Buddha's knowledge. By the realization of the *sabbaññuta-ñāṇa* the Lord is called *sabbaññū* (omniscient), *sabba-vidū* (knower of all), etc.; it is not by knowing all *dhammas* at one and the same time that he is called thus. (*na sakim yeva sabba-dhammābodhanato*). There is the potentiality (*samatthata*) in the knowledge of the Lord to penetrate the entire range of objects on account of his realization of that knowledge which is able (*samattha*) to know all *dhammas*.

A question may be raised here: Does this knowledge, when it operates, cognise all objects at once, (simultaneously), or in succession? (*sakim eva ... udāhu kamena?*)

If it simultaneously comprehends all 'compounded' (*saṃkhata*) objects (divided by distinctions of past, future, present, external, internal, etc.,) as well as all 'uncompounded' (*asaṃkhata*) and 'nominal' (*sammuti*) *dhammas*, like a person looking from a distance at a painting of mixed colours, there will be no cognition of them individually. If that happens, then there would be a deficiency in the knowledge of the Lord; he would be seeing these things as if they were not fully seen. This is comparable to the vision of a yogin, who when he perceives all objects only from the *anātma* point of view, thinking *sabbe dhammā anattā*, sees only this aspect and nothing else.

Again there are those who say that the Buddhas are called *sabba-vidū* because their cognition always exists having only the present characteristics [birth, decay, death] of all the knowables as its object, and is free from all imaginations. On account of this it is properly said: "The Elephant (i.e., Buddha) is attentive whether walking or standing". (*sabba-ñeyya-dhammānaṃ t̥hita-lakkhaṇa-visayaṃ vikappa-rahitaṃ sabba-kālaṃ bud-dhānaṃ ñāṇaṃ pavattati.*)

But this view also cannot escape the fault shown above, for having the present characteristics (*t̥hita-lakkhaṇas*) as the focus of one's knowledge must exclude the past and future *dhammas* as well as the nominal *dhammas*, all of which are devoid of those characteristics. Consequently the Lord's knowledge will have only a portion of the knowables as its objects, and it therefore cannot be said that the knowledge of the Buddha cognises all objects at once.

But if, on the other hand, it is maintained that he perceives all objects in individual succession (*kamena sabbaṃ viṣaye ñāṇaṃ pavattati*), that too is not correct. The knowables divided by genus, nature, place and time, etc., are infinite; hence there is no possibility of knowing them all one by one.

Then there are those who say: The Lord is omniscient because he knows a portion of the knowables by direct perception (*ñeyyassa ekadesaṃ paccakkhaṃ katvā*); since there is consistency between this knowledge and the true nature of the objects known, he

determines that the rest of the objects are also like that. Such a knowledge is not based on inference as might be objected, because in the world, knowledge based on inference is accompanied by doubt. This knowledge, however, is absolutely free from doubt.

Such a view is also not correct. Because in the absence of direct perception of all, it is not possible to establish inconsistency with that portion which has not been directly perceived.

Having examined several views prevalent during his time, Dhammapāla proceeds to lay down what must have been the official Theravāda doctrine:

All this is irrelevant (*akāraṇam*). Why? Because what we have here is speculation about something which is beyond the realm of speculation. Has not the Lord said: O Monks, the range of objects of the Buddha's knowledge transcends all thoughts on the subject; whosoever indulges in thinking on it will only suffer mental aberration and distress.

This therefore is the resolution of the controversy: Whatever the Lord wishes to know, whether the whole or a portion of it, of that the Lord has knowledge by direct perception, for there is no obstruction to the operation [of his mind]. And in the absence of any disturbances (*vikṣepa*), attentiveness is also ever present in him. If the entire range of *dhammas* were not to become his object when he desired to know them, then that would not conform – and such conformation is absolutely necessary – to the Law: “All dharmas are bound to the ‘adverting’ (*āvajjana-paṭibaddhā*) of the Buddha, joined to his mental concentration (*manasikāra-paṭibaddhā*), connected with his expectation (*ākankhā-paṭibaddhā*), and available as objects to his production of a thought (*cittup-pāda-paṭibaddhā*)”.

Even his knowing of past and future objects should be considered an act of direct perception, as it is not dependent upon inference, scripture or reasoning.

It may be asked: Even if it is admitted that the Buddha would know the entire range of objects if he so wished, would not this knowledge of his be subject to the same defect, viz., that of cognising in an indistinct manner due to not having perceived each object separately?

No. This objection has already been ruled out by the [scriptural] declaration: ‘The realm of the Buddha's knowledge is beyond all speculation’. Otherwise, how could there be any inconceivability, if his cognition were to be similar in operation (*samavutti*) to the cognition of the many-folk? The inconceivability consists in the fact that although his cognition has all dharmas as its objects, it nevertheless grasps them all as distinctly and as definitely as it would a single dharma.

Finally, in conformity with the Law –

‘As far the extent of knowables, so far the range of cognition; as far the limit of knowledge, so far the limit of knowables’,

the Buddha, whether he wishes to know the objects all together, or separately, all at once or one by one, knows them all as he wishes. Therefore is he called *sammā-sambuddha*.³⁹

Dhammapāla was only able to defend his inherently weak position by an appeal to the scriptures; this was adequate because he was writing his commentary for the benefit of his fellow Theravādins of the Mahāvihāra in

Ceylon, staunch upholders of the ancient tradition. They believed in the pluralistic and realistic world of dharmas, and could not conceive of an omniscience which would not comprehend the 'All'. The Mahāyāna Buddhists, however, notably Dharmakīrti and his followers at the Nālandā University, could hardly ignore the inherent defects in the traditional interpretation of omniscience. The emphasis which that interpretation placed on the knowledge of the 'All', a legacy of the days of Mahāvīra, was especially vulnerable and must have annoyed them greatly. The possibility of simultaneous cognition of the 'All' had already been rejected by the Buddha, and the alternative, cognition in succession (in sequential order), would not stand logical scrutiny.

The need to deal more vigorously with this entire issue received a further impetus with the rise of the neo-Mīmāṃsā school, which claimed that knowledge of *dharma* and *adharma* was not possible through perception (*pratyakṣa*) or inference (*anumāna*) but only through the 'eternal' Vedas, which were held to be *apauruṣeya*, i.e. neither revealed by an omniscient God nor pronounced by a human being claiming similar status. This follows from the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine which rejects both the "eternally omniscient god" concept of the Yoga school and the theistic theories of creation propounded by other orthodox schools. Nor did the Mīmāṃsaka accept the possibility of a super-sensuous perception (*yogi-pratyakṣa*) such as that claimed for Mahāvīra or the Buddha. Kumāṛila, in his *Śloka-vārttika*,⁴⁰ led a vigorous attack on these denouncers of the Veda for what he considered their exaggerated pretensions to omniscience. Moreover, what the Mīmāṃsakas found most offensive was not so much the claim to know 'All' (objects) but rather the supposed knowledge of *Dharma* (the Vedic Law).

At the same time, the Mahāyānists themselves, having moved toward either the Yogācāra Vijñānavāda or the Mādhyamika Sūnyavāda, were de-emphasizing the significance of external objects. Consequently, they were unlikely to be impressed by the 'spectacular' feat of knowing the 'All'. This trend, combined with the desire to counter the Mīmāṃsā position, led them to proclaim that what made the Buddha a truly omniscient being was not his 'far-sight' encompassing many things, but rather an *in-sight* into the *Dharma*.

The following words of Dharmakīrti define this new position and throw a challenge to the Jains to take a similar view:

People, afraid of being deceived by false teachers
in the matter of directing the ignorant,
Seek out a man with knowledge,
for the sake of realizing his teaching.

What is the use of his wide knowledge
 pertaining to the number of insects in the whole world?
 Rather, enquire into his knowledge of
 that which is to be practised by us.

For us, the most desired authority
 is not the one who knows everything [indiscriminately];
 Rather, we would have a Teacher who knows the Truth
 which leads to prosperity in this world,
 as well to the insight into things to be forsaken
 and things to be cultivated.

Whether he sees far or whether he sees not,
 let him but see the desired Truth.
 If one becomes an authority
 merely because of seeing far and wide,
 Let us worship these vultures
 who can do it better!⁴¹

A few centuries later, another Mahāyānist, the great Śāntarakṣita, was to repeat this sentiment in his famous *Tattva-saṅgraha*, composed primarily to refute the Mīmāṃsakas:

If an attempt were made to prove that one has the knowledge of the details of all individuals and components of the whole world – it would be as futile as the investigation of the crow's teeth.

By proving the existence of the person knowing only *dharma* and *adharma*, which the Buddhist postulates – one secures the reliability and acceptability of the scripture composed by him; and by denying the said person, one secures the unreliability and rejectability of the said scripture.

Thus when people [the Jains for instance] proceed to prove the existence of the person knowing all the little details of the entire world, they put themselves to the unnecessary trouble of writing treatises on the subject and carrying on discussions on the same.⁴²

It will be noticed that in the passage quoted above, Śāntarakṣita deliberately sets the words *dharma* and *sarva* in opposition, stating his preference for *dharmajña* (the knower of *dharma*) as against *sarvajña* (the knower of All). *Dharma*, as we have seen earlier, was the very essence of the Buddha's enlightenment, and is a term which one finds on almost every page of the Pāli canon. Nevertheless, while the term *sabbaññū* is encountered ever so often as a designation of the Buddha, the term *dhammaññū* (*dharmajña*) is conspicuous by its absence throughout the Pāli canon, with the possible exceptions of the variants *dhammagū* and *dhammavidū* cited in texts like the Jātaka book. In the light of our previous discussion, it would be reasonable to assume that the word *sabbaññu* (together with its companion *sabba-dassāvī*) was an ancient Śramaṇa technical term, and was in vogue among the Jains, one of the leading Śramaṇa sects, at the time of Mahāvīra. It was probably adopted by the early Buddhists for their Master, as were other Jain terms of

distinction, notably *jina* (victor) and *arhat* (the worthy, the holy). Both of these terms became part of the Buddhist vocabulary, but within a short time *jina* was left behind in preference for *buddha*, and *arhat* was 'devalued' to be used only for the disciples (*śrāvakas*). But the term *sarvajña*, being associated with a definite ontological and epistemological doctrine expressed by the Jain term *kevala-jñāna*, was less easily assimilated. Omniscience for the Jains was a permanent manifestation of the inalienable power of the pure soul (*ātman*) to cognise itself as well as all knowables at one and the same time, as expressed in the famous saying: "*je egaṃ jāṇai se sabbam jāṇai*",⁴³ "knowledge of one (thing) is knowledge of all". For the Buddhists, however, it was merely a potential power of the 'free' mind; although this power could be used at will and could cognise objects of any nature whatsoever, it was nevertheless restricted, as in the mind of an ordinary human being, to only one object at a time. In other words, the Buddhists were, even in regard to the Buddha himself, unable to dispense with the mind or to replace it with anything corresponding to the *ātman* or the *brahman* of the non-Buddhistic schools. This was the consequence of their adherence to the *anātma* doctrine, which forbade the admission of a Knower over and above the psycho-physical complex of the 'five *skandhas*' of existence.⁴⁴

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NOTES

- 1 *yadīye caitanye mukura iva bhāvāś cidacitah
samam bhānti dhrauvyavyayajanilasanto 'ntarahitāh //*
jagatsākṣi mārgaprakāṣanaparo bhānur iva yo /
Mahāvīrasvāmī nayanāpathagāmī bhavatu naḥ //
Nitya-naimittike-pāṭhāvali, p. 17, Karanja 1956.
- 2 *yaḥ sarvajñaḥ sarvavid yasya jñānamayaṃ tapaḥ /*
tasmād etad brahma nāma rūpam annam ca jāyate // Muṇḍaka, I.i.9.
- 3 *eṣa sarveśvara eṣa sarvajña eṣo 'ntaryāmy eṣa yonih /* Māṇḍūkya, 6.
- 4 *kleśakarmavipākāśayair aparāmrṣtaḥ puruṣaviśeṣa īśvarah /*
tatra niratiśayam sarvajñabījāṃ / Pātañjalayogasūtram, I.24-5.
- 5 Chāndogya, VI.1.
- 6 ... *sa sarvajñaḥ sarvo bhavati / tad eṣa ślokaḥ:*
'vijñānātmā saha devaiś ca sarvaiḥ
prāṇā bhūtāni sampratisthanti yatra /
tad akṣaram vedayate yas tu somya
sa sarvajñaḥ sarvam evāviveśa'' iti / Praśna, IV.10.
- 7 *yas tu sarvatyāgi somya, sa sarvajño na tenāviditam kiñcit sambhavati / pūrvam avi-*
dyayā asarvajña āsīt punar vidyayā 'vidyāpanaye sarvo bhavati / Praśnabhāṣya, IV.10.
- 8 Kalpasūtra, (120-1), H. Jacobi (tr.): Jaina Sūtras, Pt. I, (SBE, Vol. XXII), p. 263.

- 9 *matih smṛtiḥ samjñā cintā 'bhinibodha ity anarthāntaram / tad indriyānindriyanimit-
tam / Tattvārthasūtra, I, 13-4.*
- 10 *śrutam matipūrvam dvyānekadvādaśābhedaṃ / ibid. I, 20.*
- 11 *rūpiṣv avadheh / ibid. I, 27. bhavapratyayovadhī devanārakāṇāṃ / kṣayopasāmanimit-
tah śaḍvikalpah śeṣāṇāṃ / ibid. I, 21-2.*
- 12 *ṛjūvipulamati mānaḥparyayaḥ / ibid. I, 23. vākkāyamaṇḥkṛtārthasya parakīyama-
nogatasya vijñānāt ... Sarvārthasiddhi, I, 23.*
- 13 *utpādayayadhrauvyayuktam sat / Tattvārthasūtra, V, 30.*
- 14 *sarvadravyaparyāyeṣu kevalasya / ibid., I, 29. mohakṣayāj jñānadarśanāvaranāntarā-
yakṣayāc ca kevalam / ibid., X, 1.*
- 15 *The Jātaka (Fausbøll). Vol. I, p. 75.*
- 16 See note 14.
- 17 *kiñ ca bhikkhave sabbam? cakkhum c'eva rūpā ca ... pe mano ca dhammā ca /
idam vuccati bhikkhave sabbam / Saṃyuttanikāya, IV, p. 15.*
- 18 *Mahāvagga, I, 5, 8. [The Book of the Discipline, I, 5.8.]*
- 19 *Abhayarājakumārasuttam (Majjhima 58); Mahāpadānasuttam (Dīgha, 14).*
- 20 *MA, iii, 113; MLS, II, p. 64, n. 1.*
- 21 See Tatia: *Studies in Jaina Philosophy*, p. 239, Benaras 1951.
- 22 *Tattvārthasūtra VI, 24; IX, 11.*
- 23 *Cūḷadukkhakkhandasutta, M, I, 92-3.*
- 24 *The Middle Length Sayings, II, 228-9.*
- 25 e.g. the *Sandakasutta, M, I, 519.*
- 26 *The MLS, II, pp. 228-9. [M, II, p. 31-2]*
- 27 *M, I, 482.*
- 28 *MLS, II, p. 160.*
- 29 *M, II, 127.*
- 30 *natthi so samaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā yo sakideva sabbam ṇassati, sabbam dakkhiti,
netam ṭhānaṃ vijjati / M, II, 127.*
- 31 *Ibid.*
- 32 *MA, iii, 357; MLS, II, 310, n. 1.*
- 33 *Dīgha, iii, 134.*
- 34 *Dialogues of the Buddha, Pt. 3, p. 126.*
- 35 *bhagavā sabbaññū, na ca bhagavato satatam samitam nānadassanam paccupatthi-
tam, āvajjanapaṭibaddham bhagavato sabbaññutañānam ... āvajjitvā yad eva icchitam
jānāti / Milindapañho, p. 102.*
- 36 *tena hi buddho asabbaññu, yadi tassa pariyesanāya sabbaññutañānam hotiti ... Ibid.*
- 37 *Ibid., p. 107.*
- 38 *Paramatthamañjūsā, Pt. 1, (ed. by M. Dhammananda Thero), Colombo, 1928, pp.
188-191.*
- 39 *tasmā sakaladhammārammanam pi tam ekadhammārammanam viya suvatthāpīte
yeva te dhamme katvā pavattatīti idam ettha acinteyyam / "yāvatakaṃ ñeyyam, tāva-
takam ñānam; yāvatakaṃ ñānam, tāvatakaṃ ñeyyam; ñeyyapariyattikaṃ ñānam, ñāṇa-
pariyattikaṃ ñeyyam" ti evam ekajjham viṣum viṣum sakim kamena vā icchānurupam
sammā sāmañca sabbadhammānam buddhattā sammāsambuddho / Ibid., p. 191.*
- 40 *Śloka-vārttika, 110-2ff. For details on this controversy between the Mīmāṃsaka, the
Buddhist and the Jaina see Sukhalalji Sanghavi: Pramāṇamīmāṃsā, notes pp. 27-33
[Singhi Jain Series, No. 9]; A.N. Upadhye: Pravacanasāra, Intro. pp. 70-6 (Rājacandra
Jain Sāstramālā, 1964).*
- 41 *Pramānavārttika, I, 32-5.*
- 42 *samastāvayavavyaktivistarajñānasādhanaṃ /
kākadantaparīkṣāvat kriyamānam anarthakaṃ //
yathā ca cakṣuṣā sarvān bhāvān vettēti nisphalam /
sarvapratyakṣadarśitvapratijñāpy aphaṭā tathā //*

*svadharmādharmamātrajñasāadhanapratishedhayoh /
tatpranītāgamagrāhyahe yatve hi prasiddh yatah //*
tatra sarvajagatsūksmabhedajñatvaprasādhane /

asthāne kliśyate lokah samrambhād granthavādayoh // Tattvasaṅgraha, 3138-3141.

It should be noted that later Buddhists like Kamalaśīla came to accept the Jain position regarding the knowledge of 'All': *mukhyam hi tāvat svargamokṣasamprāpakahetujñatvasāadhanam Bhagavato 'smābhiḥ kriyate, yat punar aśeṣārthaparijñatrtvasāadhanam asya tat prasaṅgikam anyatrāpi Bhagavato jñānapravṛtter bādhakapramāṇābhāvāt sākṣād aśeṣārthaparijñānāt sarvajño bhavan na kenacit bādhyata iti. Tattvasaṅgraha-pañjikā, 3309.*

⁴³ *Āyāramga-suttam, I.3,4.*

It should be emphasized here that even the Jains considered the knowledge of the external objects as of secondary importance. Kundakunda is emphatic when he declares that the Kevalin is said to know all objects only from the *vyavahāra* point of view:

*jānadi passadi sabbam vavahāranayena kevali bhagavam /
kevalanāṇi jānadi passadi niyameṇa appānam //*

Niyamasāra, 159.

⁴⁴ The Pudgalavādins were aware of this difficulty: *yady evam tarhi na Buddhah sarvajñah prāpnoti. na hi kiñcic cittam asti caittā vā yat sarvam jānīyāt, kṣaṇikatvāt. pudgalas tu jānīyāt. Abhidharmakośa-Bhāṣya, X.p.467 (Pradhan's edition).*

PASSIONS AND IMPREGNATIONS OF THE PASSIONS
IN BUDDHISM*

The passions, *kleśa* in Sanskrit, *fan-nao* 煩惱 in Chinese, *ñon-moṅs-pa* in Tibetan, are torments, defilements of the mind, by virtue of which actions (*karman*) 'accumulate' (*upacayaṃ gacchanti*), that is, they gather force and fruitfulness and necessarily produce a retribution, notably a new existence in the world of painful rebirth¹.

The impregnations or latent odours of the passions, *kleśa-vāsanā* in Sanskrit, *fan-nao hsi* 煩惱息 in Chinese (also, *hsi ch'i* 息氣, *yü-ch'i* 氣, *ts'an-ch'i* 氣), *ñon-moṅs-paḥi bag-chags* in Tibetan, are secondary residues of the passions which remain in the mind after the destruction of the passions and determine an irrational, seemingly impassioned behaviour. It is thus that a sesame seed perfumed by a flower retains the flower's scent when the latter is no more.

Kleśa and *kleśa-vāsanā* are two entirely different things, although Buddhist speculation was late in distinguishing between them. If the *sthaviravāda* and the *sarvāstivāda* refer frequently to the *kleśa*, they attach practically no importance to the *kleśa-vāsanā*. In contrast, the latter are discussed at length in certain early Buddhist (Hīnayānist) sects, and in all the writings of the *Mahāyāna*.

The canonical Scriptures, Pāli Nikāyas and Sanskrit Āgamas, subject the *kleśa* to a study in depth and submit various classifications of them. They particularly emphasise craving (*rāga*), hatred (*dveṣa*) and confusion (*moha*), that triple poison (*viṣaṭraya*), those evil roots (*akuśalamūla*), which defile the mind, vitiate action and lead to the round of rebirth. The teaching of the Buddha has no other aim than to liberate beings from them: "Just as the ocean has only one taste, the taste of salt, so the Buddhist doctrine and discipline have only one taste, the taste of *vimukti* or deliverance"². This deliverance, that is, the destruction of craving, hatred and confusion, is called *nirvāṇa*³, *amṛta* or immortal⁴, *arhattva* or holiness⁵. It is also qualified as perfect knowledge (*pariññā* in Pāli)⁶ for it is inseparably linked to *prajñā*, 'wisdom', the third element (*skandha*) of the path to *nirvāṇa* of which it is the immediate consequence.

This *prajñā* is not the same for the holy ones on the three paths of salvation, but whether it is possessed by a Śrāvaka, a Pratyekabuddha or a Samyak sambuddha, it leads infallibly to deliverance (*vimukti*) and the destruction of the vices (*āsavānāṃ kṣaya*)⁷, and is expressed by a two-fold certainty:

the awareness of having destroyed the vices (*āsrava-kṣaya-jñāna*) and the conviction that these will not arise again (*anutpāda-jñāna*)⁸. All those who reach this point have an equal right to the supreme *pūjā* and can call themselves Arhats: "Birth is exhausted for me; the religious life is practised; that which had to be done is done; I foresee no further existence"⁹.

The destruction of the passions is the same for all the Arhats, and the Buddha proclaimed repeatedly that there is no difference between one deliverance and another¹⁰. In basing themselves on these authoritative words, several masters of the Law maintained that, under differing conditions, the Buddha taught only a single Vehicle, since all lead to the same result: the destruction of the passions (*kleśa-prahāṇa*)¹¹.

Alas, both in canonical and para-canonical sources, the texts are there to show us that, in various circumstances, the most illustrious of Śrāvakas, even after having achieved holiness and destroyed their passions, continued to behave and speak like impassioned men, victims of craving, hatred and confusion.

Śāriputra, whilst he was a serpent, threw himself into the fire rather than re-swallow the poison he had injected. Later, having become an Arhat and having been proclaimed by the Buddha to be the greatest among the wise, he still retained the spiteful stubbornness of that venomous creature. Invited home by a householder, he had partaken of a special dish, far superior in quality and quantity to that of his fellows. On his return to the monastery, the Buddha reproached him for having eaten impure food. Deeply upset, Śāriputra vomited his meal and swore never again to accept an invitation to someone's home. Nothing could make him go back on his decision¹².

His childhood friend, Mahāmaudgalyāyana, excelled among all the disciples in the strength and range of his magical powers, but he had been a monkey in his previous lives and holy though he may have been, he would gambol whenever he heard music¹³.

Devoted as he was to all the rigours of ascetism (*dhūtaguṇa*), Mahākāśyapa was of brahman origin, and having taken up the robe, he preserved the pride and severity of his caste. After the death of the Buddha, he took over as head of the Community and at Rājagṛha convened the first Buddhist council. He despised the worthy Ānanda, on the pretext that Ānanda had still not overcome his vices, and directed cruel reproaches at him to prevent him from participating in the sittings of the council. The intervention of conciliatory fathers was necessary before he would revoke this exclusion¹⁴. Besides, neither was Mahākāśyapa himself exempt from simian atavism. One day, on hearing the music of some great Bodhisattvas, he leapt up from his seat and traced some dance steps. Even if the five objects of the divine and

human blisses left him completely cold, he was unable to resist a tune¹⁵.

Brought by force to the monastery, handsome Nanda, half-brother of the Buddha, received ordination against his will and was not able to forget his young lady friend Janapadakalyāṇī. In order to cure him of his passion, the Buddha had to confront him with heavenly nymphs, infinitely more desirable than ordinary mortals. Resigned to his fate, Nanda became a model devotee and, fully occupied with watching over his senses, achieved arhatship¹⁶. His beauty and eloquence made him a highly successful teacher, but — for there is a but — before starting to speak, he would survey his audience closely and hold his gaze at length on the women¹⁷.

Brahmanic atavism weighed heavily on the excellent Pilindavatsa. Accustomed to addressing people haughtily, he greeted his fellows by calling them 'outcaste' (*vr̥ṣala*). One day, wanting to cross the Ganges and finding no craft at his disposal, he called on the divinity of the river in these terms: "You outcaste, stop flowing so that I can cross"¹⁸. In spite of these seemingly insulting words, there was no contempt in his heart. Even for the greatest of holy ones, it is difficult to correct oneself of inveterate habits.

The Arhat Gavāmpati had the detestable habit of spitting out his food and then re-swallowing it: in short, he ruminated¹⁹. Nor surprising really since he had been an ox for five hundred existences.

In Vaiśālī, a monkey met his death after having filled the Buddha's bowl with honey. He was reborn into a brahman family and as in recompense for his good deed he had as much honey as he needed; he received the name Madhuvasiṣṭha, 'Excellent-Honey'. As soon as age allowed he took up the robe and attained holiness²⁰. Nevertheless he retained his monkey habits and was often seen perched on walls and climbing trees²¹.

What is said here of the Śrāvakas also holds true of the Pratyekabuddhas. One of these, who had a long and active (or should one say passive ?) past as a courtesan, continued to make himself up like a coquette²².

All these facts speak well enough for themselves. The Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas, even though they may have destroyed the vices (*ksīṇāsrava*) and cut off the passions (*kleśa*), still engage in bodily and vocal actions not in keeping with knowledge (*na jñānānuparivartin*) and which seem to have arisen from passions. In reality, it is not truly a question of passions but of the impregnations of the passions (*kleśa-vāsanā*). Passion is a vice to be placed among the evil dharmas (*akuśala-dharma*) and which defiles the mind; impregnation is the involuntary result of past habits and does not involve responsibility: it is morally neutral, or undefined (*avyākṛta*).

Here, in technical terms is the definition of it as proposed by the bhaddanta Anantavarman, a commentator of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*²³:

Śrāvakāṇāṃ yo hi yatkleśacaritaḥ pūrvam tasya tatkrtaḥ kāyavākceṣṭā-vikārahetusāmarthyaviśeṣaś citta vāsanety ucyate. avyākṛtaś cittaviśeṣo vāsaneti.

— In every Śrāvaka who has already committed himself to a given passion, there is created by that passion a special potential, cause of a distortion in bodily and vocal behaviour: [this potential dwells] in the mind and is called impregnation. The impregnation is a special thought, [morally] undefined.

The holy ones, victims of these *vāsanā*, can be compared to a prisoner long laden with chains and who, once freed, continues to have a hesitant step. Or again, to a baby's swaddling clothes which have been soiled for a long time and which, even when cleaned, retain the smell of the stains²⁴.

The old canonical Scriptures of the Tripiṭaka were only concerned with the destruction of the passions (*kleśaprahāṇa*) and recognised that this is the same among all the Arhats, be they Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas or Buddhas. However, on reading these texts, Buddhist interpreters must have noted that alongside the passions there were the impregnations of the passions (*kleśa-vāsanā*) and that these latter subsisted, at least in part, in the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas. But what about the Buddhas? Three questions arise: Have the Buddhas radically eliminated the *vāsanā* and, if so, by virtue of what quality and at what precise moment in their long career as future Buddhas (Bodhisattvas)?

I

Two Early Buddhist sects, those of the Vibhajyavādins and the Mahāsāṃghikas, were the first to assert that the Buddha had destroyed all the impregnations of the passions. As we shall see, they were greatly influenced by the ideas of the supranaturalists (*lokottaravādin*) and the docetists which deny the Buddha any historical validity:

For the Vibhajyavādins and the Mahāsāṃghikas, the birth-body (*janmakāya*) of the Buddha is devoid of impurities (*anāsrava*). Why do they bring this up? Because they rely on the *Sūtra*, and notably the *Sūtra* (S III, p. 140; A II, p. 39) which says: 'The Tathāgata born in the world, grown up in the world, stands above the world and is not defiled by worldly dharmas' (*Tathāgato loke jāto loke samvaddho lokam abhibhuyya viharati anupalitto lokena*). It is in relying on this text that they say that the birth-body of the Buddha is devoid of impurities. Again, these masters say: The Buddha has completely and definitively destroyed all the passions (*kleśa*) and their impregnations (*vāsanā*); how could this birth-body have any impurities²⁵?

The Mahāyāna adopted this theory as a dogma and returned to it repeatedly. I will confine myself here to a quotation from the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras*:

Between the various destructions of the passions (*kleśaprahāṇa*) there exists no differences. However, the Tathāgatas, Arhats and Samyaksambuddhas have completely and definitively cut off all the passions and the sequence of their impregnations (*vāsanānu-samḍhi*). The Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas have not as yet definitively cut off the sequence of the impregnations These impregnations are not really passions. However, the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas, even after having cut off the passions, still retain a small part of them: 'semblances' of craving (*rāga*), hatred (*dveṣa*) and confusion (*moha*) still function in their bodies (*kāya*), speech (*vāc*) and minds (*manas*), and this is what is called the sequence of the impregnations. Among foolish worldlings (*bālapṛthag-jana*), they provoke disagreeableness (*anārtha*), while among Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas, they do not provoke it. All this sequence of impregnations the Buddhas do not have at all²⁶.

The *Vikurvaṇanirdeśa* considers the destruction of the impregnations as an exclusive attribute of the Buddha (*āveṇika buddhadharma*²⁷). Buddhist scholasticism has drawn up various lists of these exclusive attributes. The two main ones are that of the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣikas²⁸ and that proposed jointly by the Mahāsāṃghikas and the Mahāyānists²⁹. It is evidently to the latter that the *Vikurvaṇanirdeśa* refers here, for it says that every bodily, vocal or mental action of the Tathāgata is preceded by knowledge (*jñāna-pūrvamgama*) and accompanies knowledge (*jñānānuparivartin*), which presupposes a total absence of passions and traces of passions.

This privilege of the Buddha's is not purely theoretical but is translated into facts. The *Upadeśa* has determined a whole series of them³⁰:

In the course of his last life, Śākyamuni came up against the wickedness of men and the rigours of nature. The brahman Bhāradvāja, rightly nicknamed the Insultor (*ākrośaka*), showered him with unjustified reproaches³¹. The brahman woman Ciñcā attached a wooden bowl to her stomach, feigning pregnancy, and accused the Buddha of getting her with child³². Certain heretics held the Buddha responsible for the murder of the brahmacariṇī Sundarī³³. At Āḷavi, in midwinter when a cold wind was blowing, the Buddha, poorly protected by his monks' robes, was compelled to spend the night in the open on a thin layer of leaves³⁴. Having been invited to Verañja by the brahman Agnidatta, the Buddha, on his arrival there, found all doors closed and, for three months, had to survive on a few barley corns given to him by some kindly horse dealers³⁵. Seeking alms in Śālā, he had to return with an empty bowl (*dhautena pātreṇa*) because, on the orders of the local king, all the inhabitants had closed their doors to him³⁶. In Rājagṛha his cousin Devadatta, who had hoped to succeed him as head of the Community, plotted several attempts on his life: he tried to crush him with a rock, and a splinter of stone injured the Buddha on the toes³⁷; Devadatta set on him the drunken elephant Nālāgiri (or Dhanapāla) and only the kindness of the Buddha was able to calm it³⁸.

The Buddha endured all these ordeals without inwardly feeling or outwardly showing the slightest fear or resentment. His calm in such unpleasant circumstances was only equalled by his total imperturbability in the face of happier events that came his way. He remained impassive when the brahman Bhāradvāja, having had second thoughts, addressed him with five hundred words of praise; when the gods greeted his sermon at Banaras with cries of admiration³⁹; when, in the Trāyastriṃśa heaven, he sat for three months on padded rock (*kambalaśilā*) which served as a throne for Indra⁴⁰; when, in Śrāvastī, his meeting with the heretical teachers culminated in total triumph and a dazzling miracle⁴¹; and finally, when, on many occasions, gods and men competed in showering him with praises and offerings.

In happiness as in sorrow, the Buddha remains unperturbed. Just as gold from the river Jāmbū does not change when it is beaten and melted, so the Buddha endures criticism, mockery and slander without the slightest reaction. This is why, concludes the *Upadeśa*, we know that for him all the residue of passions (*kleśavāsanā*) is destroyed without any remainder⁴².

However, on reading the texts, certain gloomy souls thought they had detected in the gestures or words of the Buddha traces of craving, hatred or confusion. Here, the *Mahāvibhāṣā*⁴³ takes it upon itself to reassure them.

When the five hundred bhikṣus who had followed Devadatta in his schism were returned to the fold by Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana, they wondered, not without anguish, if they were still considered to be monks and if they had not lost 'the items of good behaviour' (*śīla*)⁴⁴. The Buddha received them warmly and said to them: "Be welcome, O bhikṣus, you are indeed still *pravrajita* and you still possess the *śīla*"⁴⁵. Over-affectionate words, one might say, bordering on *rāga*. Indeed not! Had the Buddha not welcomed them, the bhikṣus, overcome with shame, would have 'spat blood' and died.

The Buddha had some harsh words: he often treats his monks as 'confused people' (*mohapuruṣa*)⁴⁶; according to him, the young brahman Ambastha who lays claim to noble lineage is but the 'son of a slave' of the Śākyaas (*dāsiputraḥ Śākyaṇām*)⁴⁷, and Devadatta is a 'fool' (*mūḍha*), a 'corpse' (*śava*), a 'lickspittle' (*khetāśika*)⁴⁸. But if the Buddha utters harsh words, he intends no harm. He is a loving father who instructs his sons and if he rebukes them, it is only to set them right. Generally, bhikṣus, having been severely reprimanded, would return to the right path. Ambastha, his pride having been confounded, was reborn among the gods and discovered the four Noble Truths: his teacher, the brahman Puṣkarasārin, on being instructed by the Buddha, obtained the fruit of *srotaāpanna*⁴⁹. Only Devadatta persisted in his evil ways, but the Teacher, in treating him as a 'lickspittle' had spoken truly for, according to certain sources at least, Devadatta

had really swallowed the saliva of Prince Ajātaśatru⁵⁰. Now, a word of truth is never an insult.

Equally, the Buddha cannot be accused of pride or boastfulness when he solemnly declares: "I am the Buddha, Arhat, Samyaksambuddha, endowed with the ten powers (*bala*), possessed of the four kinds of self-confidence (*vaiśāradya*), etc."⁵¹ He is simply trying to have his qualities acknowledged by those who are unaware of them so that they can take their refuge in him and pursue perfect conduct (*pratipatti*).

Finally, the Buddha asked a great many questions: he asked a great king where he came from; he inquired about the weather and the rain from Ānanda and wanted to know where the loud cries in the monastery garden originated⁵². Can he reasonably be suspected of ignorance and confusion (*moha*)? No, because as the *Vinayas* repeat it endlessly: "Truthfinders (sometimes) ask knowing, and knowing (sometimes) do not ask; they ask, knowing the right time (to ask), and they do not ask, knowing the right time (when not to ask). Truthfinders ask about what belongs to the goal, not about what does not belong to the goal. There is bridgebreaking for Truthfinders in whatever does not belong to the goal. Awakened ones question monks concerning two matters: 'Shall we teach *dhamma*?' or 'Shall we lay down a rule of training for disciples?'"⁵³.

Thus, when the Buddha uttered harsh words which seemed impassioned, it was always for the welfare and happiness of beings. In him wisdom (*prajñā*) is backed up by great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*). This compassion is not mere sentimentality, for among the Buddhas and great Bodhisattvas, it is a compassion which is devoid of object (*anālambana*) and is detached from beings and things⁵⁴.

II

How can it be explained that the Buddhas are the only ones to have eliminated the *kleśavāsanā* while the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas still retain them? The wisdom (*prajñā*) of the Buddhas, the power of their knowledge (*jñānabala*), surpasses in efficacy that of the other two. It is an unequalled enlightenment, right and perfect (*anuttarā samyaksambodhi*) which goes far beyond the *bodhi* of the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas. The two latter are comparable to an ordinary fire, unable to burn its fuel without leaving traces of ash and charcoal. The wisdom of the Buddhas is like the cosmic fire which, at the end of time, consumes the triple world, sparing nothing⁵⁵.

This is understandable, for the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas have only accumulated the virtues (*guṇa*) and knowledges (*jñāna*) for one, two or

three generations at the most, while the Buddhas, throughout innumerable and incalculable periods (*asaṃkhyeyakalpa*) have widely cultivated the knowledges and virtues and have long since been impregnated (*vāsita*) by the perfume of the good dharmas. This prolonged practice has not only destroyed the passions (*kleśa*), it has melted away all trace of them⁵⁶.

Certain texts, like the *Upāsakaśīlasūtra*⁵⁷, have determined the differences between the *bodhi* of the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas and the *anuttarā samyaksambodhi* of the Buddhas.

A. Śrāvakas attain *bodhi* by listening, Pratyekabuddhas by reflecting, and they only understand a portion of the truth; Buddhas understand all things, without a teacher, without listening, without meditating, through the effect of their own practices.

B. Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas only know the general characteristics (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) of things — impermanence (*anityatā*), suffering (*duḥkha*) and impersonality (*anātman*) —; the Buddhas know their particular characteristics (*svalakṣaṇa*), and they alone are truly omniscient.

C. Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas know the four Noble Truths (*āryasatya*), but not the causes and conditions which govern the dependent co-production (*pratītyasamutpāda*). Comparing the waters of the Ganges to the stream of the *pratītyasamutpāda*, the Śrāvaka is like the hare that swims across the river without realising its depth; the Pratyekabuddha is like the horse that realises it at the moments it touches the bottom; the Buddha is like the elephant that comprehends all its depth.

D. Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas have cut off the passions (*kleśa*), but not their impregnations (*vāsanā*); the Buddhas have pulled up everything right down to the root.

III

What remains now is to find out at what moment in his long career, the Buddha definitively severs the impregnations of his passions. Ancient Buddhism has no answer to this question, since it concentrated its attention on the destruction of the passions and did not look into the importance of the impregnations. The latter, more subtle and tenacious than the passions, should logically be destroyed last of all. The oldest accounts devoted to the enlightenment of Śākyamuni⁵⁸ claim that he won *sambodhi* at Bodh Gayā

during the third watch of the night and that it was at that precise moment that he was 'freed of vices' (*kṣīṇāsrava*) and found deliverance (*vimukti*). The destruction of the impregnations (*vāsanāprahāṇa*) could but have accompanied or followed this deliverance; it could not have preceded it.

The minute by minute accounting of that night at Bodh Gayā by the Sarvāstivādin masters reaches the same conclusion. When Śākyamuni sat under the Bodhi tree, he was still a worldling (*prthagjana*), but a worldling who, through purely mundane meditation, was already detached from all the passions connected with the triple world, except for the nine categories of the passions of the *bhavāgra*, that is, the superior sphere of existence.

From there, in order to reach enlightenment, he had to tread a two-fold path: a path of vision (*darśanamārga*) and a path of meditation (*bhāvanāmārga*). The first, in sixteen thought-moments (*cittakṣaṇa*), led him to the understanding of the sixteen aspects of the Noble Truths and freed him from those passions which required destruction by vision (*darśanaheya kleśa*). The effect of the second was to free him from the nine categories of innate (*sahaja*) passions connected with the *bhavāgra*: he obtained this result by applying to each one of them a thought of abandonment (*prahāṇamārga*) and a thought of deliverance (*vimuktimārga*), i.e. eighteen thoughts. The seventeenth thought, known by the name of *vajropamasamādhi* 'Diamond-like Concentration' cut off in him the last category of the passions and the eighteenth thought gave him possession of this very destruction.

Sixteen thoughts of a clear understanding (*abhisamaya*) of the Truths, plus eighteen thoughts of pure meditation (*bhāvanā*) add up in all to thirty-four thoughts needed for the realisation of the achieving of enlightenment. This is the figure given by the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣikas⁵⁹ who, however, remain silent on the question of the destruction of the impregnations.

The Mahāyānists proposed to find a place for it and hoped to situate it at a precise moment of the Bodhisattva's career. As they conceive it, this career consists of three moments of capital importance.

A. *Bodhicittotpāda* or production of the Thought of Enlightenment. The Bodhisattva undertakes the resolve to reach one day the supreme and perfect enlightenment of the Buddhas so as to devote himself to the welfare and happiness of all beings. This vow commits him to the Bodhisattva's career spread over ten *bhūmi*, 'grounds' or 'stages'. During the course of the first six of these, the future Buddha practises ever more intensely the six perfections (*pāramitā*) of his state: giving, etc.

B. Obtaining of the *anutpattikadharmakṣānti*, or certainty of the non-arising

of dharmas (and consequently, their non-extinction). Long since in preparation, this certainty regarding universal emptiness is definitively acquired (*pratilabdha*) in the eighth *bhūmi*, the *acalā*, 'Immovable'. The Bodhisattva, a prediction (*vyākaraṇa*) bestowed on him by the Buddhas, is predetermined (*niyata*) as to his future Buddhahood. He aims towards this state without any possibility of turning back (*avaivartika*) and, in some ways, mechanically. Consequently, henceforth his activity takes place spontaneously, without action or effort, for his mind is no longer distracted by ideas and notions.

C. Access to *anuttarā samyakṣambodhi*, to the supreme and perfect enlightenment of the Buddhas. This takes place in the tenth *bhūmi*, the *dharma-megha*, 'Cloud of the Law', the stage of consecration in omniscience (*sarvajñānābhisekabhūmi*).

Where, in this context, do the destruction of passions (*kleśaprahāṇa*) and the destruction of impregnations (*kleśavāsanāprahāṇa*) fit in? Are they simultaneous or consecutive?

This question gave rise to controversy, but the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, as it appears in the Chinese version by Kumārajīva (T 223, ch. 6), gives a precise answer:

Twenty dharmas should be perfectly fulfilled by the Bodhisattva who is in the seventh stage, particularly (No. 15) the overturning of the passions (*kleśavivarta*). — So what then for a Bodhisattva is this overturning of passions? It is the destruction of all the passions (*sarvakleśaprahāṇa*)⁶⁰.

The Bodhisattva who has perfectly fulfilled the knowledge of all the aspects (*sarvākārajñāna*) and who has destroyed all the impregnations of the passions (*sarvakleśavāsanā*) is a Bodhisattva Mahāsattva who is to be found in the tenth stage and should be quite simply taken for a Buddha⁶¹.

We note only that a Bodhisattva *should* perfectly fulfil the destruction of the passions in the seventh stage; he does not in fact command this until his entry in the eighth, the main endowment of which is the certainty of the non-arising of dharmas (*anutpattikadharmakṣānti*). *Kleśaprahāṇa* and *kṣānti* thus coincide in timing.

This being so, we can but concur with the commentary of the *Upadeśa* on the passage which concerns us here:

In truth, when a Bodhisattva obtains the certainty of the non-arising of dharmas, his passions (*kleśa*) are already destroyed, but their impregnations (*vāsanā*) are not yet eliminated. It is because of these impregnations that he undertakes further [rebirths]. Acquiring a body born of the fundamental element (*dharmadhātujakāya*), he can transform himself at will. Through goodwill (*maitrī*) and compassion (*karuṇā*) for beings, and also to fulfil his previous vows (*pūrvapraṇidhāna*), he returns to this world in order to perfect and acquire yet more Buddha attributes. The tenth stage having been com-

pleted, he sits on the place of enlightenment (*bodhimanda*) and, through the power of his unobstructed liberation (*asaṅgavimokṣa*), he attains omniscience (*sarvajñatā*), knowledge of all the aspects (*sarvākārajñatā*) and destroys the impregnations of the passions⁶².

No-one will be surprised at the developing and enriching of the Buddhist doctrine which occurred in the course of time. All this is the result of a long labour of reflection and meditation, undertaken from age to age by the disciples of Śākyamuni. It would not be fair to consider them as innovators: they took constant care not to assert anything which had no justification, direct or indirect, in the ancient canonical Scriptures. The preceding pages have attempted to demonstrate this. I take the liberty of dedicating them to Miss I.B. Horner, whose illustrious works and talents as an organiser have led her to the presidency of the Pali Text Society. It is thanks to her that this learned institution today enjoys an unprecedented success. Like Ānanda and Upāli twenty-five centuries ago, Miss Horner is, in our own time, the most authorised guardian of the Buddhist Doctrine and Discipline (*dhamma-vinaya*).

Louvain

NOTES

* I am greatly indebted to Mrs Sara Boin, who has been kind enough to provide the English version of this article.

References to the Pāli texts conform to the abbreviations suggested by the Pali Text Society in the Pali-English Dictionary (ed. by T.W. Rhys Davids and W. Stede), Chipstead 1925.

Editions and works mentioned frequently in this article are quoted in abbreviated form as follows:

Horner, *Discipline* = I.B. Horner, *The Book of the Discipline*, 6 vols., (Sacred Books of the Buddhists, No. 10, 11, 13, 14, 20, 25), London 1938-66.

Kośabhāṣya = P. Pradhan (ed.), *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu* (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, vol. VIII), Patna 1967.

T = J. Takakusu and K. Watanabe (eds.), *Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō*, 55 vols., Tōkyō 1924-29.

Traité = É. Lamotte (tr.), *Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse de Nāgārjuna*: tome I et II (Bibliothèque du Muséon, No. 18), Louvain 1944-49; tome III (Publications de l'Institut Orientaliste de Louvain, No. 2), Louvain 1970.

Upadeśa = *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa*, T 1509.

¹ *Kośabhāṣya*, p. 277.

² *Vin.* II, p. 239; *A* IV, p. 203; *Ud.*, p. 56.

³ *S* IV, pp. 251, 261.

⁴ *S* V, p. 8.

⁵ *S* IV, p. 252.

⁶ *S* III, p. 160.

⁷ *S V*, p. 8.

⁸ *Kośabhāṣya*, p. 368.

⁹ According to the Sanskrit formula: *Kṣiṇā me jātir uṣitam brahmacaryam kṛtaṁ karaṇīyaṁ nāparam asmād bhavam iti prajānāmi*: cf. I.S. Speyer (ed.), *Avadānaśataka*, II, St. Petersburg 1909, p. 170; E. Waldschmidt (ed.), *Catuspariśatsūtra*, II, Berlin 1957, p. 170. — The Pāli phraseology differs: cf. *Vin.* I, p. 14: *Khīṇā jāti vusitaṁ brahmacariyaṁ kataṁ karaṇīyaṁ nāparam itthattāya 'ti pajānāti*, translated by Miss Horner, *Discipline*, IV, p. 21: He knows: Destroyed is birth, lived is the Brahma-faring, done is what was to be done, there is no more of being such or such.

¹⁰ *M* II, p. 129; *A* III, p. 34; *S V*, p. 410: *Ettha kho nesahaṁ na kiñci nānākaraṇaṁ vadāmi, yad idaṁ vimuttiyā vimuttiṁ*.

¹¹ All Buddhist philosophers, whether they accept or reject the oneness of the Triple Vehicle, recognise that the conscious suppression (*pratisamkhyānirodha*) of the *kleśa* is identical in all the holy ones: cf. *Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545, chuan 31, p. 162 b-c: *Samaya-bhedoparacanacakra* of Vasumitra, thesis 37 of the Sarvāstivādins and 22 of the Mahīśāsakas, tr. J. Masuda: 'Origin and Doctrines of Early Indian Buddhist Schools', in *Asia Major* 2 (1925) 49, 62; S. Lévi (ed.), *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra*, I, Paris 1907, p. 68; E. Lamotte (tr.), *Mahāyānasamgraha: La Somme du Grand Véhicule d'Asaṅga*, II, Louvain 1939, pp. 326-328; *Buddhabhūmiśōstra*, T 1530, ch. 5, p. 312 b 7-15.

¹² *Vin. of the Mahīśāsakas*, T 1421, ch. 26, pp. 173 c; ch. 27, pp. 179 b-c; *Vin. of the Sarvāstivādins*, T 1435, ch. 61, p. 463 c-464 a; *Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545, ch. 16, p. 77 b 1-2; *Upadeśa*, T 1509, ch. 2, pp. 70 c-71 a; ch. 26, p. 247 c 17-18; ch. 27, p. 260 c 12-16. — Other references in *Traité*, I, pp. 118-121; III, p. 1632.

¹³ *Mahāyānasamgrahopaniṣandhāna*, T 1598, ch. 9, p. 442 a 26-28.

¹⁴ Regarding Mahākāśyapa's ill-will during the first council, see J. Przyluski, *Le Concile de Rājagṛha*, Paris 1926. Mahākāśyapa heaps up reproaches against Ānanda (pp. 12-15, 47-51, 62, 64, 97, 120, 182-186); he humiliates him (pp. 275-276); he expels him (pp. 12, 16, 62, 97).

¹⁵ *Upadeśa*, T 1509, ch. 42, pp. 367 c 29-368 a 3.

¹⁶ *Ud.* p. 21-24; *J* II, pp. 92-94; *AA* I, pp. 315-318; *DhA* I, pp. 96-105; E.H. Johnston (ed. and tr.), *Saundaranandacarita of Aśvaghoṣa*, London 1928-32. — Other references in *Traité*, I, p. 118, footnote.

¹⁷ *Upadeśa*, T 1509, ch. 27, p. 260 c 10-12.

¹⁸ *Ud.* pp. 28-29; *UdA* pp. 192-195; *AA* I, pp. 276-278; *DhA* IV, pp. 181-182; *Vin. of the Mahāsāṃghikas*, T 1425, ch. 30, p. 467 c; *Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545, ch. 16, pp. 77 a 29-b 1; *Upadeśa*, T 1509, ch. 2, p. 71 a; ch. 26, p. 251 b 4-5; ch. 27, p. 260 c 19-20; ch. 84, p. 649 c 14-17.

¹⁹ *Fo pao en ching*, T 156, ch. 6, p. 155 c 14; *Sarvāstivādinayavibhāṣā*, T 1440, ch. 1, p. 504 c 4-5; *Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545, ch. 16, p. 77 b 2-3; *Upadeśa*, T 1509, ch. 26, p. 251 b 1-2; ch. 38, p. 337 a 4-6.

²⁰ The offering by the monkey which took place in Vaiśālī caused the town to become a celebrated place of pilgrimage. The episode, quite unknown in the Pāli Canon, nevertheless occupies a special place in Buddhist art and literature. See the references in *Traité*, III, pp. 1659-60, footnote.

²¹ *Fo pao en ching*, T 156, ch. 6, p. 155 c 16-17; *Sarvāstivādinayavibhāṣā*, T 1440, ch. 1, p. 504 c 6-7; *Upadeśa*, T 1509, ch. 26, p. 251 b 3-4; ch. 27, p. 260 c 20-22; ch. 38, p. 337 a 6-8; ch. 84, p. 649 c 10-13.

²² *Mahāyānasamgrahopaniṣandhāna*, T 1598, ch. 9, p. 442 a 27-28.

²³ Quoted in U. Wogihara (ed.), *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, Tōkyō 1932-36, p. 647.

²⁴ *Upadeśa*, T. 1509, ch. 27, p. 260 c 5-8.

²⁵ *Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545, ch. 173, p. 871 c 2-7. Cf. *ibidem*, ch. 44, p. 229 a 17-20; ch. 76, pp. 391 c 27-392 a 3.

²⁶ *Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra*, T VI, No. 220, ch. 363, p. 872 a 7-19; T VII, No. 220, ch. 525, p. 695 b 27-c 11.

- 27 *Vikurvaṇanirdeśa*, T 272, ch. 9, p. 358 b 7-8.
- 28 For example see *Samyuktābhidharmasāra*, T 1552, ch. 6, p. 922 c 15-17; *Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545, ch. 17, p. 85 a 26-27; ch. 120, p. 624 a 14-15; *Kośabhāṣya*, p. 411.
- 29 Among other sources, we quote É. Senart (ed.), *Mahāvastu*, I Paris 1882, p. 160, l. 8-16; N. Dutt (ed.), *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, London 1934, pp. 211, l. 17-212, l. 7.
- 30 *Upadeśa*, T 1509, ch. 27, pp. 260 c 27-261 a 22.
- 31 *S I*, pp. 161-163; *SA I*, p. 229; *Upadeśa*, T 1509, ch. 27, pp. 260 c 27-261 a 1; ch. 84, p. 649 c 18-22.
- 32 *DhA III*, pp. 178-183 (E.W. Burlingame (tr.), *Buddhist Legends*, Cambridge, Mass., 1921, III, pp. 19-23); *J III*, p. 298; *IV*, pp. 187-189; *UdA* pp. 263-264. — Other references in *Traité*, I, p. 123, footnote.
- 33 *Ud.* pp. 43-45; *J II*, pp. 415-417; *DhA III*, pp. 474-478 (Burlingame, *Buddhist Legends*, III, pp. 189-191); *UdA* pp. 256-262. — Other references in *Traité*, I, p. 507.
- 34 *A I*, pp. 136-138.
- 35 *Vin. III*, pp. 1-11 (Horner, *Discipline*, I, p. 1-21); *DhA II*, pp. 153-157 (Burlingame, *Buddhist Legends*, II, pp. 193-194); *Vin. of the Mūlasarvāstivādins* (Gilgit Manuscripts), ed. N. Dutt, III, part 1, pp. 24-48. — Other references in *Traité*, I, p. 124, footnote.
- 36 *S I*, pp. 113-114; *DhA III*, pp. 257-258 (Burlingame, *Buddhist Legends*, III, pp. 72-73). — Other references in *Traité*, I, p. 457.
- 37 *Vin. II*, pp. 193 (Horner, *Discipline*, V, p. 271). — Other references in *Traité*, I, p. 508, footnote.
- 38 *Vin. II*, pp. 194-196 (Horner, *Discipline*, V, pp. 272-274); *J V*, pp. 335-337; *Vin. of the Mūlasarvāstivādins* (Gilgit Manuscripts), III, part 4, p. 238, l. 16-18; *Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545, ch. 83, p. 429 a 12-b2.
- 39 *Vin. I*, pp. 11-12; *Catuṣpariṣatsūtra*, pp. 154-156; *Mahāvastu*, III, pp. 334-335; S. Lefmann (ed.), *Lalitavistara*, Halle 1902, p. 401.
- 40 *Avadānaśataka*, II, p. 89; *DhA III*, p. 217.
- 41 This refers to the great miracle at Śrāvastī. See references in *Traité*, I, pp. 531-532, footnote.
- 42 *Upadeśa*, T 1509, ch. 27, p. 261 a 22-26.
- 43 *Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545, ch. 16, p. 77 b 4-c 9.
- 44 *Vin. II*, pp. 200-201 (Horner, *Discipline*, V, pp. 281-282).
- 45 This detail does not appear in the Pāli *Vinaya*.
- 46 *Vin. I*, pp. 45, 58, 60, 78, 154, 159-160, 189, 218, 301, 305.
- 47 *D I*, p. 93.
- 48 *Vin. II*, p. 188.
- 49 *D I*, p. 110.
- 50 Subject dealt with in my article: 'Le Buddha insulta-t-il Devadatta?' in *BSOAS*, XXXIII (1970), pp. 107-115.
- 51 *Vin. I*, p. 9.
- 52 *M I*, p. 456.
- 53 *Vin. I*, pp. 59, 158, 210, etc. The translation of this formula is taken from Miss I.B. Horner, *Discipline*, IV, p. 77, etc.
- 54 *Akṣayamatīnirdeśasūtra*, T 403, ch. 4, p. 599 a 13-17. The original Sanskrit text is reproduced in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, ed. C. Bendall, St. Petersburg 1902, p. 212, l. 12-14.
- 55 *Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545, ch. 16, p. 77 c 5-8; *Upadeśa*, T 1509, ch. 2, p. 70 c 4-8; ch. 27, p. 260 c 23-27.
- 56 *Upadeśa*, T 1509, ch. 27, p. 261 a 29-b 3.
- 57 *Upāsakaśīlasūtra*, T 1488, ch. 1, p. 1038. Passage pointed out and translated in the *Hōbōgirin*, *Dictionnaire encyclopédique du bouddhisme*, Tōkyō 1929, p. 87.
- 58 Cf. E. Waldschmidt, 'Die Erleuchtung des Buddha', in *Festschrift Krause*, 1960, pp. 214-229.

59 *Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545, ch. 153, p. 780 b 29-c 6; ch. 182, p. 913 c 21-22; *Kośa-bhāṣya*, p. 71.

60 *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā*, T 223, ch. 6, p. 257 b 16-17, and 259 a 25. This passage can be reconstructed in Sanskrit as follows: *Tena bodhisattvena mahāsattvena viṃśatir eva dharmāḥ sapta-myām bhūmau sthitena paripūrayitavyāḥ. katame viṃśatih. yad uta ... kleśavivartaḥ ... tatra katamo bodhisattvasya mahāsattvasya kleśavivartaḥ. yat sarva-kleśaprahāṇam.*

61 *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā*, T 223, ch. 6, p. 259 c 8-10. This passage can be reconstructed in Sanskrit as follows: *Yadā bodhisattvasya mahāsattvasya sarvākārajñatā paripūrṇā bhavati sarvakleśavāsanāprahāṇam ca bhavati. evaṃ khalu bodhisattvo mahāsattvo daśa-myām bhūmau sthitas tathāgata eva veditavyāḥ.*

62 *Upadeśa*, T 1509, ch. 27, p. 261 c 22-28.

BUDDHIST VALUES AND THE BURMESE ECONOMY

I. BUDDHIST VALUES AND BUDDHIST CIVILISATION

Buddhists show a sound instinct for the truth when they affirm that the system to which they adhere is not a religion, but a way of life. In fact, even this is a modest claim. It is an under-estimation of the nature of Buddhism as it existed in the early centuries, and as it continued to exist into the modern period in Ceylon and Burma and Tibet until it was decapitated by foreign imperialist regimes. For Buddhism, in Aśokan India, in Bengal under the Pala kings, in Ceylon until 1815, in Burma until 1885, and in Tibet until the 1950's, was both an international culture, and a socio-political philosophy for the nation-state.

One may say that Buddhism as it is expounded in the Nikāyas, is basically a theory of existence — not of human existence only, but of all sentient existence. Moreover, in addition to the analysis of the world's ills from which it starts, it includes also a prescription which can be put into effect in order to cure those ills. In a sense this is a message of salvation, but since Buddhist theory rejects the concept of the indestructible individual *person*, it cannot be a message of *personal* salvation. Briefly it may be summarised as a prescription both for the restructuring of human consciousness and for the restructuring of human society. Without the one, the other will be ineffective. Hence the importance of the ideal of the *Cakravartin*, to which serious Buddhist rulers, such as Aśoka, or Devānampiya Tissa, or Mindon, or Mongkut, have sought to approximate themselves and their policies. The restraining of the violent elements in society, the discouragement of crime by the alleviation of poverty, the provision of the material necessities to enable the citizens of the State to pursue the Buddhist life unhindered — these have been the aims, and the achievements, of Buddhist rulers of the sort whom I have mentioned.

In such situations, where the Buddhist ideal has been most nearly approximated to, there has been a triangular relationship of a close and intimate kind between the Sangha, the ruler, and the people. The Sangha advise the ruler, guide him in the Dhamma, and support him in his administration of the State. In return he provides protection for the Sangha and engages in public works of *stūpa* and monastery building, and in ensuring optimum conditions for their pursuit of the Buddhist way. For they, the Sangha, are, so to speak, its vanguard; in the classical type of Buddhism they are expected to be the growing point, or points, or 'cells' of the restructured conscious-

ness and the restructured society. Secondly, between the ruler and the people there is expected to be a reciprocal relationship of respect and support; without an efficient ruler society reverts to the law of the fishes, where large devour small; on the other hand, without loyalty from the people, and due observance of laws which are made for the benefit of all, the ruler cannot function efficiently or humanely, and must necessarily become either a tyrant, or a puppet. Thirdly, between the Sangha and the people there is a similar reciprocal relationship of respect and support, which is too well known to need elaboration here.

This then is what is envisaged in the *Nikāyas*. The discourses of the Buddha are by no means 'other-worldly'. The son of one upon whom was laid responsibility for the ordering of the public affairs of the Sākya State, he himself was the friend and adviser of the kings of his day, such as Bimbisāra and Pasenadi. A number of the *Jātakas* contain descriptions of the ideal king.¹ In the *Kūṭadanta*, the *Mahā-Sudassana*, the *Cakkavatti Sīhanāda Suttas*, and elsewhere,² a good deal is said concerning the function of the righteous king; there is a clear implication that such righteous rule is a *desideratum* of the application of the Buddhist cure for the human condition. When Aśoka turned in revulsion from the brahmanically dominated statecraft exemplified in Kautalya's *Arthaśāstra* it was to another ideal of statecraft that he turned — to the Buddha-Dhamma. The Dhamma was a public prescription in Aśoka's understanding of it, not a private or personal message of salvation. It is the threefold structure of Sangha, King and People, which quite clearly is presupposed in the events connected with the establishment of the Buddhist State in Ceylon in Devānampiya Tissa's reign.

Yet in modern times we find that even some Buddhists fall into the error of calling Buddhism 'a personal religion'.³ How a system which denies the concept of permanent individual personality can be characterised as 'personal' is hard to understand. I suggest that Buddhism today finds itself in the unfortunate position of having been led astray from its own proper understanding of itself by accommodation to Christian concepts. Buddhism in Ceylon, for example, in the nineteenth century, at a point of low ebb in its vitality, found itself being thrust aside by an interloping combination of British political power and Christian missionary activity. The view of the Christians, both administrators and missionaries, was that two (or more) 'religions' were in competition in Ceylon, and that the 'superior' one would eventually come out on top. Christians gave the Sinhalese people the idea that what they, the Sinhalese, adhered to was a 'religion', and many of the Sinhalese people, forgetting that Buddhism was a socio-political philosophy, a culture, and a civilisation, believed them. So when Buddhism began to

revive, it accepted the colonial rulers' view of the situation, and behaved like a religion. Like the lion cub brought up among sheep it thought of itself as it had been conditioned to think. A religion is a message of personal salvation, especially so in nineteenth and early twentieth century Protestantism, and so, believing itself to be a religion, that was the model on which early twentieth-century Buddhism in Ceylon shaped itself, with a Y.M.B.A., and Sunday Schools, and so on.

Protestant, and especially Free Church, Christianity with its strongly individualistic concern, its atomisation of human society, its rejection of any link between political power and spiritual or moral doctrines, its encouragement of free enterprise and its dislike of all collectivism, was probably, as it happened, the most unsuitable model for a Buddhist culture to find itself confronted with, and the most likely, in the circumstances, to produce a distorted version of Buddhism in the understanding of its adherents. How long it will take Buddhists in Ceylon to recover the original, classical idea of Buddhism as a humanistic social philosophy, with political and economic, as well as metaphysical dimensions, no one can say. One of the most notable efforts in this direction can be seen in the work of the late K.N. Jayatilleke, especially in his *Principles of International Law in Buddhist Doctrine*.⁴ A great deal more research and thought and reaching and action and devotion are needed, in order to recover the classical understanding of Buddhist civilisation. In a number of important respects classical Buddhist civilisation provides a much needed alternative set of values, concerning the environment, economic development, international relations, mental health, and so on, to those of the West. Its recovery will require, as K.N. Jayatilleke would have said, *commitment*, and a readiness to abandon false, Western conceptions of Buddhism which crept in with colonialism.⁵

One aspect of men's common life where Buddhist values have a positive implication is that of economic activity. However, this dimension of the life of contemporary Buddhist countries is sometimes carelessly analysed and wrongly evaluated. Cases of faulty evaluation occur in connection with the tendency observed among economists, when faced with the need to explain lack of economic growth, and 'when the tools of economic analysis appear inadequate'⁶ to look round for a culprit among the non-economic or 'background' factors, and to settle on 'cultural values' as being chiefly to blame. One example of a country's economic situation being explained in these terms is Buddhist Burma.

At the outset of a paper entitled 'Cultural Values and Economic Change in Burma' Mya Maung⁷ acknowledges that "the process of economic change can only be understood as an inextricable part of a more complex process

of cumulative social change.”⁸ That would seem to be indisputable. But then he goes on to the further assertion that as far as Burma is concerned, “the impact of Buddhism upon the economic life of the people has been uniformly great”. Later he says it has been “immense”. One is justified in assuming that he means that [Theravāda] Buddhism has been, if not the major factor, at least one of the major factors responsible for Burma’s present economic condition. His view of “the impact of Buddhist cultural values upon questions of economic change” is in terms of what he calls “cultural resistance to economic change”.⁹ What is noticeable here is a failure to distinguish between specifically *Buddhist* values, and those which are local and *Burmese* rather than Buddhist. There is also a failure to distinguish between what is specifically Buddhist in terms of the Theravādin tradition of the Sangha, and the popular Buddhist religion of the lay people. In practice, of course, these theoretically distinguishable sources of values may become indistinguishable, but since the real consequences may well depend on which values predominate in any given situation, it is important to distinguish between them conceptually and to know which values, when they predominate, will produce which results.

II. ASPECTS OF BURMA’S ECONOMY NOT DUE TO BUDDHIST VALUES

One factor which may have shaped *Burmese* attitudes towards sustained economic effort is peculiar to Burma, and has no direct connection with Buddhist values. This is the relative non-scarcity of food which Burma has enjoyed for most of her recorded history, at least up to the colonial period. The fact is mentioned by Mya Maung, but without evaluation in terms of distinction between Buddhist/non-Buddhist cultural factors. The delta and valley lowland region of Burma is almost infinitely fertile; the cultivable land is extensive and the population density low by any standards, Asian or other. It is therefore a well founded claim of the Burmese that no one ever starved in Burma. Perhaps this lack of basic economic anxiety has had something to do with shaping Burmese culture; but it has to be noted that this is a local environmental factor and has nothing essentially to do with Buddhist values, except in one possible respect, namely the continuing low population density. As I have suggested elsewhere, it is just possible that Buddhist attitudes to desired family size (bearing in mind the importance placed by Buddhist people on the importance of children enjoying a secure family atmosphere), may have some bearing on relatively low birth rates in Burma compared with some other Asian countries.¹⁰ In this way Buddhist values may

have marginally influenced the situation, and helped Burma so far to avoid the pressure on food resources experienced in neighbouring India or Bangladesh.

Having looked at one non-Buddhist factor which may have helped to condition attitudes to economic activity, it is important to note two other vastly more significant factors, in this category, namely Burma's experience of colonialism, and the effect on Burma of World War II. These also present us with aspects of Burma's post-war economy for which Buddhist values are not responsible. Whereas through most of Burma's history her peoples have been able to enjoy a reasonable level of subsistence at least, and often more than that, this was not the case generally at the end of British colonial rule in Burma. The economic condition of the people of Burma during those last years was described by J.S. Furnivall, a British civil servant of many years service in Burma, in his book *Colonial Policy and Practice*. He gives a detailed analysis of the effects of the British laissez-faire policy in respect of the economic development of Burma, and demonstrates its effect upon the Burmese people in terms of rural indebtedness and agrarian distress, and along with this 'the multiplication of litigation and crime'. Economic freedom under British rule, says Furnivall, "merely allowed the people to pile up debt and lose their land [i.e. to Indian moneylenders]."¹¹ Walinsky endorses this in his *Economic Development in Burma, 1951-60*.¹² In dealing with the background to the situation inherited by the Burmese in 1947 he devotes a section to outlining the economic situation in the late 1930's, so far as the Burmese farmer was concerned. "While other prices rose [on the world markets] the price of rice dropped sharply. [Indian] moneylenders called in their loans. The pace of foreclosure quickened and economic distress in the countryside did much to stimulate the growth of political unrest, and, eventually, race riots between Burmese and Indians in Rangoon. An analysis of Burma's economic condition by a group of Japanese economists, published in Tokyo in 1961, was highly critical of the "typical monoculture economic structure wherein approximately 70% of the gross exports are dependent on rice exports."¹⁴ This group of economists, too, like Furnivall and Walinsky point to the reason for this, in British policy. The delta region of lower Burma was sparsely populated at the beginning of British rule. Burma, it must be remembered, was administered as a province of British India. India had a surplus of labour and some "richly adventurous usurious capital"¹⁵, whereas Burma had no surplus of either. British policy allowed Indian labour and capital to flow into lower Burma and develop the whole area as a rice-bowl; "not only did the Indian Chettyars move in as farming village usurers in response to the capital requirements of farmers in

the newly opened lands, but the British assisted the immigration of Indians and Indian labour emigration through subsidies and legal provisions."¹⁶ The result of this excessive development of rice for export left Burma's economy highly vulnerable; Burma was, moreover, "placed in an inferior position not only with respect to commercial and industrial financing but even in the area of labour."¹⁷ Apart from this, British control of Burma was in the interests of extractive industries such as teak and oil, which meant only the simple processing of these materials for export and sale by British-owned companies. The economy was a typically colonial one, as little diversified industrially as it was agriculturally.

To this situation of economic imbalance and rural distress was then added the physical, social and political effects of World War II, in which Burma was a major theatre of war. Lucian Pye, in his study of Burma's efforts to build up her nationhood again, from 1947, takes a curiously perfunctory view of the damage which the war between Japan and the West did to Burma. He considers that in view of Burma's mineral resources, her plentiful food-supplies (rice), and the river Irrawaddy providing "a natural and economical means of transportation" it is difficult to understand why Burma's economy did not develop more rapidly than it had done by the time he was writing just prior to 1962. "The fact that there are so few objective handicaps to economic development in Burma (sic) suggests the extreme importance of non-objective considerations.... The fact that Burmese production, fifteen years after World War II, has just been restored to pre-war levels suggests that the obstacles to its development may fall largely in the realm of political relations, psychological attitudes, and cultural values."¹⁸ To ignore the effects of colonialism and war on independent Burma's economy makes it possible for him to give major prominence to "psychological attitudes and cultural values". He mentions, only to dismiss summarily, the fact that Burma was a major scene of the fighting in World War II.

This is not the view taken by the Japanese economists who were making their survey of Burma's economic situation at about the time that Pye was writing.¹⁹ Their report emphasises that outside of Japan itself, which suffered atomic bombing by the U.S.A., "war damage in Burma was the greatest of any nation in Asia."²⁰ The effect on agricultural production was disastrous, for a variety of reasons. Livestock needed for ploughing suffered a large decrease in numbers owing to requisitioning by the Japanese Army and by disease. A legacy of the disturbed conditions of a country under occupation was the poor state of law and order, and this in turn hampered "the orderly economic activity of the farming villages", for reasons concerned with the farmers' routine, which the report analyses in detail.²¹ The farmer's

'will to produce' had been seriously affected by all this. Above all, two major campaigns were fought across the whole extent of the country, in 1942 when the British retreated into India before the invading Japanese, and then in 1945 when the "Allies bombed and fought their way back" across the country. In the course of the latter campaign, and the destruction wrought by both the retreating Japanese and the advancing Allies, Burma lost what capital facilities she had, such as transport, telecommunications, and electric power supply plants. "Even her farmlands were left devastated."²² Burma Railways had practically ceased operating, since 80% of its property had been destroyed.²³

It took until the end of the 1950's to repair the physical damage in the countryside, but not all the fertile paddy land which had reverted to jungle had been re-occupied and cultivated again by then, owing to depopulation of some areas. Hence, it is not surprising that in the preface to his *Colonial Policy and Practice*, dated 1947, Furnivall wrote: "It is a tumbled house which they inherit ... exports have fallen by two third of the pre-war figure of £37 million. The annual revenue covers only a third of the current expenditure, and the national debt of £110 million (about seven times the revenue) is rapidly increasing. ... In a troubled world, though less acquainted with affairs than their old rulers, they face a situation far more difficult."²⁴ 'Less acquainted with affairs' may be taken as a reference to the fact that under British rule the Burmese had practically no experience of public administration. The Indian Civil Service was virtually closed to them (except the 'Class II Burma Civil Service' to which was entrusted only the most routine of administrative tasks).

Independent Burma's post-war government was faced with very great internal political strife also. Even had they had the experience of administration, and even *had* they a viable economy to administer, it would still have been an extremely difficult task, in view of the political division, inter-regional conflicts, and Communist insurgency they had to deal with.

If, therefore, Burma's development in the years following 1947 was slower than that of some other countries there are many reasons for it, economic and non-economic. And among the non-economic reasons it is not necessary to look immediately at Burmese culture. The cultural factor was not the major obstacle to economic development by any means. The primary problem was the inherited economic structure, "the excessive reliance on rice production and exports which results in the entire financing structure being highly unstable ..." and, as we have seen, "the fundamental responsibility for this situation should be placed on the British colonial system which forced this monocultural system on Burma."²⁸ If, as some have tried to

argue, cultural resistance to economic change was to blame, something like this cultural resistance would have operated also in neighbouring Thailand, whose culture is a compound of similar elements to that of Burma, with Theravāda Buddhism predominating. The difference is that Thailand escaped European colonisation. Thailand's economic development since World War II seems to have been one of comfortable moderation between the poverty of postcolonial Burma and the booming entrepreneurial prosperity of Japan²⁶; in fact, it has been the 'middle way' which might be expected from a country which had been left relatively free to express its own Buddhist traditional values. The significant differences between the two cases, Burma and Thailand, lie somewhere other than in the sphere of cultural values.

III. THERAVĀDA BUDDHIST VALUES AND CAPITALISM

There is, however, the other equally significant difference just noted; namely, between Thailand and Japan. This leads us to another aspect of the relation between Theravāda Buddhist culture and economic development, an aspect of Theravāda Buddhism which was observed by Max Weber, that its values do not find natural expression in a capitalist economy. We return, therefore, to the examination of Mya Maung's thesis, that Theravāda Buddhism has been largely responsible for slow economic development in Burma, because of its resistance to economic change.

In pursuit of this thesis attention is drawn to the "lack of effort to improve one's economic position" said to be found in Burmese society²⁷. This is attributed by Mya Maung to widespread adherence to the "Buddhist doctrine" of *karma*. This doctrine, it is said, emphasises the uselessness of effort, since a man receives in this life only those boons to which his previous *karma* has entitled him. Since he believes his own effort will avail nothing he has no incentive to make any effort, and this lack of incentive will clearly have an inhibiting effect on economic progress. Such is the theory according to Mya Maung; what it ignores is the fact that Buddhist doctrine most certainly does not discourage moral effort. It is difficult to understand how anyone claiming to expound Theravāda Buddhist doctrine and values could miss so elementary a point.

Another way in which, according to this theory, Buddhist attitudes discourage economic progress is through the general view of life presented by Buddhism, as something characterised by suffering and impermanence. This, says Mya Maung, suggests to the Burman "the futility of the desire for goods, wealth, position and power."²⁸ This, however, is a considerable oversimplification. A more precise and perceptive analysis has been provided by the

anthropologist Melford Spiro.²⁹ Spiro points out a distinction which Mya Maung ignores, between the perspectives of monastic Buddhism and lay Buddhism. He characterises these two levels of Burmese Buddhist understanding and practice in his own terms as “*nibbānic* Buddhism — a religion of radical salvation” and “*kammatic* Buddhism: a religion of proximate salvation”. He distinguishes two further types in addition, which he calls “apotropaic Buddhism — a religion of magical protection”, and “esoteric Buddhism — a religion of chiliastic expectations”. It is the distinction between the first two with which we are concerned at the moment. By *kammatic* Buddhism is meant the religion of the majority of lay people, for whom the goal is not *nibbāna*, but rebirth in improved conditions from those experienced at present, although still in the mortal human world: the goal with which most Burmese are content is this proximate one, not the ultimate goal of *nibbāna*.

Buddhist cultural values might appear to the observer who has an eye to the development of capital resources to affect economic development adversely by reason of the ‘big spending’ indulged in by the Burmese Buddhist in the interests of merit-acquiring through *dāna* — such merit-making expenditure is usually devoted to lavish hospitality and entertainment for friends and neighbours, and to ceremonial banquets for members of the Sangha. Spiro provides a detailed account of expenditure on merit-making activities.³⁰ The major forms of expenditure are those connected with the Sangha. These are: (1) the *initiation ceremony*: the expenses for this are paid by the family whose son is being initiated into the Sangha, and the amount spent can vary from 200 to 5000 kyats (the average annual income in rural central Burma where Spiro’s data come from is about 1000 kyats); (2) *collective offering of robes* to members of the Sangha; this is done in one month of the year, the robe-offering season, but a single family may be involved in five or six such offerings. The most expensive of these robe-offering ceremonies known to Spiro cost 10,000 kyats; (3) *funerals of members of the Sangha*; in a small, thirty family village this can cost about 2000 kyats.³¹ Each family in such a case, contributes from 40 to 75 kyats. Other expenses are special offerings of food to members of the Sangha, the construction and repair of pagodas, and the regular daily feeding of the Sangha. The last item alone takes about 10% of the income of the family, according to Spiro. His conclusion is that “the typical upper Burmese village is reported to spend from 30 to 40% of its net disposable cash income on *dāna* and related activities.”³² These figures are derived from estimates given to Spiro by village elders in fifteen villages in Upper Burma. His own estimate is lower; based on a detailed house to house survey; he reckons it as 25%. It is, he says, “no exaggeration to say that the economy of rural Burma is geared

to the overriding goal of the accumulation of wealth as a means to acquiring merit."³³

Thus, in Burma, the pursuit of traditional religious and social values, says Spiro "provides a powerful motive for economic action." However, it is important to notice that the money which becomes available at harvest time, when the farmer sells his surplus, is channelled into what are from the entrepreneurial point of view unproductive activities. It is spent in maintaining what the Burmese experience as a pleasurable existence now, in this life, and in ensuring improved chances of an even more pleasurable existence next time. Max Weber, while he was wrong in his analysis of Buddhism at some points, was probably right when he said of Buddhism in this case that "there evolved no 'capitalist spirit' in the sense that is distinctive of ascetic Protestantism."³⁴ Unlike Weber's Puritan, "the Burmese Buddhist views worldly pleasures as a boon to be enjoyed." The money which the Burmese farmer receives in payment for his produce is usually not available even as spare cash long enough to be used for short-term investment, as for example the savings of the Malay Muslim towards his journey to Mecca are. In Burma, the season of festivity follows close upon the harvest and surplus cash is soon spent. Hence there can be little disagreement with Spiro's conclusion, that "it can hardly be doubted that over a period of successive generations, the channeling of Burmese savings into economic investments rather than religion would have made a significant difference in the development and growth of the Burmese economy."³⁵ This may well be true; but it is doubtful whether the Burmese economy which might have resulted if the money had been so channelled would have been preferable to the majority of Burmese Buddhists.

IV. THERAVĀDA BUDDHIST VALUES AND THE ENVIRONMENT

Even if Burmese Buddhists were all alerted to the situation, and were made to realise that there were alternative ways of using their surplus earnings it is by no means likely that they would choose to avail themselves of them, in the sense of engaging in competitive entrepreneurial activity. E.F. Schumacher, who served the Government of Burma as economic adviser from 1955 to 1962, has pointed out that Burmese Buddhists have their own view of what is the ultimate economic goal.³⁶ The Burmese are not obliged to accept the presupposition of the Westerner that industrialisation is good because it brings increased consumption of material goods, and thus a so-called higher standard of living. Burmese culture is geared to a more modest economic goal than that of the Western one of total exploitation of every

possible material substance which man can lay his hands on. It is geared to low consumption rather than high, especially of such goods as fuel, cloth, housing material and even, to some extent, food. The less that is consumed annually the better. The aim is "to obtain the maximum of well being with the minimum of consumption" Schumacher observes³⁷. "Thus, if the purpose of clothing is a certain amount of temperature, comfort and an attractive appearance, the task is to attain this purpose with the smallest annual destruction of cloth and with the help of designs that involve the smallest possible input of toil. The less toil there is, the more time and strength is left for artistic creativity. It would be highly uneconomic, for instance, to go in for complicated tailoring, like the modern West, when a much more beautiful effect can be achieved by the skilful draping of uncut material. It would be the height of folly to make material so that it should wear out quickly and the height of barbarity to make anything ugly, shabby or mean. What has just been said about clothing applies equally to all human requirements."³⁸

Added to his emphasis on simplicity in everyday living standards is the Buddhist emphasis on non-violence. These two emphases have been central to the recognised life-style of the Buddhist layman since the time of Aśoka. "It is good not to kill living beings" is the message to the citizens of his realm which occurs in the Aśokan *Rock Edicts* and *Pillar Edicts*. Added to this is the other injunction: to be personally generous, in the whole range of social relationships, which are carefully enumerated, and to adopt a simply style of life: "It is good not only to spend little, but [also] to own the minimum of property."³⁹ Non-violence to all beings is taken to include the physical environment, and certainly the care of trees and avoidance of unnecessary burning of forests.⁴⁰ The present writer recalls a modern example of this which he saw in the gardens of a Thai *wat*; some new trees had been planted, and were not yet established, so beside them there was a notice in Thai which said, literally "please not to hurt the trees". To use any material resources heedlessly or wastefully would be morally wrong, comments Schumacher. Renewable goods like wood and water-power should be used with care; non-renewable goods shall be used "only if they are indispensable, and then only with the greatest care and the most meticulous concern for conservation. To use them heedlessly or extravagantly is an act of violence ..."⁴¹ It may be surmised that Schumacher's presentation of the Theravāda Buddhist attitudes on economic affairs is based not so much on the evidence of the Pāli canon, although a good case along these lines could be constructed from that source, so much as on the attitudes of his Buddhist informants in Burma. More than one Westerner has been aware of the

different kinds of response which are evoked respectively by the civilisations of India and of Burma. India was seen by the nineteenth century Englishman in terms of the white man's burden, of the great tasks of reform and enlightenment which needed to be carried out, and of the superiority of his own civilisation. Burma by contrast was a pleasant land with a generally humane society. As one Englishman wrote towards the end of the nineteenth century: "Coming from half-starved, over-driven India, it is a revelation to see the animals in Burma. The village ponies and cattle and dogs in India are enough to make the heart bleed for their sordid misery, but in Burma they are a delight to the eye ... The Burman is full of the greatest sympathy towards animals ... he has no contempt for them; but the gentle toleration of a father to very little children who are stupid and troublesome often, but are very lovable."⁴² H. Fielding Hall, from one of whose works that quotation is taken, wrote a good deal about the country and the people for whom he had so great an affection and admiration. The effect of his writings about Burma and the condition of the common people in a Buddhist civilisation, was such that the London *Morning Post* reviewer of one of his books, comparing the social condition of the people of England and Burma at that time found that "for the great majority of the working classes the superiority of Western civilisation is a doubtful point."⁴³ It is much the same today, according to Lucian Pye: "India now suggests to Americans the urgency of five-year plans and the merits of modern industrial development, while Burma continues to evoke a question as to whether modern life is really the ultimate way."⁴⁴

The Theravāda Buddhist values which gradually permeated Burmese society in the course of the centuries produced an economy which has among its notable characteristics that it is, so far as the individual is concerned, non-acquisitive, and so far as the environment and natural resources are concerned notably less violently exploitative and destructive. The history of the modern West, since the rise of Protestantism, has been characterised by a drive to dominate. The natural world is subject to man, and it is his divinely-ordained task to explore its farthest corners and ransack all its resources; to refrain from doing so, to respect it, and honour it for what it is *per se* would be a sin tantamount to pantheism. And those who regard themselves as the elect, the saved, the chosen of God, have seen it as their proper task to dominate and colonise both politically and 'spiritually' the rest of the world.

For the Buddhist the task is not that of domination; but co-operation. Within Burma, in particular, the non-acquisitive, non-violently exploitative attitude has, in terms of modern statehood, found its logical expression in the creating and maintaining of a socialist society, in which the country's

natural and human resources should be respected and used for the common good of all; this has been the task to which Burma's Buddhist leaders have addressed themselves.

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NOTES

¹ See, for instance, *Jāt.* 334, 407, 501, 521, 533, 534, 540, 544, etc.

² *Anguttara Nikāya*. See *Gradual Sayings*, Vol. III, p. 114f.

³ The phrase, and the idea, are found in the Ven. W. Rahula's *History of Buddhism in Ceylon* (2nd ed., 1966), p. 54.

⁴ *Recueil des Cours*, Vol. II, 1967.

⁵ This point is dealt with more fully in the present writer's *The Buddha: Buddhist Civilisation in India and Ceylon*, London 1973.

⁶ Lorraine Barić, quoted by William Wilder, in 'Islam, Other Factors and Malay Backwardness: Comments on an Argument', in *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. II, 2 (Apr. 1968) 155.

⁷ Mya Maung is a native of Burma who received his Ph.D. degree in economics at the Catholic University in 1961. He teaches in the Finance Department of Boston College in the United States.

⁸ Mya Maung, 'Cultural Value and Economic Change in Burma', in *Asian Survey IV* (March 1964). Reprinted in *Man, State and Society in Contemporary South-East Asia* (ed. by R.O. Tilman), 1969, p. 527.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 533.

¹⁰ See T.O. Ling, 'Buddhist Factors in Population Growth and Control', *Population Studies XXIII*, pt. I, Mar. 1969.

¹¹ J.S. Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice 1947*, p. 216.

¹² Louis J. Walinsky, *Economic Development in Burma 1951-60*, (1962).

¹³ Walinsky, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

¹⁴ *Biruma no Keizai Kaihatsu* (Eng. trsl. *Economic Development in Burma*), Asian Economic Research Institute, Tokyo 1961, p. 148.

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 252.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 253. Cf. also p. 605.

¹⁸ Lucian W. Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation Building* (1962), p. 60.

¹⁹ See note 14.

²⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 183.

²¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 223.

²² *Op. cit.*, p. 254.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Furnivall, *op. cit.*, p. xi.

²⁵ *Biruma no Keizai Kaihatsu* (see note 14), p. 605.

²⁶ See Eliezer B. Ayal, 'Value Systems and Economic Development in Japan and Thailand', in *Man, State and Society in Contemporary South East Asia* (see note 8), ch. 38.

²⁷ Mya Maung, *op. cit.*, p. 528.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ Melford E. Spiro, *Buddhism and Society*, 1971.

³⁰ Spiro, *op. cit.*, p. 456ff.

³¹ Spiro, p. 457.

- 32 Spiro, p. 459.
- 33 *Ibid.*
- 34 Max Weber, *Sociology of Religion* (tr. by E. Fisschoff), 1966, p. 269.
- 35 Spiro, *op. cit.*, p. 463.
- 36 E.F. Schumacher, 'Buddhist Economics', in *Asia: A Handbook* (ed. by Guy Wint), 1965, pp. 695ff.
- 37 Schumacher, *op. cit.*, p. 698.
- 38 *Ibid.*
- 39 *Third Major Rock Edict*. See Trevor Ling, *op. cit.*, chapter 9.
- 40 *Fifth Pillar Edict*, See R. Thapar, *Aśoka and the Decline of the Mauryas*, 1961, p. 264.
- 41 Schumacher, *op. cit.*, p. 699.
- 42 H. Fielding Hall, *The Soul of a People*, 1898 (4th ed., 1902), p. 239; and see the whole chapter, 'Noblesse Oblige'.
- 43 See H. Fielding Hall, *op. cit.*, review of *The Onward Light*, facing p. 314.
- 44 Pye, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

THE ADVENT OF BUDDHISM TO BURMA

Ever since Rājakumār wrote the first dated inscription in Old Burmese (1628 A.B./1084-85 A.D.)¹, the Era of the Religion has always been reckoned in Burma from 544 B.C., the supposed date of Gotama Buddha's death. This latter date is based on Singhalese sources; modern historians mostly favour a date c.480 B.C.² Under the Mauryan emperor Aśoka, after the third Buddhist Council of Pāṭaliputra (c.253 B.C.), the Buddhist Canon was closed, and Buddhist missionaries dispatched to various countries: Aśoka's son and daughter, Mahendra and Saṅghamitrā, brought the Religion to Ceylon; and, according to the fourth century *Dīpavaṃsa* (VIII, 12) and the sixth century *Mahāvaṃsa* (XII, 44-54), the Theras Soṇa and Uttara brought it, apparently by sea, to Suvannabhūmi. This "Land of Gold", like the Greek *Chrysê*³, is generally taken to be in Further India. The Mon-Pāli inscriptions of the Kalyāṇisimā, Pegu (1479 A.D.)⁴, identify the site with the region of Lower Burma some thirty miles north of Thatôn, where Mt. Kelāsa (1100 ft) stands high on the seashore, east of the mouth of the Sit-taung. Nearly four hundred years earlier, in April 1098, in the same region, the Pagán king Kyanzittha had repaired "the great monuments built by king *Dharmāsok*"⁵, and left two long inscriptions in Old Mon, at *Kyāḱ Talañ* (Ayetthèma)⁶ below Mt. Kelāsa, and at "the prāsāda of the great Relic of *Satih*" (Kyaik Tè pagoda)⁷ some four miles north-east of it, as well as duplicates at Thatôn itself.

According to the *Mahāvaṃsa*, the arrival of Soṇa and Uttara coincided with an attack from the sea by a monstrous female *yakḱhinī* who devoured babies. Now for centuries around the beginning of the Christian era, the coasts of the Gulf of Martaban are believed to have been infested by Malayan pirates, whose remnants still survive as the Selung (Salôn) 'sea-gypsies' of the islands off southern Tenasserim.⁸ A series of small forts near river-mouths, from Twanté to the mouth of the Salween, bear witness to this. The mainland peoples called them 'demons': in Old Mon *kindok* (kālôk), in Old Burmese *philū* (bilu:), identified with Sanskrit *rakṣa*. Perhaps the original Thatôn was built by them: at any rate its oldest name known to us was *Rakṣapura*.⁹ And to this day the large island at the mouth of the Salween is called 'Bilu-gyun', "island of the demons". This constant threat to the coast of the Gulf of Martaban, may help to explain why Indian culture and religions were slower to take root here than elsewhere in Further India.

But there is evidence that the Rakṣa, once settled, changed their ways.

Rakṣapura ultimately became *Sudhammapura* (Thatôn, "city of the Good Law"). At Zôkthôk, south of Mt. Kelāsa, the *kindok* made offerings of their 'ropes of hair' (Mon *juk-sok*, Zôkthôk), and built their laterite pagoda, *Kālôk-dak*, "built by the *kālôk*".¹⁰ I have even wondered whether the *kyāk Talan* at Ayetthèma may have been the work, originally, of the Orang Talang of Central Sumatra, or may have some connection with the noble Buddhist inscription in Old Malay at Talang Tuwo, Śrī Vijaya (684 A.D.¹¹).

By the middle of the first millenium A.D., the main period of East-West invasions of Burma (Malayan in the south, Mon-Khmer in the centre, Tibeto-Burman in the north) appears to have passed. According to the *Hou-han-shu* (ch. 116), by 109 B.C. the Han were masters of Eastern Yünnan (I-chou *chün*). By 69 A.D. they were close to the Burma frontier (Yung-ch'ang *chün*). The Ai-lao people of Yung-ch'ang¹², mostly west of the Mekong, numbered over half a million, under 77 district chiefs. They traced their origin from a dragon. The tale, as told then, is devoid of Indian influence. Later (as Pelliot has shown)¹³, under a partly Buddhist guise, it becomes the P'iao-chü-ti/Pyu-saw-hti legend, common to Burma and Nan-chao. In 226 A.D. (*Shu-chih*, ch. 5), Chu-ko Liang crossed the Salween; his fort on the Kao-li-kung range was still there in the ninth century.¹⁴ But in 342 A.D. (*Tsin-shu*, ch. 14) Yung-ch'ang *chün* was abolished.

Greek, Indian and Chinese sources agree in showing that before the end of the first century A.D., by land as well as by sea, there was trade-contact between India, Further India and China. Ptolemy's *Takôla*, the port of cardamoms, should be the same as the *Takkola* of the *Milindapañha*.¹⁵ Scholars generally regard it as a port on the west coast of the Isthmus of Kra.¹⁶ Apparently north of it, in the gulf of *Sabara* (? gulf of Martaban), there was the mouth of the river *Bêsynga* (Indian *Vesunga*), peopled by cannibals (? Malayan *Rakṣas*). Greek *Chrysê*, in a large sense, may correspond to *Suvaṇṇabhūmi*: Greek *Argyre* (in spite of the absence of silver mines) to Arakan. Ptolemy's informant, Marinus of Tyre (c. 100 A.D.), should have known best the coast of *Argyrê*. The anonymous *Periplus of the Erythran Sea*¹⁷, a little earlier in date, mentions the *Sêsatai* (Ptolemy's *Saêsadai*), a stunted broad-faced people on the borders of China and India, who played an unconscious part as middlemen in the trade in 'the dark leaf', *malabathron*, probably cinnamon. The author mentions gold mines, and "a coinage of gold called *kaltis*". There was certainly no lack of gold in the north of Burma, but no ancient gold coins have been reported. But in many of its western languages, Sak as well as Chin, the common word for 'silver' is borrowed from Sanskrit *ṭaṅka*. The early Guptas extended their sway as far as North Assam (*Kāmarūpa*) and East Bengal (*Samatata*). I-tsing mentions

an old temple in India, built in the fourth century A.D. by Śrī Gupta, founder of the Gupta dynasty, for “twenty Chinese monks who left their country by the *Tsang-ko* [N. Kueichou] road in the province of *Shu* [W. Ssûch ‘uan], and made their way to the *Mahābodhi* temple.”¹⁸

But there are problems. Early in the third century A.D., Fan Shih Wan, king of Fu-nan on the Lower Mekong, “caused great ships to be built” and conquered “more than ten kingdoms”, mostly on the Malay Peninsula. “Then he wished to subdue the kingdom of *Chin-lin*; but he fell ill...” These were ports famous (by the fifth century) for scented woods, crowded with Indian merchants and Brahmans who settled there, converting the natives (many of whom were of fair complexion), and intermarrying with them. There were also, it seems, a few Buddhists. *Chin-lin*, also called *Chin-ch’ên* (the first character in each case meaning ‘gold’), was a large kingdom, rich in silver and ivory, on a big bay over 2000 *li* west of Fu-nan. 2000 *li* inland beyond it, in a wide dry plain, was the kingdom of *Lin-yang* (*liem-yang), with an ardent Buddhist population of over a myriad families, including several thousand monks. 2000 *li* beyond Lin-yang was *Nu-hou*, kingdom of “the descendants of slaves”, over 20000 families, conterminous with Yung-ch’ang.¹⁹ The problem is simple, but the data are confused. Is the “big bay” the Gulf of Siam or the Gulf of Martaban? Were these kingdoms in Central Burma or in Upper Siam?

Several early Chinese works, some dating from the fourth century A.D., refer more or less fancifully to tribes living south-west of Yung-ch’ang. In the mountains astride the frontier there were the wild *P’u* (*buok) tribes; the character is similar to the one applied to some of the hill-Burmans in the *Man-shu* of Fan Ch’o (863 A.D.). Beyond the *P’u*, 3000 *li* south-west (query south-east?) of Yung-ch’ang, there is mention of a civilised people, the *P’iao*, where “prince and minister, father and son, elder and younger, have each their order of precedence.”²⁰

At Kôkkôgwa (‘Beikthano’ – “Viṣṇu city”), about a hundred miles north of Pyu Śrī Kṣetra (Old Prome), Burma’s chief archaeologist, U Aung Thaw²¹, has excavated a site which he, rather boldly, calls “essentially Pyu in character. Masonry structures with massive walls constructed of large-sized brick, uninscribed silver coins bearing symbols of prosperity and good luck, burial urns of plain and exquisite designs, beads of clay and semi-precious stones, decorated domestic pottery, iron nails and bosses, are among the finds which reveal convincing cultural links between Beikhtano and ... Śrī Kṣetra. The significant absence of Buddhist statuary and relics and of Pyu inscriptions lend support to fix Beikthano culture at an earlier stage of Pyu chronology.” Near one entrance he found “two huge sandstone blocks, each bearing in

high relief a pair of human feet", which he took to be door-guardians. One large rectangular brick-complex he regards as a monastery; and another cylindrical one, "with four rectangular projections and two concentric retaining walls resembles the typical Andhra type of stūpa at Amarāvati and Nāgārjunakoṇḍa distinguished by the *āyaka* platforms at the cardinal points." A circular clay seal, inscribed *saṃghasiri* in Brāhmī script, he dates second century A.D.

North Arakan, at this early period, was part of Eastern India rather than Western Burma. The long series of silver coins found there, which, together with the Sanskrit inscriptions, were studied by the late E.H. Johnston,²² while distantly based on Indian symbols (*aṅkuśa*, *vardhamāna*, *Gaja Lakṣmī*, sun and moon, the rising sun, the wheel, etc.),²³ bear some resemblance to those found at Pyu sites, whether Śrī Kṣetra, Beikthano, or the northern city of Halin (south of Shwebo). But there are also marked differences. Eighteen of the twenty-two Arakan coins bear royal names inscribed above the Bull of Śiva. The four earliest coins are without the Bull, but show the Conch of Viṣṇu. The Conch also appears on a few of the earliest coins of Śrī Kṣetra,²⁴ but never the Bull of Śiva. Royal names are all Sanskritic, and confined to the coins of Arakan. They appear to start with Deva, the fourth king of the Candra dynasty. Its thirteen kings are shown on the west face of the great Shitthaung pillar to have reigned from near the middle of the fourth, to the latter half of the sixth century. Two Śaiva coins of the succeeding dynasty are shown by Johnston; but the Shitthaung inscription proves that by the middle of the seventh century king Vajrasakti had obviously turned to the Buddhist Mahāyāna; and, after an interval, early in the eighth century, his grandson Ānandacandra, author of the inscription, strongly confirmed the change to Buddhism.

About 642 A.D. Hsüan-tsang²⁵, and about 675 I-tsing²⁶, both visited Samatāṭa, and listed the Buddhist countries beyond in Further India: first, Śrī Kṣetra; then, to the south-east, Kāmalāṅka or Laṅkasuka (? north of the Malay Peninsula); further east, Dvāravati (on the Gulf of Siam); etc. Neither mention Arakan, where Śaivism still lingered. In Kāmarūpa (North Assam) Hsüan-tsang found Brahmanism dominant: though there were some Buddhists, no Buddhist monastery had ever been built there. Both Chia Tan and Fan Ch'ō (seventh to ninth centuries) place "Brahman kingdoms" in Manipur and the Hukong Valley (source of the Chindwin).²⁷

Perhaps, at this late period, one should not distinguish too sharply these Indian cults. While Buddhism waxed outside India, it waned in India itself, or tended to merge in older Brahmanic cults. A favourite theme for the sculptor in Old Burma (as in mediaeval India) was the creation (or re-

creation) of the universe from the lotus issuing from the navel of Viṣṇu, sleeping on the Śeṣa serpent. This lotus supports the thrones of the Brahmanic Triad — Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva. At least six of these Anantaśayana sculptures have been found in Burma: one at Śrī Kṣetra, two at Thatôn, one in Kawgun Cave, two at early Pagán.²⁸ Even king Kyanzittha (fl. 1084-1113 A.D.), who strove to reconcile Pagán Buddhism with Singhalese Theravāda, always claimed to be an Avatar of Viṣṇu.

One would like to know more of the tribal movements and populations in Burma around the middle of the first millenium A.D. As for Indians round the Gulf, such terms as 'kling, tling' (Kaliṅga, east coast of India) and 'Ussa' (Odra, Orissa) indicate the main sources; though Old Burmese *tanluin*, applied to Mons mostly in Lower Burma, shows that the word had changed its meaning considerably by the twelfth century.²⁹ As for Upper Burma, Burmese Chronicles generally start with Tagaung, an old city (or cities) on the east bank of the Irawady, 127 miles north of Mandalay. They write of Sākiyan kings from India ruling the Pyu, Kanyan (*Kam:yam*) and Thet (*Sak*).³⁰ I do not know who the *Kam:yam* were, unless the word is a misspelling of 'Karen' (Old Burmese *Karyan*) — a very ancient people in Burma. The Pyu (Old Burmese *Pyū*; Chinese *P'iao*) and the Thet-Kādu (Old Burmese *Sakr*, *Kantū*; Chinese *Chien-tu*) were also predecessors of the Burmans. U Aung Thaw has done some excavation at Tagaung³¹ (Old Burmese *Takon*; Chinese *T'ai-kung*). While he says that "no evidence antedating the Pagán period has yet been found" there, he points out that two types of its votive tablets are peculiar to Tagaung. He does not mention Ôdôk pagoda, where votive tablets going back to Aniruddha's northern campaign are reported.³² In spite of spurious finds there,³³ which have given it a bad name, Tagaung's antiquity as a Buddhist centre and a Kādu capital, at least as old as Pagán, can hardly be questioned. Fragmented Śak cultures can be traced along the lower hills from the plains of India to northern Yünnan. Over a thousand years ago, when the Meithei (Old Burmese *Kasañ*) and Kuki-Chin (Old Burmese *Khyan*) invaders occupied the Valley of Manipur and the Upper Chindwin, they reduced to serfdom (*Lui*)³⁴ the original Sak occupants (Andro, Sengmai, etc.). But the Sak maintained their identity down to modern times, rejecting the change to Hinduism. Hudson's book on the Meithei³⁵ shows how vital they still remain in Manipur's economy. Sak villages are also numerous on both sides of the Arakan/Chittagong border, nearly 300 miles south-west of Imphal. Lucien Bernot³⁶ has published an admirable study, including a vocabulary, of the "Cak" on the Chittagong side. The northernmost point where a Sak dialect has been recorded in modern times, is at Tamanthi on the Upper Chindwin³⁷, about a hundred miles east-north-east

of Imphal. The most numerous Sak concentration today is in Kātha district, at the source of the Mu river and the Mingin Range, where the Kādu and Gānan (who call themselves 'Asak') numbered 40000 at the 1931 Census.³⁸ In Pyu times the Sak-Kantū may well have been the most numerous and cultured people of Northern Burma, though no evidence of Sak writing has yet been found. In 1284, near the end of the Pagan period, the *Chien-tu* around Tagaung submitted to the Mongols; and in the same year, according to the same history (*Yuan-shih*, ch.13, 15), the *Chien-tu* (same characters) of the Chien-ch'ang valley, 500 miles to the east, also submitted.³⁹

The Pyu (Old Mon *Tircul*⁴⁰ — roughly the name by which they called themselves) did more than any other people to establish Indian Buddhism in Burma. They seem to have entered Burma from the east — the side furthest from India. Were they converted by the Kantū? Soon literate, they appear to have disciplined their archaic Indian script (which I call 'Tircul') to employ tonal marks as substitutes for lost final consonants. Their language was closest, probably, to the Lolo of East Yünnan and Eastern Burma. Their early megalithic cult, with its huge stone funerary urns for royalty, places them in close relation to the bronze age culture of Tran-ninh, Plaine des Jarres, in Laos.⁴¹ Never, I think, very numerous in Burma, their three main centres were their southern heavily defended capital at Śrī Kṣetra; their second strongly walled northern capital at Halin, south of Shwebo; and (according to T'ang Chinese texts) at Hsi-li-i (Śrī),⁴² somewhere near Hsen-wi or Lashio, their eastern headquarters, ruled by the king's younger brother, guarding the frontier with Nan-chao. At Śrī Kṣetra, four short Tircul inscriptions on the royal urns of the Vikrama dynasty have been read by Blagden⁴³; and if he is right (as I feel sure he is) in assuming that the Pyu Era (*taki'kha u sni*) is the so-called 'Burmese Era' starting at 638 A.D., we can safely accept his conclusion that the four kings reigned at least from 673 to 718 A.D. The first, who died in 35s./673 A.D., may conceivably have been the founder of the city, and (simultaneously) of the era. If so, this would imply, I imagine, that Śrī Kṣetra was to be the first Buddhist capital of a united Burma. One of the features of the older forms of Tircul script, both at Śrī Kṣetra and Halin, is the occasional Brāhmī lettering between the lines. This has not been explained⁴⁴; and it has led some scholars to think that the old 78 A.D. era is intended; but this is highly improbable. One must allow for time-lags. Blagden admits the "signs of great archaism" in Tircul script; but since it was much the same in the eleventh century Rājaku-mā inscription, "I cannot understand" he adds, "how anyone can profess to date their inscriptions by palaeographical evidence alone."

This is not the place to dilate on the magnificent heritage of Buddhist art and architecture already excavated at Śrī Kṣetra. Serious work began from 1906-07 onwards, with General de Beylié and Taw Sein Ko⁴⁵; and it is far from finished. The Pyu excelled in many arts, and rarely repeat themselves: so every mound has its surprises. There are brick and stucco stūpas 150 ft. high; tiny encased stupas, strangely modern; vaulted shrines of extraordinary variety of plan, as old as any in India; megalithic thrones, richly carved, 30 ft. or more in circumference; mysterious megalithic basins and mortars; megalithic Buddhist Triads and Bodhisattvas, where the reredos seems more important than the image; the Khin-ba-gôn trove of gold, silver and bronze caskets; petalled lotuses, silver coins, goldleaf manuscripts, large terracotta carvings; Mahāyānist and other votive tablets; Vaiṣṇava sculptures. Śrī Kṣetra, no doubt, has lost much of its wealth to treasure-hunters. But it has never suffered wholesale looting and burning by hostile armies.

Which explains, perhaps, why finds at Halin,⁴⁶ the second Pyu capital, have been comparatively meagre: one broken megalithic Bodhisattva-carving, with predella showing 53 realistic worshippers; and four Pyu inscriptions, early and late. Chinese contemporary accounts⁴⁷ (c.800 A.D.) mention a seated Buddha-statue, white as snow, over a hundred feet high; glazed bricks, tiles and jars; and over a hundred Buddhist monasteries (doubtless of wood), “decked with gold and silver, coated with cinnabar and bright colours, floors smeared with red kino and covered with embroideries and rugs.” These were also schools for boys and girls, from the age of seven to twenty. “They love life and hate killing. Their law has no mention of punishment nor chains and fetters. They do not wear silk because it involves injury to life.” In 801-2 A.D., when the Governor of Śrī led a formal embassy to the T’ang Court, including 35 musicians, Wei Kao,⁴⁸ the Governor of Hsi-ch’uan, took careful note (which survives), and pictures (which do not), of their 22 instruments and 12 songs, all on Buddhist themes. This gracious culture perished in the flames, when Nan-chao sacked Halin in 832 A.D. How far the early culture of Yünnan was Buddhist, it is difficult to judge; but T’ang texts about Nan-chao suggest that it hardly survived under the constant strain of wars, either with China or Tibet.

How much Buddhist literature existed in Burma in Pyu times? Opinions may differ: the following list, at least, is beyond question.

(i) *Vinaya, Mahāvagga* I, 23. The Buddhist Creed, *ye dharmmā hetuprabhavā*, etc. the stanza spoken by Assaji, which led to the conversion of Gotama’s chief disciples, Sāriputta and Moggallāna. It is engraved in Pāli on both of the Maunggan gold plates, found seven miles south of Śrī Kṣetra

and now at the British Museum. Edited by U Tun Nyein at *Epigraphia Indica*, Vol. V, 1896-99, No. 11, pp. 101-102. It is found in Sanskrit twice on stones near Sandoway in South Arakan: see E.H. Johnston's article in *BSOAS*, London XI, Part 2, Plate IV, Figure 2, and pp. 359, 363-4, 383. It is found in either language, set in moulds or stamped on countless terracotta votive tablets at almost all the ancient sites in Burma. As Coedès says (*J. Siam. Soc.* XX (1926)5-6) it "must rapidly have acquired in the eyes of the ancient Buddhists a sort of magic virtue, ... a quite irresistible charm for the conversion to the Faith of any who had not heard it."

(ii) *Vinaya, Mahāvagga* 1, 1. *Paṭicca-samuppāda*, the Chain of Causation. See Excerpt 1 (leaves 1 to 5) of the Khinbagôn goldleaf manuscript. In Pāli. Edited by U Lu Pe Win (*ASB* (1939) 12-22). A fuller version, starting from the beginning of the *vagga*, is shown on a stone found at Kunzeik village on the east bank of the Sittaung river, some 40 miles north-east of Pegu (Aung Thaw, *Historical Sites in Burma*, pp. 110-111).

(iii) *Vinaya, Mahāvagga* 1, 22. Sakka's song in praise of Gotama entering Rājagaha. See Excerpt 7 (leaves 18-19) of the Khinbagôn goldleaf manuscript.

(iv) *Dīgha Nikāya* 2. *Sāmañāphala suttanta* 49. Dr. Jivaka's praise of Gotama before king Ajātasattu, *iti pi so bhagavā* etc. See Excerpt 8 (leaf 20) of the Khinbagôn goldleaf manuscript. Also on the second Maunggan goldplate. Also, clear but fragmentary, on the goldleaf found at Kyundawzu village, Śrī Kṣetra (Duroiselle, *ASI* (1929) Plate LI (a) and p. 109).

(v) *Dīgha Nikāya* 16. *Mahāparinibbāna suttanta*. List of the 37 elements of Enlightenment, concluding with the Āryan eightfold path. See Excerpt 3 (leaf 6) of the Khinbagôn goldleaf manuscript.

(vi) *Majjhima Nikāya* 12. *Mahāsihanāda sutta* 71-72. The four *Vesārajāni* (self-confidences of a Buddha). See Excerpt 4 (leaves 6-14) of the Khinbagôn goldleaf manuscript.

(vii) *Khuddaka Nikāya* 2. *Dhammapada* gāthā 203. The four 'Bests' (*seṭṭho*). See Excerpt 6 (leaf 18) of the Khinbagôn goldleaf manuscript.

(viii) *Khuddaka Nikāya* 12. *Paṭisambhidāmagga*. The fourteen *buddhañ-ñāṇāni* (enlightened knowledges). See Excerpt 5 (leaves 14-17) of the Khinbagôn goldleaf manuscript.

(ix) The first Maunggan goldplate lists also in ascending numbers the four *iddhipādā* (bases of potency); four *sammappadhānā* (right efforts); four *sati-paṭṭhānā* (earnest thoughts); four *ariyasaccāni* (noble truths); four *vesārajāni* (confidences); five *indriyāni* (senses); five *cakkhūni* (eyes); six *asaddhāraṇāni* (uniquenesses of a Buddha); seven *bojjhaṅgā* (elements of Buddhahood); *ariyo atṭhangiko maggo* (eight-fold noble path); nine *lokuttarā dhammā*

(supernatural states); ten *balāni* (strengths); fourteen *buddhaññāṇāni* (Buddha-knowledges); eighteen *buddhadhammāni* (conditions of Buddhahood).

(x) *Abhidhamma Vibhaṅga* (PTS VI, p. 144) — Pāli stone fragment (three pieces) found on the second terrace of the Bawbawgyi pagoda, Śrī Kṣetra. See *ASI* (1911) Plate XLVII (Figures 1 and 2) and p. 89; 1912, Plate LXVIII (Figure 1) and pp. 141-2. Edited by L. Finot in *Journal Asiatique* (July-August 1912), 134-136, and (July-August 1913) 193-195.

(xi) Buddhaghosa⁴⁹, *Visuddhimagga*, chapter XXI (Nāṇamoli, *Path of Purification*, p. 745). Lists of seven of the eight *ñāṇadassanā* (contemplative knowledges) mentioned at the beginning of the chapter. See Excerpt 3 (leaf 5) of the Khinbagôn goldleaf manuscript.

The above list may be only 'the tip of the iceberg'. At Khinbagôn alone, Duroiselle found 16 more fragmentary gold and silver plates with Pyu inscriptions. The Maunggan plates were found by accident between bricks. And war was not the only danger to written literature. Palmleaf manuscripts, lodged usually in wooden monasteries, prove early victims of *anicca*. But I think it doubtful if the Pyu ever had a full set of the *Tipiṭaka*. One notable absentee from Pyu art is the *Jātaka* and its commentary: even the ten great stories of the *Mahānipāta*, which created such a sensation when they came to Thatôn, and thence to Pagán, in the eleventh century. Duroiselle suggested, hesitatingly, that one Khinbagôn terracotta plaque,⁵⁰ showing a king on his lion-throne between attendants, might illustrate the *Mūgapakkha Jātaka*: but he admitted that "the scene corresponds to none of the sixteen trials to which prince Temiya was subjected." But I think the name, at least, of Viśvaṃtara was known early, for it appears in Old Burmese, not only as Pali *Vessantara*, but in early corrupt forms, *Pisamantra*⁵¹, etc.

The legendary history of the Buddhas is told in the 14th book of the *Khuddaka Nikāya*, the *Buddhavaṃsa*. It was a lateish addition to the Canon. Early Yünnan Buddhists obviously knew nothing of it, since they derived the peoples of the world from the progeny of A-yü Wang (Aśoka), including their own ancestors, P'iao-chü-ti, Ti-méng-chü, etc. Ceylon Chronicles traced the origin of the Sākiyan family to king Mahāsammata.⁵² For the story of the 24 previous Buddhas, the *Buddhavaṃsa* goes back thousands of kalpas to Dipaṅkara, and even mentions (in ch.27) three earlier Buddhas in the same kalpa (but not their *bodhi*-trees) — Taṇhaṅkara, Medhaṅkara and Saraṇaṅkara. All are usually included in the many Pagán paintings of the 28 Buddhas.⁵³ In the present *bhadrakalpa* four Buddhas have appeared: Kaku-sandha, Koṇāgamana, Kassapa, Gotama. In the Khinbagôn trove these are shown more than once, touching Earth or in *dhyānamudrā*. But on the

centre-piece in the relic-chamber, where they are named. the order is unusual: *Gonagamona*, *Gagusadha*, *Kasyapa*, *Godama*.⁵⁴ They also appear, in *dhyānamudrā*, on the conical gold image found in Kyaik Dé-ap (Botahtaung pagoda) at Rangoon, together with a terracotta image with the Buddhist creed in seventh century writing on the back.⁵⁵ In Old Mon such group-images are rightly called "the Four Buddhas" (*kyāṅ pan*); in Old Burmese, more vaguely, "the Four Faces" (*liṃ myaknhā*).

The 24/28 Buddhas are not listed in Burma, so far as I know, before the eleventh century; but I suspect that they are implied in several large (and often jumbled) collections of Buddhist images in coastal Burma. In this area the characteristic material is Laterite — the red porous iron clay which hardens on exposure to the air. Though friable and brittle, the old laterite Buddhas of the Gulf of Martaban remain objects of beauty and reverence long after their surface-features are lost. They are monoliths, normally in the round, without reredos, and they can be colossal. One in two fragments, visible on the skyline seven miles south of Syriam, would have been about 12 ft. high. Another, found sunk in sand nearby at Htamalôn village (it is now moved to Syriam) is 17 ft. 9 in. (excluding its modern throne). At Zôk-thôk there is a small laterite monolith with the Four Buddhas set in arched shrines below, and a caitya above.⁵⁶ Adjoining the large pagodas in this region (which are usually built on massive beams of laterite), one sometimes notices a separate enclosure or *śīmā* (chapterhouse and ordination-hall), now roofless, with a jumble of laterite Buddhas. I think these once represented the 28 Buddhas. There is one such group east of the north stairway to Kyaik Hkaik pagoda, south of Syriam. Clearest is the group north of the east stairway to Kālôkdak pagoda, Zôkthôk. Here the walled *śīmā* measures 39 ft. 2 in. by 23 ft., with eight images against the east wall, ten against the west, five each against the north and south walls, and two larger images (one with reredos) facing each other in the centre.

The *Hsin-t'ang-shu* (section on P'iao) tells us something of a series of *K'un-lun* (Mon) states near the Gulf of Martaban. The *Man-shu* (ch.10) tells us more, but (I suspect) less accurately. The chief city was *Mi-ch'ên* (*myie-žen) — which might perhaps be modern Kyôn-tu near Waw, some twenty miles north-east of Pegu, near the old mouth of the Pegu river.⁵⁷ The *Hsin-t'ang-shu* says: — "After *Mi-ch'ên* one reaches *K'un-lang*, where there is the Little *K'un-lun* people. The king is called *Mang-hsi-yüeh* (*mâng-siet-ywŭt). The customs are the same as those of *Mi-ch'ên*. After *K'un-lang* one reaches *Lu-yü* (*luk-yiu), where there is the kingdom of the Great *K'un-lun* king. The king's name is Śrī Bhavānantasena (?). The river-plain is larger than at

Mi-ch'ên. From the residence of the Little king of K'un-lun, a half-day's journey brings one to *Mo-ti-p'o* (*muâ-d'i-b'uet) stockade" — from which one sailed to *Fo-tai* (Śrī Vijaya, Palembang) and *Shê-p'o* (Java).⁵⁸ The yearly rainfall in these parts is over 200 inches; and during the past millenium the land has gained greatly on the sea. Old ports, such as Thatôn, are now ten miles or more inland. Even allowing for mistakes, it is not easy to relate the above itinerary to the coastline today. Perhaps it ran roughly from Kyôn-tu south to Martaban.

Fan Ch'o, author of the *Man-shu* (863 A.D.), never visited Burma, and had to depend on frontier-informants under his command. He thought the Chindwin flowed into the sea; and so he confuses Mi-ch'ên with a (Chin?) capital in the Chindwin region. If one eliminates the confusion, his account is (briefly) as follows (translation, p. 90): — "Mi-ch'ên borders the sea. The people have short black faces. They are naturally polite and respectful. The king lives in a wooden stockade on the margin of the sea. The four feet of the house consist of stone lions, covered with planks of scented wood. The common people live in 'lofts'. They wear smocks of silkcotton. Both men and women are fond of music. At each end of their 'lofts' they set drums. After drinking liquor they beat the drums. The men join hands (with the women), and up in their 'lofts' they posture and stamp to the music. They are 60 stages south-west of Yung-ch'ang." In 835 A.D. Nan-chao "destroyed their kingdom and looted their gold and silver. They captured two or three thousand, and banished them to wash the gold of the *Li Shui* (Irawady)."

Old remains at Kyôn-tu show few signs of Buddhism, apart from the Kunzeik stone mentioned *supra*, some 20 miles upstream on the east bank. There are two large laterite lions, and a fine series of terracotta plaques, set at intervals in the brick retaining walls of mounds with laterite foundations. Each plaque (about 18 in. square and 4 in. thick) holds a round medallion in low relief with beaded border. Some, so Duroiselle tells us, are inscribed with numeral signs or characters in the Kadamba script of Telugu-Canarese,⁵⁹ used also in Pali writings at Śrī Kṣetra. They show several scenes of music, dance and revelry: boxing, bullfights, lion or tiger hunts, fighting on horseback or elephants; the figures vivid and admirably grouped, not Indian (I think, though Duroiselle says the opposite), but broad-faced, plump and (often) jolly.⁶⁰ Two Śrī Kṣetra terracottas show similar dances.⁶¹ If nominally subject to the Pyu, Mi-ch'ên sent, in 805 A.D., an independent embassy to China, where the emperor recognized its hereditary king. The *T'ang-hui-yao* (961 A.D.) adds⁶²: "Their music and dancing are the same as those of the Pyu. They especially cultivate this talent for music." The *Tai-p'ing-*

yü-lan encyclopaedia (983 A.D.)⁶³ notes that “the big-bellied areca-palm, with several hundred nuts on each of its fronds,” spread to Yünnan from Mi-ch’ên kingdom.

Fan Ch’o describes another “K’un-lun kingdom”⁶⁴ 81 stages from (presumably south of) Ta-li Lake. Its products included perfumed woods, sandalwood, areca palms, bottle gourds, glazed ware, rock-crystal, rhinoceros, etc. Nan-chao once sent an army with cavalry to attack it: but their road was cut in the rear and flooded, and over ten thousand perished of hunger, or had their right hands severed. — Perhaps this kingdom was Haripuñjaya⁶⁵ (Lamphun) in North Siam, said to have been founded in the seventh century (660 A.D.) by princess *Cammadevī*, daughter of the king of Lopburi (*Lava*) and chief queen of the provincial ruler of the city of Rāmañña” (sc. the Mons).

So near a neighbour to the Gulf of Siam, one would expect Lower Burma to have contacts with *Dvāravatī*⁶⁶, a kingdom no less Mon and at least equally Buddhist. After the break-up of Fu-nan in the sixth century, *Dvāravatī* dominated much of Siam, from the seventh to the tenth century, after which it passed under Khmer control. The oldest Mon inscription extant, a two-faced Buddhist fragment found at Vat P’o Rang, Nagara Paṭhama, Coedès dates c.600 A.D.⁶⁷ Nearly a score of words are legible. Most of them recur, spelt almost identically, in the earliest Thatôn inscriptions of the first half of the eleventh century; and the script of the one seems to be the parent of the other, and similar, not so much to seventh century ‘Tircul’ script proper, as to the wider-spread ‘P’yu (Pāli)’ of the Śrī Kṣetra goldleaf manuscript. Similar, too, is the script of the U T’ong Sanskrit copperplate.⁶⁸ But this is Śaiva; and Dr. Quaritch Wales notes also Vaiṣṇava sculptures of early *Dvāravatī*, which he connects with influences from Lower Burma rather than from Chên-la (Old Cambodia).

In spite of nearness and evidence of contact between these Buddhist states of Burma and Siam, I have had to confess (in my article ‘*Dvāravatī* and Old Burma’⁶⁹) how different they all are. Similarities there are; and I detail them; but they are mostly late, perhaps not much earlier than the tenth century: — nine types of votive tablets common to both countries, and stemming from Pāla Bengal; Buddha images with both hands raised in *abhaya* or *vitarka mudrā*, the Buddha usually seated (in Burma), standing (in *Dvāravatī*) — an archaic type in Burma⁷⁰; and the mysterious “Fat Monk” (? Kaccāyana), which has a long history in Burma⁷¹: Dupont shows one specimen (Figur 253) from Wat P’ra Pat’on. The difference lay largely, I suppose, in the different influences from India which informed them. *Dvā-*

ravati, as Dupont sees it, was influenced especially by Amarāvati and Ceylon. Lower Burma (the *Ussi*, *Ussāla*, *Ussā Paikū* of later inscriptions⁷²) was influenced by Orissa. Was this the reason why Dvāravati excelled in sculpture, and Lower Burma in architecture? If we discount, as legendary, the connections of Buddhaghosa and Thatôn (see note 49), there seems to be little evidence connecting Burma with Ceylon or even South India before the eleventh century, apart from the word Telinga/Kalinga, which was obviously misapplied, as a name for Mons, in Old Burmese. From the middle of the eleventh century, on the other hand, connections have always been extraordinarily close. There was no real obstacle on the navigational side. Monsoon winds blow from one side or the other all the year round. As early as the *Sussonḍi Jātaka* (No. 360) we read of merchants of *Bharukaccha* (Greek Barygaza; Broach in the Gulf of Cambay) setting sail for *Suvaṇṇabhūmi*; and Fa Hsien's return-voyage, in 411-414 A.D. from Tāmralipti via Ceylon to China⁷³, shows that such voyages, if fraught with danger, were not unusual. Was it Rājendracōla's great raid of 1025 A.D.⁷⁴ which suddenly aroused the coastal cities of the Bay of Bengal to a sense of danger and the desire for unity?

At Pegu itself there are two walled cities, east and west of the *Hamṣa* ridge, on which stands the great Shwemawdaw pagoda. Both sites abound in early evidence of Buddhism. The older city, to the east, had once a harbour communicating with the mouth of the Sittaung. In 1913-14 trial-excavations here were made by the late scholar, Dr. J.A. Stewart⁷⁵. Some sculptures thought to be Śaiva were found; a Trimūrti in pose of worship; also a vaulted shrine (the vault has now fallen in). Stewart was inclined to ascribe the Hindu figures to the legendary king *Tissa*, the heretic who persecuted Buddhism, until he was finally converted by the miracles done by the maiden *Subhaddā*, who became his queen *Bhadrādevi*.⁷⁶ Two Middle Mon inscriptions (1470-71 A.D.), near Pegu, record repairs to stūpas attributed to this queen.⁷⁷ The legend may possibly go back to an historical "queen of Martaban living in the city of *Du'wop*" (query Pa-an?), whose Old Mon inscriptions (perhaps early eleventh century) are engraved on the robe-hem of two standing images of the Buddha, in Kawgun Cave and Thatôn Shwézayan pagoda.⁷⁸ "All Buddha-images" she claims, "of clay or stone, whether in *Du'wop* or in all the other realms, were carved by me and my disciples only."

There is ample evidence, both at Thatôn (old *Rakṣapura*) and in Kawgun Cave (on the west bank of the Salween, 28 miles above Martaban), that Brahmanic cults were once powerful. Low down on the west wall near the entrance to the Cave, is engraved the still unedited three-line inscription of *Śrī Parameśvara*, dated by Dr. Barnett sixth to seventh century A.D.⁷⁹ There

is also Burma's finest stone-relief of Viṣṇu Anantaśayana.⁸⁰ Probably from Thatôn come several images of Brahmā and Gaṇeśa,⁸¹ and the grand four-armed Śiva and Pārvati, with Nandi and Mahiṣāśura⁸² (styled by Dr. Nihar-Ranjan Ray "Orissan, c.ninth century"). The oldest Buddhist image yet found at Thatôn (it was in three fragments), is the Late Gupta bronze standing Buddha now at Saddhammajotika monastery, coated with greenish enamel.⁸³ Few other Buddhist remains there seem older than the early eleventh century. Further north (round Mt. Kelāsa), and west (around Pegu), Buddhism dominates. At Pegu distinctive forms of stone sculpture, derived perhaps from Gupta, are to be found. There are six foot tall pointed images of the standing Buddha, in simple pose and high relief, sometimes shown as Cakravartin, crowned, with regal belt, necklace and long jewelled robe-hem. Against this large projection is an intricately carved halo and background in low relief, where scenes of Gotama's life are shown: not neatly organized in tiers and panels, as in Gupta-Pāla reliefs, but buried in swirls of detail, for the pious eye to seek and joy to find.⁸⁴ At Nagawun Thein, five miles south of Pegu, the tall pointed image with elaborate nimbus shows the Taming of the Nālāgiri Elephant.⁸⁵ The very different two-faced carved relief from Pegu East city,⁸⁶ shows the same scene on one face, and, on the other, the Conception, Nativity and Bath (lowest tier); the Four Weeks (not the Seven, as in Pagán intaglios) spent near the Bodhi tree (middle tier); and perhaps the *Māra-vijaya* in the broken top tier. Four miles south of the city, the interior of the great Shwégugyi or Mahābodhi temple had once radiating arches, now mostly collapsed.

About the middle of the eleventh century, *Aniruddha*, king of Pagán in Central Burma, set out on his first campaign, to extend his little dry-zone realm of *Tambadipa* to include the rice lands of the Irawady delta, once controlled by the Pyu; and in so doing, to contain the constant Mon-Khmer influx from the east, which had been the root of instability in Lower Burma for over a thousand years. Perhaps he hoped to effect this peaceably: and from the first he made clear his intention to promote Buddhism, and if possible, obtain copies of the *Tipiṭaka*. These might still be available, at any rate in Ceylon, then engaged in a desperate struggle against the Śaivite Coḷas. After occupying Śri Kṣetra, he felt it prudent to remove the palladium-relic from within the Bawbawgyi pagoda; but left the half-deserted city otherwise intact. As soon as he had occupied Khabin (Old Burmese *Krapaṇ*), the walled capital between Twanté and Rangoon, he built (or repaired) the great 'Maung Di' pagoda, encasing it with his largest plaques, inscribed in Pāli.⁸⁷ Meantime, it seems, the internecine wars of Siam — Haripuñjaya (Lamphun),

Lavapura (Lopburi), and Śrī Dharmarāja (Ligor), followed by pestilence and a Khmer invasion, spilled over into Burma. This gave Aniruddha his chance to rescue Pegu, capture Thaton, and occupy Tenasserim.⁸⁸

Before the crisis, king *Makuṭa* (the name was later misread as 'Manoha') had been elected at Thatôn as civil (*paṇḍit*) and military (*trāp*) leader, with resounding titles. The last title — *sakalatāmbāvisēyatreyloka-varmma*, "Armour of the Three Worlds and all the regions of Copper" — sounds like a sneer at the upstart kingdom of *Tumbadīpa*. At Thatôn new walls and a palace had been built, pagodas and *sīmā* enriched with remarkable carvings, new to Burma, both in stone and terracotta, all illustrating the ten great *Jātakas* of the *Mahānipāta*.⁸⁹ Makuṭa's *trāp* inscription,⁹⁰ partly in Mon verse, clearly foresees the coming battle. The latter part of his *paṇḍit* inscription gives once again, in Mon, the gist of the ten *Jātakas*. In the earlier part, after reference to oldtime *Rakṣapura* and repetition of the long titles of its king Makuṭa, "skilful in all the arts", he continues in Pāli verse: — namo sabbabuddhānaṃ

taṇhaṅkaro mahāvīro medhaṅkaro ma[hā] yaso saranaṅkaro lokahito dīpaṅkaro jutind-
haro koṇḍaṇḍo jinapāmoḁkko maṅgalo purisāsabho sumano sumanadhiro revato rativad-
dhano sobhito gunasampanno anomadassī januttamo padumo lokapajjoto nārado (d)am-
masārathi padumuttaro sattasāro sumedho aggapuggalo sujāto sabbalokaggo piyadassī
narāsabho aṭhadassī kāruniko dhammadassī tamonudo siddhattho asamo loke tisso ca
varadadamvaro phusso (ca varado buddho) vipassī ca anūpamo sikhī sabbahito satthā
vesabhū sukhadāyako kakusandho satthavāho koṇāgamano ranañjaho kassapo sirisaṃ-
panno gotamo sākyapuṅgavo etesañeva sambuddhā aneksasattako....

(continued in Old Mon)

In correspondence with the late lamented master of Pali and Singhalese archaeology, Dr. Paranavitana, I gave my readings (none too certain) of this early inscription; and here I venture to quote from his reply (dated December 8th, 1971): "The Pāli text which you have partly deciphered, is a *Paritta* text which is very often recited by the Buddhists of Ceylon in their devotions. It is known as the *Aṭavisi-pirita*, i.e. the protective text of the twenty-eight (Buddhas). It is included in the collections of *Pirit (Paritta)* texts, and also in a Handbook for the use of *Sāmaṇeras* and monks, called *Sāmaṇera Baṇadahaṃ-pota*." After noting a few minor variations in reading, he adds: "I am not aware of any canonical or commentarial scripture in which this *Paritta* occurs. Is it possible that this text was a composition of the king eulogised in the inscription or a spiritual teacher who flourished in his reign? At any rate it appears that this *Paritta* text was introduced from Burma to Ceylon. Is this text not used in this manner among the Burmese Buddhists? What is the significance of the word *ādikāle* 'in ancient times' occurring in line 1? It appears that many inscriptions of historical importance have been

published recently in Burma, of which we in Ceylon have no information ...”

Living in Jersey, I was unable to answer his questions. I doubt if Makuṭa, who was probably a soldier, wrote this poem; or whether the phrase *ādikāle rakṣanāmapure*, which introduces both his inscriptions, does more than remind his readers of the antiquity of the great city which they had to defend. And since Buddhist literature is far older in Ceylon than at Thatôn, I should expect the text to be Singhalese in origin. But whichever the source, it appears to be the first clear evidence of actual contact between the Buddhist cultures of the two countries, which was to be of such vital importance, at any rate for Burma, ever since.

Channel Islands

NOTES

¹ *Epigraphia Birmanica*, Vol. I, Part 1, pp. 2-3.

² W. Geiger, *The Mahāvamsa* (PTS transl. 1950), p. xxiv (483 B.C.). *Cambridge History of India*, Vol. I, p. 697 (478 B.C.).

³ L. Renou, *La Géographie de Ptolémée, L'Inde* (VII, 1-4), Paris 1925. Pomponius Mela (c.50 A.D.) was the first to mention *Chrysē* and *Argyrē*, islands of gold and silver beyond the Ganges.

⁴ C.O. Blagden, 'The Inscriptions of the Kalyāṇisīmā, Pegu', Inscr. No. XII, *Epigraphia Birmanica*, Vol. III, Part II (Mon text). Taw Sein Ko, 'A Preliminary Study of the Kalyani Inscriptions of Dhammacheti, 1476 A.D.', reprint from the *Indian Antiquary*, Bombay, 1893 (Pāli text).

⁵ *Epigraphia Birmanica*, Vol. I, Part II, Inscr. VIII A⁷ (pp. 157, 164).

⁶ *Ibid.*, Inscr. V⁴⁷ (pp. 145, 146.)

⁷ *Inscriptions of Burma*, Portfolio V, Plate 549⁴⁵. See also my *Old Burma - Early Pagan*, I, pp. 56, 63, 77-78. For the Thatôn fragments, see *IB* V Pl. 548 b, c.

⁸ C.O. Blagden, 'A Malayan Element in some of the Languages of Southern Indo-China' (*J. Straits Branch RAS*, No. 38, 1902).

⁹ *IB* IV, Pls. 358⁴, 359^{4,43}.

¹⁰ U Mya, *ASI* 1935, pp. 51-52 and Plate XXI.

¹¹ *OBEP* I, p. 61, n. 81. For the Talang Tuwo inscription west of Palembang, see Coedès, *BEFEO*, t. XXX, 1930, pp. 29ff, No. II.

¹² *Journal of the Burma Research Society*, Vol. XIV, Part II (Aug. 1924), pp. 111-124.

¹³ Pelliot, 'Deux Itinéraires', *BEFEO*, t. IV (1904), 157-169. P'iao-chü-ti is represented as a son of Aśoka. The Ta-li region becomes a second Gandhāra (Chinese *Miao-hsiang-kuo*). Cf. *Burm. Gandhālarāj*.

¹⁴ Chu-ko Liang's fort, 200 *li* west of Yung-ch'ang across the Salween, or 200 *li* east of T'êng-yüeh, is mentioned in Chia Tan's itineraries (*Hsin-t'ang-shu* ch. 43 B). It is also mentioned by Fan Ch'o (*Man-shu* transl., p. 60).

¹⁵ *Milindapañha* 359. I.B. Horner, *Milinda's Questions*, Vol. II, p. 222. Note that the Buddhist Thera Nāgasena, who answered the questions of the Greek king Menander, was born at Kajaṅgala (Rājmahāl) on the right bank of the Ganges near its bend to the south — an ancient staging-post (see Chia Tan) on the route between Magadha and China. Nāgasena was a familiar name to the scholars of Kyanzittha's court, c. 1100 A.D.:

see *OBEP*, p. 76. For the old Nāgasena temple at Tadāgalé near Rangoon, see *ibid.*, p. 137 and n. 55 (I first misread the name as *Nāgalena*).

¹⁶ Takôla: G. Coedès, *Les États hindouisés d'Indochine et d'Indonésie* (2nd ed., Paris. 1964) p. 80. P. Wheatley (*The Golden Chersonese*, p. 69) places it a little further south, at Trang.

¹⁷ Hjalmar Frisk, *Le Périples de la mer Erythrée* (Göteborg, 1927), pp. 119, 121-2. For a general discussion of the evidence, see *JRBS*, Vol. XIV, Part 2 (Aug. 1924), 127-137.

¹⁸ Tsang-ko road: *ibid.*, p. 138. Chavannes, *Mémoire sur les religieux éminents*, pp. 82-84.

¹⁹ Pelliot, *BEFEO* (1903), 265-268. Coedès, *États hindouisés* (1964), 74-82. *JRBS* XIV, Part 2, 140-158; XXIX, Part III (Dec. 1939), 264-267, 276-277. Chinese references to Chin-lin, Lin-yang and Nu-hou are given in note 9 on p. 277: *Liang-shu*, Ch. 54 (Fu-nan); *Shui-ching-chu*, Ch. 1, 7 v^o; Ch. 36, f. 29 v^o, etc.

²⁰ *P'u* and *P'iao* (early texts). Chinese references are given *ibid.*, pp. 277-278, notes 10 and 11. They are first mentioned, c.350 A.D., in the *Hua-yang-kuo-chih* of Ch'ang Ch'ü (Ch. 4, Nan-chung-chih). They were then "in the extreme south-west of Ning-chou", which suggests a region in the south-east of Yünnan. For the *P'u-tzū Man* of Fan Ch'o (863 A.D.), see *Man-shu* (transl.), p. 39.

²¹ Aung Thaw, *Historical Sites in Burma* (Rangoon, 1972), pp. 1-9. See also his *Preliminary Report on the Excavation at Peikthanomyo, 1959* (Archaeological Survey, Burma), and *Report on the Excavations at Beikthano* (Rangoon 1968); as well as yearly archaeological reports (in Burmese). Note the large use of 'burnt brick' (Pāli *itṭhaka*) here. The word, whether in Old Mon, Old Burmese, Old Khmer, Thai, etc. is usually of Indian origin, and suggests derivation from the 84000 monuments, attributed to Aśoka, matching in number the sections of the Dhamma.

²² E.H. Johnston, *BSOAS*, London, Vol. XI, Part 2, 383-385 and Plate V. In his article, 'Some Sanskrit Inscriptions of Arakan' (pp. 357-385), he (and Dr. Barnett) edited the West Face of the Shitthaung Pillar.

²³ Cf. J.H. Banerjea, *The Development of Hindu Iconography* (Calcutta 1956), Pl. II, 11, 12.

²⁴ Conch of Viṣṇu. *ASI* (1927), Plate XLII (f).

²⁵ Hsüan-tsang left for India in 629 and returned to China in 645. For places near the Burma border, see S. Beal, *Si-yu-ki*, II, pp. 193-200; *Life of Hiuen-tsiang*, pp. 131-133. Also, for the dating, see R. Grousset, *Histoire de l'Extrême-Orient* (Paris 1929), I, pp. 97-99.

²⁶ I-tsing, v. Grousset, *op. cit.*, p. 296. He sailed from Canton in 671, spent six months at Śrī Vijaya, landed at Tāmralipti in 673, and stayed in India till 685, mostly at Nālandā. After ten more years at Śrī Vijaya, he returned *via* Canton in 695. See Takakusu, *Record of the Buddhist Religion* (1896), pp. 9-10; Chavannes, *Mémoire sur les religieux éminents...* (Paris 1894), pp. 9-10.

²⁷ Chia Tan: *Hsin-t'ang-shu*, Ch. 43 B. Fan Ch'o: *Man-shu* transl., p. 92.

²⁸ Anantaśayana sculptures. *OBEP* I, 217-219. For a sixth sculpture, unearthed in a small shrine west of the Mimalaung Kyaung, Pagán, see report in the *Rangoon Working People's Daily* for February 16, 1968.

²⁹ *OBEP* I, 20-21 and notes 64, 65. For *Tanluin*, see *IB* I, Pls. 25¹⁴, 27⁴, 35⁴, 75b⁸, 81²⁸, etc.

³⁰ *Glass Palace Chronicle* (transl.), pp. 1-6.

³¹ Aung Thaw, *Historical Sites in Burma*, pp. 99-103 (Tagaung). See also U Than Swé's Burmese account of 'Excavation-Finds at Tagaung' (Rangoon, 1971).

³² *OBEP* I, 28-29, 36-37. I suspect Tagaung to be the Ta-êrh ('Big Ears') kingdom of Fan Ch'o's *Man-shu* (transl. p. 92).

³³ For Dr. Führer's Sanskrit inscription of 416 A.D. alleged to have been found there, see G.E. Harvey, *History of Burma*, p. 310.

34 v. Grierson, *Linguistic Survey of India*, Vol. III, Part III. For vocabularies of Andro, Sengmai and Chairel, see W. McCulloch, *Account of the Valley of Munnipore and of the Hill Tribes* (Calcutta 1859).

35 T.C. Hodson, *The Meitheids* (London 1908). See the Index, s.v. *Loi*.

36 Lucien Bernot, *Les Cak*, (Paris 1967).

37 R. Grant Brown, 'The Tamans of the Upper Chindwin, Burma', *J. Roy. Anthr. Inst.* XLI (1911) 305-317, taken (I think) from *Census of India* (1901), *Burma Report*, Part II, p. 128.

38 *Census of India, 1931*, Vol. XI, *Burma* Part I – Report pp. 186-187; Part II, Tables, pp. 223, 248.

39 In an article on 'The Early Syām in Burma's History' (*J. Siam Soc.* XLVI, Pt. 2 (Aug. 1958), 183-4, note 82). I tried – wrongly, I now think – to distinguish these *Chien-tu* of Burma from those of North Yünnan. The characters are identical.

40 *Tircul*: v, *OBEP* I, 68, note 132. Purely for convenience, I reserve this term *infra* to the peculiar Indian script used by the Pyu for writing their own language, as distinguished from 'Pyu (Pāli)', the more widespread script used for Pāli/Sanskrit inscriptions. Cf. A.H. Dani, *Indian Paleography* (Oxford 1963), pp. 241-247.

41 v. Mme. Colani, *Mégaliths du Haut Laos* (2 vols., Paris, 1935).

42 Hsi-li-i (*Śrī*): Chia Tan's itinerary, *Hsin-t'ang-shu*, Ch. 43 B; section on P'iao, *ibid.*, Ch. 222 C; *Chiu-t'ang-shu*, Ch. 197.

43 C.O. Blagden, 'The 'Pyu' Inscriptions', *Epigraphia Indica* XII (1913-14), No. 16 127-132. Reprinted at *JBRs* VII, Part I (1917) 37-44.

44 Note, however, Dr. Nihar-rañjan Ray's comment on the Sanskrit/Pyu inscription on the pedestal of the headless Buddha of Kan-wet-khaung-gôn, Śrī Kṣetra: "The record is composed in beautiful Sanskrit verse, but is interspersed with what Dr. Blagden has recognized as Pyu renderings of the Sanskrit text; the script is later Gupta-Brāhmī of Eastern India of about the seventh century ..." (*Sanskrit Buddhism in Burma* (Calcutta 1936) p. 19).

45 L. de Beylié, *Prome et Samara* (Paris 1907); *L'Architecture Hindoue en Extrême-Orient* (Paris 1907); Taw Sein Ko, *ASI* (1909-10), 113-123, and subsequent yearly archaeological reports, both of India and Burma. For a brief modern survey, see Aung Thaw, *Historical Sites in Burma*, pp. 16-33.

46 Halin: v. Aung Thaw, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-15.

47 *Chiu-t'ang-shu*, Ch. 197 (P'iao); *Hsin-t'ang-shu*, Ch. 222 C; *Man-shu*, transl., pp. 90-91. For other references, see *JBRs* XXIX, iii (1939), 280, note 45; and for a general survey, *ibid.* XXVII, iii (1937), 239-253, 'The Ancient Pyu'.

48 Wei Kao's precious description of these ancient instruments is given in the long section on 'P'iao' in Ch. 222C of the *Hsin-t'ang-shu*. It is possible that the musicians were *K'un-lun*, i.e. Mon, rather than Pyu.

49 Buddhaghosa. According to late Burmese Chronicles (e.g. *Glass Palace Chronicle*, transl. pp. 46-50) this great fifth century commentator on the Pāli scriptures, was a native of Thatôn, and after his studies in Ceylon, returned there with a set of the *Tipiṭaka*. For a discussion of the legend, see J. Filliozat, *L'Inde Classique* (Paris 1953) Vol. II, pp. 355-357.

50 *Temī Jātaka* (?): Duroiselle, *ASI* (1927), Plate XL (d) and p. 173.

51 *IB* I 22⁵ *Pisamantra*; II 188² *Pisamattā*; III 305²⁵ *Pisamantarā*. This was the name given to the sermon commonly delivered at the time of a dedication. Another sermon preached on such an occasion was called *Mālāṇ* (*IB* I 22⁴, 563 s. 1201 A.D.). It concerned the legendary Thera Malaya who, according to North Thai sources based probably on Singhalese, went up to Tāvātimsa to worship at the Cūlāmaṇi Cetiya, and there met the future Buddha Metteyya. See Col. Ba Shin, 'Shyaṇ Mālāi of the Burmese', (*Bull. Burm. Hist. Com.* I, Pt. II. 147-152) and W. Geiger, *The Mahāvamsa* (PTS transl.) p. 223, note 1 – *Malayamahādevatthera*; G.P. Malalasekera, *Dictionary of Pāli Proper*

Names, II, s.v. *Malaya Mahādeva*.

52 *Dīpavamsa*, Ch. 3; *Mahāvamsa*, Ch. 2. Fragments of the story are shown in the Mon paintings of Pagán Myinkaba Kubyaukgyi, c.1113 A.D. See *Bull. Burm. Hist. Com.* II (1961), 404-405.

53 *OBEP*, Vol. I, pp. 391-397. For Pagán stone reliefs of the 28 Buddhas, see *ibid.*, pp. 313-314, and Vol. III, Pls. 195-201. Mon Bo Kay found the names of the Bodhi trees of the first three Buddhas in the *Sotatthakā* of Cūlabuddhaghosa.

54 Duroiselle, *ASI* (1927) 175.

55 *ASB* (1948) Pl. 3; 1948-52, Pl. 3. *Arch. Neg.* 7650; 4706, 4707. U Mya, *Votive Tablets of Burma*, Part I, Pls. 86, 87 and p. 61.

56 *ASI* (1935) Plate XXI (d).

57 The Pegu River, as Professor Daw Thin Kyi has shown, once flowed out east into the Sittaung estuary. Later, it turned south to Pegu, and flowed out south-west into the Rangoon river, below the city.

58 Cf. Pelliot, *BEFEO*, Vol. IV, pp. 221-231. I take *Mo-ti-p'o* to be Martaban (Old Mon *Mūhtahma* (?); Old Burmese *Muttama*).

59 Duroiselle, *ASI* (1937) 80-81; *ASB* (1938) Plate III (c) and p. 11.

60 Kyōntu: Duroiselle, *ASI* (1936), 72-73 and Plate XXXII (d); (1937) pp. 80-83 and Plates XXXI to XXXIII; *ASB* (1938) pp. 10-11 and Plate III.

61 U Mya, *Votive Tablets of Burma*, Part II, Pls. 31-33 and pp. 22-23.

62 Wang P'u, *T'ang-hui-yao* (961 A.D.), Ch. 33, f. 26 r^o; Ch. 100, f. 19 r^o. A later tribute-mission in 862 A.D. is also mentioned.

63 Li Fang, *T'ai-p'ing-yü-lan* (983 A.D.), Ch. 567, f. 8v^o; 789, f. 5 r^o; 961, f. 8 r^o; 971 f. 5 r^o, 6 r^o;

64 Fan Ch'o, *Man-shu*, Ch. 10 (transl., pp. 91-92).

65 Haripuñjaya: *Epochs of the Conqueror (Jinakālamāli)*, PTS transl. 1968, pp. 96-110. Coedès, *États hindouisés*, Index; H.G. Quaritch Wales, *Dvāravatī* (London 1969), pp. 85-86 and Plate 54. Seven Old Mon inscriptions of Haripuñjaya, dating from the first half of the thirteenth century (king *Sabbādhissiddhi*), have been edited by R. Halliday ('Les Inscriptions Môn du Siam', *BEFEO* XXX (1930) 1-2).

66 *Dvāravatī*. See, especially, G. Coedès, *Recueil des Inscriptions du Siam*, 2nd Part, *Inscriptions de Dvāravatī, de Çrīvijaya et de Lavo* (2nd ed., Siam Society, 1961); P. Dupont, *L'Archéologie Mône de Dvāravatī*, 2 vols., Text and Plates (Paris 1959); H.G. Quaritch Wales (*op. cit.*); R. Le May, *The Culture of South-East Asia* (London 1954), pp. 61-73 and figs. 27-46. I have just received from Nai Pan Hla a photograph and readings of a ninth century Buddhist Mon inscription found at Ban Thalāt, some 30 miles north of Vieng Chan, Laos.

67 Coedès, *op. cit. supra*, Planche XVIII and p. 3.

68 U T'ong copperplate: Quaritch Wales, *op. cit.*, Plate 9 and 10(a), and pp. 20-25. He writes: "There is every reason to believe that *Dvāravatī* was a predominantly Buddhist country. It must have been at U T'ong that the full force of late Gupta influences were felt, coming over the Three Pagodas pass."

69 *J. Siam Soc.* LIII, Part 1 (Jan. 1965) 9-25.

70 Double *abhaya* or *vitarka mudrā*: *OBEP*, Vol. I, 144-145; Vol. III, Plates 95 b,c,d; 442a, 443.

71 'The Fat Monk', *OBEP* I, 206-208; III, Plates 90, 91.

72 *Ussi*, *Ussāla*, *Ussā Paikū*: *IB* II Plate 216²¹; *List* 46(a)², 49⁵, 963a⁹; *Glass Palace Chronicle* (transl.), p. 92.

73 Fa Hsien: v. S. Beal, *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, Introduction, pp. lxxi-lxxxiii.

74 Rājendracola: v. Coedès, *États hindouisés*, pp. 261-264.

75 J.A. Stewart, 'Excavation and Exploration in Pegu', *JBRs* VII,i (April 1917), 13-25, with 6 plates. The alleged date of its founding is 825 A.D. The old city was occu-

pied "till about the middle of the fifteenth century A.D."

76 Subhaddā, Bhadrādevī. For the legend, see R. Halliday, *The Talaings* (Rangoon 1917) pp. 8-9; G.E. Harvey, *History of Burma* (London 1925), pp. 8-9.

77 Middle Mon inscriptions: H.L. Shorto, *Dictionary of the Mon Inscriptions from the Sixth to the Sixteenth Centuries* (London 1971), p. xxx (No. 50) – Pegu, Kyauktaing-gan, 1470 A.D.; p. xxxii (No. 86), dated 1471.

78 Old Mon inscriptions: *IB* IV Plate 360 a,b (Shorto, *op. cit.*, p. xxviii (Nos. 6, 7). Both date from the first half of the eleventh century.

79 *Śrī Parameśvara*: *IB* IV Plate 355(b) and Index. *ASB* (1958) Pl. 13 (p. 64).

80 Viṣṇu Anantaśayana: *ASB* (1958), Pl. 14 (p. 64). *Arch. Neg.* 7717.

81 Gaṇeśa and Brahmā: *OBEPI*, 205-6, 211; III, Plates 88, 89 (Gaṇeśa);

82 Śiva and Pārvatī: R.C. Temple, *Ind. Ant.* XXII, (1893), Plate XIII(a). Ray, *Brahmanic Gods in Burma*, Pl. XV 20 and pp. 57-59. *Arch. Neg.* 852.

83 v. U Mya, *ASI* (1930-34), Part I, p. 204, and Part II, Plate CXII(d). *Arch. Neg.* 3665, 3666.

84 Pegu, statues in the Theins at East and West Shwénātha monasteries. *Arch. Neg.* 7707-7709, 7698, 7699.

85 Nāgavana Sīmā: *ASB* (1940), Plate III(b) and pp. 14-15. *Arch. Neg.* 4207; 7710-7713.

86 Old Pegu, Thawka Gandama garden – Lu Pe Win, *ASB* 1940, pp. 10-11 and Plates I(e) and II(a). *Arch. Neg.* 4212, 4213.

87 'Maung Di', pagoda and plaques: *OBEPI* III, Plates 4, 5, 79b.

88 For all this campaign, see *OBEPI*, 21-27.

89 Old Thatōn. The best account has been given by the late lamented U Mya – a brilliant pioneer and outstanding Burman archaeologist, whose career almost spanned the life of the Burma Archaeological Department. See *ASI* (1930-34), Part I, 195-204; Part II, Plates CXII-CXVI; (1935), 50-51, Plate XXII(g,h). For the Old Mon inscription recording the foundation of Thaton Kalyaṇī Sīmā, see *IB* IV Plate 360 (c). The stone carvings are similar to those of Kānok Nākhon in North-East Siam (see E. Seidenfaden, *BEFEO* XLIV (1954), 643-7 and Pl. LXXIII).

90 For Makuta's *trāp* and *pandit* inscriptions, see *IB* IV, Plates 358, 359. Neither contains a date. Transcriptions in Burmese character are given in U Chit Thein's 'Collection of Mon Inscriptions' (Rangoon 1965), pp. 1-7.

A CRITIQUE OF BUDDHIST IDEALISM

I

It is necessary to specify the sense of the term 'idealism' in which it is generally used to describe the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda school of Buddhism. I shall apply this term here particularly to the philosophical school of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, of which Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti became later exponents. For the sake of convenience and feasibility, I shall ignore in this paper the later developments of this school to be found in the writings of Ratnākaraśānti and Jñānaśrimitra in the tenth and eleventh centuries A.D.

Philosophical idealism is usually characterized as a denial of the common-sense view that material/external objects exist independently of the mind, i.e., independently of their being perceived. And this general character of idealistic philosophy was undoubtedly present in the Vijñānavāda theory of reality. Thus, without the risk of gross misunderstanding the term 'idealism' can be properly applied to it. In what follows I shall be concerned with the peculiar nature of Yogācāra idealism, and it is hoped that, as a result of this exposition, its difference from other forms of idealism will eventually be made clear.

Two noteworthy points can be underlined at the outset. *First*, unlike its Western counterpart, idealism in the Buddhist context was not used as a support for philosophical theism, according to which God is a perfect spiritual being who created everything else and hence more fundamental than any material thing He has created. Nor was it used to support a sort of pantheism, according to which nothing exists except God and his modes and attributes. *Second*, like its Western counterpart, Buddhist idealism is also a rejection of what may be called materialism, and an assertion of a spiritualistic metaphysic that is favourable to religious belief.

The second point underpins also the soteriological significance of the 'Consciousness only' (*vijñaptimātratā*) doctrine. Just as the 'Emptiness' doctrine (*śūnyavāda*) supplies the philosophic basis for the therapeutics of *Nirvāṇa*, so also idealism or *vijñaptimātratā* doctrine provides the metaphysical rationale for pursuing the religious programme to realise *Nirvāṇa* in the form of pure, translucent consciousness, the 'absolute'. The *vijñapti* doctrine was a reaction, on the one hand, against the Mādhyamika interpretation of *prajñā* (wisdom, insight) as essencelessness and emptiness, and, on the other, against the realistic overtone of the Sautrāntika-Vaibhāṣika metaphysics. For Maitreya/Asaṅga, *sūnyata* becomes *dharmatā*, and this *dharmatā* is *sat* 'exis-

tent' in so far as it represents the essence of all *dharma*s, as well as *asat* 'non-existent' in so far as it negates the duality (*dvaya*), viz., subject and object, which is always inherent in our experience. The verse that sums up the fundamental doctrine of the school is ascribed to Maitreya and handed down to Vasubandhu by Asaṅga.

abhūtaparikalpo 'sti, dvayam tatra na vidyate
śūnyatā vidyate tv atra, tasyām api sa vidyate

The 'imagining of the unreal' exists; (but) the (supposed) duality is not present in it. Emptiness, however, is present here (and) even in emptiness that (i.e., 'imagining of the unreal') is present.

Vasubandhu explains: The imagining of the unreal here is the discrimination of the forms of the apprehensible (*grāhya*) from the form of apprehension (*grāhaka*). "Duality" refers to the apprehension and the apprehensible. "Emptiness" means the nature of the imagining of the 'unreal': this nature is devoid of the apprehension-apprehensible distinction.¹

Two more verses from the *Madhyāntavibhāga* will establish clearly Asaṅga's position against the Mādhyamika:

Consciousness arises having the appearance (*pratibhāsa*) of objects, beings, self, and cognized states; [but] objects [etc.] do not exist. And because of the non-existence of objects [etc.], that [consciousness of objects, etc.] is also unreal. I.3. Therefore, the nature of its being [merely] 'the imagination of the unreal' is established. That [position, i.e. non-existence of everything] cannot be maintained without admitting total non-existence [of even the imagination of the unreal]; [but] salvation is intended to be realized from the disappearance of this [imagination of the unreal, which, therefore, should be admitted to exist].² I.4

The *abhūtaparikalpa* consists in the wrong ideation or assumption of existence and essence of objects. It is represented by a continuous series of mental states which have no beginning, but will end with *Nirvāṇa*. In fact, it corresponds to the process of *saṃsāra* (wordly existence or life experience). For Nāgārjuna, one may say, *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa* cannot be sharply distinguished since both are empty or void. (MK. XXV, 19,20). But, for Maitreya/Asaṅga, both exist, *abhūtaparikalpa* and *śūnyatā*, wrong ideation and emptiness, *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*, *yena śūnyam* and *yat śūnyam*.³ Wrong ideation co-exists with the ultimate, emptiness or *citta*, although the former covers or defiles the other. And by removing the former, the pure *citta* is realized.

Apart from the *cittamātratā*, two other important characteristics of the Maitreya/Asaṅga school are: (1) the *ālaya* doctrine ('storehouse' or 'home' consciousness), and (2) discrimination of the three aspects (natures) of reality. The influence of the Sautrāntikas, specially their concept of 'seed' and 'maturation' (*bīja* and *vipāka*), is visible in the *ālaya* doctrine. I have discuss-

ed this point elsewhere and hence will not elaborate it here.⁴ The classic exposition of the 'triple-nature' of reality is found in the *Sandhinirmocana-sūtra*.⁵ As my main concern in this paper is the philosophic position which refutes the external/material world as unreal, I will skip here the soteriology of the 'triple-nature', or the *abhūta-parikalpa*. It is conceded that the main purpose of the Maitreya/Asaṅga school is to describe the process and progress of meditation towards the *sarvākārajñatā*, the complete wisdom of the Buddha, which represents the final good of the Way (*mārga*). The 'ideation only' or 'consciousness only' theory has been inserted into a frame of the mystic ascension of the saint, and the philosophic speculation here is of only secondary importance. However, I am concerned here with the philosophic implication of this very attractive theory — the same philosophic implication that concerned a majority of later Yogācārins and their critics.

One historical point before I proceed any further. I believe that some form of philosophic idealism was concomitant with the rise of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Thus, in my opinion, the expositions and critiques of idealism found in the *Nyāya-sūtra* (or, even in the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* and the *Śābara-bhāṣya*) need not necessarily be placed after the rise of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu (i.e. 300-400 A.D.). For, the specific critique of, and distinct reference to, Vasubandhu is to be found in Uddyotakara and Kumārila, and not earlier. But, although it was concomitant with the rise of Mahāyāna Buddhism, idealism became crystalized as a religio-philosophic system in the hands of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu while Diṇnāga and Dharmakīrti developed it further as a philosophy with their special doctrine of *sva-samvitti* 'self-consciousness'. But more on this later.

II

I shall now concentrate upon Vasubandhu's philosophic argument in favour of *vijñaptimātratā*, 'consciousness only'. Vasubandhu refuted materialism and defended idealism on both epistemological and metaphysical grounds. His basic epistemological argument was as follows: Since it is possible for unreal/non-existent things to 'appear' (cf. *avabhāsa*) in consciousness, we may conclude that everything that seems to exist is just a 'making of consciousness' (*vijñapti*). The fact that consciousness reveals the non-existents as external objects is like the fact of our perceiving non-existent strands of hair or the non-existent second moon under the influence of the eye-disease called *timira* (ophthalmia?)⁶. Under delusions and dreams, we perceive objects that are not there. Our knowledge of the external/material world is actually of a piece with the universal delusion (*avidyā*) because an ex-

ternal world does not exist apart from, or outside, our consciousness of it.

Vasabandhu formulated three objections to this thesis and answered them accordingly. If external objects did not exist and hence were not related causally to our consciousness of them, then (a) what determines the fact that we have one particular consciousness at a given place and time; (b) how is it that one state of consciousness is not limited to just one person but experienced by many alike (e.g. why a number of people can see that there is a chair in this room), and (c) how can a non-existent object function as it is expected to function (e.g., how can a non-existent apple satisfy hunger, or a non-existent woman evoke amorous feelings)? The first and the third objections are answered by referring to the example of dream experience. One dreams of a particular thing at a given place and time and of another thing at another place and time without there being any (ostensibly) external factor to determine it. And a dream object, viz., a dream-woman can satisfy the experience of sexual hunger in dream too, i.e., a dream object can be libidinally cathected.

To answer the second question, Vasubandhu referred to the example of an illusory experience of hell. In books like the *Mahāvastu* (from which Vasubandhu obviously derived his example) the Buddhist conception of hell is described as being the fact of some extremely painful experiences (such as that of being chopped into pieces, or swimming in a lake of filth) which is shared at the same time by a number of *pudgalas* (persons) having a common personal history. In reality, however, there is no hell outside the mind of these individuals.⁷ Even if we are hesitant about the credibility of this type of example, i.e., the fact of a common psychosis described in the Buddhist mythology, Vasubandhu's argument does not lose its force. In a world of scientific technology, it is not impossible to create conditions for some common delusion which can deceive a number of persons. It is possible to think of Descartes's all powerful evil demon, or a modern mad scientist, who might stimulate several men's brains with various electrodes and employ the process so ingeniously that all of them will experience enjoying a sumptuous dinner while no food is actually present. Witness the renewed interest in the theory of hypnotic states. Thus, some form of Cartesian doubt might even lead us to the conclusion of the unreality of the external world.

Several points can be noted in this connection by way of contrast. First, ordinarily we can make a distinction between two types of illusion or rather between illusion and delusion. In one case, one is wrong about what one is in fact perceiving. In the other, one is mistaken about the very fact that he is perceiving at all. It is the second kind of illusion, or delusion, that is most

pertinent for arguing in favour of the radical sort of idealism that Vasubandhu hoped to establish. His example is that of the eye-disease in which one visualizes non-existent strands of hair. This is like the experience of pain in a limb which has actually been amputated and no longer there. Such subjective experiences possess the vivacity of the genuine perceptual experience. And thus, the idealists claim, they are phenomenologically indistinguishable from those that occur in so-called authentic perceptions. If this is conceded, Vasubandhu can easily drive the point home that the so-called material/external world is only an appearance *in*, and hence an integral part of, our modes of consciousness.

Second, in the empiricist tradition of the West, the view that is rather contemptuously (and, to my mind, somewhat unjustly) labelled as Naive Realism is often refuted by what is generally called The Argument from Illusion. In plain language, 'Naive Realism' stands for an innocent *prejudice* (as it is alleged by philosophers) of the ordinary man that the sensible qualities that we perceive around us, colour, shapes, sounds, touch, smells, etc., actually belong to the material objects outside. Such a claim, it is believed, can be easily upset by pointing out the fact that we are sometimes deceived by our senses, as in the case of illusions and delusions. But this 'Argument from Illusion' led the empiricists of the West to devise the disastrous theory of sense-data — a veil or screen of representations between us and the external world — which, for some time, enjoyed the confidence of well-known philosophers in the West. From the premise (which was, for all we know, supplied by Locke) that what we *immediately* perceive are sensations or ideas, George Berkeley was led to his celebrated thesis: *esse est percipi*. One acceptable sense of the thesis is that what we call 'material things', such as trees, rocks and tables, are orderly groups or bundles or collections of sensations.⁸

Vasubandhu's idealism appears to be strikingly similar to that of Berkeley, but it nevertheless differs from Berkeley's idealism quite radically. For one thing, in Berkeley's thought the notion of a material substance as distinct from sensible qualities is unimaginable and inconceivable (and if they were conceivable they would be problematic existents). But Vasubandhu's example of eye-disease not only carried religious and moral overtones with it but also emphasized the non-duality and finality of consciousness. It is the non-dual, fluctuating consciousness which splits itself into a duality, an experience and the object-appearance of that experience, the forms of apprehension and the apprehensible (*grāhaka* and *grāhya*), although this appearance of duality is a disease to be cured by *prajñā*, the ultimate insight. For another, the Representative and Causal theories of perception, as they are found in

the Western empiricist tradition, concede at least that the external world, for all we know, may be out there, although it is not directly known by our senses. In Buddhist idealism, however, even this concession would be fatal because then the claim of absolute reality to be ascribed to pure, transcendental consciousness, would be at stake.

III

Vasubandhu justified his idealism also on metaphysical grounds. The so-called material object (e.g., a table) is necessarily thought to be composite in structure and hence cannot be *substantially* or independently real. In *Vimśatikā*, verse 11, it is said:

The [material] object is neither a unitary whole, nor a multitude of atoms, nor even a combined form of atoms, because an atomic constituent cannot be justified as a real constituent [of matter].

An atom is usually conceived as the smallest, impartite, constituent of matter. But the theory of creation of divisible bodies out of indivisible and impartite atoms (i.e., the Vaiśeṣika theory of atoms) goes bankrupt when its inner contradiction is exposed. If the different atoms are connected (i.e., conjoined) with one another to create a new body bigger in size, then those atoms must be big enough to have different parts in order to make conjunction possible. But this will contradict the impartite nature of atoms. If, on the other hand, atoms being impartite and indivisible do not have any spatial extension, no conjunction of them will produce bodies bigger in size than atoms. The Kāśmīra Vaibhāṣikas (a school of Buddhist realists) used to hold that atomic constituents are not physically conjoined (as the Vaiśeṣikas thought) but are merely combined (*saṃhata*) to create impressions of solid, material bodies. Vasubandhu rejected this view too on the ground that such a combination of atoms would be either indistinguishable from the Vaiśeṣika notion of a body as a 'whole' (*avayavin*) or indefensible because one such combination could not have physical conjunction with another such combination. It should be noted here that according to the Buddhist realists, while bodies or wholes are imaginative constructs (cf. *prajñapti-sat*), their atomic constituents are ultimately real (cf. *dravya-sat*). But by exposing the inner contradiction of any atomic theory of matter Vasubandhu reached his desired conclusion: Nothing exists but consciousness.⁹

Diñnāga took his cue from Vasubandhu, and rejected, in his *Ālambana-parīkṣā*, the notion of material/external objects as it was understood in the Sautrāntika/Vaibhāṣika metaphysics (the Buddhist realists). He assumed two

a priori principles. What becomes the 'objective support' (*ālambana*) of a state of consciousness at any moment (1) must, on the one hand, be causally related to the consciousness-state, and (2) must contribute its 'form' or 'image' (*ākāra*) to it. For the Buddhist realists, it should be recalled, a composite body like a chair or a pot is an imaginative construct and hence only conventionally real. And that which is such a construct cannot *cause* anything.

The Sautrāntika might take atoms to be externally existent and lending 'objective support' to the corresponding cognitive state, i.e., the state of consciousness. In other words, the atoms being substantially or ultimately real (*dravya-sat* or *paramārtha-sat*) can cause the corresponding consciousness. But, Diñnāga argued, the atoms being formless themselves cannot contribute the form or image to the corresponding cognitive state. Thus, the atoms do not satisfy the second condition for being the 'objective support' of consciousness. The Vaibhāṣikas, on the other hand, might take the combination of atoms in the form of a chair, etc., to be the objective support. For such a combination possesses a particular form, and hence can contribute its form to the corresponding cognitive state. But, according to Diñnāga, such a combination fails to satisfy the first condition. In other words, this combination being only a construct and hence only conventionally real cannot *cause* the corresponding consciousness. For Diñnāga, a conceptual construct is as much real as the second moon appearing in our diseased eye-organ (cf. *timira*).

Diñnāga noted a third view (ascribed to Vāgbhaṭa by the commentator Vinitadeva). According to this view, the collection (*saṃcaya*) of atoms is capable of producing the cognitive state, and the image or form can be contributed jointly by the multitude of atoms. Diñnāga rejected this on the following ground. Under this view, it would be difficult to distinguish between the cognition of an earthen tea-pot and that of an earthen pitcher, both varying in shapes and sizes from each other, but constituted of atoms of the same kind (viz., earth atoms). If the distinction is maintained on the basis of their difference in size or shape, it would be unacceptable because size or shape does not belong to the atoms, the real entities, but to the constructs, the pitcher and the tea-pot. Thus Diñnāga reached his conclusion: the so-called *ālambana* or objective support does not lie outside consciousness, but *in* it; it is the appearance of the object in cognition itself.¹⁰

IV

In the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Diñnāga developed his doctrine of *svasaṃvitti*

'self-consciousness' or 'self-awarenesses', which must have inspired Dharmakīrti's elaborate defense of idealism in his *Pramāṇavārttika*. Dharmakīrti took issue mainly with the Sautrāntikas. The Sautrāntikas believed in some kind of 'representation' theory of consciousness. For according to them, representations or to use the Sanskrit metaphor, the 'forms' or 'images' (cf. *ākāra*) of consciousness are contributed by the external object, and external objects do exist although what we perceive directly are only their 'forms' in consciousness.¹¹

Briefly, the doctrine of 'self-consciousness' states that in each act or moment of consciousness there are not only two 'forms' or appearances, the object-appearance of the cognition itself, the forms of comprehension (*grāhaka*) and the comprehensible (*grāhya*), but also a self-comprehension or self-cognition where both these forms are registered. For Dinnāga, self-cognition is a kind of mental perception which constitutes an integral part of our each act of consciousness. Each state of consciousness in the consciousness series is ultimately real and self-revealing in character while it reveals both the object-form and its comprehension.¹²

One of the classic arguments of Dharmakīrti is based upon this principle of self-cognition. Although a formulation of this argument is found in the *Pramāṇavārttika*, the verse, which sums up concisely this argument, and which has accordingly been quoted very often by later philosophers, is located in his *Pramāṇaviniścaya*. By using the principle (like that of Leibnitz's), identification of the indiscernibles, Dharmakīrti argued:

The cognition of blue and the blue (as an object) must be non-different (from each other), for they are apprehended together always (i.e., when one is apprehended the other is also apprehended and vice versa). The (apparent) difference (between them) is due to (our) delusions, just as one sees two moons (under the influence of an eye-disease).¹³

In each act of consciousness, according to the doctrine of self-cognition, there are three aspects, the object-aspect, its cognition and self-awareness (cf. *grāhya*, *grāhaka* and *svasamvitti*). All three are integral parts of one momentary state of consciousness. Thus, there is the invariable fact that the object-form is never apprehended without its cognition-form being apprehended, it is argued that one should not be distinguished from the other.

What, then, accounts for the particularity and variety of our different cognitive states? The answer is amazingly simple. It is not the external world, but the internal *vāsanā*, individual backlog of our personal history, our mental dispositions, the residual forces of our past actions, coupled with the ingrained, beginningless, *avidyā* 'wrong notions'.

The Yogācāra idealism can very well lead to a solipsistic position, when it

is carried to its logical extreme. In this respect too, Western empiricist tradition offers a parallel, where the question of avoiding solipsism became a recognized problem. It was Dharmakīrti who tried to refute the charge of solipsism in a separate treatise, *Santānāntarasiddhi*.¹⁴ The main point of his argument can be summed up as follows. The method by which the idealist would prove the existence of other minds (i.e., *viññāna-santāna* or consciousness-series other than one's own) is not much different from the method by which the realist would hope to establish the existence of other minds. If, for the realist, the physical acts and speech belonging to other bodies are regarded as evidence of the existence of other minds, the idealist can very well adduce the ideas or representations of the same visible physical acts and speech as evidence of the existence of other *santāna* or consciousness-series. Although this argument is not very convincing, it nevertheless exploits the weakness of the argument of the opponent.

V

We may now look into the other side of the story. Since Yogācāra idealism was a challenging philosophical position, it evoked criticisms from all sorts of realists, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Mīmāṃsakas, the Jains as well as the Buddhist realists. In what follows, I shall limit myself to the criticisms of some Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers, as well as of Kumāṛila, the Mīmāṃsaka. Further, I shall concern myself with mainly epistemological rather than metaphysical or ontological arguments. In most Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika texts, one finds an elaborate defense of their theory about the constitution of matter out of atomic parts. The notion of atoms can be made compatible with creation of gross bodies. For example, the Nyāya posited the dyads as intervening between the impartite atoms and the gross particles, the motes. The dyads are atomic in dimension and size, but are divisible and have parts. Thus, conjunction of several dyads can give rise to the gross motes or bodies without running into the absurdities that Vasubandhu mentioned. Elsewhere I have discussed the Nyāya answer to the Buddhist critique of atoms, and hence I will not elaborate the point further.¹⁵

For a critique of idealism on epistemological ground let us first turn to Uddyotakara. The oldest, perhaps pre-Vasubandhu, form of idealism cited dream-experience etc. as examples where non-existent objects appear in consciousness. Uddyotakara countered: on what grounds are the objects of dream-experience etc. thought to be non-existent? In fact there are two senses of 'non-existence' which are distinct, and should not therefore be confused. One is what we can call temporal non-existence, and the other is

non-temporal non-existence. When a thing does not exist before its coming into being and after its going out of existence, we can say that it has this temporal non-existence, i.e. it is temporally non-existent. But this temporal non-existence is hardly equivalent to what we understand by the term 'unreality'. The non-temporal non-existence is, on the other hand, equivalent to unreality. An unreal object, e.g., a sky-flower, is non-existent only in the second sense. To prove his contention, the idealist must show that dream-objects or objects of memory are non-existent not in the first sense, but only in the second sense. Usually we declare dream-objects to be non-existent because they are not apprehended by our waking experience. Uddyotakara analysed this proposition:

- (1) If x is not apprehended by our waking experience then x does not exist.

Uddyotakara's first objection here was that the qualification 'waking' in the antecedent was redundant. The modified version (needed to prove the consequent ' x does not exist' by asserting the antecedent) would be:

- (2) If x is not apprehended by our experience then x does not exist.

Then Uddyotakara proceeded to show that this conditional was, in fact, a contrapositive version (cf. *viparyaya*) of the following conditional:

- (3) If x exists then x is apprehended by our experience.

Now it is a truism in logic, Uddyotakara argued, that the contrapositive will be true provided we previously proved the original sentence true. In Uddyotakara's words:

If apprehension proves existence then it is warranted that non-apprehension proves non-existence.¹⁶

In other words, if non-apprehension has any power to prove non-existence, it is dependent upon the 'contrapositive' relation, viz., upon the proposition: apprehension proves existence.

The idealist contended: the so-called object is not different from its consciousness because it is merely an apprehensible (*grāhya*) like the feeling of pleasure or pain. The point is that the feeling of pleasure or pain although apprehensible through consciousness is not differentiable from it, and we can apply this argument to all objects of consciousness. Uddyotakara argued that this point would lose its force against the Nyāya view of pleasure and pain. For Nyāya, consciousness is only a particular cognitive state, and feeling of pleasure or pain is what is apprehended, i.e., cognized through that cognitive state. A particular state of feeling is what is an *internal* object as opposed to, for example, a table which is called an external object. But an

'object', whether internal or external, must be distinguished from its cognition inasmuch as the latter is an act (i.e., meaning of a verb) while the former is the accusative or patient toward which the action is directed.

Vasubandhu explained the particularity of, and distinction between, different cognitive states on the analogy of dream-states. Uddyotakara argued that even in dream experience, particularity and distinction are based upon the particular nature of comprehensible objects. If it is pointed out that the apprehended object is temporarily non-existent at the time of dream experience, Uddyotakara countered that this is simply the nature of any erroneous cognitive state, and the dream is only one type of many erroneous cognitive states that we usually have. The idealist may claim that all our cognitive states are, in a sense, erroneous inasmuch as they externalize an object-form which is not external. But, Uddyotakara argued, this will be impossible to prove. A cognitive state is considered erroneous only when it is contrasted with a correct cognitive state, i.e., with a piece of knowledge. If there were no example of knowledge, how could there be any example of error?

To underpin the distinction between knowledge and error, the earlier Nyāya analyzed a piece of cognition, a state of consciousness, as follows. In each piece of cognition, there are two different types of objects formulating that cognitive state. One is called *pradhāna*, the 'principal' object, and the other is called *tattva*, the 'contextual' object. In the wrong apprehension of a rope as a snake, the principal object is the snake (or, the snake-universal) as Navya-nyāya would like to call it) whereas the contextual object is the rope which is present in the context. There are no cases of error without there being one principal object corresponding to it. And dream experience is an erroneous cognitive state where the principal object is the common features shared by both dream-objects and known external objects (or objects of our waking experience). Moreover, one *can* describe one's dream to the other, and thus a dream-object is also communicable through words. The expressibility through words, by virtue of which a dream-object becomes a public property instead of being exclusively private like a feeling of pain, is, in fact, grounded upon the common feature of particular things, i.e., universals. Elsewhere I have discussed the old Indian theory which states that 'the ground for application' (*pravṛtti-nimitta*) of a word for expressing a thing is the universal or generic feature of that thing. Now, to the extent that we admit universals to be mind-independent or extramentally real, we have to admit that even our dream experiences are grounded upon an external world. In short, according to Uddyotakara, the objectivity of our dream experience is proved by its expressibility through words.¹⁷

Vasubandhu justified the non-privacy of our ordinary experiences by referring to the hell-example, the case of a common psychosis where the corresponding object does not exist. According to Uddyotakara, this explanation will run into contradiction. A particular hell-experience, viz., experience of a pool of filth (or blood), is also what Nyāya would call an erroneous experience, and thus it too depends upon what we have called the principal object, viz., the blood-universal and/or the pool-universal. And such 'principal' objects, as already noted, are grounded in waking experiences and thereby grounded in outside reality.

Further, according to Uddyotakara, an error or a delusive perception is usually in the form of a certitude (*niścaya*), a decision as opposed to a doubt (*saṃśaya*). And a false certitude of the form 'This is a man' (where in semi-darkness there lies a tree-trunk in the visual field) is removed (i.e., destroyed) by the true certitude or knowledge of the form 'This is a tree-trunk'. But the object, i.e. the principal object, of the false certitude is not destroyed thereby because it does not happen that when the true certitude arises a man ceases to be man. Besides, according to Uddyotakara, there are definite causal antecedents to a false certitude. They are, broadly speaking, (a) perception of the common feature, (b) non-perception of the specific feature or distinguishing mark, and (c) superimposition of a definite specific feature which is actually absent from the context or situation. In this way, knowledge and error can be clearly distinguished.¹⁸

VI

I shall next discuss the arguments of Kumāṛila, Jayanta and Bhāsarvajña, as they grappled with the problems raised by Diñnāga and Dharmakīrti in defense of idealism. Kumāṛila refuted Buddhist idealism rather elaborately in two sections, *Nirālambana-vāda* and *Śūnya-vāda*, of his *Ślokavārttika*. Although some of his refutations amounted to sophistry, he nevertheless offered important criticisms of Diñnāga's theory of self-cognition (*sva-saṃviti*). In *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Diñnāga argued in favour of the 'self-cognition' theory by first asserting that a state of consciousness must have two appearances or forms: object-appearance and cognition-appearance. If this two-fold appearance of a cognitive state is not admitted then it would be difficult to explain, according to Diñnāga, the recollection of a past cognitive state. Recollection is caused by the memory-impression of a previous experience. But we see that we recollect not only the object of previous experience but also our previous experience itself. Unless this two-fold appearance were present in our previous experience, we could not have recollection

of the two in this manner. And, Diñnāga argued, this proves further that each cognition is self-cognized. For unless a cognition is self-cognized it can never be recollected. The Naiyāyikas hold that a cognition is not self-cognized, but cognized by another piece of cognition. According to Diñnāga, this theory leads to an infinite regress because to make recollection possible the second piece of cognition must be cognized by a third piece of cognition and so on *ad infinitum*. Thus, Diñnāga established that there is a self-cognition aspect in each state of consciousness where both the apprehensible and apprehension are revealed.

Kumārila disagreed on this point. The fact of recollection cannot establish the two-fold appearance of a cognitive state because, for Kumārila, what is recollected is always the object and never the previous cognition itself. According to Kumārila's theory of knowledge, a cognitive state is never perceived (i.e., apperceived) directly, but its occurrence is only inferred from what he calls the cognized-ness (*jñātatā*) of the object cognized. Thus, when the object of previous experience is recollected, the previous experience may then be inferred indirectly (through *arthāpatti* 'indirect implication'). But this should not be confused as perception or even direct recollection of the cognitive state.

Besides, if apprehension and the apprehensible were in fact identical, it would be difficult to explain some recollection, for example, of this form: "I do not remember what I apprehended at that time." Here is a recollection of the occurrence of an apprehension but the form of the apprehensible, the object, is for some reason left out of the recollection. If apprehension and the apprehensible were identical, this would not have happened.¹⁹

Jayanta repeated this point of Kumārila while he tried to refute Dharmakīrti's classic argument mentioned above, an argument based on 'togetherness'. Both, the Naiyāyikas like Jayanta and the Jains like Akalaṅka, made an attack on Dharmakīrti by pointing out that the expression 'together' used in Dharmakīrti's reasoning implied difference rather than unity. But this is only a verbal slip because Dharmakīrti's meaning is quite clear: Blue and the cognition of blue are identical because they are apprehended always by the same apprehension. As against this position. Jayanta held: a piece of cognition does not cognize itself. A cognition or a state of consciousness is not self-luminous and hence self-cognition is not an acceptable theory. It is possible to cite many counter-examples where the apprehensible blue appears in the cognition "This is blue", but its apprehension, i.e., cognition, does not appear there. Hence it is possible to claim that there are cases where *blue* is apprehended but its cognition is not apprehended. An apprehension of the cognition of blue will be of the form "I know that this is blue." And

in Kumāṛila's example "I do not remember what I actually apprehended at that time," Jayanta argued, we have a counterexample where the mere apprehension is recollected without the recollection of the apprehensible object.²⁰

Dharmakīrti has argued that perception of an object is not established for him who has not *apperceived* the perception.²¹ But the Nyāya argues that perception of an object is, in fact, possible even when the apprehension (of the object) is not *apperceived*. For as soon as the object is apprehended we can say that perception of the object has taken place; we do not need to wait until and unless apperception of that perception has taken place. In other words, the object is revealed as soon as the perception arises, and not when the perception is perceived (i.e., apperceived). Arising of perception and apperception of that perception are two different facts which may happen at two quickly succeeding moments (or, even simultaneously), but they should under no condition be confused as one and the same fact. Perception can reveal objects when it itself is not revealed.

Jayanta also pointed out that the analogy between a lamp and a cognitive state to prove their self-revealing character is really faulty. "Cognition reveals itself" involves only a bad metaphor for "cognition cognizes itself" or "cognition makes itself known". It is not also proper to say that a lamp reveals itself. In fact, a lamp too depends upon other conditions to reveal its own self. The eye-organ receives or apprehends other objects depending upon the lamp, i.e. light, whereas it apprehends the lamp more directly. But to make its own self known, the lamp has to depend upon the eye-organ, etc. And strictly speaking, this would not establish the self-revealing character of the lamp or light.²²

Diñnāga pointed out that there would be an infinite regress in the Nyāya theory of apperception. But as explained above, origin of perception (and not apperception of perception) amounts to the revealing of the object. Thus, we do not need to have all our perceptual (in fact, all our cognitive) states apperceived. In order to make our recollection of previous experience possible, we have to admit that the previous cognitive state was therefore apperceived. But apperception of apperception is ruled out because although we recollect that we know such-and-such, we seldom recollect that we knew that we knew such-and-such.

Dharmakīrti's argument based upon 'togetherness' of *blue* and cognition of *blue* has been criticized by Bhāsarvajña as follows: Does the apprehension, which, according to Dharmakīrti, is said to apprehend both the cognition and the object *blue*, apprehend also their difference or not? If it does not apprehend their difference, we should never be able to refer to them differ-

ently by two different expressions. In other words, if the difference is not registered in the apprehension, it cannot be registered in the linguistic expression of such apprehension. If, however, the difference is registered in the apprehension, why should we mistrust it? If it is argued that the said appearance of difference is wrong, like the appearance of two moons before our diseased eye, the Nyāya counters that this is untenable. The appearance of two moons is wrong but their two appearances (one real moon and one unreal) are certainly distinguishable. Similarly, the object-appearance and the cognition-appearance should certainly be distinguishable. The appearance of two moons is considered wrong because we can cite a case where there is the appearance of only one (viz., in true perception of the moon). But the object-appearance and the cognition-appearance cannot be declared as identical unless there is a case where the two appear as one. Thus, self-cognition, if it registers difference between object and cognition, cannot prove their identity.²³

Jayanta has repeatedly pointed out that even the doctrine of self-cognition is not immune to the fault of infinite regress. If the object-form being the apprehensible is apprehended by the cognition-form, and this cognition-form is apprehended by the self-cognition, then by the same token the cognition-form has also the form of an apprehensible and self-cognition would have the form of its apprehension. But if the self-cognition obtains a form in this manner then it is liable to be apprehended by another apprehension and so on *ad infinitum*. The point is that the charge of infinite regress is only a formal fault and does not further the argument in either case.²⁴

To come back to Bhāsarvajña. It may be argued that if a cognition is not self-cognized, it loses its power of revealing anything (cf. *aprakāśa*). Bhāsarvajña countered: if the loss of the power of revealing anything means the loss of the power of making something known, then we have eye-organ etc. as counterexamples. The eye-organ can reveal something without being cognized itself. But if the loss of the said power means loss of illumination (as in the case of a lamp), it is a case of bad metaphor. Only light has illumination and cognition is not the same thing as light or lamp. It is only poetic to say that cognition has illumination. If, however, the loss of the said power means the loss of its nature (essence of being consciousness), then it is untenable. For certainly a thing does not lose its nature (or essence) if it goes unrecognized. Flowers will have fragrance even if there were nobody to smell them. It may be asked: without self-cognition what else could constitute the nature (essence) of a piece of cognition? The Nyāya answer is that the essence or nature of a piece of cognition is simply the common property (a generic property) of all pieces of cognition, viz., the cognition-

universal. This property can as much be identified with the feature of self-cognition as the nature of fire can be identified with the property of burning its own self, or as the nature of a knife can be identified with that of cutting its own self.²⁵

Before we conclude our critique, let us ponder a little over the doctrine of *vāsanā* and that of *ālaya*. The Buddhist mechanism of *vāsanā* can be explained as follows. Each experience leaves its trace behind, which becomes a part of the ever-increasing volume of such residual forces. This volume is, in its turn, said to determine the nature and content of our next experience. The Nyāya criticizes it as follows: Since there is no soul or individual personality to carry this ever increasing volume or burden of the *traces* of past experience, the question arises: is this burden different from, or identical with, the consciousness series? If it is held to be different then the theory of 'consciousness only' will be at stake. If it is identical with consciousness, then we would have to admit that this storehouse of latent traces is also ever fluctuating along with the consciousness series. In fact, we have to concede the oddity that millions of *latent traces* are also dying every moment and creating new *latent* traces. Asaṅga and Vasubandhu developed the *ālaya* doctrine, 'storehouse consciousness', to account for the continuity of latent traces in the form of seeds through ever-fluctuating states of consciousness. But this *ālaya* again, has to be conceived as an ever fluctuating series receiving new seeds and dispensing with some old seeds through fruition at every moment.

Realists like Kumābila and Jayanta found this concept of *ālaya* very difficult to accept. For, under this theory, not only one has to imagine the momentary, fleeting states of consciousness (no matter whether it is the *base* consciousness or *ālaya*, or the *surface* consciousness or *vijñapti*) as the container or substratum of innumerable latencies or traces, but also one has to concede the actual and instantaneous arising and destruction of such innumerable latencies. Only when a latency or seed reaches its maturity (*vipāka*), it produces a particular form of experience. But the question is: why should we talk of the dying of innumerable latencies when we will have to say that these latencies as latencies come to life again in the next moment?²⁶

Some Buddhists draw the analogy of 'perfuming' one thing with the other. In other words, latencies are transferred from one consciousness state to the other just as the perfume of one thing is transferred to the other by association. Jayanta argued that this analogy was misconceived. Perfume is a (physical) part of the thing that possesses it, and transference of the perfume is, in actuality, the transference of this subtle 'physical' part of one thing to the other. But the Buddhist postulates that one state of conscious-

ness is totally annihilated before the other state arises in its place (cf. *nir-anvaya-vināśa*). But the notion of 'perfuming' will involve not total destruction but only partial destruction with traces left behind. Besides, if the state of consciousness is only momentary, how can it transfer its perfume to the other state. For, ordinarily, a thing has to stay longer than just a moment in order to transfer its perfume to another thing.²⁷

VII

I have given the philosophic formulation of the Yogācāra idealism and also shown formulations of some classical objections to such a philosophic position. Whatever might have been the motive or driving force behind this refutation of external/material world as unreal and unfinal, it was received with all philosophic seriousness in India (as the above sketch tends to show). The opponents who disagreed with idealism tried to provide philosophic arguments, rather than religious or theological skirmishes for the refutation of idealism. Very seldom was an appeal made, in this philosophic dispute, to religious faith, either Buddhist or non-Buddhist. Thus, I see in this controversy between idealism and realism, in their formulation as well as refutation, one of the most interesting developments in the history of Indian philosophy. After considering the period in history as well as the sophistication of the arguments, I am inclined to believe that this constitutes a very important part of our heritage, that is, our philosophic heritage in the global sense. I wish to underline this global sense of our philosophic heritage by repeating a belief of mine which was expressed in the preface to my first book: "India should not, indeed cannot, be left out of any general study of the history of logic and philosophy."²⁸

To review briefly the issue at hand. There is a sense in which the arguments of the idealist seem to be very convincing. They do make a very strong case for the position that we are indeed shut up in our ideas, or that the essence of a thing consists in its being experienced. Beyond this, however, I would not be inclined to concede anything further. It would, for example, be wrong to assume that the idealist has *deductively* proved his thesis. All that the idealist has succeeded in doing is to warrant a claim of this type: As far as the available evidence goes, the assumption of the reality of the material world may be false. But to cast a reasonable doubt over our uncritical assumption of the existence of the material world is not the same thing as proving the falsity or unreality of the external world. For implied in the notion of unreality of the material world is a theory of a supersensible world which is believed to be real and even more valuable. But this

becomes more a matter of religious faith than a philosophic point. As long as we are on philosophic grounds, we can accept the fact that the idealist can within reasonable limits challenge our beliefs in the external world. But we may again point out that to be able to challenge a belief does not amount to destroying that belief, let alone replacing that belief with another, equally questionable, belief, i.e., belief in 'consciousness only'.

The idealist is also guilty of an illegitimate generalization. First, a doubt whether the external world exists independently of mind or not is simply used by the idealist to challenge a certitude about the independent existence of the external world. But it is also taken (illegitimately, I believe) here to establish the opposite certitude that the external world *does not* exist independently of consciousness. This is in fact an illicit extension of the function of doubt. And the Nyāya would be justified in pointing this out.

Second, the Idealist relies on a very questionable generalization step. From an examination of some of our experiences where the so-called object of experience is actually an object *in* experience (such as dreams, delusions and hallucinations), the idealist takes a big step forward to conclude that all objects of our experience are in fact objects *in* experience and hence do not exist independently of it. This is a generalization based on insufficient grounds and hence logically not beyond censure. Even as a persuasive argument it is not adequate. For the notion of the external objects is so ingrained in us that it will need much stronger persuasion in order to dislodge it. But if the idealist's arguments are intended simply to awaken a religious awareness in us to follow the path of meditation and *nirvāṇa*, I would not subject it to logical scrutiny. I can admit that the arguments could be more persuasive to a religious mind.

A Jain philosopher, Akalaṅka, had the insight to point out that the reasoning of the idealist is as fallacious as the reasoning used by the Naiyāyika to prove the existence of God as the intelligent creator of the world. Having seen that some things that have structures and composite forms, such as a chair, a pot, are produced by an intelligent or sentient agent, the Nyāya generalizes that all things that possess a structure must have an intelligent creator, i.e., God. The idealist, according to Akalaṅka, makes a similar illicit step.²⁹

Last but not the least, if the idealist challenges the realist to prove conclusively and beyond doubt the reality of the material world, it might only be a good strategy in public debate. For even if the realist fails to prove his thesis conclusively (as he may very well fail if he falls into the trap set by the idealist), this will not, in my opinion, constitute a good vindication of idealism. A realistic interpretation of error, hallucination and dream, is in-

deed, possible, and the Nyāya theory in this regard is not, in my opinion, very far from truth. But construction or consistent description of a realistic metaphysic is another matter. Partial failure in this respect will not constitute a justification of idealism. A realist may even refuse quite consistently to describe an ontological system. For it is the idealist who has challenged the commonly shared beliefs, and so it behoves him to establish his thesis conclusively.

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NOTES

¹ *Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya* (ed. by G.M. Nagao), pp. 17-18

“*tatrābhūtaparikalpo grāhya-grāhaka-vikalpaḥ /
dvayam grāhyam grāhakam / sūnyatā tasyābhūta-
parikalpasya grāhya-grāhakabhāvena virahitatā.*”

² *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19.

“*artha-sattvātma-vijñapti-pratibhāsam prajāyate
vijñānam nāsti cāsyārthas tad-abhāvāt tad apy asat*” I.3

“*abhūta-parikalpatvam siddham asya bhavaty atah
na tathā sarvvathā ‘bhāvāt tat-kṣayān muktir iṣyate*” I.4. See Appendix E

³ G. Tucci, pp. 34-35.

⁴ See my forthcoming article, *Ālayavijñāna*.

⁵ See Appendix A.

⁶ *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi*, *Viṃśatikā*, p. 3.

“*vijñapti-mātram evaitad asadārtthābhāsanāt /
yathā taimirikasyāsat-keśacandrādidarśanam*”

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

⁸ The classical formulation of the empiricist's thesis in the West is found in J. Locke's *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, G. Berkeley's *The Principles of Human Knowledge* and D. Hume's *An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding*. Descartes's point about an 'evil demon' is found in *Meditations*. For remarks of modern philosophers on the problem, see B. Russell's *Human Knowledge and Problems of Philosophy*, J.L. Austin's *Sense and Sensibilia*, and H.H. Price's *Perception*. A good anthology of twentieth-century sources in the philosophy of perception is to be found in *Perceiving, Seeing and Knowing* (ed. by R.J. Swartz), New York 1965.

⁹ *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi*, pp. 6-8.

¹⁰ See *Ālambanaparikṣā*, verses 1-8.

¹¹ The concept of *ākāra* 'form' is very intriguing. In the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature, the wisdom of the Buddha is described as *sarvākārajñānatā*. The so-called objective support or *ālambana* of a consciousness-moment is nothing but the idea that develops, at a particular moment, in our mind from mind itself, there being no external, independent object. The form of this *ālambana* is called *ākāra*. In the spiritual ascent of a person through meditation, a new *ākāra* replaces the old *ākāra*. To the *śrāvaka*, for example, the *ākāra* of a *rūpa-dharma* is *anitya* 'impermanent'. In other words, the 'form' under which *rūpa* appears is *anityatā* 'impermanence'. To the bodhisattva, however, the *ālambana* will be *anitya* and its *ākāra* will be *anabhiniveśa* 'unattachment'. See Tucci, pp. 23-24.

¹² *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Hattori's note pp. 106-113.

¹³ Cf. *Sahopalambhaniyamād abhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ*, as quoted in texts like *Nyāyamañjarī* and *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*. See also Appendix B.

¹⁴ See H. Kitagawa, in Appendix A, I, pp. 407-439. Kitagawa has given a translation of *Santānāntarasiddhi*.

¹⁵ See my *Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis*, pp. 52-54. My arguments there were based particularly on Uddyotakara: pp. 213-216.

¹⁶ *Nyāyavārttika*, pp. 521-524.

See Appendix D.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 522.

‘na cittena paraḥ pratipādyate ity artho ‘syo na
sidhyati. na hītarasvapnam anākhyātam itaro
vijānātīti

For the Indian theory of meaning and universals see my *Epistemology ...*, pp. 106-109.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 524-525.

cf. “mithyābuddher nimittam asti. kim punas tat-?
sāmānyadarśanam viśeṣadarśanam avidyamāna-
viśeṣādhyāropa iti.”

¹⁹ Kumārila, p. 221.

cf. ‘na smarāmi mayā ko ‘pi grhīto ‘rthas tadeti hi
smaranti grāhakotpāda-grāhyarūpavivarjitam
tasmād abhinnaṭāyām ca grāhye ‘pi smaraṇam bhavet
grāhakasmṛtinirbhāsāt tatrāpy eṣaiva grhyate”
tadatyantāvinābhāvān naikākāraṃ hi jāyate
anvaya-vyatirekābhyām siddhaivam bhinnatā tayoh.

Śūnyavāda, verses 83-85.

²⁰ *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 110.

kvacī ca grāhyākārānupaśliṣṭakevalagrāhakā-
vamarśanam api drśyate “na smarāmi
maya ko ‘pi grhīto ‘rthas tadeti hiti”.

²¹ Cf. *apratyakṣopalambhasya nārthadrṣṭiḥ prasidhyati*. Quoted in *Nyāyabhūṣana*, p. 108, and in *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 104 and 108. Jayanta notes: *apratyakṣopalambhasya ca pratyutārthadrṣṭiḥ siddhyati, upalambhotpāda evārthadrṣṭir na punar upalam bhadṛṣṭiḥ /*

²² *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 108.

²³ *Nyāyabhūṣana*, pp. 132-133.

²⁴ *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 15.

²⁵ *Nyāyabhūṣana*, pp. 137-139.

²⁶ *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 114. na cālayavijnānam
kiñcid asti, saty api tasminn aśeṣavāsanāsahasra-
samāśraye tatkṣanikatvāt sakrd eva
tathāvidhavāsanākumūlajñānavinaśaḥ syāt.

²⁷ *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 113

nir-anvaya-vināśaḥ ca na tadamśo ‘nuvartate
yataḥ kathañcid vāsyeta pūrveṇa jñānam uttaram

²⁸ *The Navyanyāya doctrine of Negation*, Preface, p. X.

²⁹ Akalaṅka, p. 43

sanniveśādibhir drṣṭair gopurātṭālakādiṣu
buddhipūrvair yathā tatriva neṣyate bhūdharādiṣu
tathā gocaranirbhāsair drṣṭair eva bhayādiṣu
abāhyabhāvanājanyair anyatrety avagamyatām .

APPENDIX A

Sandhinirmōcana-sūtra (pp. 60-61)

[The translation is by the author from Lamotte's Sanskrit reconstruction.]

“There are, Guṇākara, three *dharma*-characters. What are these three? They are, to be sure, (1) the imagined character, (2) the dependent character and (3) the perfected character.

“Now there, Guṇākara, what is the imagined character of dharmas? It is, to be sure, the determination of descriptive names of *dharma*s (elements of reality) through their essential or peculiar attributes so that there may be linguistic usages and conceptual communications.

“What is, Guṇākara, the dependent character of dharmas? It is surely the dependent origination of dharmas: ‘That being there, this arises’; ‘from the origin of this, that originates’; ‘*saṃskāra* (mental forces) arises depending upon *a-vidyā* (wrong notions) and so on. In this way, this great mass of that consisting exclusively of sufferings (*duḥkha*) arises.

“What is, Guṇākara, the perfected character of dharmas? It is, to be sure, ‘thusness’ of *dharma*s. Understanding of this (character) is the cause of the strength of a *bodhisattva*, the ground for contemplation or fixation of the mind upon the ultimate root. As meditational process takes place as a result of this understanding, there arises the unsurpassable climax of enlightenment.

“Just as, Guṇākara, there is the *timira* defect in the eye of a person who is suffering from *timira* disease, in the same way we should understand the imagined character.

“Just as, Guṇākara, due to *timira*-disease there appear before that (diseased) person strands of hair or black bees or (black) sesame seeds, or dark objects, or yellow objects, or red objects or white objects, in the same way we should understand the dependent character of dharmas to be.

“Just as, Guṇākara, there are natural appearances of correct objects before that eye of that very person when the eye-sight is purified and cured of the *timira*-disease, in this very fashion we should understand the perfected character (of dharmas) to be.”

APPENDIX B

Dharmakīrti: *Pramāṇavārttika*

[The translation is by the author.]

Since the (cognizable) object is invariably apprehended along with its

cognition, in what manner could we establish the object as distinct from its cognition?

Distinctness is apprehended (however) by persons having illusory vision, just as the two moons appear to a person with the diseased eyesight. (And) there is no invariability in the apprehension of two (really) distinct things, viz., the blue thing and the yellow thing.

There is no (cognizable) object which is unapprehended, and it is not seen that there is a cognition which is being apprehended without the (cognizable) object. Thus, there cannot be any distinction between these two (cognition and object).

Therefore, it is irresistibly concluded that the (cognizable) object which appears at the time of cognition is indistinguishable from its cognition.

Pratyakṣa pariccheda, verses 388-391.

APPENDIX C

Vātsyāyana

[The translation is by the author.]

Nyāyasūtra 4.2.31-32

Supposition of 'the means of knowledge' (*pramāṇa*) and 'the objects of knowledge' (*prameya*) resembles the supposition of dream-objects. Vātsyāyana: 'Just as in a dream objects do not exist but are supposed to be there, similarly the means of knowledge and the objects of knowledge do not exist but we (only) suppose that there are objects of knowledge and means of knowledge.'

NS 4.2.33 [Answer] This argument is not established because it is not based on a reason.

Vāt.: There is no reason to prove (conclusively) that the means and the objects of knowledge are only supposed to be there like the supposition of objects in a dream, and that they are not known like the objects of waking experience. Therefore, the (above) argument is not established for there is no reason. (See *NS* 4.2.33)

Moreover, there is no reason to maintain that unreal objects are cognized in a dream experience.

[Objection] (The reason in the latter case is:) "Dream objects are not cognized when one wakes up."

[Answer] Since the objects of waking experience are cognized their existence is not refuted. (To explain:) If the objects in a dream are proven to be non-existent because they are not apprehended when one wakes up,

then (at least) those objects that are apprehended by one at one's waking state are proven to be existent because of their being apprehended (at the waking state). For, the reason becomes adequate in the 'contra-positive' case. If existence is established through apprehension then non-existence can be established through non-apprehension. If not the first, then non-apprehension cannot be an adequate reason for proving non-existence. For example, when the lamp is absent, visible colour cannot be seen. Thus, here the negated version is justified by the positive case: (e.g. when there is a lamp present, we see a visible colour, and thus, non-perception of visible colour can be said to be due to the absence of a lamp).

One must also assign a reason for regarding dream-objects as (products of) imagination. (To explain:) He who says that the means and objects of knowledge are like the supposition of dream-objects should speak about a reason on the basis of which the dream-objects are (said to be mere) imagination. Certain dreams are inspired by fear, certain dreams are inspired by joy, some dreams are different from both of these two types, and sometimes we do not (even) dream (while asleep). Supposition of dream-objects have their 'causal antecedents' (*nimitta*) and the imagination of these objects is justified by the imagination of the causal antecedents.

NS 4.2.38 Supposition of dream-objects resembles supposition of objects in an act of remembering or desire (or determination to obtain).

Vāt.: Such objects as have been previously known (or apprehended) become the objects of supposition in a dream, just as they become objects of supposition in an act of remembering, etc. Just as both an act of remembering and a desire to obtain has as their objects things which have been previously (in consciousness) apprehended, and hence they cannot invalidate (the existence of) such things, so also the cognition of objects in a dream has for its objects previously apprehended things and such a cognition likewise cannot invalidate (the existence of) such things. Thus, objects of our dream-experience are already apprehended by our waking experience.

He who sees a dream while asleep surely wakes up and remembers the dream-experience — "I saw this (in a dream)." There he becomes certain that his supposition of dream objects is false on the basis of his experience when he wakes up. (To explain:) When dream objects are being remembered, one becomes certain by virtue of the waking state of one's consciousness that the supposition of dream objects is false.

If there were no distinction between the two (dream and waking ex-

perience), the reasoning will be meaningless. (To explain:) When one does not agree to a distinction between the dream and the waking experience, the reasoning that the means and objects of knowledge are like supposition of objects in a dream will be meaningless because the basis of that reasoning will (thereby) be rejected.

Certitude (of a person) that it is *x* with regard to something that is non-*x* has as its (objective) basis a 'principal' object (*pradhāna*). (E.g.): Certitude that *this is a man* with regard to a tree-trunk which is not a man depends upon a 'principal' object. Surely, if some man or other were never known before, one cannot have, with regard to something which is not a man, a certitude that *this is a man*. Thus, certitudes of dream objects which are expressed as "I saw an elephant", or "I saw a mountain", should have as their (objective) bases some 'principal' objects.

NS 4.2.35 False apprehension is destroyed by true apprehension, just as the supposition of a dream object is destroyed at the waking stage.

Vāt.: Certitude that *this is a man* with regard to a tree-trunk is called a false apprehension — it is the cognition that it is *x* with regard to that which is non-*x*. Certitude that this is a tree-trunk with regard to a tree-trunk is called true cognition. It is the false apprehension that is rejected by the true cognition, but not the object which is the generic character of either being a tree-trunk or a man. Just as the state of consciousness at the waking stage rejects the supposition of objects in a dream, but not the generic character of objects is thereby rejected, so also where there is a cognition of a magic show or castles in the cloud, i.e., the certitudes that it is *x* with regard to what is a non-*x*, the false apprehension is destroyed by the true cognition, but the object is not thereby rejected.

False cognition in a magic show and the like has also a 'material' condition. When a man taking a piece of substance, whose character is familiar, uses tricks and creates a false certitude (that it is a different thing) in the mind of others, it is called magic. Configuration of thick mist, etc., in the manner of a city or castle generates from a distance the cognition of a city or castle. For, when such mist, etc., are not present, the impression of a city or a castle (in the cloud) does not appear. The impression of water is generated by the vibrating sun-rays connected with the terrestrial heat, for we apprehend here the common character (i.e., vibrating brightness). Thus, the false cognition is not without its causal antecedents because it happens at some place at a certain time in a certain person.

It is seen that these are two distinct cognitive states, one belongs to the magician and the other is that of the spectator — one is that of the

distant person with regard to a cloud-castle and mirage, and the other, that of the person who is standing close-by; with regard to a dream object, one cognition is that of the sleeping person and the other is that of the same person while he is awake. This distinctness of cognitive states cannot be explained if there were nothing that exists, or if everything were unreal and without essence.

NS 4.2.36 A cognition state is to be thus understood, for we apprehend its causal antecedents as well as its coming into being.

Vāt.: Just as the object cannot be rejected, so also the false cognition cannot be rejected. Why? For we apprehend its causal antecedent as well as its coming into being. The causal antecedent of a false cognition is certainly apprehended by us. And the false cognition itself is also apprehended (apperceived by an individual) as it originates in that individual, for it is subject to mental perception (since it is a mental state). Therefore, a false cognition also exists.

NS 4.2.37 Since there is a distinction between *tattva*, the 'contextual object' and *pradhāna* 'principal object', the duality of a false cognition is justified.

The 'contextual object' is the tree-trunk, the 'principal object' is the man. With regard to the tree-trunk there arises a false cognition that *this is a man* because while the distinction between the 'principal object' and the 'contextual object' is not eliminated their common character is (nevertheless) comprehended.

Thus, there arises false cognition of a circle of flying ducks in a flying banner, of a (flying) pigeon in a (falling) pebble. There are no false cognitions co-present in the same object because they are dependent upon the comprehension of a common character. For him according to whom everything is without essence and unreal there may arise false cognitions which are co-present in the same object.

APPENDIX D

Uddyotakara: *Nyāyavārttika* (pp. 521-525)

[The translation is by the author.]

It is not true that the means of knowledge and the objects of knowledge are supposed (to be existent) like (the objects in) a magic show, or the appearance of a castle in the cloud, or a mirage. For this (thesis) cannot be proved.

No reason is given when it is asserted that unreal objects are being supposed (to be existent) like dream-objects. What reason is there to maintain that the objects in a dream-experience are unreal?

[Opponent:] The reason is what is called *khyāti* (appearance of objects in experience). The reason for maintaining the thesis, viz., objects that are apprehended at the waking state of consciousness, do not have a separate existence from consciousness, is the appearance of objects as in a dream.

[Answer:] No. Your example (i.e., the dream-example) stands in need of a proof just as does your thesis.

What is the reason for believing that the objects that appear in a dream-experience are not distinct from the (dream-)consciousness?

[Opponent:] The objects do not exist since they are not apprehended by the waking person.

[Answer:] If you think that these objects do not exist just because they are not apprehended by the waking person, then you are wrong. For you have added a qualification (unnecessarily).

It is implied that those objects that are apprehended by the waking person exist. And the qualification, those "that are not apprehended by the waking person" is superfluous.

If you argue that the objects that are apprehended either in the waking experience or in a dream are unreal but the consciousness (of such objects) exists, (we ask:) what could be your reason?

The fact of being not apprehended by the waking person cannot be cited as a reason because it is incapable of establishing the 'contrapositive' (*viparyaya*; viz., apprehension of objects by the waking person proves their existence).

If apprehension proves existence only then it is warranted that non-apprehension can prove non-existence.

It is contended that the reason should be capable of establishing the 'contrapositive' thesis (viz., apprehension proves existence).

[Opponent:] The objects are not distinct from the consciousness (of them) because they are subject to comprehension (by the consciousness) just as a particular feeling (of pain) is. Just as that which is apprehensible (*grāhya*) like a particular feeling, is not distinct from consciousness, so also the objects are not distinct from consciousness.

[Answer:] A feeling is a feeling of either pleasure or pain. Consciousness is a cognitive state (of mind). A cognitive state is distinct from the feeling of pleasure or pain. Therefore, your supporting example is not correct. Pleasure and pain are what are apprehensible, and their apprehension is a cognitive state. Thus, the apprehensible must be distinct from its apprehension.

If you argue that consciousness is identical with the feeling (i.e., pleasure or pain), we still say that there is no supporting example where

the apprehensible and the apprehension are (undoubtedly) identified with each other. For, an act and the object to which that act is directed cannot be identical with each other.

If you wish to establish identity (between apprehension and the apprehensible) without caring for the evidences of the means of knowledge, you establish (only) four 'personality' aggregates (instead of five, by equating feeling with consciousness); and this will contradict your doctrinal position (that there are five 'personality' aggregates, viz., aggregates of matter, feeling, perceptions, mental forces and consciousness).

If you do not accept even four aggregates but admit consciousness only that is (commonly) experienced, we then counter: since there are neither internal nor external objects to account for the distinctness of the states of consciousness, how can you explain the distinction of different states of consciousness?

[Opponent:] One state of consciousness is different from the other just as one dream is different from another.

[Answer:] Even in that case, the distinction of consciousness-states should be explained as owing to the comprehension of (different) things, that are observed and experienced. If, in the case of dreams also, the distinction of consciousness-states is asserted to be owing to the difference of comprehension, then we counter by pointing out the distinction of comprehension from the comprehensible. The comprehensible cannot be identical with comprehension.

All the dream-experiences that reveal cities, birds, gardens and chariots distinctly, are erroneous cognitive states. And these erroneous cognitive states originate, sharing the generic features of the waking cognitive states.

[Opponent:] In my theory, all cognitive states will be held to be erroneous.

[Answer:] If you say that, we ask you to point out the 'principal' object (*pradhāna*) in such errors. There cannot be an erroneous cognition which is without any 'principal' object.

Moreover, he who does not accept that the objects are distinct from consciousness, should be countered with the refutation of this reason based upon the examination of its nature.

Is the nature of the object (in a dream) that of being external? If so, then the position becomes contradictory (viz., what is internal in consciousness is said to be external).

Is the nature of the dream-object that of being consciousness? If so, then the dream-object cannot be established because the states of consciousness cannot be communicated to others. For, if the dream of one

person is not expressed in words, the other person would not be able to know it.

[Opponent:] The states of consciousness taking the 'forms' of words are conveyed to others.

[Answer:] He who says this should explain the meaning of the word 'form', *ākāra*. The 'form' (in this context) is the apprehension by which something non-*x* appears as *x* depending upon the similarity of the 'principal' object, (e.g., "This is a snake" — this wrong apprehension has taken the 'form' of a snake with regard to something that is not a snake but has similarity with the 'principal' object, i.e., a snake).

Also, in your view, words are not real, and hence the sentence "the consciousness-state takes the 'form' of words" is a statement without a reference.

He who does not accept that objects are distinct from consciousness, should also be asked to explain the distinction between a dream and a piece of waking experience. The objects are non-existent as much in the waking experience as in the dream; hence, wherefrom could there be such a distinction as reflected in the statement "This is a dream and that is a waking experience?"

Even the discrimination of what begets merit and what begets demerit cannot be established (under your view). For, just as one does not incur demerit by having illicit sexual relations in a dream, so also one would not incur demerit by doing so in the waking state.

[Opponent:] The (said) discrimination is maintained by the fact that in one case the person is overwhelmed with slumber, while he is not so overwhelmed in the other case.

[Answer:] This is also wrong. How does one know that this odd behaviour of the mind is caused by the influence of slumber?

[Opponent:] The clarity and unclarity of the states of consciousness distinguish the dream stage from the waking stage.

[Answer:] You will have to explain the notion of clarity and unclarity without taking recourse to the objects (which are, according to you, non-existent).

[Opponent:] It has been seen that states of consciousness can be distinct even when their objects are non-existent. For example:

The departed spirits originating from the maturation of similar 'residual forces of action' (*karma*) see a river full of filth. No river is actually present there, nor any filth. And one thing cannot be many. But the states of consciousness are seen to be distinct, for some spirits see the same as a river full of water, and some others see it as a river full of

blood. Thus it is ascertained that consciousness alone arises in different forms in the manner just described, depending upon its internal conditions while the external objects as its conditioning antecedents do not exist.

[Answer:] This is wrong because it runs into contradiction. If you say that consciousness appears in different forms in this manner while the external condition does not exist, we then ask: How is it so?

If consciousness takes the 'form' of blood, you should explain the status of this blood. What is the status of this blood? In the same way, one should raise questions about the 'form' of water or the 'form' of the river. When each word in the sentence "They see a river of filth", is examined by analysis, the sentence becomes devoid of any objective reference if the aggregates of matter etc. did not exist.

Regulation of place and time is also not possible. The departed spirits see the river full of filth in a particular place, not in just any place whatsoever. If objects did not exist, the reason for such regulation of place would have to be explained.

If, for a person, the existent object is determined by some 'form' or other, then it is proper to hold that some of his cognitive states are erroneous. False cognitive states do not reject (the existence of) the 'principal' object. Thus, one should point out the 'principal' objects in the cognition of the river of filth etc. What applies to the cognition of the river of filth etc. is also applicable to the cases of the magic show, appearance of the castle in the cloud, and mirage-water.

[Opponent:] "You imagine the 'perfuming' of action (*karma*) to be in one place and the result of it in another place." (Vasubandhu, *Vimśikā*). The meaning of this (line) is: The (corresponding) result should be there where the action takes place. For him who takes objects to be different from their consciousness, the action will happen in one place while its result will be in another place, and thus the action and its result will have different substrata (but cause and effect are supposed to have the same substratum).

[Answer:] This is not true, for I do not concede the point. I do not concede that the action and its result are occurring in different substrata. The action is located in the self (*ātman*) and the result is also in the same locus. Thus, the (supposed) fault (in my position) is rejected.

The objects (of my consciousness) are different from my consciousness because they possess generic features as well as specific features. They are distinct just as my consciousness-series is distinct from the consciousness belonging to another personality-series (i.e., another person).

The objects are different from consciousness because they can be established (as external) by means of knowledge. Also because they are 'effects' (*kārya*, 'causally conditioned'), they are temporal, and they are preceded by residual traces of action (*dharma*).

APPENDIX E

"na tathā sarvathā 'bhāvāt"

The meaning is admittedly not clear. Sthiramati comments: *na tathā 'stitvān na ca sarvathā nāstitvāt tadgrāhyagrāhakapratibhāsam utpadyate*. I wish to thank Dr. S. Katsura for pointing this out to me. The possible translation would be "(*Abhutaparikalpatva* is established) because it does not exist as (it appears) and because it is not non-existent in every respect."

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THE GĀNDHĀRĪ VERSION OF THE *DHARMAPADA*

It was a happy coincidence that the appearance of the Gāndhārī (= G) *Dharmapada* (= *Dh.*) in 1962¹ was followed closely by that of the *Udānavarga* (= *Uv.*) in 1965.² Although portions of both texts had long been known,³ their publication *in toto* gave renewed impetus to the comparative study of the Pāli (= P) *Dh.* in relation to its Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit (= BHS) and Prakrit (= Pkt.) equivalents.

As the investigation continues into the peculiarities of morphology and phonology of G *Dh.*, it becomes possible to define more accurately its ambiguities, and in the light of these to use G *Dh.* as a check or control upon the versions in BHS and Pkt. We must, however, in all our discussions remember that G *Dh.* is a translation. The fact that words are spelt with alternations, e.g. *p-/pr-*, *-y-/v-*, *ś/s/s*, means only that the translator (who may or may not have been the scribe), put certain interpretations upon the text of his exemplar (which was not written in the G dialect). His translation depended upon his interpretation. Sometimes material from the source dialect(s) was left untranslated, either by error, or because the word or phrase did not occur in the G dialect, and so could not be translated, e.g. JB notes “*niṣidh-* did not survive in the language” (p. 246 on 231). If the source material was ambiguous, and therefore capable of being interpreted in different ways, so his interpretation, and therefore his translation, could differ from that of another translator who was handling the same material. If we find, in different traditions, different readings of what we have reason to believe was originally the same text, we must search for the explanation in a dialect which contained forms which could have produced such an ambiguity. This was not necessarily the language of the original composition, but simply one through which the text went in the course of its transmission. The existence of any particular word or form or idea in G *Dh.* does not prove anything *per se* other than that the scribe or redactor so interpreted the material before him.

In this paper, offered in honour of Miss Horner, whose contributions to Pāli studies have helped immeasurably all those who work in the field of Buddhism, I have made a further attempt⁴ to use G *Dh.* as an aid to the interpretation of P *Dh.* and BHS *Uv.*, and vice versa. I have also taken the opportunity of suggesting solutions to some of the many problems which arise in these texts, as well as making some comments upon P and Pkt grammar and lexicography.

13: JB gives (Index, p. 301) two Sanskrit (= Skt.) alternatives (*dveṣin-*, *dā-ṣin-*) for *doṣi*. He correctly points out (p. 180) that the reference in pāda c is to Māra, but he does not note that *doṣi* is the equivalent of P *Dūsi*, *Dussi* = Māra (see *Dictionary of Pāli Proper Names*, s.v. *Dūsi*, and cf. *Dussi* in *Thag.* 1187-88).

15: JB states (p. 181) that the interpretation of P *sammati* as a verb (= *śāmyate*) is most improbable, since no comparable instances have been noted of a sandhi-consonant after an indicative verb in either P or Pkt. It is certain that JB is right in rejecting this interpretation, but for reasons other than the one he gives. The state of P and Pkt. grammatical and lexical studies is such that any argument from silence is unwise, since the fact that a grammar or dictionary does not list a particular form means only that the author did not know of it, not that it does not exist.

Sandhi *-m-* in the position described certainly exists in P, e.g. *nayanti-m-etam* J v 445; *tapati-m-idam* Vv. 35.2. Sandhi *-m-* also occurs in BHS, e.g. *abhinandanti-m-āgatam* (v.l. at Uv. 5.20d); *viñānati-m-ālapantam* Mahāvastu i 155.4 (with the MSS, see *BHS Grammar*⁵ §4.59). Sandhi *-r-* too occurs in this position in P, e.g. *bhāti-r-iva bhagavato mukhavaṇṇo* D ii 205.10; *bhavanti-r-assa* J vi 206.

For another example of an argument from silence see the note on 156 below.

16: In pāda b P has *samacariyā samaṇo ti vuccati*; Uv. 11.15 has *śramaṇaḥ śamitāśubhaḥ*, with the pun which worked so well in P, where both words begin with *sam-*, not working so well with *śram-* and *śam-*. The *Pāli-English Dictionary* (= PED) assumes (s.v. *samacariyā*) a derivation from *sama-* < Skt. *śama-* 'calmness, quiet', but G *sama'irya* with dental *s-* shows that the G redactor did not follow that derivation. It might be suspected that the redactor was merely making a mistake in derivation, or simply following his exemplar blindly, but confirmation of the G form is found in Aśoka's *Rock Edict XIII* (O)⁶ where the eastern form *samacaliyam* is replaced at Shahbazgarhi by *samacariyam*, not *śama-*, and is consequently to be translated 'equanimity'. The same translation is probably to be given here for *sama'irya* and for P *samacariyā*. We should also note *samu cari* in 325, where J iv 172 has *samam care*. Neither *samacaryā* nor *śamacaryā* is quoted for Skt. by Monier-Williams (= MW)⁷ or *BHS Dictionary*.⁸

P *samacariyā* is presumably to be taken as a truncated oblique case form from an *-ā* stem (Geiger,⁹ §81), and the same explanation must be given for the G form. Similar forms are found elsewhere in G Dh., e.g. *cadripravha*

(see the note on 197) and perhaps *aṣamaṇadha* (see the note on 257). Since both *-cariya-* (nt.) and *-cariyā-* (fem.) are found in P, however, it is possible that we have here the abl. in *-ā* (P) or *-a* (G), of a nt. noun *samacariya-* (cf. *brahmacariya-*), instead of the usual fem. noun *samacariyā-*.

17: JB points out (p. 183) that G *sayi* supports the reading *sace* in *Dh.* 396 against *sa ve* in *Sn.* 620 and *Dh. A* iv 158; *Uv.* 33.15 confirms this with *saced*. In his note on 271 (p. 259) JB points out that P *attano va* is probably a misreading for *attano ca* since G has *atvaṇo i* and *Uv.* 18.9 *ātmanas tu*.

These comments can be made because, although the Brāhmī script has confused *ca* and *va* from the earliest times,¹⁰ the Kharoṣṭhī script does not, and moreover the G dialect differs in its treatment of initial *v-* in *va* and initial *c-* in *ca*. The latter word being an enclitic, *c-* is treated as though it were intervocalic (§70), whereas initial *v-* is retained. The same phenomenon can be used to decide between the readings *ca* and *va* elsewhere in P, e.g. in 19 G reads *drigha ci rasa ji* where P reads *dīgham va rassam vā*: *Uv.* 33.25 reads *dīrgham tathā hrasvam* which favours *ca* as against *vā*; in 169 G has *taruva babaka va* while P has *dārujam babbajam ca*: *Uv.* 2.5 confirms *va* with *vā*; in 195 G has *sarve ya prana* while P has *sabbe va pāṇe*: *Uv.* 31.43 confirms *ca* with *sarvāms tu satvām*; in 269 G has *yo ya vi kitva* while P has *yo vāpi katvā*: *Uv.* 8.1 confirms *ca* with *yaś cānyad api*; in 296 G has *ya vi* where P has *vāpi* and *Uv.* 6.17 *cāpi*.

37: JB suggests (p. 187) that *ruva chada* probably arose because we have here a form equivalent to the Skt. acc. pl. masc., i.e. **rūpān*, instead of the expected nt. form. This would then show the development *rūpān śabdān* > *rūpān śabdān* > *rūpān chabdān* (Whitney,¹¹ §203). He points out (§50) that we cannot be certain whether the form *chada* is due to the specific context of the verse, or whether it had become the normal development of Skt. *śabda-* in the dialect.

We can be fairly certain that the form is due to the context, i.e. to *rūpa-* being declined as though it were a masc. noun, for an exact parallel to this occurs in P in *Thag.* 1099, where *rūpe* is found as the acc. pl. instead of the expected *rūpā(ni)*, presumably by analogy because it is in a context with *rase*, *sadde*, etc. In the nom. pl. all the nouns (masc. and nt. alike) in this stock list occur with the nom. pl. ending *-ā*, e.g. at *Thag.* 455, so that it is quite understandable that all the nouns would be given the same ending *-e* in the acc.

50: A close examination of the structure of this verse shows that JB is cor-

rect in making the suggestion (p. 189) that *ābhāti* in the P version (and in *Uv.* 33.74) is not the original form of the verse. It is clear that the only finite verb required in the verse is *tapati*, and any other verb destroys the parallelism that the sun, moon, a *kṣatriya*, a *brāhmaṇa*, and the Buddha all shine. It is probable that the parallelism is continued by putting a participle with each subject, making it clear that each shines only while it is doing something: the sun and the moon shine while they are visible, i.e. by day and night respectively, the *kṣatriya* when he has his armour on, the *brāhmaṇa* while he is meditating, but the Buddha shines all the time.

It therefore seems likely that *abha'i* = **ābhayaṃ* (i.e. the pres. part of *ābheti* (see *PED* s.v.)). In pāda d *ja'i* is probably for *jhāyaṃ* (i.e. the pres. part.). It is noteworthy that *Dh.A* iv 144 records a v.l. *jhāyan ti* for the lemma *jhāyī ti*.

The cadence *ābhayaṃ candimā* would not fit the standard śloka cadence pattern $\cup - \cup \cup$, although such variants are not rare in P (see *Elders' Verses*¹² I §35, II §59). Nevertheless this could have led to a pronunciation *ābhaya(m)*, which would have facilitated the development of the P and BHS versions. It is clear that these versions are based upon a dialect where both *-ati* and *-aya(m)* became *-ai*.

82: G *visaḍa-* is presumably based upon a form *visata-* in the exemplar. JB points out (p. 197) the v.l. *visaṭaṃ* in a Burmese MS of Sn., but the form *sata-* < Skt. *sṛta-* is more common in P than one would believe from reading his note, e.g. *anuvisaṭa-J* iv 102; *anusata-Dh.A* iv 49; *ussata-M* ii 65; *nissata-Ap.* 68; see also *PED* s.vv. *visaṭa-/visata-*.

It is clear that the redactor of the G version did not recognise the word in his exemplar, or he would have written *visaḍa-*, for in the G dialect the past parts. of verbs in *-ṛ-* are formed with *-ada-*, *-ida-*, or *-uda-*, e.g. *kada-* and *kida-* < *kṛta-*, *muda-* < *mṛta-*, i.e. with dental *-d-* not retroflex *-ḍ-* (what was formerly read as *vriḍha-* in 172 is read by JB as *vriḍha-*). The redactor did not recognise the root *śat-* either, or he would have written *śaḍa-*. The BHS redactor did recognise it as coming from *sṛta-*, and wrote *visṛta-* (*Uv.* 32.66ff).

JB states (p. 198) that parallelism favours *visaḍa(m)* being a pres. part. I find it difficult to follow the semantic development he suggests, taking the verb to be *śat-* 'to be sick'. He suggests that **viśat-* would mean 'to cure a disease', but if *vi-* had a privative sense the verb could only mean 'to be well', and the causative would be needed to give the meaning 'to make well = to cure'. It is possible that, if *śat-* is to be seen here, *vi-* could have the meaning 'in different directions', and *viśat-* would simply mean 'to be ill'. We could

then translate it as a pres. part.: 'whoever controls anger, as a sick man controls snake poison'.

I think, however, that the parallelism in the verse differs from that suggested by JB. In 81 the pres. part. *viyini* goes with the verb *najakamo*, which to be understood as going with both pādas a and b: "whoever searching does not find essence in existences, as one searching does not find flowers among fig-trees", i.e. there are two locs. and two accs. In 83 we should translate "whoever seizing pride pulls it out complete, as one seizing a lotus pulls it out having flower and stalk (i.e. complete)". There the parallelism consists of both objects having adjectives implying completeness with them. In this verse we may translate "whoever controls anger when it has arisen, as one controls snake poison when it has spread". Here the parallelism consists of the fact that both objects have past parts. in agreement with them.

We can surmise either that the G redactor was careless when he received *visaṭa-* in his exemplar, and 'translated' to *visaḍa-* without thinking, or that the form was not typical of the language of the exemplar and hence was not recognised for what it was. *Visaṭa-* would be an eastern form, and it is likely that the language of the exemplar was a western dialect, with past. parts. of verbs in *-ṛ-* in *-ata-*, *-ita-*, or *-uta-*. A form with *-ṭ-* would have been anomalous in the exemplar, and its very unusualness would have puzzled the redactor.

86-87: Despite JB's very long note (pp. 201-4) on *(n)jecasari* and *precasari*, the meaning of pāda a is by no means clear, and it seems worth while suggesting yet another solution to the problem. JB quotes *Sn.A 21: yo nâccasārī ti yo nâtidhāvi, na paccasārī ti na ohiyyi*, but points out that *paccasārī* can hardly mean 'lagging behind'. The BHS version seems to show the same idea: *yo nâtyasaram na câtyaliyam* (*Uv. 32.55*). Both may, however, be merely reminiscences of the sentiment seen in *oliyanti eke, eke atidhāvanti* (*Ud. 72 It. 43-4*).

It cannot be stressed too much that G *Dh.* is only a translation of the exemplar the redactor received. The fact that the BHS version has the prefix *aty-* in both verbs shows that the redactor of that version did not understand the second verb in his exemplar as having the prefix *prati-*. If we punctuate the P version *yo n' accasārī na p' accasārī* we can see the possibility that the G redactor misunderstood his exemplar and produced a hyperform *prec-*.

It is clear that there must be some sort of antithesis between the two verbs. Here the metre of the verse (*Aupacchandasaka*) may provide a clue. Pāda a of the P version is slightly irregular metrically. JB has pointed out (p. 194) that there is no reason to suppose that the redactors were very sensitive to metrical minutiae, and verses of comparable irregularity are not

uncommon in P (see *EV* I §29). If, however, we assume that the metre should be corrected then we can read *yo n' accasari na p' accasari*, and so obtain an antithesis between the simple verb stem *sar-* and the causative stem *sār-*. We may then translate "whoever has never transgressed nor even caused to transgress", which is a type of phrase to which parallels may easily be found, e.g. *yo na hanti na ghātetī, na jināti na japaye* (*A* iv 151 = 198). There is thus a paradox in the word play between *accasari* and *accagāmā* in pāda b of *Sn.* 8: "whoever has not gone beyond (= transgressed), but has gone beyond (this *papañca*)".

The third sg. aorist of a causative verb in P is usually in *-ayi*, but in BHS such aorists are found in *-i* (see *BHS Grammar* §38.32).

139b: *P atikhīṇa-* has caused difficulty. *PED* explains 'broken bow (?)', while the *Critical Pāli Dictionary* states "perhaps 'destroyed, consumed, i.e. quite worn out or slackened'."¹³ The word occurs in P only at *Dh.* 156 and *Dh.A* iii 132 explains: *cāpātikhīṇā ti, cāpāto atikhīṇā cāpā vinimmuttā. Uv.* 17.4 reads *śenti cāpātikhīṇā vā*, which confirms the P gloss. It is unfortunate that pāda c is missing in the G version, for it would have been informative to know whether the confusion between *-khīṇa-* and *-kiṇṇa-* was also present in the G verse. The confusion may have arisen because the verse was transmitted through a dialect where *k* and *kh* could be confused (as in G), with the subsequent change of *-iṇṇ-* > *-iṇ-*, but the more probable explanation is that *khīṇa-* was inserted by scribal error because *khīṇamacche* occurred in the previous verse. The error did not occur in the BHS version (and probably not in the G version either) because there the adjective describing the pool was not *kṣīṇamatsya-* but *'lpamatsya-* (cf. *G apamatse* in 139a).

156: In the note on 15 above I pointed out the danger of basing an argument upon the absence of any particular form in the P and Pkt. grammars and dictionaries. In his discussion of *vijīṇeṇa* (p. 226) JB excludes the possibility of a development *-c-* > *-j-* in G since "such a development is virtually unknown in Middle Indian", and he notes that Pischel (§302)¹⁴ cites only one example, and that from Hemacandra. I have elsewhere¹⁵ given a number of examples to show that this change was by no means as rare as JB assumed, and Mehendale has given examples from Pkt. inscriptions,¹⁶ including the form *pisāji-* quoted by Pischel from Hemacandra. There is therefore no reason for dismissing the development of *vijīṇeṇa* < *vicīṇeṇa*. An alternative explanation can, however, be put forward. Sir Harold Bailey has drawn attention to the existence of a root *jar-* parallel to *car-*,¹⁷ and has quoted *anujīṇa-* with the meaning 'followed'. It would thus be possible to assume

the existence of **vijīrṇa-* from the same root, with the meaning “practised”.

171: JB suggests (p. 232) that in the P version of this verse *ye* arose from a misunderstanding of the original version where *ye* was intended as a nt. sg. acc. He states “there is no reason to doubt that the acc., as in any other neuter word, would be identical with the nom.” This is, however, not true of the eastern dialect in the Aśōkan inscriptions, where the nt. nom. is in *-e*, but the acc. is in *-am*.¹⁸ JB refers to *se* quoted as acc. by Pischel (§423), but this is not the simple acc. of the third person pronoun stem *ta-*, but an enclitic oblique case form, analogous to the first and second pronoun forms *me* and *te*, and either formed on the analogy of them, as Pischel implies, or a genuine historic remnant from Indo-European (cf. Avestan *hōi*, *hē*, *šē* and Old Persian *šaiy*).¹⁹ JB is not the only one to be confused by these forms in *-e*. *PED* (s.v. *sa*²) states “a form *se* is Magadhism for nt. sg. acc. *tam*, found e.g. at *D* ii 278 [lines 16, 30] 279 [line 12] *M* ii 254 [line 25] 255 [line 6]”. This information is probably taken from Geiger (§105.2) where these same references are given, and *se* is stated to be nom./acc. sg. nt. There is, however, no evidence that Geiger thought they were acc. in these contexts, and his statement that the form is nom./acc. is probably based upon the assumption that nt. pronouns had the same ending for both nom. and acc. In fact *D* ii 278-9 reads *ye avitakke avicāre, se paṇītatare*; *M* ii 254 reads *ye lokāmi-saṣaṃyojane, se pavutte*; *M* ii 255 reads *ye ānañjasamyojane, se bhinne*. In all these contexts *ye* and *se* are nom.

There is no evidence that *ye* is ever acc. sg., and there seems to be no reason for doubting that it is nom. pl. in this verse. The solution to the problem of the missing correlative is probably simple. As JB states of the mixed metaphors in the verse, “The verse appears to be pieced together rather carelessly from traditional materials”.

197: JB states (p. 242) “*cadri pravha* is left uncompounded = *cāndrī prabhā*.” It is not at all clear what case this form could be. The P form *canda-ppabhā* must be a gen.,²⁰ i.e. a truncated oblique case form of an *-ā* stem (= *-āya*) For other examples of this in G *Dh.* see the note on 16 above.

We must therefore assume that the G form is a compound too, and JB does not rule this out. He hints that Skt. *candrimā* may be a back formation from Middle Indian *candimā*, and this view is supported by the suggestion made by Helmer Smith²¹ that *candi-* is a genuine form, made by adding *-i-* to the root *cand-*, whereas *candra-* shows the addition of the suffix *-ra-*, cf. *śuci-* and *śukla-*. If this is correct then G shows the same hyper-form as Skt., both here and in 50.

228: JB points out (p. 246) that *kradava-* (found also in 280) and *kadarya-* are so similar in form that they must be related etymologically, but he suggests that the connection is not one of direct equivalence. I would rather suggest that the two words are directly connected, and that the G form arises from the development of an intrusive *-r-*.

It commonly happens that such an intrusive *-r-* arises in proximity to another *-r-*, e.g. Hindi *karor* < **kor* < Skt. *koṭi-*, and late Latin *crocodilus* < *crocodilus*. In the case of *kradava-* the development would be *kadarya-* > **kradarya-* > **kradayya-* > *kradavva-* (written *kradava-*), with the glide alternation *-yy-/-vv-* seen in P *pubba-* 'pus' < **puvva-* < **puyya-* < Skt. *pūya-* (Geiger §46). The same intrusive *-r-* may lie behind *drugadi* (203 275 325) which probably stands for *druggadi* or *druṅgadi* (p. 64, n. 4), the latter perhaps being attested in *druggade'o* (51), where the transliteration *-gg-* is merely symbolic (§ 11). The development would be *durgati-* > **drurgati-* > **drugati-* > *druggadi-* or *druṅgadi-*. As JB states, the G forms cannot be explained as mere transpositions of *-r-*, i.e. < **drugati-*.

257: JB takes *aṣamaṇadha* as an oblique case form of an *-ā* stem, equivalent to *aśravaṇatā* (p. 255). It is not clear why we should have an abstract noun in *-tā* here, and since *Uv.* 14.4 has an ablative *aśravaṇād*, it would seem preferable to assume that we have here a quasi-ablative ending < *-atas*, which we find in *viśeṣadha* (116) where P has *visesato*.

272: The P version of this verse reads *attano vajjāni pana chādeti | kalim va kitavā saṭho* in pādas c and d; *Uv.* 27.1 reads *ātmanaś chādayaty eṣa | kṛtvā yadvat kalim śaṭhaḥ*.

The word *kitava-* 'gambler' is attested in Skt from the *RV* onwards (MW s.v.), and if Mayrhofer²² is correct in taking this to be a Middle Indian form < **kṛta-vant-* 'possessing the best throw', then P presumably retains an older form in *kitavā-*, besides *kitava-*. It would seem that the BHS redactor received a form with *-vā* in his exemplar, but did not recognise it as a nom. sg. He assumed it was the absolutive of *kṛ-* with a *svarabhakti* vowel (cf. Pkt. *kadua* and *gadua* (Pischel, §581)), and he accordingly replaced it by *kṛtvā* in his redaction, "like a gambler having made (= thrown) the losing throw".

305: P has *sa ve saṃgāmajuttamo* in pāda d; *Uv.* 23.3 has *saṃgrāmo durjayah sa vai*. JB prints (p. 167) *sagamu utamu* as two separate words, thus following the structure of the BHS version where *yo* in pāda a and *sā* in pāda d do not refer to the same person or thing. JB does not, however, refer to the difference between the P and the other versions, nor does he note that if we

print *sagamu'utamu*, and assume that *-j-* became *-y-* and then disappeared (§32), then the P and G versions are identical, and *-u* in *sagamu* is not the nom. sg. ending, but results from *-a* labialised after *-m-*. There is no reason to doubt the existence of *saṃgrāmajit-*, because it is attested for Skt. (MW s.v.).

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NOTES

- ¹ John Brough, *The Gāndhārī Dharmapada*, London 1962. Where they occur without any other indication, (p.) and (§) throughout this article refer to the pages of this edition and the paragraphs of its introduction. Numbers in heavy type refer to verses of G *Dh*.
- ² F. Bernhard, *Udānavarga*, Göttingen 1965.
- ³ For previous literature about G *Dh*. and *Uv*. see pp. viii-ix.
- ⁴ See 'Notes on the Gāndhārī Dharmapada', *IL* 32 (1971) 213-20.
- ⁵ F. Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar*, New Haven 1953.
- ⁶ I follow the division into sections adopted by E. Hultzsch in *The inscriptions of Asoka*, Oxford 1925 (= Hultzsch).
- ⁷ Sir Monier Monier-Williams, *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, Oxford 1899.
- ⁸ F. Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary*, New Haven 1953.
- ⁹ W. Geiger, *Pāli Literature and Language*, Calcutta 1943.
- ¹⁰ Epigraphists have differed in their reading of these two *akṣaras* (see A.C. Woolner, *Asoka text and glossary*, Part II, Calcutta 1924, s.v. *vu*).
- ¹¹ W.D. Whitney, *Sanskrit Grammar*, Cambridge, Mass., 1889.
- ¹² K.R. Norman, *Elders' Verses I (Theragāthā), II (Therīgāthā)*, London 1969, 1971 (= EV).
- ¹³ *Saddanīti* II 1236 refers *atikhīna* to an otherwise unattested verb *khi-* 'to go' (*khi gatiyaṃ, atikhīno ti atigato*).
- ¹⁴ R. Pischel, *Comparative grammar of the Prākṛit languages*, Delhi 1957.
- ¹⁵ See 'Some Aspects of the Phonology of the Prakrit Underlying the Aśokan Inscriptions', *BSOAS XXXIII* (1970) 134, n. 21.
- ¹⁶ M.A. Mehendale, *Historical grammar of inscriptional Prakrits*, Poona 1948, § 172(a) *piśāji-* < *piśāci-*, § 227(a) *sūji-* < *sūci-*, *ajariya-* < *ācārya-*, p. 116, n. 27 *pajina-* < *prācina-*.
- ¹⁷ H.W. Bailey, 'Arya II', *BSOAS XXIII* (1960) 35, n. 5.
- ¹⁸ The pronominal forms in *-e* and *-o* which are said to be acc. sg. neut., i.e. *se, ṣe* at Kalsi (Hultzsch p. lxxviii); *so, yo, e* at Shahbazgarhi (pp. lxxxvii, xcii); *se* at Mansehra (p. xcix), Dhauri and Jaugada (p. cvi), and in the Pillar Edicts (p. cxviii), can be shown to be either a scribal error or idiosyncrasy, e.g. *yo yaśo ichati* at Shahbazgarhi in Rock Edict X (A) where the other versions have *yaṃ yaśo/yaśo ichati*, or examples of the conjunctive use of the third person and relative pronouns. Although these conjunctive forms are usually assumed to be acc., it may be more accurate, since all other forms in *-e* and *-o* are nom., to regard them as nom. too.
- ¹⁹ J. Bloch, *L'indo-aryen du Veda aux temps modernes*, Paris 1934, p. 14. T. Burrow, *The Sanskrit Language*, London 1955, p. 267.
- ²⁰ AA ii 329 (on A i 215 = iv 151) glosses: *candappabhā ti sāmi-atthe paccattam, candappabhāyā ti attho*. The untruncated form is found in prose: *candappabhāya kalam*

nāgghanti solasim (A v 22). The compound is found resolved in prose, e.g. *candassa pabhāya* (A iii 365), *candiyā pabhāya* (It. 20).

²¹ H. Smith, *Saddaniti*, Lund 1928-66, p. 1372.

²² M. Mayrhofer, *Kurzgefasstes etymologisches Wörterbuch des Altindischen*, Vol. I, Heidelberg 1956, p. 208.

WRONG NOTIONS OF *DHAMMATĀ* (*DHARMATĀ*)

(At a recent meeting of the American Association for Asian Studies, a paper was presented in which it was suggested that *Dhamma* and *Dhammatā* might be regarded as “a Theravāda notion comparable with ‘Grace’.” In the ensuing discussion, a professor stated that according to some Canonical texts “everything comes out of the *dharmatā*.” When I wrote later asking him kindly to send me the Canonical passage, with the reference, either in Pāli or in Sanskrit, which says that “everything comes out of the *dharmatā*,” he was, quite obviously, unable to do it, as no such passage exists. This discussion prompted me to write the present article).

Much has been written and still is being written in the West about the word *dhamma* or *dharma*.¹ Oriental scholars in the West are still troubled and obsessed by this little word. When the early Orientalists came across the word *dhamma*, they were perplexed by the multifarious usages of this term in different contexts with diametrically opposed and conflicting meanings. The translators of the original Pāli and Sanskrit Buddhist texts were in a position of some desperation as they could not find an equivalent in any Western language to fit all contexts. One will never find it and can never find it. Sylvain Lévi, translating the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra*, which he edited himself, uniformly used the word ‘idéa’ for *dharma* in all contexts — which is an obvious failure. The term *dhamma* or *dharma* can never be translated into any Western language by a single equivalent which embraces all the different meanings of the original term. It has necessarily to be translated by different words in different contexts.

Various usages and meanings of the word *dhamma* in different contexts are explained in Pāli Commentaries with examples from Canonical texts.² The *Abhidhānappadīpikā* (*Pāli Nighaṇḍu*), ancient Pāli ‘Dictionary’ composed in Pāli verse (twelfth century A.C.), memorized by young *bhikkhu* students who follow the traditional Buddhist monastic education and discipline, after it has enumerated 14 different meanings of the word *dhamma*, ends the verse by *ādo* ‘et cetera’.³ The 14 meanings given in the verse are: (1) nature; (2) teaching, doctrine; (3) wisdom, intelligence; (4) justice, right way; (5) truth; (6) normal, usual, primary condition or state; (7) merit, meritorious deed; (8) the knowable, the field of knowledge; (9) virtue; (10) good conduct or good manners, civility; (11) concentration, mental discipline; (12) non-being, non-self; (13) transgression, breaking a Vinaya rule, ecclesiastical offence; (14) reason, cause.

There is no term in Buddhist terminology which has wider connotations than *dhamma*. It can include the good, the meritorious, the wholesome (*ku-sala*) and the bad, the demeritorious, the unwholesome (*akusala*, *pāpa*) as well as the neutral (*avyākata*).⁴ Sometimes it is used in the Commentaries even with reference to such things as the hair on the head.⁵ The term *dhamma* denotes, in some contexts, all conditioned, compounded, produced things and states in the world including our life, including the whole of existence as well as the Unconditioned, the Uncompounded, Nibbāna, as it does in the well-known line *sabbe dhammā anattā*.⁶

When one encounters such a challenging term from a culture not one's own, it is understandable that one becomes confused and confounded. But a learned Buddhist nurtured and disciplined in his own culture both knows and *feels* the different meanings of the word *dhamma* in different contexts. The particular meaning of the word *dhamma* in any given context is quite clear and simple.

Then *dhammatā*, which is the *taddhita* (secondary derivative) form of *dhamma* (*dhamma*+suffix *tā*), is an expression that can easily be misunderstood. This is the term that some people consider to be 'comparable with Grace'; others suppose it to be the ultimate reality out of which everything comes!

It should be clearly understood that *dhammatā* does not contain all the meanings of the word *dhamma*. It contains mostly the meanings: 'nature', 'natural', 'way', 'habit', 'custom', 'customary', 'usual'. Let us examine some examples where this term is used from the most ordinary to the highest level.

A little snake, according to its habit, *attano dhammatāya*, comes to the hermitage of an ascetic.⁷ Here the word *dhammatā* is used just to indicate the snake's habit of going about. A simple idea and a simple expression. It does not signify any mysterious or eternal power, or a mystical idea which is behind the snake's going about. Its going about is not caused by any supernatural power called *dhammatā*, but its going about itself is its own *dhammatā*, its own habit. *Dhammatā* is just a Pāli word for expressing this simple idea. *Dhammatā* is not the reason for a phenomenon. One need not become unnecessarily over-serious or philosophical or religious when one sees this word in a Pāli text. It has nothing to do with ontology, teleology, epistemology or theology.

Devadatta rolled down a rock with the intention of killing the Buddha when he was seated at the foot of a hill. This rock struck another rock and was stopped from rolling down, but a splinter thrown off by the collision of the two rocks wounded the foot of the Buddha. In answer to King Milinda's

question regarding this matter, Nāgasena says: "But that splinter did not fall of its own nature (automatically, *attano dhammatāya*), but it fell down owing to Devadatta's act." ⁸ Here again *dhammatā* is used to convey a simple idea, with no philosophical or metaphysical significance. Rocks simply do not fly around and hit people. That is not their nature.

In the *Mahāpadāna-sutta* of the *Dīgha-nikāya*⁹ are described a series of occurrences, events and facts beginning with the Bodhisatta's descent from the Tusita heaven to be conceived in his mother's womb up to his birth. For example, when the Bodhisatta is conceived in his mother's womb and when he is born, an infinite and great radiance appears in the universe and ten thousand world-systems tremble and quake; when he is conceived in his mother's womb, four devas in the four directions protect him; after the conception, his mother enjoys perfect health and does not produce a lustful thought about any man; on the seventh day after the Bodhisatta's birth, his mother dies and is reborn in the Tusita heaven. The description of each item begins with *dhammatā esā* "This is the way," and ends with *ayam ettha dhammatā* "Here this is the way." ¹⁰

The Commentary on the *Dīgha-nikāya*¹¹ explains the word *dhammatā* here as *sabhāvo* "nature", *niyamo* "order of things", and goes on to enumerate five kinds of *niyāma* "order of things": (1) *kamma-niyāma* "the order of *kamma*", *i.e.* good actions produce good results and bad actions produce bad results; (2) *utu-niyāma* "the order of seasons", *i.e.* in certain regions of the earth at certain periods the flowering and fruiting of trees, the blowing or ceasing of wind, the degree of the heat of the sun, the amount of rain-fall, some flowers like the lotuses opening during the day and closing during the night and so on; (3) *bīja-niyāma* "the order of seeds or germs", *i.e.* a seed producing its own kind as barley seed produces barley; (4) *citta-niyāma* "the order of mind", *i.e.* the order of the process of mind-activities as the preceding thought-moment causing and conditioning the succeeding one in a cause and effect relation; (5) *dhamma-niyāma* "the order of dhamma", *i.e.* such events like the quaking of the ten thousand world-systems at the Bodhisatta's conception in his mother's womb and at his birth. At the end of the discussion the Commentary decides that in this case the *dhammatā* refers to *dhamma-niyāma*.

Here one can see clearly that *dhammatā* is a word used to denote events which are natural, normal and regular. That water flows or wind blows is *dhammatā*, natural. It should not be considered that these things happen because of *dhammatā*, but their happening (in this way) is itself *dhammatā*. These happenings and *dhammatā* are not two different things, they are one and the same thing. To consider *dhammatā* as some mysterious force or

power which guides or causes these natural events is to introduce the idea of something external which is foreign to Buddhism. In simple language *dhammatā* means “it is so”, “it happens this way”, “it is natural”. *Dhammatā* is not some thing or some power that stands behind these happenings. *Dhammatā* does not explain or even refer to the question of why it happens. That is an entirely different matter.

The Buddha, just after his Enlightenment, still staying at Uruvelā on the banks of the river Nerañjarā, seated under the Goatherd’s Banyan tree (*ajapāla-nigrodha*), thought that there was no one more perfect than himself in virtue (*sīla*), in concentration (mental discipline, *samādhi*) and in wisdom (*paññā*), under whom he could live obeying him and paying him reverence, and decided to live honouring and reverencing the *Dhamma*, Truth, which he had just realized. At this moment, Brahmā Sahampati appeared before him and said that all the Perfect Buddhas who were in the past, all the Perfect Buddhas who will be in the future, and the Perfect Buddha who is now, all of them lived, live and will live honouring the *Dhamma*: it is their way, *esā Buddhāna dhammatā*, “It is the way of the Buddhas.”¹² Here quite clearly *dhammatā* means “the way”, “the custom”.

The *Kosambiya-sutta* of the *Majjhima-nikāya*¹³ says that if a monk endowed with the right view (in this case a *sotāpanna* “stream-entrant”) falls into some transgression, he confesses it quickly to the Master or to his fellow monks. The Buddha says: “Bhikkhus, this is natural for a person endowed with right view” – *Dhammatā esā bhikkhave diṭṭhisampannassa puggalassa ...*¹⁴ Here the Commentary explains *dhammatā* by *sabhāvo* (nature).¹⁵

In the same *sutta* (next paragraph), it is said that for such a person endowed with the right view, even if he is occupied with some material duties (such as washing and cleaning for his fellow monks), it is natural, it is his way (*dhammatā*) that he is always zealous and full of deep aspiration for higher virtue (*adhisīla*), higher mental discipline (*adhicitta*) and higher wisdom (*adhipaññā*).

In the *Aṅguttara-nikaya*¹⁶ there is an interesting *sutta* which deals with the progress of a series of deeply spiritual and psychological states, in which the term *dhammatā* is repeatedly employed. The use of the term in this *sutta*, more than anything else, seems to have led some people to imagine “a Theravāda notion comparable with ‘Grace’.” In order to clarify the problem, it is necessary to give the relevant portions of this *sutta*. It begins:

Bhikkus, for a person who is virtuous (*sīlavato*), perfect in virtue (*sīlasampannassa*), there is no need of the purposeful thought:¹⁷ ‘Let there arise in me the freedom from

remorse'. It is natural (*dhammatā esā*)¹⁸, Bhikkus, that in a person who is virtuous, perfect in virtue, there arises the freedom from remorse.

Bhikkhus, for a person who is free from remorse there is no need of the purposeful thought: 'Let delight arise in me'. It is natural, Bhikkhus, that delight arises in a person who is free from remorse.

Bhikkhus, for a person who is delighted there is no need of the purposeful thought: 'Let joy arise in me'. It is natural, Bhikkhus, that joy arises in a person who is delighted.

Bhikkhus, for a person who is joyous there is no need of the purposeful thought: 'Let my body be calmed (relaxed)'. It is natural, Bhikkhus, that the body of a person who is joyous becomes calmed (relaxed).

Bhikkhus, for a person whose body is calmed (relaxed) there is no need of the purposeful thought: 'Let me feel happy'.¹⁹ It is natural, Bhikkhus, that a person whose body is calmed feels happy.

Bhikkhus, for a happy person there is no need of the purposeful thought: 'Let my mind be concentrated'. It is natural²⁰, Bhikkhus, that a happy person's mind is concentrated.

Bhikkhus, for a person who is concentrated there is no need of the purposeful thought: 'Let me know and see things as they really are'. It is natural, Bhikkhus, that a person who is concentrated knows and sees things as they really are.

Bhikkhus, for a person who knows and sees things as they really are, there is no need of the purposeful thought: 'Let me be dispassionate and detached'.²¹ It is natural, Bhikkhus, that a person who knows and sees ... is dispassionate and detached.

Bhikkhus, for a dispassionate and detached person there is no need of the purposeful thought: 'Let me realize the wisdom-vision of deliverance'.²² It is natural, Bhikkhus, that a dispassionate and detached person realizes the wisdom-vision of deliverance.

In this way, Bhikkhus, spiritual states themselves promote spiritual states (lead to spiritual states, make spiritual states progress), spiritual states themselves accomplish spiritual states²³, for the passage from this shore to the other shore.²⁴

This *sutta* relates the progress of a series of highly spiritual states in a natural and logical sequence. Very much the same idea is expressed in many other places in the Pāli Canon.²⁵ This has nothing to do with the idea of grace, nor has it anything comparable with grace. Grace is something, a favour, that comes from God, granted by God, without which man is incapable of achieving his salvation, however much he may try. This idea is utterly alien to Buddhism. It is too obvious to need repetition that Buddhism does not recognize a creator-God who takes care of the world and on whom the world depends. Without such a God or Divinity a notion of grace is inconceivable and absurd.

This *sutta* begins with a man who is virtuous, perfect in virtue (*sīla*). *Sīla* is related to the control, direction and discipline of physical and verbal actions and the conduct of life. This has to be achieved with purposeful thought, will and effort. It does not happen naturally. The *Netti-pakarāṇa* clearly says that self-discipline (*attasammāpaṇidhāna*) is the basis or proximate cause (*padatṭhāna*) for various kinds of *sīlas*.²⁶ Once a person is established and perfect in *sīla*, he is on the way and he becomes naturally free from remorse because his character, his life, is blameless, faultless,

guiltless. It is not necessary then for him to think: "Let me be free from remorse." When he is virtuous and guiltless, it is natural (*dhammatā*) that he becomes free from remorse. When he is free from remorse, naturally he becomes delighted; when he is delighted, naturally he becomes joyous and so on, as in the *sutta*, till he attains the vision into deliverance (*vimutti*). These states are produced naturally by themselves one after the other. No deliberate or purposeful thought or will is necessary.

In another place²⁷, expressing the same idea in different words, the Buddha says that if a person develops the 37 qualities leading to enlightenment (which include *sīla* "virtue", *samādhi* "mental discipline" and *paññā* "wisdom"), even if he has not the wish: "Oh that my mind be free from cankers and attachment," yet his mind does become freed from cankers and attachment. Why? Because he has developed those qualities. Similarly, when a hen broods on her eggs properly, even if she does not have the wish: "Oh that my chicks might break the egg-shells with their claws and with their beaks and come out safely," yet those chicks will break the shells and come out safely. Why? Because she has brooded properly. (The contrary also is given in the *sutta*: Even if the hen wishes, without brooding properly, her chicks will not come out. In the same way, even if a person wishes that his mind be freed, without developing the necessary qualities, his mind will not be freed.)

This shows clearly that when the work is done, the result is natural and automatic; no wish or will or purposeful thought is therefore necessary. One does not, and cannot, get the realization of Truth with the purposeful thought or wish or decision: "Now I will realize the Truth" or "Let me now realize the Truth." The realization of Truth takes place naturally, when one's mind is cultivated and purified by the development of necessary qualities as mentioned above. This is a realistic attitude which is characteristic of Buddhism.

To introduce a notion of grace into this, just because the realization of truth happens without one's purposeful thought or wish, is futile. The last sentence of the *sutta* quoted above, namely: "In this way, Bhikkhus, spiritual states themselves promote spiritual states, spiritual states themselves accomplish spiritual states ...," shows clearly that there is nothing behind or above or apart from these spiritual states themselves which can be considered as some external or superior force or power or grace.

Those who want to show a "Theravāda notion comparable with 'Grace,'" wrongly and cloudily translate the line *dhammo have rakkhati dhammacārīṃ*²⁸ as "Dhamma protects the one who moves in its wake" and try to suggest that *Dhamma* here implies a kind of supreme power out of which

grace comes. But the word *dhamma* here, according to the Commentary, simply means “virtue” or “moral virtue”.²⁹ This line really means: “Virtue protects him who practises virtue.” There is nothing metaphysical or philosophical in this statement. It means, in other words, that your honest and virtuous character will protect you. It is popular, moral maxim, some thing like “Truth will prevail”.

Dhammatthitatā, which occurs in several places in the Pāli Canon, is another term grossly misunderstood and misinterpreted. It is in this term, loosely associated with *dhammatā*, that some people try to find the idea of a supreme power, similar to God or Brahman, out of which everything comes. Let us examine some examples.

In the *Aṅguttara-nikāya*³⁰ there is a *sutta* which says that whether Tathāgatas (Buddhas) appear or not, this state of things (*dhātu*)³¹, this stability of nature (*dhammatthitatā*), this way of nature (*dhammaniyāmatā*)³², just exists, namely, that all conditioned things are impermanent, all conditioned things are *dukkha*, and all *dhammas* (i.e. both the conditioned and the unconditioned) are without self.³³ This the Tathāgata realizes and understands, declares and teaches, explains and makes it plain and clear.

This of course is so. Whether Buddhas appear or not, the fact that all conditioned things are impermanent and *dukkha* and that all *dhammas* are without self, always prevails. It has nothing to do with the appearance or non-appearance of Buddhas. In this *sutta*, this fact is called *dhātu* “state of things”, “principle”, “natural condition”, *dhammatthitatā* “stability of nature”, *dhammaniyāmatā* “the way of nature”. The Buddha does not make them so. Nobody, no external power, makes them so. It is the way of things. It is their own nature. It is *dhammatthitatā*. The Buddha only realizes this truth, declares and explains it.

Similarly, explaining the *paṭiccasamuppāda* and the *paṭiccasamuppanna* (Dependent Origination and the Dependently Originated), the Buddha says³⁴ that whether Tathāgatas appear or not, this state of things (*dhātu*), this stability of nature (*dhammatthitatā*), this way of nature (*dhammaniyāmatā*), this causality (*idappaccayatā*)³⁵ just exists, and that the Tathāgata, having realized it, declares, teaches and expounds it.³⁶ In this *sutta*, *paṭiccasamuppāda* is equated with *tathatā*.³⁷ The Commentary further clarifies it by saying that *tathatā* is a synonym for *paccayākāra* which is an equivalent of *paṭiccasamuppāda*.³⁸

Elsewhere *paṭiccasamuppāda* is equated with *dhamma*: “He who sees *paṭiccasamuppāda* sees *dhamma*, he who sees *dhamma* sees *paṭiccasamuppāda*.”³⁹ And *dhammatthitiñāṇa* is explained as *paccayākārañāṇa*.⁴⁰ Thus *dhammatthitatā* and *dhammaniyāmatā* may be considered as *paṭiccasamup-*

pādaṭṭhitatā and *paṭiccasamuppādanīyāmā* or *tathatāṭṭhitatā* and *tathatā-nīyāmā*.

A late Mahāyāna *sūtra* expresses precisely the same doctrine in slightly different terms: "Whether Tathāgatas appear or not, this nature of things (*dharmatā*), this stability of the state of nature (*dharmadhātusthiti*) just exists, namely, the voidness of all things (*sarvadharmasūnyatā*) and the non-conceivability of all things (*sarvadharmānupalabdhi*)." ⁴¹

Śūnyatā or *sarvadharmasūnyatā* is an equivalent of *pratītyasamutpāda* or *tathatā* or *nairātmya*.⁴² So this passage, too, says that whether there are Buddhas or not, this *dharmatā*, *śūnyatā*, which is *pratītyasamutpāda*, *nairātmya* or *tathatā*, always exists. This does not mean at all that everything comes from *dharmatā*. The term *dharmatā*, introduced into this Mahāyāna passage, but not found in the *Samyutta* passage quoted above, which is earlier, is employed here as an equivalent of *śūnyatā*. But *śūnyatā* is not a source out of which everything comes. *Śūnyatā* (= *pratītyasamutpāda* = *tathatā*) is only the fact how things really are, but things do not come out of *śūnyatā*, or *pratītyasamutpāda*, or *nairātmya*, or *tathatā*. Whether we like it or not, whether we accept it or not, Buddhism does not recognize any source, an original or first cause, out of which everything comes.

Let us consider this problem another way: If one says that everything comes out of *dharmatā*, then that *dharmatā* must be the ultimate, absolute reality. According to Buddhism there is only one ultimate, absolute reality, and that is *Nirvāṇa*. But nothing comes out of *Nirvāṇa*. If anything comes out of *Nirvāṇa*, then it must be the cause, the origin of that thing. But *Nirvāṇa* is neither a cause nor an effect. *Nirvāṇa* is *akālika* "timeless" or "beyond time". This fact is so well known among Buddhists that even a popular ancient story book like the *Sahassavatthu* describes *Nirvāṇa* as *kālavimutta* "free from time".⁴³ According to Buddhist philosophy, "time is a designation for the continued succession of cause and effect."⁴⁴ There is nothing that can be called time apart from the unbroken continuity of cause and effect. So, when *Nirvāṇa* is described as 'beyond time', that means it is beyond cause and effect. Therefore it is neither produced by anything nor does it produce anything.

From this brief discussion one may see that "a Theravāda notion comparable with 'Grace' " or the idea that everything comes out of *dharmatā* is baseless and absolutely repugnant to the Buddha's teaching as far as we know it from the extant Canonical texts.

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NOTES

¹ E.g. W. Geiger, *Pali Dhamma*, Munich 1920. I.B. Horner, 'Early Buddhist Dhamma', *Artibus Asiae*, xi. 1/2, 1948; *The Middle Length Sayings*, vol. I, London 1967, pp. xix-xx. E. Conze, 'Dharma and Dharmas', *The Middle Way*, London, February, 1961. H. von Glasenapp, *Buddhism, A Non-Theistic Religion*, George Braziller, New York, pp. 49ff.

² For example, *Papañcasūdanī*, Commentary on the *Majjhima-nikāya*, Part I, Tripitaka Publication Press, Colombo, 1933, pp. 15-16.

³ *Dhammo sabhāve pariyatti-paññā-ñāyesu sacca-ppakatisu puññe, ñeyye guṇ'ācāra-samādhisū'pi nissattatā'pattisu kāraṇādo. Abhidhānappadīpīkā* (ed. by W. Subhūti), Colombo 1900, verse 784.

⁴ *Kusālā dhammā, akusālā dhammā, avyākatā dhammā, Dhammasaṅgaṇī*, Tripitaka Publication Press, Colombo, 1953, p. 1; *Kusālākusalasāvajjānavajja, ... dhammānaṃ D II, (PTS), pp. 223-228; ... kusālānaṃ dhammānaṃ... pāpakānaṃ akusālānaṃ dhammānaṃ ... M II, (PTS), p. 251.*

⁷ *kesādīnaṃ dhammānaṃ samūhaṭṭhena; Sumaṅgalavilāsinī*, Commentary on the *D*, Tripitaka Publication Press, Colombo, 1925, p. 544; *kesādidhammasamūhasamkhātāṃ ibid*, p. 545.

⁶ See Walpola Rahula, *What the Buddha Taught*, Gordon Fraser Gallery, Bedford or Grove Press, New York, pp. 57-58.

⁷ *Ath'eko āsivisapotako attano dhammatāya caranto aññatarassa tāpasassa assamapadam patto, Jātaka*, Vol. I (PTS), p. 245, (*Velukajātaka*).

⁸ *Na ca pana sā sakalikā attano dhammatāya patitā, Devadattassa upakkamena patitā, Milinda*, (PTS), p. 179. T.W. Rhys Davids translates this passage: "But that splinter of rock did not fall of itself, it was cast down through the act of Devadatta." *The Questions of King Milinda*, vol. I, (SBE, vol. XXXV), Oxford, 1890, p. 294. Miss I.B. Horner translates: "But that splinter did not fall down of its own essential law, it fell down owing to Devadatta's treachery." *Milinda's Questions*, vol. I (SBB Series, vol. XXII), London, 1963, p. 255.

In my opinion, there is no need to translate the word *dhammatā* in this context as "essential law", as Miss Horner does, which introduces an unnecessary metaphysical or philosophical overtone. Rhys Davids' translation, though a bit free, conveys the idea better in this context.

⁹ *D II* (PTS), p. 12ff.

¹⁰ T.W. Rhys Davids translates the word *dhammatā* as 'rule' in this case. *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Vol. II (SBB Series, vol. III), pp. 9ff.

¹¹ *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī*, vol. I, Colombo, 1918, p. 288.

¹² *A II* (PTS), p. 21; *S I* (PTS), p. 140.

F.L. Woodward translates: "... All dwell their dhamma honouring, Do dwell and shall dwell: 'tis their way." *The Book of the Gradual Sayings*, vol. II (PTS), p. 21. Mrs. Rhys Davids, in her translation of the *Samyutta-nikāya*, has, unfortunately, overlooked the line *esā Buddhāna dhammatā* and forgotten to translate it. See the *Book of the Kindred Sayings*, vol. I, p. 176.

¹³ *M I* (PTS), p. 324.

¹⁴ Miss I.B. Horner translates: "This is propriety, for a man endowed with (right) view." *The Middle Length Sayings*, vol. I (PTS), pp. 386, 387.

¹⁵ *Papañcasūdanī*, vol. II, Colombo, 1943, p. 334. The word *dhammatāya* in the same passage is explained *sabhāvena* "by nature".

¹⁶ *A V* (PTS), p. 2ff. Another *sutta*, *ibid*, p. 312ff. deals with the same subject with only a slight change.

¹⁷ *na cetanāya karaṇīyaṃ*, lit. "nothing that should (could) be done with a purposeful thought." *Manorathapūrāṇī*, Commentary on *A*, Tripitaka Publication Press, Colombo,

1931, p. 817, says: *cetanāya karaṇiyanti cetetvā kappetvā pakappetvā kātabbam* “*cetanāya karaṇiyam* means that which should be done after having thought, conjectured and deliberated.”

18 F.L. Woodward translates *dharmatā esā* by “This is in accordance with nature.” *The Book of the Gradual Sayings*, vol. V, p. 3. The Commentary, *Manorathapūraṇī*, Colombo, 1931, p. 817, explains *dharmatā esā* by *dharmasabhāvo esa, kāraṇaniyamo ayam* “It is natural way, this is causal certainty.”

19 Woodward translates “I feel happiness”, taking the verb *vediyāmi* to be indicative (*op. cit.*, p. 3, n. 5), and after this he translates the other verbs also wrongly. But *vediyāmi* here is in the imperative mood like the other verbs expressing wish in this *sutta*. So it should be: “Let me feel” or “May I feel”.

20 Here Woodward translates freely: “It follows,” and later: “It follows naturally.” (*op. cit.*, pp. 3-4).

21 *Nibbindāmi virajjāmi*. Woodward (*op. cit.*, p. 4): “I feel revulsion; interest fades in me.” Most people translate *nibbindati* “feels revulsion” or “feels disgust”. Revulsion or disgust is a violent sentiment allied to repugnance (*paṭigha*), which may be found in a person who does not see things as they really are, but not in “a person who knows and sees things as they really are.”

22 *vimuttiñānadassana*. Woodward translates: “realise by knowing and seeing,” which obviously is incorrect (*op. cit.*, p. 4).

23 *dharmā’va dhamme abhisandenti, dharmā’va dhamme paripūrenti*. Woodward translates (*op. cit.*, p. 4): “one state just causes another state to swell, one state just causes the fulfilment of another state.”

24 *apārā pāram gamanāya*. Woodward translates (*op. cit.*, p. 4): “for the sake of going from the not-beyond to the beyond.” The Commentary, *AA*, Colombo, 1931, p. 817, explains: *apārā pāram gamanāyāti orimatirabhūtā tebhūmakavaṭṭā nibbānapāram gamanattāya*. “*apārā pāram gamanāya*” means for the voyage “from this shore which is the existence (*vaṭṭa*, that is *samsāra*) consisting of three domains (*tebhūmaka*) to the other shore which is *Nibbāna*.” (Three domains are the domains of sense-pleasures (*kāma*), of fine material (*rūpa*) and of non-material (*arūpa*). Woodward, evidently without understanding this commentarial passage, translates it: “for the purpose of going from the this-side-become three-dimensioned round to the Nibbana beyond.” (*op. cit.*, p. 4, n. 3).

25 E.g. *D I* (PTS), pp. 70, 73, 84; *M I* (PTS), p. 37; *III*, p. 86; *A III* (PTS), p. 21; *Netti* (PTS), p. 29.

26 *Netti* (PTS), p. 29: *attasammāpaṇidhānaṃ sīlanaṃ padaṭṭhānaṃ*.

27 *A IV* (PTS), pp. 125ff.

28 *Theragāthā* (PTS), p. 35, v. 303.

29 *Theragāthattakathā I* (Tripitaka Publication Press, Colombo, 1918), p. 397: *Tattha dhammo’ti lokiyalokuttaro sucaritadhammo* “*Dhamma* there means mundane and supra-mundane virtue.”

30 *A I* (PTS), p. 286: *Uppādā vā bhikkhave Tathāgatānaṃ anuppādā vā thitā’va sā dhātu dhammatthitatā dhammaniyāmatā sabbe saṃkhārā aniccā ... sabbe saṃkhārā dukkhā ... sabbe dhammā anattā*.

31 *dhātu* here does not mean “realm” or “domain” as in *kāma-dhātu*, *rūpa*, *arūpa-dhātu*, or “element” as in *paṭhavi-dhātu*, *cakkhu-dhātu*, *viññāna-dhātu* etc. See note 36.

32 *Manorathapūraṇī*, Commentary on *A* (Tripitaka Publication Press, Colombo, 1923) p. 461: *dhammatthitatā’ti sabhāvatthitatā, dhammaniyāmatā’ti sabhāvaniyāmatā*.

33 Woodward’s translation “All phenomena are not-self” is inaccurate. He uses the word “phenomena” indiscriminately for both *saṃkhārā* and *dhammā*, which is misleading. *Gradual Sayings*, I, pp. 264-265.

34 *S II* (PTS), p. 25ff.

35 Mrs. Rhys Davids translates: “... this nature of things just stands, this causal status,

this causal orderliness, the relatedness of this to that." *The Book of the Kindred Sayings* II, p. 21.

36 SA II (Tripitake Publication Press, Colombo 1927), p. 30: *Thitā'va sā dhātū'ti thito'va so paccayasabhāvo, na kadāci jāti jarāmarañassa paccayo na hoti* "Thitā'va sā dhātu means this nature of conditions just exists, there is never a birth which is not the cause of decay and death." (Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Kindred Sayings* II, p. 21, n. 1, taking *jātijarāmarañassa* as a compound translates: "there is nowhere any birth, old age, death without cause." But *jāti* here is in the nominative case, and the Commentary explains the phrase *jātipaccayā jarāmarañam*). And further, the Commentary says that the two terms *dhammatthitatā* and *dhammaniyāmatā* express causality itself.

37 *yā tatra tathatā avitathatā anaññathatā idappaccayatā ayam vuccati bhikkhave paṭiccasamuppādo*. S II (PTS), p. 26.

38 *Tathatā'ti ādīni paccayākārasseva vevacanāni*. SA II, Colombo, 1927, p. 31.

39 M I (PTS), p. 191: *yo paṭiccasamuppādam passati so dhammam passati, yo dhammam passati so paṭiccasamuppādam passati*.

40 SA II, Colombo, 1927, p. 51.

41 *utpādād vā Tathāgatānām anutpādād vā sthitaivaiśā dharmatā dharmadhātusthitiḥ yad idam sarvadharmasūnyatā sarvadharmānupalabdhiḥ*. (*Daśabhūmisvaro nāma Mahāyānasūtram*, (ed. by Ryuko Kondo), Tokyo, 1936, p. 136.)

42 Remember here that in a passage from the *Aṅguta-nikāya* quoted above (n. 30), it is said that all *samkhāras* are *anicca* and *dukkha*, and that all *dhammas* are *anatta*, and that this is *dhammatthitatā*, *dhammaniyāmatā*. In the Pāli Canon *suñña* is explained as *anatta*. See Walpola Rahula, 'Asaṅga', *Encyclopaedia of Buddhism*, Vol. II, Fascicle I, p. 144.

43 *kālavimuttam nissaranam nibbānam*. *Sahassavatthuppakaraṇa* (ed. by Buddhaddatta), Anula Press, Colombo, 1959, p. 5.

44 *Hetuphalaprabandhapravṛttau kāla iti prajñaptiḥ*. Pralhad Pradhan (ed.), *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, Santiniketan 1950, p. 11, or Walpola Rahula (tr. et ann.) *Le Compendium de la Super-doctrine (Philosophie) (Abhidharmasamuccaya) d'Asaṅga*, Ecole Française d'Extrême-Orient, Paris, 1971, p. 16.

BUDDHISM AND THE MALDIVIAN LANGUAGE

The Maldivian Islands have been entirely Muslim since the conversion of their King in 1153 A.D., according to the traditional dating. There is, however, no doubt that they were Buddhist before that time. Though memory and evidence of Buddhist times had been largely forgotten, it was suggested by Lieutenants Young and Christopher, the first to compile a Maldivian-English vocabulary, from their experiences of some months in Male in 1834-35, that the islands must have once been Buddhist; and this was eventually put beyond doubt by H.C.P. Bell's expedition in 1922. Bell's conclusions, as summed up in his posthumous 'monograph',¹ are that such remains of Buddhist structures as he had seen seemed to be of a fairly developed kind, and he appears to think that the fourth century A.D. is the earliest date at which such buildings as he found traces of could have been constructed. This, of course, does not preclude the spread of Buddhist belief to the Maldivian Islands at an earlier date. More detailed evidence may perhaps be available from the excavations undertaken by the Maldivian government on *Todḍū* some fifteen years ago, but the report on these, published in Maldivian as volume 11 of *Divehi Tārīkhāḥ Au Alikamek* in 1958, is unfortunately not available to me.

Connected with this also is the question of the channels by which the Divehi or Maldivian language came to the Maldivian Islands. Most of the recent authorities on Maldiviana — Gray, Bell and Geiger — have thought it probable that the language (which is Indo-Aryan) was brought to the Maldives by Sinhalese people from Ceylon, but M.W.S. de Silva has recently advanced arguments² to show that it is more likely to have come primarily direct from south India (or at least from India; this point is left rather obscure). This transference he specifies as probably simultaneous with the separation of Sinhalese from other Indic languages. Ceylon was colonized by the Sinhalese in or about the fifth century B.C., but the 'separation' of the language is presumably a stage which would become evident somewhat later. Dr. de Silva suggests that the basic strata of Maldivian are at least pre-fourth century A.D., but advances no further opinions on a possible time schedule.

It is possible, therefore, either that Indo-Aryan speaking people settled in the Maldives around the fifth century B.C., or that they came from India at some time up to 800 years later. If they arrived as early as the fifth century B.C., it seems unlikely that they would then have been Buddhist. In that case

they must have adopted Buddhism later, either from Ceylon or from mainland India. While we are not able to deny that Aśokan missionary influence might have spread as far as the Maldives, we certainly have no historical indication that this was so; and in view of the undoubted close connection of the Sinhalese and Maldivian languages, both of which have progressed from the Prakrit stage in a very similar manner, it seems *prima facie* more likely that Buddhism spread to the Maldives from Ceylon at the same period when Maldivian speech was undergoing Sinhalese-type changes in its development. Here we have another problem; if Sinhalese and Maldivian speakers split off from each other as early as the fifth century B.C., how did they contrive to keep such very similar development, unlike that of any other Indo-Aryan tongues, for the next eight centuries or so? And this same problem will remain if we assume that the forerunners of the Maldivians were settled from India at any later period than the Sinhalese settlement in Ceylon. For if that was the course of events, where in south India did the proto-Maldivian people live for those intervening centuries? That the suggestion is that they probably lived in south India seems indicated by the mention of a 'southward drift' and by the suggestion of Dravidian influence on the morphology of Maldivian.

The history of these early times is indeed full of gaps, but the lack of all information about an Indo-Aryan speaking people positioned for several centuries in southern Dravidian India, and clearly in close contact with the Sinhalese is surely at least as surprising as the lack of mention in the *Dīpavamsa* and *Mahāvamsa* of Buddhist missionary activity directed to the Maldives. It is not in fact likely that there was any deliberate missionary activity. It would be much easier to suppose that Buddhism came to the Maldives with proto-Sinhalese-speaking Buddhist settlers; and that such Sinhalese-speaking Buddhist settlers should come from Ceylon, rather than south India, is surely a more natural supposition than any alternative.

The linguistic evidence given in Dr. de Silva's article is in fact itself the principal evidence adduced for the pre-Sinhalese or non-Sinhalese origins of Maldivian speakers. It is not, however, in itself particularly conclusive. It is undoubtedly the case that Maldivian today exhibits features which have not only disappeared from Sinhalese today, but had already disappeared, if indeed they ever existed, by about 1200, when our existing Sinhalese literature may be said to commence.³ A notable example of such linguistic evidence is the Maldivian emphatic case-ending *-ī*, or *-aki*, used when the predicate is another noun, which Dr. de Silva very acutely traces in the Sinhalese *Heḷaṭuvā* or lost Tripiṭaka commentary, as quoted in our texts of *Dhampiyā-aṭuvā-gāṭapadaya*. But it is hardly permissible, I believe, to trace Dravidian

influences such as are suggested in (a) the polite imperative ending *-ti* and (apparently) the particle *-tī* and (b) the negative infinitival or dative ending *-kar*.⁴ To take the last one first: it is a notable feature of Maldivian that negative statements demand also an *-ek* suffix to a nominal word or words. Thus *mi boḍu*, this is big, but *mi boḍek nūn*, this is not big.⁵ Just as *-ar* corresponds to the Sinhalese dative termination *-ata*, so *-akar* corresponds to Sinhalese *-akata*, and has nothing to do with Tamil *-kku*. This ending will, where necessary, appear with other case-forms: *mī mageek nūn*, this is not mine.⁶ It may even appear twice in the infinitival context: *miek engēkar netē* or *mi ēngēkarek netē*, this is not to be understood, cannot be understood (converse of *mi ēngēn eba huri*).

In this connection we may also consider negated tense forms.⁷ *kaē*, eats, and *kanī*, is eating, may both be negated in the form *nukaē*, i.e. the formal negative of *kaē*, but *kanīkī nūn* or *kanīek nūn*, the formal negative of *kanī*, is equally permissible, though with a difference of usage.⁸ In Sinhalese, *kayi* is in traditional grammar specified as present and *kanne(ya)* as future, but the distinction is not clearly observable in early classical literature in practice, and an earlier distinction of meaning there, too, between habitual and actual present is at least a possibility.

Of the ending *-ti* Dr. de Silva says "The imperfective affix *-ti* is lexically similar to the futuritive affix *-ti* known in Dravidian, and may be explained as a Dravidian borrowing. This *-ti* is widely used in Maldivian and is also found in various types of subordinate clauses which require the stating of a future implication." I am not clear what the reference is here. In subordinate clauses *-tī* (or *-tīve*) is commonly used of causality, but I am not familiar with other uses of *-ti* with a future implication. In any case, Dravidian influence seems rather improbable. There are remarkably few Dravidian loanwords to be found in Maldivian; it is, however, true that the verbal past tense forms in *-jje*, which closely resemble the Sinhalese forms in *-cci*, look Dravidian.

The early history of the Maldives (and indeed of Ceylon also) is mostly a matter of guesswork. Maldivian written history dates from the Islamic conversion of 1153, before which time we have only scattered and uncertain references, from Ptolemy onwards, to guide us. The mention in Cosmas Indicopleustes (sixth century)⁹ unquestionably refers to the Maldives, but it is only with the Arab Suleimān (ninth century)¹⁰ that inhabitants of the islands are definitely mentioned. In considering this question, (Sir) Albert Gray, after recounting Pyrard's statement that the Maldivians themselves attributed their own settlement to people coming from Ceylon about 1100,¹¹ goes on to say that this date must be put back several centuries. He continues "I find no mention in Pyrard of any other race who may have yielded to

Sinhalese conquerors, and if the Sinhalese were the first colonists, they were probably there as far back as the beginning of the Christian era, when Ceylon was a powerful Monarchy." H.C.P. Bell in his *Monograph* writes: "Gray is assuredly right in this conjecture," but then adds "As an alternative, though less probable supposition, it may perhaps not be unduly rash to surmise for the earliest Aryan colonization of the Group a date synchronic with that of Ceylon itself (viz., four or five centuries before the Christian era), by a distinct but kindred body of the same adventurers, instead of assuming a subsequent direct immigration from this Island." He also says: "It is more than likely that the Aryan settlers, whether an independent colony or a migration from Ceylon, found an aboriginal race (Vēddā or other) on the Group," and supports this by the Maldivian tale of Koimalā Kalō, said to be a royal prince from Ceylon who eventually settled at Male, with the consent of the aboriginals (Bell's 'unique churls')¹² of Girāvaru island. Girāvaru is still accounted an 'old island' among Maldivians — though it has recently been officially depopulated. But what language its aboriginal inhabitants may have spoken is as problematical as the language that may have been spoken by the aboriginals of Ceylon in the fifth century B.C.

W. Geiger's views are similar. In 1900¹³ he stated: "The fact can scarcely be disputed, that, at a period of time still unknown to us, the Maldives were colonized from Ceylon, or, as also may be possible, were colonized at the same time as Ceylon, by Aryan immigrants who came over from the Continent of India. The first view seems the more probable to me." In 1902,¹⁴ however, he definitely states that he believed the islands were settled from Ceylon not earlier than eight or nine centuries ago, and elsewhere¹⁵ claims that "In one word, Maldivian must have separated from Sinhalese at a time when the latter had already, in respect of Sound, assumed the form which it has at present. And this, as I think I have proved, was about the year 900 A.D." De Silva rightly points out the impossibility of such a dating, and the insufficiency of Geiger's observations here about Indo-Aryan palatal development in Maldivian, and in particular about the initial *y*-.¹⁶

Dr. de Silva also refers rather obscurely to records that many people emigrated from the south of Ceylon during the tenth to twelfth centuries. Considerable contact with the Maldives during the centuries immediately preceding the Muslim conversion is certainly very probable, and the occurrence in Maldivian of the name *Badaturu*, attested by de Silva, is of great interest.¹⁷ Such contacts were probably largely between south Ceylon and the southern Maldivian atolls, where the language is generally said to resemble Sinhalese more than the language of Male does (and has been specified as 'purer'). But it is perhaps somewhat ingenuous to argue both that there

were large scale, regular and constant contacts with Sinhalese after the tenth century, which included actual emigration of Sinhalese to the Maldives, and also that the lack of mention in the chronicles of a 'major colonization' of the Maldives around this same time must be taken as proof that no colonization took place. Even Geiger can hardly have meant to posit an official occupation of the islands at this period. Many of the linguistic features adduced on the whole show much more affinity than dissimilarity between Sinhalese and Maldivian.

It is quite certain that the Maldives were inhabited before the tenth century, and we have no reason to doubt that the people of the ninth century mentioned by Suleimān were Indo-Aryan speakers. Once, however, we go back to an earlier date than the beginnings of literary (as opposed to epigraphical) Sinhalese, we cannot easily say what features Maldivian and Sinhalese of *that* period did or did not share. For instance, it is clear that when Sinhalese and Maldivian separated, the distinction between *l* and *ʃ* still held. M.W.S. de Silva holds that these sounds had coalesced in Sinhalese by at least the sixth century. I am not sure what the evidence for this is; P.B.F. Wijeratne¹⁸ puts the coalescence in the tenth century. The *-yyā* conditional is indeed a striking feature of Maldivian,¹⁹ but in Sinhalese also we may have a trace of it in phrases with *hāki*, *yutu* and *denavā* (*sitiya hāki*, can think: *bāliya deti*, allow to look). Relevance to the linguistic dating may be found also in the absence of *u* and *o* Umlaut in verbal inflexions in Maldivian. P.B.F. Wijeratne²⁰ gives examples of Umlaut *u* in Sinhalese as early as those of Umlaut *a*, but of Umlaut *o* only as much as two centuries later.

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NOTES

¹ H.C.P. Bell, *The Maldive Islands. Monograph on the History, Archaeology and Epigraphy*, Colombo, 1940, p. 108.

² M.W.S. de Silva, 'Some Observations on the History of Maldivian', *Transactions of the Philological Society*, Oxford 1970, pp. 137-162.

³ Such undoubtedly earlier works as we have show a state of language not fully attested and not always fully intelligible to us.

⁴ I use *r* for the distinctively Maldivian letter which de Silva transcribes as *ʃ*.

⁵ On p. 154 of de Silva's article *mi faivān marakar bodu nūn* should be amended to read *bodek nūn*.

⁶ This would seem to correspond to Sinhalese *magē eka noveyi*. Even in a simple predication in Sinhalese there appears to me to be a tendency to say, for example, *amāruvak nā* quite as often as *amāru nā* (Maldivian *uṇdagū / uṇdagulek nūn*).

⁷ Maldivian verbal absolutes may also take the *-ek* suffix in negative statements: *nidāfaek nūn*, (is) not asleep.

⁸ Cf. Sinhalese *yanne nā* and *yanavā noveyi*. Maldivian forms such as *nuek-kaē* are also found, besides *nukaē*.

- 9 See *Christian Topography of Cosmas*, Hakluyt Society I, 98, London 1897, p. 364.
- 10 See *Voyage du marchand arabe Sulayman* (tr. by G. Ferrand), Paris 1922, pp. 31-33.
- 11 A. Gray, 'The Maldiv Islands: with a Vocabulary', *JRAS* (1878) 179. Bell, in 'Excerpta Maldiviana 9', *JRAS* (Ceylon Branch) 83 (1930) 555, points out that the word *Laṅkā*, which he takes as equivalent to *Lakkā*, is used of the Maldives in Maldivian copperplate grants of the fourteenth century.
- 12 *Monograph*, p. 7n.
- 13 See W. Geiger, 'Māldivische Studien I', *Sitzungsberichte der königlichen bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu München* (1900), philos.-philol. Classe, p. 642.
- 14 W. Geiger, 'Etymological Vocabulary of the Maldivian Language', *JRAS* (1902) 990.
- 15 W. Geiger, 'Māldivische Studien III', *SKBAW* (1902), philos.-philol. Classe, p. 114. The complete series of three 'Māldivische Studien' were printed together in an English translation as vol. XXVII of the *Journal of the Ceylon Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1919); but it seems erroneous to assume, as I formerly did, that we have there the author's views of any later date than 1902.
- 16 In *Ran Tari*, however, *yāru* is not English for 'yard', but Persian for 'friend'.
- 17 The name *Boḍufenvaluge* is unlikely to be connected with Sinhalese *-vaḍu*; it appears to mean 'House of the Large Well'.
- 18 P.B.F. Wijeratne, 'Phonology of the Sinhalese Inscriptions', *BSOAS* XIV, 297.
- 19 It is not, however, *concessive*.
- 20 *BSOAS* XII, 175.

PĀLI GOTTA/GOTRA AND THE TERM GOTRABHŪ
IN PĀLI AND BUDDHIST SANSKRIT

Two distinct forms of the vocable appearing in Old Indo-Aryan as *gotra*- 'family, clan, lineage' are attested in the Middle Indo-Aryan of the Pāli literature. The form *gotta*-, with assimilation of the Old Indo-Aryan consonant cluster *-tr-* to *-tt-*, is the normal Pāli development of OI *gotra*-;¹ and in the literature it is frequently met with in the well-known meanings of 'family, lineage, ancestry' (*PTSD*). It appears for example in collocation with, or in the proximity of, *nāma* 'name' (e.g. *Vinaya* I, pp. 93, 127; II, p. 239; IV, p. 12; *Dīghanikāya* I, p. 92); *jāti* 'birth, descent' (e.g. *Suttanipāta* vv. 104, 423, 1004), and *kula* 'family' (e.g. *Suttanipāta* v. 423; *Jātaka* II, p. 3). When the Buddha is represented in the *Pabbajjāsutta* of the *Suttanipāta* (v. 423) as saying: *ādiccā nāma gottena sākiyā nāma jātiyā tamhā kulā pabbajito 'mhi*, this means that he entered the religious life leaving a family that is solar by lineage (*gotta*) and Śākyan by descent. The Pāli texts also present such compounds as *gottatthaddha* 'conceited as to lineage' (*Suttanipāta* 104, together with *jātitthaddha* 'conceited as to descent'), *gottapañha* 'enquiry regarding lineage' (*Suttanipāta* v. 456), *gottapaṭisāri(n)* 'relying on lineage' (*Dīghanikāya* I, p. 99; *Aṅguttaranikāya* V, p. 327), *gottarakkhita* 'protected by lineage' (*Suttanipāta* v. 315), and *nātigottabandhava* 'related through kinsmen and lineage' (*Cullaniddesa*, p. 455, quoted in *PTSD*).

The second form *gotra*-, which the dictionaries quote only as occurring in the compound *gotrabhū*² (n. masc.) and in composite words derived from it such as *gotrabhūñāṇa* and *gotrabhūdhamma*, is phonologically irregular in Pāli³; and the question arises as to the origin and use of this form in the Pāli texts.

An explanation of this for Pāli anomalous form may be provided by a consideration of the philosophical and religious connotations of the terms in which it appears, and by comparison with the etymologically equivalent Sanskrit term *gotra* in the usage of the Buddhist schools that employed Sanskrit as their canonical language.

The term *gotrabhū* occurs first, apparently towards the end of the *Nikāya* period, in the *Dakkhiṇāvibhaṅgasutta* of the *Majjhimanikāya*, and also in two lists of persons found in the final portion of the *Aṅguttaranikāya*.

The first of these lists contains an enumeration of persons to be honoured (*puggalā āhuneyyā pāhuneyyā dakkhiṇeyyā añjalikaraṇīyā*) of whom the

Arhat is the chief while the *gotrabhū* is the last following the other degrees of Saints (*ariya*) (*Āṅguttaranikāya* IV, p. 373).⁴ A person is so considered, according to the Sutta, because he is a most excellent field of merit (*anuttaram puññakhettaṃ*). In the second list of the *Āṅguttara* the *gotrabhū* is the last of ten types of religious persons, the first of whom is the *Tathāgato Arahant Sammāsambuddho* himself while the ninth is the *saddhānusārī* or person who follows the way of faith (*Āṅguttaranikāya* V, p. 23).⁵ In these two passages the term thus designates a person of an elevated spiritual condition, the *gotrabhū* being a person leaving the condition of the worldling (*puthujjana* = Skt. *prthagjana*) to become an *ariya* (Skt. *ārya*) or Saint.⁶

On the other hand in the *Majjhimanikāya* it is said that in the future there will exist ill-disciplined and evil *gotrabhūs* clad in the yellow robe of the monk who will receive gifts destined for the community of genuine monks (*bhavissanti kho pan' Ānanda anāgatam addhānaṃ gotrabhuno kāsāvakantḥā dussilā pāpadhammā*, III, p. 256.) This reference to evil *gotrabhūs* seems, however, to be isolated in the Pāli canon.⁷

In the *Puggalapaññatti*, an Abhidhamma text dealing with the different types of persons (*puggala*) recognized in Buddhist soteriology, the *gotrabhū* is defined as one possessing certain factors immediately subsequent to which the saintly factor becomes established (*katamo ca puggalo gotrabhū / yesam dhammānaṃ samanantarā ariyadhammassa avakkanti hoti tehi dhammehi samannāgato puggalo ayaṃ vuccati 'gotrabhū'*, § 1.10, pp. 12-13).⁸

On the other hand, according to the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, a text of the *Khuddakanikāya*, and Mahānāma's commentary, the *Saddhammappakāsinī*, the term *gotrabhū* designates what might perhaps better be called a state of consciousness, which results from mastery or victory (*abhibhavana*) over the worldling's 'lineage' (*puthujjanagotta*) and its conditions, and from realization (*bhāvana*) of the saintly 'lineage' (*ariyagotta*).⁹

In the section of the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* devoted to *gotrabhū*-knowledge (*gotrabhūñāṇa*) – which immediately precedes the *maggañāṇa* and is defined as transcending understanding relating to emergence and turning away with respect to the external (*bahiddhā vuṭṭhānavivattane paññā*)¹⁰ – the question arises as to what constitutes the *gotrabhū*. This question is answered by means of an enumeration of the sixteen factors which the *gotrabhū* overcomes (*abhibhū*), from which he/it emerges (*vuṭṭhāti*) and from which he/it disengages (*vivattati*), as well as of the further factors to which he/it takes in joy (*pakkhandati*). The *gotrabhū* first overcomes origination (*uppāda*), saṃsāric process (*pavatta*), phenomenal sign (*nimitta*), effort accumulating *karman* (*āyūhana*), reconnection in birth (*paṭisaṃdhi*), conditions of existence in the stream of *samsāra* (*gati*), generation (*nibbatti*), arising (*upapatti*),

birth (*jāti*), growing old (*jarā*), illness (*vyādhī*), death (*maraṇa*), pain (*soka*), lamentation (*paridevanā*), affliction (*upāyāsa*), and the conditioning sign with respect to the external (*bahiddhā saṅkhāranimittam*)^{11a}; and the *gotrabhū* then takes to the absence of these factors (viz. *anuppāda*, *appavatta*, etc., with *nirodha* and *nibbāna* as the opposite of the *bahiddhā saṅkhāranimittam*). The *gotrabhū* likewise emerges from these sixteen factors and takes to their absence culminating in *nirodha* and *nibbāna*. And finally the *gotrabhū* disengages from these sixteen factors and takes to the latter factors (§1.1.10, I, pp. 66-67). The question next arises as to which factors (*dhamma*) of the *gotrabhū* are produced by tranquillity (*samatha*) and which are produced by insight (*vipassanā*). The *Paṭisambhidhāmagga* answers it by enumerating eight factors produced by *samatha*, namely (i) the overcoming of the hindrances (*nīvaraṇa*)^{11b} to attain the first stage of meditation (*jhāna*), (ii) the overcoming of mental quest and deliberation (*vitakkavicāra*) to attain the second *jhāna*, (iii) the overcoming of pleasure (*pīti*) to attain the third *jhāna*, (iv) the overcoming of happiness and pain (*sukhadukkha*) to attain the fourth *jhāna*, (v) the overcoming of the apperceptive notions (*saññā*) of material form (*rūpa*), resistance (*paṭigha*) and multiplicity to attain the concentration of the domain of the infinity of empty space (*ākāsānañcāyatanasamāpatti*), (vi) the overcoming of the apperceptive notion of the latter to attain the concentration of the domain of the infinity of consciousness (*viññāṇaṇcāyatanasamāpatti*), (vii) the overcoming of the apperceptive notion of the latter to attain the concentration of the domain of nothingness (*ākīñcaññāyatanasamāpatti*), and (viii) the overcoming of the apperceptive notion of the latter to attain the concentration of the domain of neither apperceptive notion nor non-apperceptive notion (*nevasaññānāsaññāyatanasamāpatti*). The text then continues by enumerating the ten factors produced by virtue of insight, namely (i) the overcoming of the first list of sixteen factors, beginning with production^{11c} and ending with the conditioning sign with respect to the external, to attain the path of entry into the Stream (*sotāpattimagga*), (ii) the overcoming of them to achieve the fruit of entry into the Stream, as well as (iii-vii) the overcoming of them to attain the path and to achieve the fruit of the once-returner (*sakadāgāmi*^o), the non-returner (*anāgāmi*^o), and the path of the Arhat; overcoming is likewise necessary to achieve (viii) the fruit of the Arhat, (ix) Void abiding (*sunnatavihāra*), and (x) signless abiding (*animittavihāra*). As for the nature of these *gotrabhū-dhammas*, fifteen are defined as wholesome (*kusala*) and three as neutral (*abyākata*), none of them being unwholesome (*akusala*).¹² Eight of them are conditioning supports (*paccaya*) for *samādhi*, while ten are conditioning supports for *ñāṇa*, all eighteen being conditioning supports of the three Gates

of Deliverance (*vimokkhamukha*, i.e. *suññata*, *animitta* and *appaṇihita*) (§ 1.1.10, I, pp. 66-68).¹³ In this text, as already mentioned, the *gotrabhūñāṇa* figures immediately before path-knowledge (*maggañāṇa*, § 1.1.11). In a later section it is explained that while transcending understanding with respect to the external (*bahiddhā vutṭhānavivattaṇe paññā*) and the *gotrabhū-dhammas* are different in name, they are one in meaning (§ 1.5.21, II, p. 64).

In his commentary on the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, Mahānāma gives a number of further explanations some of which may be mentioned here. Thus, according to certain authorities, the first inflection (*ābhoga*) towards *nibbāna*, the first attention (*samannāhāra*), is called *gotrabhū*;¹⁴ this name is then not suitable when the final realized state called 'fruit' (*phala*) is intended (p. 276). Mahānāma distinguishes between two types of *gotrabhū* and the corresponding *gotrabhūñāṇa* according to the levels of tranquillity (*samatha*) and insight (*vipassanā*), and he also refers to a *phalagotrabhū*. Because of the influence of passions (*kilesa*) the *samthagotrabhūñāṇa* (which is of eight kinds as seen above) is associated with desire (*nikanti*), while the *vipassanāgotrabhūñāṇa* (which is of ten kinds) is free from desire since Ariyas do not have any desire for the *gotrabhū*; this distinction corresponds to that between *sāmisā* and *nirāmisā* in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*. Thus only the *vipassanāgotrabhūñāṇa* is said to have 'emerged' (*vutṭhita*) since desire has been cut off. Moreover, whereas the *samthagotrabhū* corresponds to the *pakatūpanissayapaccaya*'s of the three *vimokkha*'s, the *vipassanāgotrabhū* corresponds to their *ananta-rūpanissayapaccayas*. As for the term *phalagotrabhū*, it refers to overwhelming, emergence and disengagement when one is turned towards *nibbāna* owing to inclination to it. Reference is also made to authorities who speak of eight *samāpattigotrabhūs* of wholesome (*kusala*) nature with regard to the eight *samāpattis* mentioned above (p. 276). Finally, since the *gotrabhūñāṇa* is, because of its connexion with emergence, the name for transcending understanding relating to emergence and turning away with respect to the external, what are called the *gotrabhūdhammas* are this *gotrabhūñāṇa* ('*bahiddhā vutṭhānavivattaṇe paññā*' *ti vutṭhānasambandhena gotrabhūñāṇam vuttam / 'gotrabhūdhammā' ti gotrabhūñāṇam eva* /; p. 567).

The early fifth century commentator Buddhaghosa has also devoted several paragraphs of his great Summa of the Pāli canonical tradition, the *Visuddhimagga*, to the *gotrabhū* and the *gotrabhūñāṇa*.¹⁵ According to his chapter on meditation, the culminating point in the series of conscious 'impulsions' (*javana*) is called *gotrabhū* because it triumphs over the sensory domain belonging to the level of desire (*kāmāvacāra*), and the limited 'lineage',¹⁷ and because it realizes the great 'lineage' (*yaṇ c'ettha sabbanti-mam tam parittagottābhūbhavanato mahaggata gottabhāvaṇato ca 'gotrabhū'*

ti pi vuccati, §4.74).¹⁸ It establishes (*appeti*) absorption (*appanācitta*), the fifth and final conscious moment which immediately follows it (§4.74). And it is the immediately preceding condition for determining thought (*adhiṭṭhānacitta*) relating to the fourth stage of meditation (*jhāna*) on the level of form (*rūpāvacara*) (§§12.58, 13.5). Preliminary training (*pubbayoga*) with a view to transcendent understanding (*paññā*) consists in the application of insight (*vipassanā*), through penetration of the Buddha's Teaching, until one approaches Conformity (*anuloma*, the conscious 'impulse' preceding the *gotrabhū* in the series of *jāvanas*),¹⁹ and then the *gotrabhū* itself (§14.28). By virtue of *vipassanā* ten *gotrabhūddhammas* occur, namely the paths and their fruits on each of the four levels of the Saints plus Void abiding (*suññatavihāra*) and signless abiding (*animittavihāra*) (§23.7).²⁰ The *gotrabhū* furthermore functions as a kind of objective support (*ārammaṇupanissaya*) for the Disciples (*sekha*, as opposed to the worldlings on the one hand, and the *asekha* on the other) (§17.80-81).²¹ As an object (*ārammaṇavasena*) impurities (*āsava*) persist only up to the *gotrabhū* (§22.56). The *gotrabhū* then has as its object (*ārammaṇa*) Nibbāna, which is without phenomenal sign (*animitta*) (§21.126).

As for the *gotrabhūñāṇa*, it constitutes the end (*pariyosāna*) for *vipassanā* conducive to emergence (*vuṭṭhānāgāmini*) (§21.134; cf. §14.28). The *gotrabhūñāṇa* is discussed in some detail in the first part of Chapter XXII treating of purification by knowledge and vision (*ñāṇadassanavisuddhi*). There it is stated that it cannot be reckoned as either the way (*paṭipadā*, treated in Chapter XXI) or the result (treated in Chapter XXII) since it is placed between them; it can nevertheless be called *vipassanā* since it falls in its stream (§22.1). By it one attains the saintly lineage (*ariyagotta*, or *ariya-saṅkhā* or *ariyabhūmi*), which is opposed to the lineage of the worldling (*puthujjanagotta*, or *puthujjanasaṅkhā* or *puthujjanabhūmi*) (§22.5). Since it has Nibbāna as its object, the *gotrabhūñāṇa* emerges (*vuṭṭhāti*) from the phenomenal sign (*nimitta*) in one respect, even though it does not wholly emerge from the saṃsāric process (*pavatta*) because it does not comprise the cutting off of origination (*samudaya*);²² this is what the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* has referred to as 'paññā relating to emergence and turning away with respect to the external' and as 'taking in joy to non-origination after disengaging from origination' (§22.44). The *gotrabhūñāṇa* also sets in train, so to speak, the path-knowledge (*maggāñāṇa*) which has Nibbāna as its object; and on the level of entry into the Stream (*sotāpatti*) this path makes one attain the filial state (*orasaputtabhāva*) in relation to the Sammāsambuddha, as well as the seven saintly treasures (*ariyadhana*) (§22.12-14).²⁴

Thus in the *Visuddhimagga* also the term *gotrabhū* evidently designates

an elevated state of consciousness at the very outset of the saintly path, rather than to a person as such, as in the passages studied earlier. These two uses of the term, one for a *puggala* and the other for a state of consciousness, are, however, not contradictory or exclusive; for in Buddhist psychology and soteriology it is the mental aspect that normally predominates, and the psychological types which Buddhism recognizes are then defined precisely with regard to their mental states.^{23a}

It thus appears that there exists a fairly clear semantic differentiation between the vocables *gotta* and *gotra*^o paralleling the difference in their forms.^{23b} While the vocable *gotta* designates basically, and quite regularly from the point of view of the development of Indo-Aryan, a lineage or clan in the sociological sphere, the vocable *gotra*^o refers specifically to a spiritual 'lineage' on the preliminary stage of the *ariya* 'saint', thus paralleling the Buddhist semantic development of the social term *ārya/ariya*.

Yet, beside its usual sociological use, and very possibly under the influence of its cognate *gotra* as employed in Pāli (and perhaps Sanskrit) religious and philosophical contexts, the word *gotta* occasionally has also in Pāli the meaning of a spiritual lineage, as in the compound *ariyagotta* which is opposed to *puthujjanagotta* and appears beside *ariyabhūmi* and *ariyasāṅkhā* in the above quoted passage of the *Visuddhimagga* (§22.5) which also mentions the *gotrabhū*. The religious connotation is also implicit in the terms *parittagotta* and *mahaggaṭtagotta* alluded to above. And the fact that the *Visuddhimagga* equates the *ariyagotta* and the *ariyabhūmi* 'spiritual stage of the saint' furthermore suggests that *gotta/gotra* and *bhūmi* can in certain contexts designate notions that are equivalent or at least very closely associated. In this connexion it may be recalled that the *Saddhammappakāsinī* states that *gotta* and *bīja* 'germ, seed' have the same meaning (pp. 275-276); this identification is of special interest since the equivalence of the Sanskrit terms *gotra* and *bīja* is maintained by both a Śrāvakayānist Ābhidharmika school and by the Mahāyānist Yogācārins.²⁵

For purposes of hermeneutic etymologizing (*nirukta*) a Pāli tradition connects the word *gotta* with the root *gup-* 'to protect'. According to Mahānāma's *Saddhammappakāsinī*, entering the eight concentrations — i.e. the four *jhānas* and the four *samāpattis* of the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* (§1.1.10 quoted above) which are called *gottas* because they are protected from the hindrances — is called *gotrabhū* by virtue of *samatha*; then, by virtue of *vipassanā*, the *gotrabhū* has as object the fruits (*phala*) of the four paths — namely of the *sotāpatti*^o, the *sakadāgāmi*^o, the *anāgāmi*^o and the *arahatta-magga*. Similarly, according to a *Pakarāṇa* quoted by Mahānāma, Nibbāna is a *gotta*

because it also is protected (*guttatā*) from hindrances; and having Nibbāna as a definite goal receives the name of *gotrabhū* (*Saddhammappakāsinī*, pp. 275-276). — Alternatively, we find also an explanation according to which the *gotta* is so called because of its function of protecting (*tāyati*, root *trā-*);²⁶ this etymology of course recalls the familiar explanation of Sanskrit *gotra* as *go-* + *trā-*.²⁷

As for the Pāli term *gotrabhū*, it has been rendered in various ways by modern translators. In his pioneer and still very valuable *Dictionary of the Pali language* published a century ago (London, 1875), R.C. Childers translates: "One who is in a fit state to receive sanctification; a priest." Childers distinguishes between *gotrabhū* as referring to Arhatship, for example in the *Puggalapaññatti*, and *gotrabhū* as referring more generally to the *śramaṇagotra*, as in the above quoted passage of the *Majjhimanikāya* where he takes it to denote the fraternity of monks. And he adds that in its first sense it means "one whose mind is in that state of strong illumination which immediately brings about the attainment of *sotāpattimagga*". In the Pali Text Society's *Pali-English-Dictionary* (1921-1925) T.W. Rhys Davids and W. Stede write: "'become of the lineage'; a technical term used from the end of the Nikāya period to designate one, whether layman or bhikkhu who, as converted, was no longer of the worldlings (*puthujjanā*), but of the Ariyas, having Nibbāna as his aim." S.Z. Aung and C.A.F. Rhys Davids have rendered the term in their translation of the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* by 'adoption' and 'evolving'²⁸ the lineage' (*Compendium of philosophy*, London, 1910, pp. 67-68, 129, n. 3). Ñāṇatiloka translated the term by 'geadelt, reif; Gereifter; Reife-Moment' (*Visuddhimagga* (tr.), *Der Weg zur Reinheit*, Konstanz, 1952, pp. 163, 628, 804, 808, 841), and also by 'Anwärter auf Heiligkeit' (*Puggalapaññatti* (tr.) p. 6).²⁹ And recently in his translation of the *Visuddhimagga*, Ñāṇamoli has used the rendering 'change of lineage' (*The Path of Purification*, Colombo, 1964). F. Edgerton in his *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary*, New Haven, 1953, has translated 'a member of the religious community'.

It is clear that the translations offered by Childers, Rhys Davids-Stede and Edgerton are applicable to *gotrabhū* as used with reference to a *puggala* in the Nikāyas and the *Puggalapaññatti*, but hardly to the meaning attested in the later scholastic literature which is covered by the renderings given by Aung-Mrs. Rhys Davids, and Ñāṇatiloka. Edgerton's 'a member of the religious community' indeed does not even cover the first meaning completely, and seems suitable only for the *Majjhimanikāya* passage, which had in fact been interpreted in a similar way already by Childers. As for Ñāṇamoli's 'change of lineage', the justification for rendering *bhū-* by 'change' is hardly

clear, since the Pali tradition³⁰ explains it either by *abhibhavana* 'overcoming' or by *bhāvana* 'realization' (whence no doubt Aung's and Mrs. Rhys Davids's 'evolving').

In the Buddhist literature in Sanskrit a vocable *gotrabhū* appears — as a feminine noun rather than, as in Pāli, a masculine — in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (*Sagāthaka*, v. 15):

āśritā sarvabhūteṣu gotrabhūs tarkavarjitā |

nivartate kriyāmuktā jñānajñeyavivarjitā ||

On the basis of this passage F. Edgerton explains: "Apparently a fem. collective or abstract, the 'communion of saints', corresponding to the Pāli masc. which refers to an individual person." — However, the question arises as to whether in this verse-passage the reference may not be rather to the *gotrabhūmi*. At all events the Tibetan translators, who render *rigs kyi sa* (the normal equivalent of *gotrabhūmi*), seem to have taken the word as an *Ārṣa* form or as a metrically determined form of *gotrabhūmi*; and that their interpretation is not without foundation is shown by the fact that in verse 6.11 of the *Abhidharmakośa*, *daśabhū* clearly stands for *daśabhūmi*.³² On this assumption the verse would mean: "The *gotra*-stage present in all living beings³³ and free from ratiocinative thought ceases when liberated from activity and separated from knowledge and the knowable." Indeed, the splitting of *vijñāna* into the polar dichotomy of knowledge and the known is considered a source of bondage; but when one frees oneself from this dichotomy as well as from *saṃsāric* activity one passes from the preliminary *gotrabhūmi* to the advanced stages (*bhūmi*) of the *Ārya-Bodhisattva* and finally to the *buddhabhūmi*. — In the vocabulary of many of the *Mahāyāna Śāstras* the *gotra* existing by nature (*prakṛisthagotra*) is said to become developed (*samudānītagotra*) and fortified (*paripuṣṭagotra*); and in the terminology of the texts expounding the *tathāgata-garbha* doctrine the *Tathāgata*-embryonic-essence present in all living beings (*sarvasattva*, compare *sarvabhūta* in the *Laṅkāvatāra* passage) is to be freed from the adventitious impurities (*kleśa*) and the state of the *tathāgata* is then achieved. (If it is thought that *gotrabhū* in the passage of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* cannot for linguistic reasons stand for *gotrabhūmi* in spite of the doctrinal suitability and the linguistic parallel from the verse of the *Abhidharmakośa*, *gotrabhū* can be understood as *gotra*-state rather than as *gotra*-stage.) It is therefore not certain whether the Sanskrit literature of Buddhism has a word that is the precise reflex of Pāli *gotrabhū*. But in either case Edgerton's translation 'Community of saints' for Skt. *gotrabhū* seems unlikely.

In sum, Pāli *gotrabhū* can be understood as '[one] having the state of the

lineage',³¹ and Sanskrit *gotrabhū* in the *Laṅkāvatāra* passage can be understood as 'lineage-stage' (= *gotrabhūmi*) (or as 'lineage-state').

The existence of the Pāli doublet *gotta/gotra*⁰ is of significance not only linguistically but also from the doctrinal point of view. The idea mentioned by Buddhaghosa that the *magga(ñāṇa)*, founded on the *gotrabhūñāṇa* having Nibbāna as its aim, allows a person to attain the state of a son (*orasaputtabhāva*) of the Buddha is especially noteworthy;³⁴ it in fact recalls the Mahāyānist concept of a spiritual 'lineage' (*gotra*) or 'clan' (*kula*) in which one takes birth and which makes one belong to the Buddha's own 'family'. The parallelism between the *gotrabhū* as an *ārammaṇupanissaya* as well as the concept of the *upanissaya* in Pāli and the use in the Mahāyānist literature of the term *niśraya* as an equivalent of *gotra* also seem to point in the direction of common doctrinal developments reflected in a terminology that is closely related if not altogether identical.³⁵

The above noted evidence, which is of both a linguistic and a doctrinal character, would then tend to show that the Theravāda school and its Pāli texts are not as isolated as has sometimes been made out from the currents of thought represented in the Sanskrit works not only of the other Śrāvakayānist schools but even of the Mahāyāna. Many trends in the Theravāda were no doubt conservative and even fundamentalist, protestant and exclusive; but there is enough evidence available to show that the Theravāda, and accordingly the monastic communities of Sri Lanka, participated to a not inconsiderable degree in certain of the developments of Buddhist thought in South Asia as a whole.

In the face of the doctrinal parallels and similarities discussed above it could of course be supposed that the developed 'Pāli' and 'Sanskrit' traditions in Buddhism both go back to an early common source without the one having borrowed directly from the other at some more recent period. This is surely the case in certain instances (for example the notion of the transfer of merit which is indeed characteristic of the Mahāyāna but which is also certainly not unknown in the Pāli tradition, ancient and mediaeval, where the terminology used by the different Buddhist traditions is, however, not identical).³⁷ In the case of the term *gotra*, however, the use in Pāli of a linguistic form that is phonologically not properly Pāli would suggest that the theory of the *gotrabhū*, the *gotrabhūñāṇa* and the *gotrabhūddhamma*'s has a link with a 'Sanskrit' tradition.³⁶

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NOTES

¹ Cf. W. Geiger, *Pāli, Literatur und Sprache*, Strassburg, 1916, § §53, 62; M. Mayrhofer, *Handbuch des Pāli I*, Heidelberg, 1951, §167.

² On the masculine form *gotrabhū* see for example Aggavaṃsa, *Saddanīti* (ed. by H. Smith,) pp. 70, 77-8, 86, 234.

³ V. *Saddanīti*, p. 870: *pāvacaṇasmim hi na kadāci pi chatraṃ gotraṃ icc ādīni dissanti, gotrabhū ti pade pana samāse vattamānattā takāro trakāraṃ pappoti vā ...*

In addition to the masculine form *gotrabhū* the *Saddanīti* quotes the neuter form *gotrabhu* (pp. 86, 234, 646), explaining that the masculine form has reference to a person (*puggala*) while the neuter form has reference to *nāṇa* or *citta* (pp. 63, 86-7, 234, 646). Thus Aggavaṃsa writes (pp. 86-7): *gotrabhū ti, paññattārammaṇaṃ mahaggaṭṭārammaṇaṃ vā gotrabhu: cittaṃ, taṃ hi kāmāvacaragottaṃ abhibhavati mahaggaṭṭagottaṃ ca bhāveti nibbatteti ti gotrabhū ti vuccati. api ca gotrabhū ti nibbānārammaṇaṃ magga-vīthiyaṃ pavattaṃ gotrabhu nāṇaṃ vā, samkhārārammaṇaṃ vā phalasaṃpattivīthiyaṃ pavattaṃ gotrabhu nāṇaṃ. tesu hi paṭhamāṃ puthujjanagottaṃ abhibhavati ariyagottaṃ ca bhāveti gottābhidhānā ca nibbānato ārammaṇakaraṇavasena bhavati ti gotrabhū ti vuccati; dutiyaṃ pana samkhārārammaṇaṃ pi samānaṃ asevanapaccayabhāvena sasampayattāni phalacittāni gottābhidhāne nibbānaṃhi bhāveti ti gotrabhū ti vuccati. idaṃ pāli vavatthānaṃ:*

*gotrabhu iti rassattavasena kathitaṃ padaṃ |
napumsakan ti viññeyyaṃ nānacittādipekkaṃ ||
gotrabhū iti dīghattavasena kathitaṃ pana |
pullingam iti viññeyyaṃ puggalādikapekkaṃ ||*

In this context the term *gotta* is explained as equivalent to *nibbāna* on p. 70. See also below, pp. 204-5.

The printed texts quoted below in the present article, however, read *gotrabhūnāṇa* ('knowledge of the *gotrabhū*', i.e. a *puggala*), rather than *gotrabhu nāṇaṃ* 'knowledge which is *gotrabhu*' (i.e. which 'overcomes' – *abhibhavati* – the *gotta* of the realm of desire, 'cultivates' – *bhāveti* – and 'develops' – *nibbatteti* – the great *gotta* while taking Nirvāṇa [*gotta* = *nibbāna*] as its object). But as will be seen below (p. 200), the reference indeed seems often to be in fact to a state of consciousness rather than to a *puggala* as such.

⁴ Elsewhere the word *āhuneyya* is also used of a sacred fire (*aggi*; v. *Dīghanikāya* III, pp. 5, 217; *Āṅguttaranikāya* IV, p. 41). In the *Visuddhimagga* (§7.95) it is defined as *āhavanīya* 'worthy of receiving offerings' (*āhavanam arahati*).

⁵ Cf. *Saddanīti*, p. 870, with p. 622.

⁶ It is to be noted that *ārya/ariya* is another word taken from the social sphere to designate a spiritual type, an Āryan as a 'noble' of the spirit.

⁷ Such monks are perhaps referred to as *gotrabhū* because they take gifts, and it is stated that the *gotrabhū* is a person to be honoured with offerings.

To account for this second view of the *gotrabhū* R.C. Childers distinguishes between *gotrabhū* as referring to Arhatship, and *gotrabhū* as referring to the *śramaṇagotra* when it designates the fraternity of monks (*Dictionary of the Pāli language*, s.v.).

⁸ The *gotrabhū* is also mentioned in another Abhidhamma text, the *Kathāvatthu* (247 and 309).

⁹ Cf. Buddhaghosa, *Visuddhimagga* §4.74 (see below).

¹⁰ On *vutthāna* 'emergence' cf. S.Z. Aung and C.A.F. Rhys Davids, *Compendium of Philosophy*, London, 1910, p. 67f., 215 n. 4.

¹¹ (a) V. *Saddhammappakāsinī*, p. 275: *lokikasamkhārā hi kilesānaṃ nimittattā nimittakāreṇa upatthānato vā 'nimittan' ti vuccanti*, 'for mundane conditionings are called *nimitta* since they are conditions for passions or occur in the form of conditions [for them]'. (b) V. *Saddhammappakāsinī*, p. 275: *nivaraṇādīgottābhibhavanato 'gotrabhū' ti*

(where *gotta* is said to have the same meaning as *bija* 'germ'). (c) V. *Saddhammapakāsinī*, p. 275: *uppādādigottābhibhavanato gotrabhū' ti*.

12 This classification might seem to exclude the idea of an evil *gotrabhū*, as mentioned in the *Majjhimanikāya*.

13 On the *vimokkhamukha*'s as preliminaries to the *gotrabhū* see *Aṭṭhasālinī* § 3.654; S.Z. Aung, *Compendium of Philosophy*, pp. 67-68.

14 Cf. *Visuddhimagga* § 22.5,44 (see below).

15 On the relation between Buddhaghosa and the author of the *Saddhammappakāsinī* see Ñānamoli, *The Path of Purification*, Colombo, 1964, p. xxx.

The *gotrabhū* is also mentioned in the *Aṭṭhasālinī* (pp. 43, 231, 290 etc.).

17 *paritta* is here taken as *paritta*¹ 'limited' (instead of *paritta*² 'protection') because it is opposed to *mahaggata*. (But see *Saddanīti*, pp. 479-480, where *paritta* used beside *gotta* has the meaning of protection: *tāṇaṃ parittam gottam ... tatra parittan ti mahātejavantaṭāya samantato sattānaṃ bhayaṃ upaddavaṃ upasaggañ ca tāyati rakkhati ti parittam ...*.)

18 Cf. *Saddhammappakāsinī*, p. 275, on *abhibhavana* and *bhāvana* as explanations of the element *bhū*.

19 On *anuloma* v. *Visuddhimagga* §§ 4.74, 21.128-134, 22.5; *Aṭṭhasālinī* § 3.507. Aung translates the term by 'adaptation' (*Compendium of Philosophy*, pp. 66, 68).

20 Here Buddhaghosa refers to *Paṭisambhidāmagga* I, p. 68 (see above).

21 V. *Paṭṭhāna* I, p. 165. (On the *upanissaya* as a condition qualifying one for Arhatship see *Jātaka* I, p. 235; *Aṭṭhasālinī* § 5.34. Childers explains the term as 'predestination to salvation'. The Pali Text Society's Dictionary compares the *gotrabhū* and the *upanissaya*.)

22 Cf. *Aṭṭhasālinī*, p. 231.

23 (a) In the *Aṭṭhasālinī* (which refers back to the *Visuddhimagga*) the term *gotrabhū* may, however, be understood as referring to a person. In this work it is described how the *gotrabhū* is still distant from the goal (*nibbāna*) so long as the passions (*kilesa*) have not been removed (p. 43; cf. pp. 356-357).

There it is also said that the *gotrabhū* emerges from the *nimitta* and is preceded by two, three or four *anuloma* moments according to whether one is highly intelligent (*mahāpañña*), moderately intelligent or only slightly intelligent (the one of moderate intelligence being taken as a standard for the purpose of discussing the appearance in the series of the *gotrabhū* and the *maggacitta*) (p. 231). As for the *gotrabhūñāna*, it has *nibbāna* as object, and the preceding *anumola* moments serve to clear away the darkness of the three grades of passion (*kilesa*); hence, by way of analogy, *nibbāna* may be compared to the moon and the *anuloma*'s to winds progressively blowing away the clouds of darkness, the *gotrabhūñāna* being then likened to a man with eyes (looking for the moon), so that the objectivation of pure *nibbāna* by the *gotrabhūñāna* is comparable to the seeing of the moon in a cloudless sky. In another analogy concerning the relation between path-knowledge and *gotrabhūñāna*, the latter is said to be a factor that permits the *maggāñāna* to aim at *nibbāna* in the way a blindfolded archer seated on a moving platform would shoot his arrows at targets as soon as he receives from a companion a sign to the effect that the platform on which he is seated has brought him into a position where he faces the target. The function of the *gotrabhūñāna* is then to provide a *saññā* to the *maggāñāna* (pp. 232-233). (b) The etymological – and conceptual – relationship between the two continues, however, to be clearly felt in Pāli; see for example *Saddhammappakāsinī*, p. 275; *Saddanīti*, p. 70 (*gotrabhū ti padass' attham vadantehi garūhi tu 'gottam vuccati nibbānam' iti gottan ti bhāsitaṃ*) and p. 86 (quoted above, p. 206, note 3).

24 *Ānguttaranikāya* IV, pp. 4-6 enumerates them as: *saddhā-dhana*, *silā*^o, *hirī*^o, *ottappa*^o, *suta*^o, *cāga*^o, and *pañña*.

25 See D. Seyfort Ruegg, *La théorie du tathāgatarbha et du gotra*, Paris, 1969.

26 *Paramatthamahjūsā Visuddhimagga-Atthakathā*, p. 134 (quoted by Nānamoli, *Path of Purification*, p.143, note 18); *Saddanīti*, pp. 479-480 with p. 359.

27 Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, 'Ārya Vimuktisena ...', WZKSO 12-13, 1968, *Festschrift E. Frauwallner*, p. 311; *Théorie*, pp. 78, 132, 143-144, See J. Wackernagel – A. Debrunner, *Altindische Grammatik* II/22, pp. 79, 701.

28 'Evolving' apparently renders °bhū, understood as *bhāvana* (see above).

29 These two distinct renderings given by Nānatiloka correspond to the two meanings of *gotrabhū* noted above.

30 See above.

31 Cf. *Saddanīti*, p. 77: *gotrabhū ti, gottasamkhātam amatamahānibbānam ārammaṇam katvā bhūto ti gotrabhū. sotāpattimaggaṇa anantarapaccayena sikhappattabalavavipassanācittena samannāgato puggalo, vuttam h' etam bhagavatā: 'katamo ca puggalo gotrabhū ...'* [Puggalapapañatti, p. 12]. Here then °bhū is explained as *bhūto* (and not as equivalent in meaning to *abhibhavati* or *bhāveti* as on p. 86, quoted above, p. 206, note 3, and elsewhere in the Pāli literature quoted above).

32 In the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* the *gotrabhūmi* precedes the *adhimuktīcaryā*° which in its turn precedes the *śuddhādhyaśāya* (§ 3.3), just as the *gotravihāra* precedes the *adhimuktīcaryā*° which in its turn precedes the *pramuditā*° (§ 2.4). (Neither is counted in the list of ten *bhūmis* in the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, which lists the *pramuditā* as the first *bhūmi*.) Cf. N. Dutt, *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, Chap. IV; *Theorie*, pp. 91-92.

33 Cf. the *tathāgatarbha* possessed by all sentient beings (*sarvasattva*)?

34 *Visuddhimagga* §22.13-14. On the *putto oraso* (and the *dhammadāyada*) see *Dīghanikāya* III, p. 84; *Majjhimanikāya* I, p. 12; III, p. 29; *Saṃyuttanikāya*, II, p. 221; *Itivuttaka*, p. 101. On the same notion as developed by the Mahāyāna, cf. *Śrīmālādevī-siṃhanādasūtra* f. 447b, quoted in the commentary on the *Ratnagotravibhāga* 1.36. – The concept has been discussed in the *Hōbōgirin* s.v. *Busshi* (p. 172) and by P. Mus, *Barabudur*, Hanoi 1935, pp. *12, *124, *255 and Chapters X-XV.

35 V. *Bodhisattvabhūmi* § 1.1 (p. 2) on the *gotra* as *nīśraya*, etc.

36 In Sinhalese the form *gota* is derived from Pāli *gotta* (see W. Geiger, *Etymological glossary of the Sinhalese language* [Colombo, 1941], s.v., and R. L. Turner, *Comparative Dictionary of the Indo-Aryan Languages*). In addition Sinhalese dictionaries list the form *gotra*, presumably a Sanskrit borrowing (rather than from Pāli *gotra*° discussed above). In Sinhalese the consonant cluster -tr- is not unusual, whereas in Pāli a cluster consisting of a stop + r is quite rare, though certainly not unknown.

37 In connection with a gift (*dakkhiṇā*) and the merit accruing therefrom the Pāli canon speaks of a dedication (*ādis* – e.g. *Mahāparinibbānasutta* in *Dīghanikāya* II, p. 88), to which *dakṣiṇādesānā* corresponds in the canon of the Sarvāstivādins. The scholastic Pāli term is *patti*, which appears also in the compounds *pattidāna*, *pattidhamma* and *pattānumodanā*; and the expression *dakkhiṇam ādise* of the *Mahāparinibbānasutta* is glossed as *pattim dadeyya* (*Sumaṅgalavilāsinī* II, p. 542). (The most usual Mahāyānist term seems to be (*punya-*) *pariṇāmanā*.)

Some modern Sinhalese scholars seem to discount the existence of such an idea in the genuine Pāli tradition; but see the present writer's remarks in his review of N.A. Jayawickrama's translation of the *Jinakālamālī* (*The Sheaf of Garlands of the Epochs of the Conqueror*, Pāli Text Society Translation Series No. 36, London 1968) in *JAOS* 92 (1972) 180-181. – On the subject see also G.P. Malalasekera, 'Transference of Merit in Ceylonese Buddhism', *Philosophy East and West* 17 (1967) 85-90; R. Gombrich, 'Merit Transference in Sinhalese Buddhism', *History of Religions* 11 (1971) 203-219 (who attempts an interpretation of the concept of *anumodanā*).

PĀLI LITERATURE OF THAILAND *

I. BACKGROUND TO THE PĀLI TRADITION

The Buddhism enunciated in the Pāli Canon, better known as the Theravāda (or 'Teaching of the Elders'), spread beyond the confines of its native land during the reign of Emperor Asoka in the third century B.C.

As a direct result of the third Buddhist Council, convened by him, monk-teachers were despatched to the neighbouring countries. Very little definite information is recorded of the fate of those missions with the supreme exception of that to Ceylon where no less a person than the emperor's own son, Mahinda, was chosen to promulgate the Dhamma.

Although Buddhism was soon well established in Ceylon, there are very few historical references to Buddhist contact with mainland South-East Asia. In fact it was the Mahāyāna form of Buddhism that first penetrated the mainland kingdoms direct from India. However, the first contact with the Theravāda was made before 1000 A.C. The powerful Burmese dominion of Anuruddha had been converted to the Theravāda through contacts with Ceylon and, as a result, northern Thailand, which formed part of his kingdom, was similarly influenced.

Two centuries later the independent kingdom of Lānnā was established in the north with the southern half of the Thai country forming the expansionist kingdom of Ayodhya (1350-1767). The capital of Lānnā was founded in 1296 in Chiengmai which much later gave its name to the whole province.

In 1423, twenty-five monks from Chiengmai, eight from Cambodia and six from the Burmese Mon kingdom received the *upasampadā* ordination in Ceylon. They returned two years later, those from Chiengmai finally arriving in the Lānnā capital in 1430. The monks established themselves in the Pā Deng temple, two miles west of Chiengmai, and soon embarked on a *Dhammadūta* tour of the towns of Chiengrai, Lampoon, Lampāng and Chiengsen.

Thus was founded the Sīhala (Ceylon) sect or the Laṅkāvaṃsa (Ceylon tradition) which gave rise to a great revival of Pāli literature and learning. This movement was accentuated in 1442 with the accession of Tilok, one of the most renowned kings of Lānnā, who, in 1475, convened a Council for the revision of the canonical texts.¹

II. PĀLI ORTHOGRAPHY IN THAILAND

During the 15th and 16th centuries the northern Thai capital of Chiangmai boasted the presence of several Pāli scholars whose names have come down to us through the works composed by them. In the southern capital of Ayodhya (or Ayuthia), however, it would appear that the only scholars present were those who could translate Pāli texts into Thai and no original Pāli studies from this region are known to us. It is possible, however, that such manuscripts were destroyed when Ayodhya was sacked by the Burmese in 1767.

As far as the texts were concerned the script generally used would have been Thai which was, in fact, based upon the Khmer alphabet. During the early part of the Laṅkāvaṃsa period, however, the Sinhala script was employed but doubtless this was confined to monk-scholars. During the early 19th century, Mongkut (Rāma IV) invented a new script, the *ariyaka*, which was based upon the Roman alphabet. This was intended to facilitate the actual printing of Pāli texts as opposed to their traditional dissemination by means of palm leaves on which the Khmer characters were inscribed. However, this innovation failed to gain popular acceptance and it died a natural death.

As mentioned above, the Pāli texts and other sacred writings were inscribed in Khmer letters whereas the Thai script, which had been introduced in 1283, was employed for secular works and translations only. It was not until the reign of Chulalongkorn (Rāma V, 1868-1911) that the entire Pāli Canon was published in Thai script.² Copies of this edition, which he himself had sponsored, were distributed to all known Pāli institutes.

III. THAI PĀLI TEXTS

Now follows a survey of all known original Pāli compositions in chronological sequence. As will be seen, few texts of any originality or importance were composed after the eighteenth century.

The *Saddhammasaṅgaha*³ is more or less a history of Buddhism in Ceylon in eleven chapters including the first three Councils (*Saṅgāyanā*). It is interesting to note that a fourth Council, held by the Arahant Mahinda under the presidency of Mahāriṭṭha in Ceylon, is mentioned.

The author gives a description of the writing of the *Tipiṭaka* under the patronage of Vaṭṭhagāmini Abhaya (101-77 B.C.), Buddhaghosa's works and the writing of the *ṭīkā*s by Kassapa and his colleagues during the reign of Parākramabāhu I (1153-86 A.C.). The ninth chapter deals with the

The author of this important work was Dhammakitti who probably lived at the end of the fourteenth century. Both he and his teacher, also named Dhammakitti, were *theras* of Thai nationality. The colophon⁵ states that a *thera* called Dhammakitti of good conduct and well versed in the *Piṭakas* lived in Ceylon. His pupil, also known as Dhammakitti, went to Ceylon to receive the *upasampadā* ordination. Thereafter, the latter returned to his native Ayodhya (*punāgato sakamṁ desamṁ sampatto Yodayamṁ puramṁ*) and whilst residing in the Laṅkārama, built by King Paramarāja, he composed this treatise.

The *Cāmadevivam̐sa*⁶, a history of Buddhism in the Lānnā kingdom⁷, and the *Sīhinganidāna*⁸, the history of the image from Sīhala (i.e., Ceylon), were written by Bodhiram̐si of Chiengmai. The latter relates how in the late thirteenth century, Ruang, King of Sukhodaya (in central Thailand), acquired this Buddha image. When his mission returned from Ceylon the image was displayed in several towns.

The *Ratanabimbavaṃsa*¹⁰, the history of the Emerald Buddha ('Phra Keo'), was written by Brahmarājapañña at Sirijanālaya in the Mahādhammarājapabbata monastery. The *Amarakatabuddharūpanidāna*, an account of the origin of this famous Buddha statue made by gods, was written by Ariya-vaṃsa of Burma. Both works draw upon materials from Indian sources and were composed presumably towards the end of the fifteenth century.

A number of authors flourished in the famous city of Navapura (or Paramenda).¹¹ A *thera* named Ñāṇakitti was one such who appeared during the last years of the fifteenth century. He wrote a series of grammatical exegeses of Buddhaghosa's Commentaries (*Aṭṭhakathās*). An *atthayojanā* of the *Sa-mantapāsādikā* for example, was composed by him in 1492 or 1493. Besides

this he wrote a glossary to the *Pātimokkha* called *Gaṇṭhidīpanī* and the *Kaccāyanarūpadīpanī*, a commentary on the famous late thirteenth century grammar of Coliya Buddhappiya, the *Rūpasiddhi*.

Ñānakitti's most well-known composition is a treatise on Buddhaghosa's *Atthasālinī*, written in 1495 whilst he was living in a monastery called Panasārāma in the jak grove situated to the north-east of Chiangmai. In the opening stanzas the author clearly states the object of undertaking this work: "Having saluted the noble and widely famed teacher, Buddhaghosa, I shall compose this small work for the easy understanding of the Commentary on the Abhidhamma written by Buddhaghosa who himself with difficulty crossed the deep ocean of Abhidhamma, subtle and full of meaning and which clarifies the text."

In the colophon of the *Atthasālinī-atthayojanā*¹², moreover, we find a copious account of the monastery where the author lived and wrote: "There was a noble city called Abhinavapura, to the north-east of which was located a monastery called Panasārāma, where jak fruits were in abundance, which was attractive to many people. There was a king¹³ of lion-like nature who could not be dominated. Wise, with great merit, he was the owner of four white elephants. That monarch of great fame was born of a noble dynasty, was a king of kings, compassionate, bearing the epithet of Laṅkā, he built this monastery which radiated beauty. The wise *thera*, Ñānakitti, who was living in this monastery, composed this exegesis to the *Atthasālinī* which was well produced." In addition to the foregoing it has been mentioned at the end as follows: "This exegesis to the *Atthasālinī*, written by the *thera* Ñānakitti who was well-versed in the *Tipiṭaka* together with the Commentaries, who had deep knowledge in all the grammars, living in the monastery known as Panasārāma which was situated to the north-east of the city of Abhinavapura, is ended."

The *Sammohavinodanī-atthayojanā*¹⁴, the exegesis of the *Sammohavinodanī*, was also written by the same *thera* in 1495. Although we are unable to find any trace, Ñānakitti may well have written an exegesis of the *Pañcappakaraṇaṭṭhakathā* too but he is definitely credited with a biographical work, the *Buddhaghosanidāna*.¹⁵

Bode ascribes the *Atthasālinī-atthayojanā* and *Sammohavinodanī-atthayojanā* to Sumaṅgala who lived in the reign of a Shan king, Sihasūra, the founder of Pin-ya (Pali: Vijayapura) in 1312,¹⁶ according to the *Piṭakatthamaing*¹⁷, a Burmese history of Pāli literature. But the colophon of the *Atthasālinī-atthayojanā* categorically mentions the author's name as Ñānakitti along with the name of the monastery where he resided. The internal evidence — which we see in the work itself — is much more authentic than the

external evidence but possibly the *Piṭakatthamaing* is referring to two different exegeses written on the *Atthasālinī* and *Sammohavinodanī*, namely, the *Atthasālinī-atṭhakathāyojanā* and the *Sammohavinodanī-atṭhakathāyojanā*.¹⁸

The *Pañcikā-nāma-atthayojanā*¹⁹ is a kind of sub-commentary written on the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*, a twelfth century treatise composed in Ceylon by Anuruddha, and on its *ṭīkā*, the *Abhidhammatthavibhāvinī*, whose author, Sumaṅgala, also lived in twelfth century Ceylon. As Ñāṇakitti wrote *atthayojanās* on the *Atthasālinī* and the *Sammohavinodanī*, he could well be the author of this *atthayojanā* too.

There is an *abhinavaṭīkā* entitled *Ganthasāra*²⁰ written on the *Saddabindu*²¹, which was composed by King Dhammarāja Kyaswa (1234-50)²² who built the Prassada *cetiya*²³ in the city of Arimaddana (Pagan) in Burma. According to the opening stanzas, the *Ganthasāra* was written at the request of Ñāṇakitti by Dhammakitti Mahāphussadeva who lived in the town of Haripuñjaya.²⁴

Some consider the Pāli work called *Māleyyatherasutta* to have been written in Ceylon but *The Story of Phra Mālai* is a popular Thai poem adapted from this work. The Thai metrical version was composed in 1736²⁵ whilst the original *Māleyyatherasutta* is among those apocryphal Pāli *suttas* which were perhaps forged in Thailand.

The Pāli original was probably written in Chiangmai around 1500. The author, whoever he was, is obviously indebted to some of the *Jātakas* such as the *Lohakumbhijātaka*, *Samkiccajātaka*, *Mahānārada-kassapa-jātaka* and especially the *Nimijātaka*, but he does not adhere to his sources very faithfully. It is probable that the story in brief was originally composed in Ceylon but rewritten in greater detail in northern Thailand.

The *sutta* tells how Māleyyathera, born in Ceylon and ordained as a monk while still young, eventually becomes an *arahant* possessing the power to travel instantly to any part of the universe. On a visit to a hell he sees a great number of his former acquaintances undergoing frightful tortures.²⁶

One of the most important historical works written in Thailand is the *Jinakālamālīpakaraṇa*,²⁷ whose author was Ratanapañña Thera of northern Thailand. In his preface to the work, Damrong says that Ratanapañña was one of two monks of the same name, one lived in Lampāng and the other in Phujao. Saeng Manavidura is of the opinion that the author lived in Wat Si-halārāma or Wat Mahābodhārāma.²⁸ We can, however, maintain that the work was composed in 1516 (and subsequently extended to 1528 by an addendum) by Ratanapañña whilst residing in the Rattavana monastery (Ratanamahāvihāra) of Chiangmai, as stated in the colophon.

This is a late study of outstanding events in Buddhist history from its origin in India, subsequent spread to Ceylon and establishment of 'Sinhalese Buddhism' (*Sīhala-sāsana*) of the Mahāvihāra school located at Anurādhapura, Ceylon. As such, this work compares well with the Pāli chronicles of Ceylon (*vaṃsa-kāvya*) or *avadānas* of Thailand; also with *praśasti-kāvya* as some chapters towards the end of the book exalt King Tilok and his great-grandson, Phra Muang Keo, together with the Mengrai dynasty in general, to which they belonged. It includes a religious history of Lampoon and Chiengmai together with accounts of neighbouring kingdoms — viz., Cambodia, Yonarattha, Sukhodaya (or Sukhothai), etc. It also contains information on the intercourse between Ceylon and south-east Asia, especially prior to the introduction of the Kalyāṇi *upasampadā* from Lower Burma during Dhammaceti's reign. However, legends are also included which do not ensure the reliability of this as an historical work.

There are six main topics: (i) The sixfold antecedent (*Chabbidhanidāna*) deals with the life of the Buddha commencing with the mental resolve (*manopañidhāna*) of the Bodhisatta and ending with the *Parinibbāna*. A description of relics is included together with a summary of the twenty-four Buddhas preceding Gotama. (ii) A brief description of the first three Councils (*Saṅgītikālakathā*). (iii) The history of Buddhism in Ceylon (*Laṅkāśāsanapavatti*) from its introduction up to the arrival of the Tooth Relic in c.256 A.C. (iv) The political and religious history of Haripuñjaya (*Haripuñjayappavatti*) from its establishment by Cāmadevi up to its annexation by Mengrai in 1292. (v) The history of the Lānnā kingdom, Lāva dynasty and kings from Mengrai, who became "sole ruler of Yonarattha and Haripuñjaya", and founded Chiengmai. It deals also with Chiengmai's role as a centre of Buddhism and the introduction of the Sīhala-sāsana into Thailand and neighbouring countries. (vi) The arrival of the Sīhala Dispensation (*Sīhala-sāsana-gamana*) and the account of its establishment (*Sīhala-sāsanajotanakathā*) — these last two sections comprising, in effect, a political and religious history of Chiengmai.

The *Vajirasāratthasaṅgaha*²⁹ was also composed by Ratanapañña. Eighteen months after completing the *Jinakālamālipakaraṇa*, he compiled a summary of the Buddha's teaching which highlighted its essence. The author was residing in the Mahāvanārāma whilst writing this work but it is recorded that he was living in the Mahārattavanārāma whilst compiling the *Jinakālamālipakaraṇa* and it is possible that the two monasteries are identical.

Finally, a Thai chronicle dealing with the origins of Buddhism was translated into Pāli by Ratanapañña under the title, *Mūlasāsana*, in the early sixteenth century. The author of the original work is unknown. This work has

made a special reference to the history of Buddhism in the Lānnā kingdom.

Attention should now be drawn to one of the most well-known and beloved Pāli authors in the history of Thailand.

Sirimaṅgala lived, with many famous contemporaries, in the new city of Chiangmai during the golden age of Thai scholarship at the beginning of the sixteenth century. One of his earliest treatises is the *Vessantaradīpanī*. Written in 1517, it is based on the original *Vessantarajātaka*.

The *Cakkavāḍadīpanī*³⁰ is another treatise, this time to explain Buddhist cosmology. In one of the opening verses the author states: "Having brought together the essentials which have been taken from the different books, I shall expound the *Cakkavāḍadīpanī* for ease of comprehension."³¹

The colophon states: "The *Cakkavāḍadīpanī* consists of six chapters written by a *mahāthera* who was exceedingly energetic, master of the *Tipiṭaka*, endowed with confidence, wisdom and vigour, desirous of his and others' prosperity, known as Sirimaṅgala, the name given to him by his teachers; dwelling in the *vihāra* known as 'Savaṇakham' in the Deyya³² (= Thai) language, situated to the south-east of the Sīhalārāma³³, in 1520, during the reign of the king who was a nephew of the lord of the new city of Paramenda (= Chiangmai) who was above all kings, royal, nobly devout, aspiring to Buddhahood, delighted with the Dispensation of the Buddha, is thus ended."³⁴

Another cosmological treatise is the *Lokadīpanī* which is based on the account of the beginnings of life and the world as given in the *Aggañña Sutta* (*Dīgha Nikāya*) and on similar descriptions contained elsewhere.

The *Maṅgalatthadīpanī*³⁵, which consists of 505 pages, is the best and most extensive exposition of the *Maṅgala Sutta* (*Sutta-Nipāta*) so far written in the Pāli language. It occupies a unique place among the works written on various *suttas*. The learned author, Sirimaṅgala, has written (in 1524) collecting and summing up in brief the relevant details from the Commentaries, sub-commentaries, exegeses such as the *Visuddhimagga*, and including anecdotes and parables. It seems it was specially composed for the benefit of preachers (*dhammakathikas*).

The colophon says: "The energetic *mahāthera* by the name of Maṅgala prefixed Siri who had critical knowledge in the *Sutta*, *Abhidhamma* and *Vinaya* and who was the pupil of Buddhavara composed this *Maṅgalatthadīpanī* which was delightful to the senses."³⁶

According to the colophon this was written during the reign of the emperor who was the nephew of the king who possessed the epithet Laṅkā.

A contemporary of Sirimaṅgala, Ñāṇavilāsa, wrote the *Saṅkhyāpakāsaka*; but its sub-commentary was composed by Sirimaṅgala in c.1520 during the

reign of Bilakapanathādhirāja, who ascended the throne of Chiengmai in 1495. According to the colophon, the author lived in Chiengmai in the south-west part of the Sīhalārāma.

During the same period, a forest-dwelling *thera* named Uttarārāma composed the *Visuddhimaggadīpanī*, a treatise on Buddhaghosa's fifth century *magnum opus* on the threefold scheme of Buddhist training – morality (*sīla*), meditation (*samādhi*) and wisdom (*paññā*). Another, unknown, *thera* wrote the *Uppātasanti*.³⁷ This latter work contains verses in praise of the Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha which should be chanted to avoid dangerous accidents. The *Sāsanavaṃsa* maintains that the army of the Emperor of China was defeated by the chanting of these verses.³⁸

The *Ganthābharanāṭikā* is an important sub-commentary on a grammatical treatise, the *Ganthābharana*,³⁹ of the celebrated Burmese teacher and author, Ariyavaṃsa, who settled in Ava during the reign of Narapati (1442-1468). This *ṭikā* was written in 1584 by the wise Saṅgharāja, named Suvāṇṇaramsi, the head of the Vijayārāma (now Wat Vijai in Viengchan district).⁴⁰

It might be worth bearing in mind that in 1558 Chiengmai was conquered by the king of Pegu and remained a vassal state of Burma until near the end of the 18th century. With the aid of the king of Bangkok, Chiengmai regained her freedom only to become inextricably linked with the fortunes of the southern kingdom. Thereafter, with the founding of the Chakri dynasty in 1782 by Chao Phaya Chakri (Rāma I), the history of the modern kingdom of Thailand begins. In actual fact the last link with the past was only broken as late as 1949 when the old designation for the country, Siam, was officially changed to Thailand.

The *Saṅkhepa*, the annals of Ayodhya,⁴¹ was written in précis form in 1680 at the request of Phra Narai. It is an enumeration of the historical facts regarding this kingdom from its foundation up to 1604.

The *Paṭhamasambodhi* is a traditional life of the Buddha. Both the name of the author and the date of the work are unknown. However, this work has been cited in a 17th century chronicle called the *Gandhavaṃsa*⁴² and therefore it must be of an earlier date. In 1844 Rāma III (Phra Nang Klao, 1824-51) asked Krom Somdet Phra Paramānujit Jinnorot, who was then head of Wat Jetuphon in Bangkok under the name of Suvāṇṇaramsi, to collect the fragments of the *Paṭhamasambodhi* in order to compile a complete text. The prince-monk executed this request in the first six months of 1845 and edited the present recension in thirty chapters.

The *Saṅkhepatthajotani*,⁴³ a treatise on the *Visuddhimagga*, was written by an anonymous scholar.

The *Sotabbamālinī*⁴⁴ is a text of 130 pages which was composed especially to outline the advantages of listening to the Dhamma. It is said that this work was brought over from Thailand by the party of monks headed by Upāli Thera that came to re-establish the *upasampadā* ordination in Ceylon during the reign of Kīrti Sri Rājasiṃha in 1756.

This book is illustrated with various anecdotes. There is the summary of a story which is not found anywhere else in Buddhist literature: Once upon a time a band of traders with various commodities boarded a ship bound for Tambapaṇṇi (an ancient name for Ceylon). A Buddhist monk accompanied them and during the voyage he started to recite the chapter of the uprising of consciousness from the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* beginning with 'wholesome states' (*kusāladhammā*). A fish, attracted by the sweet sound of the Dhamma, followed the ship until it docked. The crowd assembled near the harbour saw the fish and killed it with arrows. This fish was reborn in a rich family in Rohaṇa province in the Sīhaladīpa (the main name given to Ceylon at that time) and was known as Sumana. Many monks visited his house for alms and the boy, who was much pleased with the monks, eventually renounced his home and joined the Saṅgha, although his parents tearfully tried to prevent this happening. He soon mastered the entire *Tipiṭaka* and became known as Saddhāsumana.

This story may have been composed to illustrate the contemporary regard that Thailand showed towards Ceylon as the centre of the Dhamma. The author is unknown but obviously it was written by a *thera* towards the end of the eighteenth century.

The most detailed and best known historical chronicle in Thailand is undoubtedly the *Saṅgītiyaṃsa*,⁴⁵ the history of the Councils, which was compiled by Bhadanta Vanaratana Vimaladhamma (Somdej Phra Vanarat) during the reign of Rāma I in 1789. As many as nine Councils are recorded: of them, the first three were held in India, the next four in Ceylon and the last two in Thailand. The eighth was convened in Chiangmai by King Śrīdharmacakravartī Tilaka (Tilok) in 1475. It lasted a year and established Buddhism on a firm basis; all the learned monks in the country participated. The ninth was held under Rāma I in 1788 in the new capital of a unified Thailand, Bangkok, following the destruction of Ayodhya by the Burmese. 218 *theras* and 32 lay scholars assembled to recite the *Tipiṭaka* for a year, the records of which had been depleted by the recent invasions. The Saṅgha was completely reorganised and Buddhism experienced a revival in terms of new *vihāras* and the like.

This work is divided into chapters, the first one being called *Jambudīpa-saṅgītiniddesa*. It begins with the prediction of Dīpaṅkara, describes the

birth and youth of the Bodhisatta Gotama and quotes from the text of the *Dhammapada* Commentary. Following the inclusion of verses on the Enlightenment and Passing-away (*Parinibbāna*), the author relates the tradition of the first Council. Quoting relevant stanzas from the *Mahāvamsa* and *Saddhammasaṅgaha*, he relates the history of the second Council in India. The accounts of the conversion of Asoka, the third Council at Pāṭaliputta, the mission of Arahant Mahinda to Ceylon are inspired by the records of the *Samantapāsādikā*, *Saddhammasaṅgaha*, *Mahāvamsa* and *Dipavamsa*. The second chapter is known as *Laṅkādiṭṭhacattutthavārasaṅgahaniddesa* which contains the account of the fourth Council in Ceylon and a general record of Buddhism in the island. It also provides a genealogy of Asoka and the first kings of Ceylon. The four following chapters reproduce two sections of the *Jinakālamālīpakaraṇa*. The seventh chapter is called *Anukkamachattim-sarājaniddesa*, the history of thirty-six kings of Ayodhya. The eighth chapter is called *Navadhammasaṅgahaniddesa* gives an account of the ninth Council and the final chapter is miscellaneous in character.⁴⁶

The history of the Ayodhya period can be more easily examined than that of the Sukhodaya in view of the plentiful documentary records still extant. The most familiar version of this history is generally held to have been the work of Krom Somdet Phra Paramānujit who flourished in the mid-nineteenth century. In compiling it he made use of Vanaratana's history in Pāli, one part of which was called the *Mahāyuddhakāravamsa* and the other the *Cūlayuddhakāravamsa*. The two volumes were thus ascribed to Paramānujit and were generally considered to be the only books in existence relating to the history of Ayodhya.

These two Pāli chronicles related the wars fought against neighbouring kingdoms with a view to exalting the personality of the kings involved. Thus, if certain conflicts resulted in defeat for the forces of Ayodhya they were simply omitted from the records! As their titles suggest, the two chronicles describe 'great' and 'minor' wars respectively. An example of the former was the one waged against Pegu from the time of Somdet Phra Mahā Chakrabat to the time of Somdet Phra Naresuan when the Peguans were finally defeated and their realm came under the jurisdiction of Ayodhya.⁴⁷

The *Mukhamatthakathā*,⁴⁸ an old commentary to Anuruddha's *Paramatthavinicchaya*, was written by a *thera* called Mahābodhi who lived in the city of Vabra⁴⁹ in the Devoya⁵⁰ country (*Devoyaraṭṭhe vipule Vabrapure*), at the request of the Saṅgha (*Saṅghenajjhesitenāyaṃ Mukhamatthakathā katā*) according to the colophon. The author was so named due to his having worshipped the Bodhi tree (*ficus religiosa*) under which the Buddha attained enlightenment at Buddhagaya. Embellished with *sīla* and other good quali-

ties, he was the younger brother of Dhammasenāpati, an erudite scholar honoured by the king (*Dhammasenāpati nāma paṇḍito rājapūjito, tassa bhā-tā kaṇiṭṭho yo sīlādiguṇabhūsito*). According to the city and country mentioned in the colophon above, it would seem that the author was a Thai.

There exists a work in Thailand dealing with iconography called the *Buddhalakkhaṇa*. It describes the peculiarities of the marks and characteristics of the Buddha image⁵¹ which are, however, not strictly followed by Thai artists. The author as well as the date of this treatise is unknown but the latter may have been brought to Thailand by Indian artists.

Finally, there are two Pāli texts of which little is known:

The *Rāmaññasamaṇavaṃsa*⁵² — an account of the Kalyāṇi inscriptions which were so recorded by order of the King of Pegu in 1476.

*Correspondence with the Sinhalese Saṅgha*⁵³ — by Rāma IV (1851-68), better known as Mongkut, who himself spent twenty-seven years as a monk prior to ascending the throne. During that valuable training period he founded the Dhammayuttanikāya which sect has long distinguished itself for intensive practice of the Dhamma and conscientious adherence to the Vinaya.

Mongkut will also be remembered for reforming the teaching of Pāli which resulted in a minor renaissance in this field of study. One product of this concern for the language of the texts was his *Collected Works on Buddhism in Pali*.⁵⁴ Another result is to be heard in the stanzas which he composed for chanting in Dhammayuttanikāya *vihāras*.⁵⁵ At least two collections⁵⁶ have been published in this century in addition to six devotional tracts.⁵⁷

IV. LAO PĀLI TEXTS

There exist in Laos (where Buddhism was established c.1375) many texts which are word-for-word commentaries or paraphrases of the original Pāli texts, called *nissayas*. On the hill, Vat Phra Ouak, in Luang Prabang (the ancient royal and religious capital), there is a temple library which contains manuscripts of Lao *nissayas* including one on the *Visuddhimagga*.

The *Jātakas* are the most popular literature, however, although the order differs from the accepted Pāli text and we find a collection of ten *Jātakas* is very popular in this country.⁵⁸ There is also a collection of fifty apocryphal *Jātakas*⁵⁹ under the collective title of *Lokipaṇṇāsajātaka*. These were composed in hybrid Pāli during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries by an anonymous *sāmaṇera* (novice monk) resident in Chiangmai.⁶⁰ Each *Jātaka* is longer than the original story from which it is adapted but each contains local folklore in addition to Dhamma. Not only do these fifty *Jātakas* enjoy

great popularity in Laos but also in the neighbouring Theravāda countries as well.⁶¹ Twenty-seven stories are, however, peculiar to the Lao version which are not found anywhere else.⁶²

There is an apocryphal *sutta* called the *Jambupattisutta* which is peculiar to Laos. The *sutta* narrates the story of a king called Jambupatti who visited the Buddha in the dazzling robes of royalty in order to impress him. The Buddha, however, was found sitting on a throne dressed in the apparel of a Cakkavatti (universal) king, shining as a god. Seeing him, Jambupatti's pride diminished. This story has been portrayed in a mural painting of the temple library in Luang Prabang. In the scene the Buddha is depicted as pointing out to Jambupatti the torments he must suffer if he fails to follow the principles of his teaching.⁶³

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NOTES

* For present purposes Laos is included in this survey by virtue of the close ethnic, linguistic and cultural affinities with Thailand.

¹ Reginald le May, *The Culture of South-East Asia*, London, 1954, p. 187.

² In 39 volumes in 1893. (Soon thereafter he established in Bangkok the Vajirañāṇa National Library of Thailand.) Another complete edition was published by the King Mongkut Pali Academy, Bangkok, in 45 volumes between 1925 and 1928; it was dedicated to the memory of his brother, Rāma VI, by King Prajādhīpoka.

³ Ed. N. Saddhānanda, *Journal of the Pali Text Society* (JPTS), 1890.

⁴ G.P. Malalasekera, *Pali Literature of Ceylon*, Royal Asiatic Society, London, 1928; M.D. Gunasena, Colombo, 1958, pp. 10, 246.

⁵ For the complete translation of the colophon *vide* Malalasekera, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

⁶ Published in Bangkok, 1920. *Vide* 'The History of Muang Haribhunjai' in The Siamese Society's *15th Anniversary Commemorative Publication*, Vol. I, 1904-29, Bangkok, 1954, p. 82.

⁷ The Lānnā kingdom consisted of seven towns in northern Thailand: Chiengrai, Chiengmai, Mae-hongsorn, Lampoon, Lampāng, Prae and Nān.

⁸ Published in Bangkok, 1913. Cf. 'The History of the Statue of the Buddha named Phra Sihing', The Siamese Society, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-1. Also, *P'ra Buddha Sihinga* (tr. by Camille Notton), The Bangkok Times Press, 1933. (The translator states that this was written in 1417.)

⁹ Chulalongkorn's brother.

¹⁰ Published in Bangkok, 1912. Cf. *The Chronicle of the Emerald Buddha* (tr. by Camille Notton), The Bangkok Times Press, 1933.

¹¹ Navapura or Abhinavapura ('New City') was the name given to modern Chiengmai but elsewhere Nabbisi and Lakunna have been mentioned. There, a king called Lānkā lived according to the *Atthasālini-atthayojanā*. Since the god Indra (P'ra In) is regarded as the protector of the *Buddhasāsana* in Thailand, the name Paramenda ('Great Indra') may have been used for 'New City' during this period as well.

¹² Ed. Paññāsekharā Mahāthera, Ranville Vihāra, Kataluwa, Lokopakāra Press, 1849.

¹³ He may be Tilok, the ruler of the Lānnā kingdom which covered northern Thailand. His dates are 1442-87 and it is conjectured that he was responsible for building the Panasārāma.

- 14 Ed. Paññāsekharā, *op. cit.*, 1852.
- 15 Published in Bangkok, 1913.
- 16 Mabel Haynes Bode, *Pali Literature of Burma*, Royal Asiatic Society, London, 1909, 1966, p. 27.
- 17 *Pitakatthamaing*, Sudhammavati Press, Rangoon, 1905, p. 40.
- 18 *Ibid.*, p. 35, Nos. 250, 251.
- 19 Printed in Bangkok in two volumes with an index.
- 20 *Pitakatthamaing*, *op. cit.*, p. 62, No. 410; *Gandhasāra*, published in Burma.
- 21 *Ibid.*, p. 62, No. 409.
- 22 Another book written by the king was the *Paramatthabindu*, *ibid.*, p. 40.
- 23 For the account of the building of this *cetiya* (pagoda), *ibid.*, p. 41.
- 24 Another name for Lampoon.
- 25 Cf. 'Les ouvrages pali composés en pays thai', by George Coedès in *Bulletin de l'École française d'Extrême-Orient (BEFEO)*, Vol. XVIII (1918) 40.
- 26 The protagonist, Māleyyathera (= Thai Pra Malai), may be identical to the celebrated Sinhalese *arahant*, Maliyadeva (v.1. Malaya-Mahādeva, Maliya-Mahādeva) born in the 2nd century A.C. Vide G.P. Malalasekera, *Dictionary of Pali Proper Names (DPPN)*, PTS, London, 1960, Vol. II, p. 450f.
- 27 Ed. A.P. Buddhadatta Mahāthera, PTS, London, 1962; his Sinhalese edition, Laṅkā Bauddha Maṇḍalaya, Colombo, 1956; Coedès' transcript of pp. 104ff. of Damrong's Thai edition and his monograph, 'Documents sur l'histoire politique du Laos occidental', *BEFEO*, Vol. XXV (1925); Damrong's edition, Bangkok, 1909; *The Sheaf of Garlands of the Epochs of the Conqueror* (tr. by N.A. Jayawickrama), PTS, 1968.
- 28 Dr. Saeng Manavidura's observations on the *Jinakālamālipakarana* in *The Sheaf of Garlands*, *op. cit.*, p. xlv.
- 29 There is a ms. of the work in Colombo Museum. It consists of fourteen palm leaves, each 1' by 1'' long.
- 30 *Ibid.*, ninety-seven leaves, each 22'' long.
- 31 *Nānāganthesu sārattam gahetabbam samādiya karissāham subodhattham Cakkavā-lakadīpanim*.
- 32 Perhaps 'Deyya' is derived from 'Yodaya' (< Ayodhya or Ayuthia) or it may be the Pāli form of 'Thai'. 'Deyye' or 'Dai' was an ancient name for Thailand and its language seems to have been Deyyabhāsā according to the colophon.
- 33 Very probably Sīhalārāma is identical with Laṅkāārāma built by King Paramarāja. Dhammakitti mahāsāmi wrote the *Saddhammasaṅgaha* whilst living in the Laṅkāārāma. Cf. the colophon of this work.
- 34 *Iccayayam navapure patitthita-Sīhalārāmassa dakkhina-pacchimadisāyam patitthite Deyyabhāsāya 'Savanakham' ti pākatanāme vihāre vasantena mahuggāhena tipitakadha-rena saddhābuddhiviriyapatimaṇḍitena sakaparesam kosallam icchantena Sirimaṅgalo ti garūhi gahitanāmena mahātherena Paramende navapure issarassa Laṅkāvhayassa rājanat-tuno rājādhirājassa manujindassa sabbarājūnam tilakabhūta paramasaddhassa patthi-tasabbhaññutañānassa buddhasāsane pasannassa kāle dvāsityādhikaṭṭhasatasakarāje ma-hāsampavasse katā chakaṇḍapatimaṇḍitā Cakkavāladīpanī nitthitā*.
- 35 Published in Bangkok, 1912. It is also known as the *Maṅgaladīpanī*. *Sāsanavaṃsa* (ed. by Bode), PTS, 1897; (tr. by B.C. Law), PTS, 1952, p. 51. Bode, *op. cit.*, p. 47, *DPPN*, II, p. 411. Ed. Vajirañāṇa, Mahāmakuta-Rājavidyālaya, Bangkok, 1962. Today, this book is used as a standard text in the fourth and seventh grades of the official Pāli examinations in Thailand.
- 36 *Suttābhidhammavinayesu vicārañāno siriyaḍimaṅgalabhiddhānayutoruthero ussāhavā racayi Buddhavarassa sisso Maṅgaladīpanimihattarasābhiraṃam*.

37 *Sāsanavaṃsa*, *op. cit.*, p. 51. *Vide* Bode, *op. cit.*, footnote no. 5 on p. 47.

38 *Ibid.*, p. 51.

39 V. 1. *Gandhābharana*, *Gaṇḍābharana*. This Burmese author's work was extensively studied by scholars in Burma in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

40 We read in the colophon:

*Ganthābharanāṭikā 'yaṃ Vijayārāmasāminā
Suvannaramsināmena saṅgharājena dhīmatā
Sakyasīhassa nibbānā vassesu atitesu hi
atthavīśasatādhīsu dviśahasseeṣu racitā.*

41 A copy of the manuscript of the *Saṅkhepa* (= 'concise') was discovered and published by Damrong in 1907. The manuscript is now preserved in the National Library and has been translated by Dr. Frankfurter under the title, 'Events in Ayuddhya from Chola-Sakarāj 686-966', *Journal of the Siam Society* VI (1909) 3. *Vide* Coedès' 'Une recension pālie des annales d'Ayuthia', *BEFEO* XIV (1914).

42 *Gandhavaṃsa*, *JPTS*, 1886, p. 65.

43 A copy of the manuscript is preserved in the National Library.

44 Ed. Vimalasiri Thera, *Samudrārāma*, Ahungalla, Nirṇayasādhaka Press, Bentota, 1911.

45 Two manuscripts of this book are preserved in the National Library. It was published under the royal decree of Rāma VI in 1923 to commemorate the cremation of Prince Chudhadhaharthiloka Kromkhum Bejboon Indrajaya, a son of Rāma V. Tr. Phimthi Press, Bangkok, 1924. *Vide*: Coedès' article, *BEFEO* XV (1915); B. Jinānanda's article on the Councils in *2500 Years of Buddhism* (ed. by P.V. Bapat), Government of India, Delhi, 1956, pp. 51-53.

46 *Vide* Coedès' article, *BEFEO* XIV (1914).

47 The Siamese Society, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-95. *Cūlayuddhakāravāṃsa*, published in Thai, Bangkok, 1920.

48 *Mukhamatthakathā*, copied by the late Ven. A.P. Buddhaddatta from a Burmese manuscript, consists of thirty-six foolscap pages.

49 It may be the Pāli equivalent or corruption of Wat Phra and the city may have been called after the monastery situated there.

50 Devoya may be the derivation of Dvāravatī. Cf. Deyya too in footnote 32.

51 It is interesting to note that a paper written by Paramānujit (the son of King Phra Buddha Lot La who died in 1824) which has been translated into English by Frankfurter throws considerable light on the Buddha image in Thailand. *Vide* 'The Attitude of Buddha', *Journal of the Siam Society* X (1913) 11.

52 Published in Bangkok, 1913.

53 Published in Bangkok, 1925.

54 Pāli and Thai texts, *Mahāmakuta-Rājavidyālaya*, 1968.

55 *Vide*: *King Rāma the Fourth Mongkut* (ed. by Sāsanasobhana, Mahāmakuta-R.), 1968, pp. 5-35; *Ordination Procedure*, Prince Vajirañāṇavarovasa, Mahāmakuta-R., 1963, pp. 72-89.

56 *Vide*: *Buddhist Recitations for Various Occasions* (Pāli and Thai texts), Mahāmakuta-R., 1968; *Pāli and Siamese stanzas recited during the Visākhapūjā*, Bangkok, 1919.

57 Works by Mongkut with Prefaces by Damrong Rājanubhab: *Pāli Gāthā in Praise of the Holy Discipline*, 1921. *Pāli stanzas composed on the names of his children*, 1924. *Pāli Stanzas based on the formula 'Itipiso Bhagavā'*, 1924. *Gāthā Dhammapariyāya*, 1925. *Religious Instruction in Pāli*, 1925. *Pāli Gāthā used in connection with the Bija Maṅgala Royal Ceremony*, 1925.

58 Namely, (1) *Temiyakumāra*, (2) *Janakakumāra*, (3) *Suvaṇṇasyāma*, (4) *Nimirāja*, (5) *Mahosadha*, (6) *Bhūridatta*, (7) *Candakumāra*, (8) *Nāradaśarma*, (9) *Vidhurapaṇḍita*, (10) *Vessantara*.

59 Namely, (1) *Samuddaghosakumāra*, (2) *Suddhammakumāra* or *Sutarājakumāra*, (3) *Sudhanakumāra*, (4) *Sirasakumāra*, (5) *Subhamittarāja*, (6) *Suvannasaṅkha*, (7) *Candaghātaka*, (8) *Suvannamiga*, (9) *Suvannakuruṅga*, (10) *Setamūsika*, (11) *Tualakapaṇḍita*, (12) *Maghamāṇava*, (13) *Aritṭhakumāra*, (14) *Ratanapajjota*, (15) *Sunandakumāra*, (16) *Bārāṇasī*, (17) *Dhammadhajapaṇḍita*, (18) *Dukkammakumāra*, (19) *Dabbasiddhikumāra*, (20) *Paññābalakumāra*, (21) *Dadhivāhana*, (22) *Mahisakumāra*, (23) *Chaddanta*, (24) *Campeyyanāgarāja*, (25) *Bahatāgāvi*, (26) *Kapila*, (27) *Narajivakumāra*, (28) *Siddhisārakumāra*, (29) *Kusarāja*, (30) *Jetṭhakumāra*, (31) *Duttharājakumāra*, (32) *Vatṭakarāja*, (33) *Nārada*, (34) *Mahāsutasōma*, (35) *Mahābalarāja*, (36) *Brahmaghosarāja*, (37) *Sādirāja*, (38) *Siridharasetṭhi*, (39) *Mātuposaka* or *Ajitarāja*, (40) *Vimalarāja*, (41) *Arindumarāja*, (42) *Viriyapaṇḍita*, (43) *Ādittarāja*, (44) *Surūparāja*, (45) *Suvannabrahmadattarāja*, (46) *Mahāpadumakumāra*, (47) *Sūrasenarāja*, (48) *Siricundamaṇirāja*, (49) *Kapirāja*, (50) *Kukkura*.

60 *Pitakatthamaing*, *op. cit.*, p. 54. No. 369.

61 The collection was rendered into Thai in 25 volumes and can be seen in the National Library.

62 Cf. Henry Deydier, *Introduction à la Connaissance du Laos*, Saigon, 1952, p. 29.

63 P.V. Bapat's article on Laos in *2500 Years of Buddhism*, *op. cit.*, p. 432.

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THE INTERMEDIATE-STATE DISPUTE IN BUDDHISM

The possibility of life after death has always fascinated mankind. India was no exception, even with its metaphysical setting of rebirth theory. Then, with the belief in the extraordinary powers of yogins to delve into nature's secrets it was held that some individuals could communicate what really happened after death. As when the Buddha used a divine eye (*divya-cakṣus*) to observe the sentient beings going from here to various destinies good and bad, and later told his disciples about it.

But is there life between death and rebirth? It is well known that the theory of such an intermediate state (*antarā-bhava*) was a disputed point among the early Buddhist sects. The ones agreeing that there is such a state were the Pūrvaśāila, Sammatīya, Sarvāstivādin, Vātsīputrīya, and the Later Mahīśāsaka. The Buddhist sects that rejected the notion were the Theravādin, Vibhajyavādin, Mahāsāṅghika, Mahīśāsaka, as well as the work *Śāriputrābhīdharmasāstra* (of the Dharmaguptaka sect, which issued from the Mahīśāsaka).¹

In the Mahāyāna period Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa*, Chapter III, and self-commentary, amassed strong scriptural evidence in support of the intermediate-state theory.²

At the outset it should be admitted that the material is abundant on the side of the sects which admitted the intermediate state in this sense, since it allowed a great scope for mythological elaboration. In contrast, the sects which rejected this kind of intermediate state apparently did not make much of a negative position, so their immediate textual contributions to the problem are meagre and their reasoning has mostly to be inferred. It is possible that the Buddhist sects did not always understand the expression 'intermediate state' the same way, and so in some cases there is only a seeming disagreement.

Our considerations promise to relate early Buddhism to certain Brahmanical teachings, to clarify the position of the Buddhist teacher Nāgārjuna, and also to tie in this intermediate-state dispute with Buddhist embryology theory.

1. THE THESIS OF NO INTERMEDIATE STATE

The Theravāda rejection of the intermediate state is set forth in *Points of Controversy*,³ but the space is devoted to rejecting some arguments for the

intermediate state without giving in its stead a coherent alternate position. This is not to deny the relevance of criticism that only three realms are stated in the scriptures, that of desire (*kāma*), of form (*rūpa*), and the formless realm. Perhaps this criticism forced the opponents of the intermediate-state theory — as this paper will show — to treat this state in terms of the three realms. Also, the Theravāda attempted to interpret the scriptural name *antarāparinirvāyin* as “attaining Nirvāṇa before half of his life in a Brahma world has expired.”⁴ Vasubandhu argues against this, charging that one could then reinterpret the other ones among the five Anāgāmins.⁵

How then, does one of the early sects express its denial of an intermediate state in a positive way? I appeal to the Mahāsāṅghikas, having shown elsewhere that the *Śrīmālā-sūtra* was a product of this school,⁶ and it may be cited in this connection even though it belongs among the early Mahāyāna scriptures:

Lord, as to ‘cyclical flow’ (*samsāra*), no sooner do the sense organs for perception pass away than it (the Tathāgatagarbha) takes hold of sense organs for perception, and that is ‘cyclical flow’.⁷

Presumably all the Buddhist sects — the Theravādin, etc. — that posited centers of consciousness other than the *mano-vijñāna* and also denied the intermediate state, would have some analogous theoretical statement in terms of the sense organs.

Of such sects, the Theravādin have a *bhavaṅga-viññāna*, the Vibhajyavādin a *bhavāṅga-vijñāna*, the Mahāsāṅghika a *mūla-vijñāna*, the Mahīśāsaka a *samsārakoṭiṇiṣṭha-skandha* — the forerunner of the *ālayavijñāna* of the Mahāyāna⁸ — and the Dharmaguptaka as an offshoot of the Mahīśāsaka inferentially the equivalent.

Passing to the Mahāyāna period in its philosophical sense, three reasons may be advanced for believing that Nāgārjuna did not subscribe to the thesis of an intermediate state (*antarā-bhava*).

(1) He writes in the *Pratītyasamutpādaḥṛdaya-vyākaraṇa*:⁹

Just as in the case of a flame from a flame, the reflected image in a mirror from a face, an impression from a seal, a fire from a burning crystal, a sprout from a seed ... a person is not taught to understand that the one is different from the other, so also in the case of reconnection (*pratisamḍhi*) of the personality aggregates (*skandha*), the wise person will understand that there is no transfer.

Since the old *skandhas* do not transfer, there is no intermediate state for them, just as there is no intermediate state between the two flames in the case of a flame from a flame.

(2) He writes in the *Madhyamaka-kārikā* (XXVI, 20):

What be the limit of *nirvāṇa* is also the limit of *saṃsāra*. There is nothing, however slight, intermediate (*antara*) between the two.

This shows an aversion for intermediate states.

(3) He does not refer to an intermediate state in his *Friendly Epistle*.¹⁰ although his description of the hells, and so on, in this work allows him a context to bring in an intermediate state if this were his sectarian position; and this is the context in which those who espouse the intermediate state do in fact mention it.

Then what can we decide from this about Nāgārjuna's school? Now, the Mādhyamika school based on Nāgārjuna always maintains that of the *viññānas*, besides the five based on outer senses, he accepted only the *mano-viññāna*. We arrive then at the striking conclusion that while Nāgārjuna appears to be in the camp of those rejecting an intermediate state, he cannot be identified with any one of the known sects which reject it. But since Nāgārjuna is an independent thinker of the early Mahāyāna, there is no reason to insist that he be identified with any early sect.

Perhaps the most important doctrinal effect of the opposition to an intermediate state is the interpretation of the first two members of Dependent Origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*) as pertaining to the previous life. This interpretation is deeply impressed on the Abhidharma literature, both in the Pāli and Sanskrit languages.¹¹ Of course, birth was standardized in terms of *viññāna*, third member of Dependent Origination. Therefore, the first two members, nescience (*avidyā*) and motivations (*saṃskāra*) would perforce constitute an intermediate state, after No. 12, old age and death (*jarā-maraṇa*), unless the first two members could somehow be understood to not follow upon death. A solution was to say that those two belong to the previous cycle. We can see this same theory in the Dependent Origination verses of the Mahāyāna biography of the Buddha called the *Lalitavistara*, containing this verse:¹²

By the wrong procedure engendered by the constructions of imagination, nescience (*avidyā*) arises and there is no originator of it at all. It provides the cause of motivations (*saṃskāra*), and there is no transfer. Perception (*viññāna*) arises with transference in dependence [on motivations].

This is consistent with Nāgārjuna's statement cited above (from his *pratītya-samutpāda* commentary), because *viññāna*, not the previous nescience and motivations, now starts the transference by descending into the womb, or other birthplace. Here *viññāna* depends on the old *saṃskāra* just as the face in the mirror depends upon the model face. Thus the *Lalitavistara* agrees with the theory found in Pāli Buddhism that the first two members of

Dependent Origination pertain to the previous life. Hence they are said to be reflected in the new series, started by *vijñāna*, the seed.

But if the first two members of Dependent Origination are attributed to the previous cycle, the question arises: Where? A kind of answer is suggested by the *Pitāputrasamāgama-sūtra*:¹³

So, great King, a 'first perception' (*prathamavijñāna*) arises having two conditions pertaining to 'birth' (*aupapatti*) – by reason of the 'last perception' (*caramavijñāna*) as predominant condition (*adhipati-pratyaya*) and by reason of *karma* as support condition (*ārambana-pratyaya*).

In fact – as I have shown in a different context¹⁴ – this passage takes 'death' to be divided into two phases – expiration as the last perception and death vision as the *karma*. The *karma* is called in Chinese and Tibetan Buddhist mythology the '*karma*-mirror' of Yama's judgment hall.¹⁵ It is well accepted in the theory of Dependent Origination, in the case where the first two members pertain to the previous life, that member No. 2, *saṃskāra*, is the old *karma*, and furthermore that member No. 1, *avidyā*, is the state of previous defilement (*kleśa*). Hence *avidyā* in this context is tantamount to the 'last perception' (*caramavijñāna*); and perhaps it is for this reason that Vasubandhu compares this *avidyā* with a king who, when he comes, is accompanied by his courtiers (the host of defilements).¹⁶ Then member No. 3, *vijñāna*, becomes the 'first perception' (*prathamavijñāna*) in the new life.

There is a remarkable foreshadowing of this death-fertility – death as the instigator of another life – in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (I,2,2): "There was nothing whatsoever here in the beginning. By death indeed was this covered, or by hunger, for hunger is death. He created the mind, thinking, 'Let me have a self'. Then he moved about, worshipping. From this, thus worshipping, water was produced." Observe how neatly this fits the first four members of Buddhist Dependent Origination in the interpretation denying an intermediate state:

Bṛhadāraṇyaka statement

"by death indeed was this covered"
 "or by hunger, for hunger is death"
 "He created the mind, thinking, 'Let me have a self' "
 "Then he moved about, worshipping. From him, thus worshipping, water was produced"

Dependent Origination

1. nescience (*avidyā*)
2. motivations (*saṃskāra*)
3. perception (*vijñāna*)
4. name-and-form (*nāma-rūpa*)
 (= *vijñāna* in the womb)

In short, the Buddhist sects that deny an intermediate state are consistent with the tradition, pre-dating Buddhism, that life comes from death.

II. THE THESIS OF AN INTERMEDIATE STATE

There must have been fierce argument on the subject to have called forth from Vasubandhu his spirited defence of the intermediate state. He says (*Abhidharmakośa* III, 12, commentary):

/ asaty antarābhave katham antarāparinirvāyī nāma syāt / Were there no intermediate state, how could there be the term [found in the scriptures] 'a being who has *parinirvāṇa* in the intermediate state'?

This is part of the teaching that among the five kinds of non-returnees (*anāgāmin*), there is the *antarā-parinirvāyin* who, according to the interpretation which Vasubandhu follows, reaches Nirvāṇa in the intermediate state. He refers to the *Satpuruṣagati-sūtra* for varieties of the *antarā-parinirvāyin* (*infra.*).

Vasubandhu explains the intermediate-state being in two verses (*ibid.*, III, 13-14):

It [the intermediate-state being] has the configuration of what is to be the configuration of the future being, since it has the same forecasting; to wit, which is subsequent to the moment of birth and prior to death (i.e. the future being has the period of moment right after birth to moment just before death).

It is seen by the pure divine eye belonging to beings of its class. It has the force of magical power of act. Its sense organs are perfect. It cannot be impeded or turned back. It feeds on odours (*gandhabhuk*).

Vasubandhu's commentary refers to a *Saptabhavasūtra*¹⁷ for the teaching that the five destinies, men, gods, animals, hungry ghosts, and hell beings, have their cause (*saṁhetuka*), namely the *karma-bhava*, and have their access (*sagamana*), namely the *antarā-bhava*. His commentary explains the term *gandhabhuk* as *gandharva*. He refers to the *Āśvalāyana-sūtra* (presumably from the *Madhyamāgama*) for the reference to the word *gandharva* as some kind of being, to wit (as Miss I.B. Horner translates from the equivalent Pāli scripture, the *Assalāyanasutta* in the *Majjhima-nikāya*): "But do you, sirs, know whether that *gandhabba* is a noble or brahman or worker or merchant?" And this question was preceded by the remark (her translation): "We do know, sir, how there is conception. There is here a coitus of the parents, it is the mother's season and the *gandhabba* is present; it is on the conjunction of these three things that there is conception."¹⁸

In the Vedic period the *gandharva* is a kind of spirit generally placed in the *antarikṣa* (the intermediate space between earth and sky) along with the Pitaras (ancestors) and Asuras (demi-gods).¹⁹ The intermediate space can be understood as having Indra in the daytime and the Gandharva at nighttime for chief or typical deities.²⁰ Besides being a musician, the *gandharva* in the

Veda could be a cloud,²¹ and this meaning was continued into Mahāyāna Buddhism as a simile of illusion (*māyā*), the often mentioned “city of *gandharvas*”, meaning the “castle in the air”, a particular atmospheric phenomenon.²² Even this use of the word continues the association with the mid-space. According to Vedic conceptions²³ the *gandharva* was the second of the three non-human deities that married a woman before she married a human male (= one born of woman), the first being Soma (= Candra) in the sky, and the third being Agni (= Yama) on earth.²⁴ The *gandharva*, in these old Indian ideas, gave the woman her sweetness of voice. Of course, the Vedas did not contain the notion of *gandharva* as a disincarnate entity headed for rebirth; indeed, the rebirth theory has never been traced to the four Vedas.

However, since the theory of *karma* and rebirth has a sympathetic treatment in certain old Upaniṣads, the question arises as to whether the *gandharva* is mentioned therein along the lines of the *Assaṭāyanasutta*. Such a mention may be intended, although obscurely, in the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, which presumably is to be dated at about the same time as that old Buddhist scripture. The *Kaṭha* states (II, 3, 5):

As one sees in a mirror, so (Brahman) in the *ātman*;
 As (one sees) in a dream, so (Brahman) in the world of the forefathers (*Pitrloka*);
 As (one sees) toward (*pari*) the water, so in the world of the *gandharvas*;
 As in light and shade, so in the world of Brahmā.

If we interpret this passage of the *Kaṭha* as a progression, as Radhakrishnan thinks it is,²⁵ then the similes can be clarified as follows:

<i>simile</i>	<i>referent</i>	<i>progression</i>
“as in a mirror”	Brahman in the <i>ātman</i>	present life
“as in a dream”	Brahman in the world of the forefathers	state after death
“as toward the water”	Brahman in the world of <i>gandharvas</i>	heading for rebirth
“as in light and shade”	Brahman in the world of Brahmā	<i>vijñāna</i> in the heart ²⁶

Since “toward the water” (*apsu pari*) implies “toward the female”, it follows that the “world of *gandharvas*” may reasonably be identified with the *gandharvas* that are meant by the *Assaṭāyanasutta*.

Taking these *gandharvas* in the meaning of intermediate state beings, we notice that a Mahāyāna Buddhist scripture, the *Ārya-Ānanda-garbhāvakraṇ-tinirdeśa* classifies them so as to be within the Buddhist three worlds. It explains that beings headed for an evil destiny have in the intermediate state

a displeasing colour of personality aggregates, namely hell beings have a colour like the burnt stump of a tree; animals, like smoke; hungry ghosts, like water; and that beings headed for a good destiny have a pleasing colour in the intermediate state, namely, men and gods (in the realm of desire), like the colour of gold; gods in the realm of form, the colour of abiding white; while gods in the formless realm are colourless for the very reason that the realm is formless (and therefore lacks both colour and shape).²⁷ This is presumably what Vasubandhu means by saying the being has the configuration of the future being, as one of the five destinies.

Asaṅga, who belongs to the later Mahīśāsaka²⁸ and so accepts the intermediate state, speaks along the lines of that Mahāyāna scripture in his *Bodhisattvabhūmi* when he says that the *antarābhava* is of two kinds, the kind invested with darkness (*tamaḥ-parāyana*) like pitch-black nights, said to have a bad colour (*durvarṇa*); and the kind invested with light (*jyotiḥ-parāyana*) like nights that are lighted, said to have a good colour (*suvarṇa*).²⁹ The kind of a bad colour leads to a bad destiny; and the kind of a good colour leads to a good destiny.

Asaṅga also explains:³⁰

Besides, there is its synonymous terminology. The term “intermediate state” is used because it manifests in the interval between the death-state and the birth-state. The term *gandharva* is used because it has access (*gamana*) by way of odour and has growth (*puṣṭi*) by way of odour. The term “made of mind” (*manomaya*) is used because the mind, taking recourse to itself, proceeds to the birthplace, but not because its going to a body is going with an object-support (*ālambana*). The ‘resultant’ (*abhinirvṛtti*) is used because it is productive in the direction of birth.

The *Abhidharmakośa* (III, 40c-41a) adds a further name “seeking birth” (*saṃbhavaiṣin*), which Asaṅga apparently includes in “made of mind”, according to his explanation.³¹ The denial of an object-support seems inconsistent with the explanation for the name *gandharva*.³² So the proponents of the “intermediate state” also have here a problem that does not appear to be resolved.³³ Anyway, the *gandharva* has perfect sense organs, as Vasubandhu has already cited.

Besides there are the periods by weeks, found both in the intermediate-state theory and in the theory of intra-uterine development which could therefore be labelled the “lunar route.” Thus, Asaṅga states:³⁴

Also, the intermediate state lasts for seven days. But when there is not the condition for rebirth, and when there is the condition for rebirth – is an uncertain matter. And when this [condition] is not attained, then it lasts from seven days to seven times seven days after one has died, while the condition of rebirth is not being attained. When that period has elapsed certainly one attains the condition of rebirth. Sometimes in that very place there is the ‘resultant’ (*abhinirvṛtti*) of the one passed away since seven

days. Sometimes, in the case of one with bad fortune (or: who is unlucky) (a 'resultant') elsewhere, for if another activity of the *karma* should change the course, it would cause that seed of *antarābhava* to change course.

Presumably what Asaṅga means by the "bad fortune" is that the *gandharva* has contributed to the conception in the womb, and then has gone away.

In the case of the intra-uterine development, there are the two *garbhāva-krānti* scriptures in both Tibetan and Chinese of the Ratnakūṭa collection. The smaller of these, the *Ārya-āyusmannandagarbhāvakrāntinirdeśa*, was translated from Chinese into German by Huebotter.³⁵ Both of these texts have the teaching that parturition occurs upon 38 weeks.³⁶ Interestingly, this total of 266 days happens to be exactly the number stated by a modern biological work to be the full term of pregnancy.³⁷

As the Mahāyāna developed into tantric Buddhism, there was much made of the intermediate state, with different kinds of *bardo*, as it is now frequently referred to by the Tibetan equivalent (abbreviated) of the word *antarābhava*. My studies in this literature showed me one usage of the term "intermediate state" practically equivalent to the ten lunar months of intra-uterine development.³⁸ Even the *Points of Controversy* would not have objected to the "intermediate state" if the opponent had said that this is what it is. Indeed, Asaṅga's statement of the periods of seven-day multiples suggests a coordination of this "intermediate state" with the early development of the embryo.

However, the early proponents of the "intermediate state" doctrine necessarily understood this in some way that put them at variance with, and made them opponents of, those who reject the intermediate state. Just as there are doctrinal implications in the case of those who reject the intermediate state, so there are such implications for those who accept it. Perhaps it is in the light of the intermediate-state position that Asaṅga has an alternate way of grouping the members of Dependent Origination, as found in Sanskrit in his *Abhidharma-samuccaya*.³⁹

How are the members grouped — [Into] the groups [called] members which cast downward, members which are cast downward, productive members, and resultant members. What are the members which cast downward? They are nescience, motivations, and perception. What are the members which are cast downward? They are name-and-form, six sense bases, contact, and feelings. What are the productive members? They are craving, indulgence, and gestation. What are the resultant members? They are birth, and old age and death.

Since Asaṅga does not classify the first two members as "past life", it is not possible to make the kind of correlation that was done previously in association with the *Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*. One may conclude that the first

three members — those which cast downward — are the intermediate state, although admittedly I have not found Asaṅga stating this explicitly.

Moreover, when speaking of the species (*gotra*) of the religious family, Asaṅga raises the question as to whether it belongs to a single or multiple lineage, and answers in part, “That seed does not have the characteristics of difference as long as it stays apart from the six sense bases (*ṣaḍāyatana*).”⁴⁰ This remark immediately contrasts with the position previously cited from the *Śrīmālā-sūtra*. When Asaṅga allows a possibility of the ‘species’ staying apart from the six sense bases, he assumes an intermediate state between the prior set of six sense bases and the later set of six sense bases. Perhaps Asaṅga must take this position because of his emphasis on yoga training, with its premise that one may detach himself from the senses. But usually such detachment would be from the five outer senses, and Asaṅga allows such detachment also from the sixth sense, the *manas*.

Turning now to the three kinds of *antarāparinirvāyin* in the theory of five kinds of *anāgāmin*, long ago Louis de La Vallée Poussin made a comparison of the Sanskrit version from the *Satpuruṣagati-sūtra* cited by Yaśomitra in his *Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā*, with the Pāli version in the *Āṅguttara-nikāya*, vii, 52.⁴¹ For the purpose of the present article, I have edited from the Bihar MS of Asaṅga’s *Srāvakabhūmi* his statement about three kinds, which I thereafter translate:⁴²

• / antarā-parinirvāyī pudgalaḥ katamaḥ / antarā-parinirvāyīṇaḥ pudgalās trayāḥ /

/ ekāntarā-parinirvāyī pudgalaḥ cyutamātra evāntarābhavābhinirvartikāle antarābhavam abhinirvartayaty abhinirvartate samakālam eva parinirvāti / tadyathā parīttāḥ śakalikāgnir utpannaiva parinirvāti /

/ dvītiyo ’ntarā-parinirvāyī pudgalaḥ antarābhavam abhinirvartayaty abhinirvartate antarābhave tatrastha eva kālāntareṇa parinirvāti / no tu yeno-papattibhavas tenādyāpy upanato bhavati / tadyathāyogudānām vā ayaḥsthālānām vā dīptāgnisamprataptānām ayoghanair *unmathitānām⁴³ ayaḥprapāṭikā utpataty eva parinirvāti /

/ tṛtiyo ’ntarā-parinirvāyī pudgalaḥ antarābhavam abhinirvartya yenopapattibhavas tenopanamati / upanataś ca punar anupapanna eva parinirvāti / tadyathā / ayaḥprapāṭikā utpadya prthivyām apatitā eva parinirvāti / ta ime trayo ’ntarā-parinirvāyīṇaḥ pudgalā ekadhyam abhisamkṣipyā antarā-parinirvāyī pudgala ity ucyate /

What is the person who attains *parinirvāṇa* in the intermediate state? There are three persons who attain *parinirvāṇa* in the intermediate state.

The first person who attains *parinirvāṇa* in the intermediate state is made to fulfill the intermediate state no sooner has he died, at the time of accomplishing the intermediate state. He accomplishes it at exactly the same time and attains *parinirvāṇa*. For example, a tiny flame of hay arises and immediately disappears.

The second person who attains *parinirvāṇa* in the intermediate state is made to accomplish the intermediate state and accomplishes it, just staying staying there in the intermediate state and in the intervening time attains *parinirvāṇa*, but where be the state of rebirth (*upapattibhava*) does not just now head toward that place. For example, just as when iron balls or iron plates are made burning hot by being violently struck with iron hammers, and the mass of sparks from the irons just ascends and disappears.

The third person who attains *parinirvāṇa* in the intermediate state when he accomplishes the intermediate state does head to where is the rebirth state; and having headed there, without being reborn, attains *parinirvāṇa*. For example, just as when a mass of sparks from the iron ascends and then when falling not quite reaching the earth, disappears.

When one takes these three *antarā-parinirvāyin* persons together, the expression "person who attains *parinirvāṇa* in the intermediate state" is used.

So this is the theory repeated by Asaṅga and his brother Vasubandhu centuries after the *Points of Controversy* rejected this interpretation of the word *antarāparinirvāyin*. But, upon inspection of the three kinds of *antarāparinirvāyin* as Asaṅga states them, we find it is actually only the second one that has an *antarābhava* not accepted by the opponents of such a state. This is because all the Indian Buddhist sects agreed that there is a death state followed by a rebirth state within the womb (in the case of human birth), and therefore would not deny the *antarābhavas* which coincide with the death and rebirth states. But they would likely ask, "Then why use the expression 'intermediate state' in these cases?"

III. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

My investigation indicates that the old Upaniṣads and the old Buddhist scriptures both present the rival theories of "no intermediate state" and "intermediate state". Perhaps in the Upaniṣads this reflects a contrasting orientation of the 're-death' (per *Brhadāranyaka*) and the 're-birth' (per *Kaṭha*) positions. In the Buddhist sects the difference is partly temperamental, to wit, those rejecting the state preferring to have a rational control of Buddhist doctrine; and those accepting the state willing to allow mytholo-

gical exuberance. Once one accepts the intermediate state, there is no end to the elaboration, as evidenced in the *Tibetan Book of the Dead*.

This research also leads to the curious conclusion that the same ancient Buddhist scriptures can lead to opposing doctrines with partisans equally divided among the old Buddhist sects. This should unsettle the all-too-frequent posture among modern exponents of Buddhism where someone claims that he knows better than others the Dharma of the Buddha. Of course, as far as the intermediate-state dispute is concerned, there is no need to attribute one position over the other to early or 'original' Buddhism.

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NOTES

¹ André Bareau, *Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, Saigon 1955, p. 283.

² L. de La Vallée Poussin, in his translation of Vasubandhu's work, gave the main known references of his day, *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*, troisième chapitre, Paris 1926, p. 32, n.

³ Translation of the *Kathā-vatthu* by S.Z. Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids, London 1915, pp. 212-13.

⁴ *Kathā-vatthu* (tr.), pp. 212-13; and *Designation of Human Types (Puggala-paññati)* (tr. by B.C. Law), London 1922, pp. 24-25.

⁵ de La Vallée Poussin (tr.), III, p. 38. Vasubandhu appears to argue that in such a case, we could say that the *upapadya-parinirvāyin* means one who attains *parinirvāṇa* upon being born in a Brahma world, which is of course absurd. It seems that in his way of disputing, if a term is a member of a standard list, a reinterpretation of such a term has implications for the other members of the list.

⁶ A. Wayman and H. Wayman (trs.), *The Lion's Roar of Queen Śrīmātā; a Buddhist Scripture on the Tathāgatagarbha Theory*, New York 1974, pp. 2-3.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

⁸ Bareau, *Les sectes*, pp. 72, 177, 187, and 240.

⁹ Photo ed. of Tibetan canon (PTT), Vol. 103, p. 271-4: / ji ltar mar me las mar me dan / bzin las me lon gi gzugs brñan 'byun dan / rgya las rgya'i 'bur dan / me sel las me dan / sa bon las myu gu dan / ... / de dag kyan de fid dan de las gzan no zes ses par slob ma yin pa de bzin du / phun po fin mtshams sbyor ba yan / mi 'pho bar yan mkhas rtogs bya / .

¹⁰ 'Nāgārjuna's *Suḥrillekha*' (tr. by H. Wenzel in *Journal of the Pali Text Society*, 1886, pp. 2-32).

¹¹ See, for example, Nārada, *A Manual of Abhidhamma*, Kandy, Ceylon, 1968, Diagram XVII; and de La Vallée Poussin (tr.), III, pp. 62-63.

¹² F. Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Reader*, New Haven 1953, p. 24:

/ saṃkalpakalpajanitena ayoniśena
bhavate avidyā na pi saṃbhavako 'sya kaścit
saṃskārahetu dadate na ca saṃkramo 'sti
vijñānam udbhavati saṃkramaṇam pratītya //

¹³ As cited in Śāntideva's *Śikṣāsamuccaya* (ed. by the Mithila Institute), 135, 12-13.

¹⁴ A. Wayman, 'The Fivefold Ritual Symbolism of Passion', in *Studies of Esoteric Buddhism and Tantrism*, Koyasan, Japan, 1965, p. 133.

- 15 I have included a discussion of this matter in a paper, 'The Mirror as a Pan-Buddhist Metaphor-Simile', *History of Religions*, 13: 4, May 1974, pp. 264-65.
- 16 *Abhidharmakośa*, III, 21a-b: / pūrvakleśadasāvidyā saṃskārāḥ pūrvakarmanāḥ /. And de La Vallée Poussin (tr.), III, p. 63.
- 17 de La Vallée Poussin, II, p. 13, states that the authenticity of this *sūtra* was contested.
- 18 I.B. Horner (tr.), *The Middle Length Sayings*, Vol. II, London 1957, p. 349.
- 19 Cf. A.A. MacDonell, *Vedic Methology*, Strassburg 1897, pp. 136-37.
- 20 At least such are my conclusions in 'Climactic Times in Indian Mythology and Religion', *History of Religions*, 4:2, Winter 1965, p.300.
- 21 R.S. Panchamukhi, *Gandharvas & Kinnaras in Indian Iconography* (Dharwar, 1951), p. 3.
- 22 Cf. Étienne Lamotte, *Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse*, I, Louvain 1944, pp. 369-73.
- 23 The Marriage Hymn, *Rgveda* X, 85, 40.
- 24 My interpretation, 'Climactic Times', pp. 298-99, was written with leanings to the "intermediate state" position, generally accepted in Tibetan Buddhism.
- 25 S. Radhakrishnan, *The Principal Upaniṣads*, New York 1953, p. 643.
- 26 So states Asaṅga in the *Yogācārabhūmi* (Part I, ed. by V. Bhattacharya), University of Calcutta 1957, 24.18-19: / yatra ca kalaladeśe tadvijñānaṃ sammūrcchitaṃ so 'sya bhavati tasmin samaye hṛdayadesaḥ / "At the time that the *vijñāna* becomes unconscious at wherever be the *kalala*, its place is the heart." For the comparable idea in the Pāli commentarial tradition, cf. Y. Karunadasa, *Buddhist Analysis of Matter*, Colombo 1967, pp. 62-66, in a discussion of the term *hadaya-vatthu*. The comparable Upaniṣadic theory is in terms of the *vijñānamaya-puruṣa*.
- 27 In the Tibetan Kanjur, Ratnakūṭa collection, *PTT*, Vol. 23, p. 103-5.
- 28 Cf. A. Wayman, *Analysis of the Śrāvaka-bhūmi Manuscript*, Berkeley 1961, pp.25-29.
- 29 *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, (ed. by Wogihara), II, pp. 390-91.
- 30 *Yogācārabhūmi*, I, 20.9-13: / tasya punaḥ paryāyā antarābhava ity ucyate maraṇabhavotpattibhavayor antarāle prādurbhāvāt / gandharva ity ucyate gandhena gamanād gandhena puṣṭitaś ca / manomaya ity ucyate tannisṛitya manasa upapattyāyatanagamanatayā / śarīragatyā ca punar nālambanagatyā / abhinirvṛttir apy ucyate upapatter ābhimukhyena nirvartanatayā / .
- 31 Cf. *Abhidharmakośa*, (tr.), III, pp. 122-23.
- 32 That is to say, odour is ordinarily taken as the object-support of the sense of smell. Compare MacDonell, *Vedic Mythology*, p. 137: "The RV. adds the touch that Gandharva wears a fragrant (*surabhi*) garment (10, 123⁷), while in the AV. (12,1 2³) the odour (*gandha*) of the earth is said to rise to the Gandharvas."
- 33 One rationalization to avoid the object-support could be that the *gandharva* is 'perfumed' by *vāsanā* (habit-energy), so provides its own odour. On the other hand, it would be natural to rationalize that the odour of sexual union is the odour which rises to the *gandharva*, and this ordinarily would be construed as an object-support (*ālam-bana*).
- 34 *Yogācārabhūmi* I, 20.4-8: / sa punar antarābhavaḥ saptāhaṃ tiṣṭhaty asaty upapattipratyayalābhe / sati punaḥ pratyayalābhe 'niyamaḥ / alābhe punaś cyutvā punaḥ saptāhaṃ tiṣṭhati yāvat sapta saptāhāni tiṣṭhaty upapattipratyayam alabhamānaḥ / tata ūrdhvaṃ avaśyam upapattipratyayam labhate / tasya ca saptāhacyutasya kadācit tatraivābhinirvṛttir bhavati / kadācid anyatra visabhāge / sācet karmāntarakriyā parivarteta tad antarābhavabījaṃ parivartayati //
- 35 Dr. Med. et Dr. Phil. Huebotter (tr.), *Die Sutra über Empfängnis und Embryologie* (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Natur- u. Völkerkunde Ostasiens), Tokyo 1932.
- 36 Huebotter, p. 21; Tibetan for the same text, *PTT*, Vol. 23, p. 99-3; and Tibetan for the larger text, the *Ārya-Ānanda-garbhāvākraṇṭi-nirdeśa*, *PTT*, Vol. 23, p. 107-4. But,

according to P.V. Bapat, *Vimuttimaggā and Visuddhimaggā*, Poona 1937, p. 129, the *Vimuttimaggā* gives 42 weeks for the same development.

37 Martin and Vincent, *Human Biological Development*, The Ronald Press Company, New York, 1960.

38 Wayman, 'The Fivefold Ritual Symbolism of Passion', p. 130.

39 P. Pradhan (ed.), *Abhidharma-samuccaya*, 26.20ff.

40 Wayman, *Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi Manuscript*, p. 59.

41 'Pali and Sanskrit', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1906, pp. 346-51.

42 This is the manuscript utilized in the work of n. 28 above. The present excerpt is not included in that work. The Tibetan equivalent is found in the Tibetan Tanjur, *PTT*, Vol. 110, p. 69-3ff.

43 Part of this word was covered by a tack used when R. Sankrityayana photographed the manuscript in Tibet.

